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ABSTRACT
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the debate surrounding Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the question of whether Britain should join dominated the political 
agenda. Public opinion was characterised by widespread opposition to closer 
integration with Europe. This thesis investigates the social psychological processes 
underlying the dynamics of public attitudes towards the euro during this period. It 
focuses on three factors, shown in previous research to be particularly useful in 
explaining variation in support for EMU: the nature of information about the issue 
circulated by the media, variation in public involvement in the issue and the strength of 
people’s attachment to British national identity.
The empirical studies undertaken draw on a number of theoretical approaches but two in 
particular play a central part in the thesis: the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of 
persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) and Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1987). 
Together, they provide a social psychological framework for understanding the role of 
information, involvement and identity in attitude formation and change.
Four empirical studies were undertaken. The first two focus on the media. Study A 
looks at how much press coverage of the single currency issue the public was exposed 
to over the course of the debate. Study B looks at the content of this coverage, 
particularly in relation to forms of persuasive argument employed by press outlets of 
differing political outlooks. The next two studies focus on the role of involvement and 
identity in persuasion. Study C is an analysis of data from a public opinion field 
experiment -  a Deliberative Poll -  and study D reports an experiment especially 
designed to test the postulates of the ELM in relation to public attitudes towards the 
euro. The final chapter contains a summary of the thesis, some conclusions and a 
discussion of some of the emerging issues.
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FOREWORD
Historical and political context of the research
British political ambivalence towards integration in Europe can be traced as far back as 
the 1950s, when the decision was taken not to participate in the European Coal and 
Steel Community (a core group of six European nations formed in 1951), to concentrate 
instead on its close ties with the Commonwealth and the USA. Later, when talks began 
to discuss the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), culminating in the 
1957 Treaty of Rome, British politicians remained sceptical because of concerns that 
membership of the EEC would have a negative impact on trade links outside of Europe. 
As the UK began to trade more and more with the EEC and as the Community grew 
stronger economically, however, the arguments for participating became more 
compelling. Britain finally joined in 1973, following two failed applications during the 
1960s vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle (partly out of concerns that 
Britain’s relationship with the US would compromise its commitment to its European 
partners). However, politicians were divided as to whether the decision to join had been 
appropriate for the UK. Because Britain had not been involved from the outset, it had 
not been able to influence the decisions that shaped the institutions of the European 
Community (EC), and so some were not well suited to the British economy. As a 
result, a number of concessions had to be made when Britain joined, which negatively 
impacted on trading links with the Commonwealth. There was also widespread 
reluctance to pursue even closer integration, which many saw as a step closer to 
political union and ultimately, towards the establishment of a federal Europe. For this 
reason, the Labour government took the decision to hold a referendum on whether 
Britain should stay in the EEC or not.
The vote was held in 1975 and despite widespread opposition towards continued British 
membership of the EEC (with 55% of those expressing an opinion in pre-referendum 
polls claiming they would vote against staying in the Common Market), the ‘Yes’ camp 
succeeded in achieving a swing in public opinion of 22%, resulting in 67% voting in 
favour of staying in to 33% voting against (Worcester, 2000). But Britain’s relations 
with its EEC partners remained problematic because of the Government’s continued 
disinclination to support further political and economic developments within the
13
Community. Throughout the next decade, the Conservative Prime Minister Thatcher, 
became increasingly hostile towards EC projects aimed at creating stronger political 
links within Europe. In particular, Thatcher vehemently opposed European 
Commission President Jacques Delors’ plans for European-wide social rights and only 
with reluctance consented to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1990, which 
had been established in 1978 with the purpose of achieving currency stability across the 
continent, in order to lay the foundations for a union of European currencies.
In 1987, despite her disinclination to support closer integration, Thatcher signed the 
Single European Act -  a treaty which promoted the improvement of living and working 
conditions for European citizens and laid down a timetable for achieving a full internal 
market by January 1993. These plans were later consolidated in the Treaty on European 
Union, which was the outcome of negotiations that took place at a summit in Maastricht 
in 1991. The Maastricht Treaty introduced new forms of co-operation between 
European governments on issues such as defence and justice, adding a concrete political 
dimension to integration for the first time. In addition, the treaty committed EC nations 
to the decision to establish Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It provided a clear 
timetable for the unification process and laid down the criteria for entry into its final 
stage, the single European currency.
British politicians continued to view the European project with suspicion and resistance 
grew at both the political and popular level. Prime Minister John Major, who unlike his 
predecessor had been keen to put Britain at the heart of Europe, was held back by the 
divided attitudes to European integration held by his party. Many Conservatives feared 
that integration would result in a loss of British sovereignty and the centralisation of 
power in Brussels. Many, like Thatcher herself had been, were suspicious of the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (especially those in the Social Chapter) and even 
supporters of the single currency had concerns that the proposed timetable and criteria 
for achieving the convergence of the European Union (EU) economies were unrealistic 
and over-ambitious. In addition, concerns about EMU were partially vindicated when it 
became clear that Britain had joined the ERM at an exchange rate against the 
Deutschmark that was too high to sustain. In September 1992, as a result of excessively 
destabilising currency speculation on the pound, Britain was forced to withdraw, an 
event which fuelled political, media and public opposition towards integration and in 
particular towards the single currency. Major struggled to get the treaty ratified by
14
Parliament, despite achieving opt-outs for Britain over the single currency and the social 
chapter and over the course of his leadership he was unable to unite the Conservative 
Party on the issue of Europe.
By the time the New Labour government came to power in 1997, plans for the 
introduction of the single European currency -  the ‘euro’ -  were well advanced. The 
decision about which EU Member States had achieved the necessary economic 
convergence to qualify for inclusion in EMU was made in Spring 1998, and the 
exchange rates at which countries would join the single currency were fixed. Eleven 
qualifying countries signed up to the new currency (later joined by a twelfth -  Greece -  
in June 2000), while the remaining EU member states at that time -  Denmark, Sweden 
and the UK -  opted out of participation at the first wave. The euro was launched as an 
electronic currency for use by banks and foreign exchange dealers in January 1999, and
in 2002, euro notes and coins went into circulation.
<
Unlike its predecessor, the new Labour leadership was broadly united on the issue of 
EMU, committed in principle to joining the euro, but only if a) the economic case for 
doing so could be established as ‘clear and unambiguous’ and b) the public voted in 
favour of British membership in a referendum. This position was outlined in a 
statement to the House of Commons by the Chancellor Gordon Brown in October 1997, 
which was later published as the ‘National Changeover Plan’ (HM Treasury, 1997). 
The plan detailed the criteria by which the suitability of the single currency for the 
British economy could be assessed. Five ‘economic tests’ were proposed, aimed at 
establishing the relative costs and benefits of EMU membership for the British 
economic interest. Broadly, they concerned: 1) the compatibility of business cycles and 
economic structures, and the suitability of shared interest rates; 2) whether the British 
economy was sufficiently flexible to cope with any problems that may arise; 3) whether 
joining EMU would encourage investment in Britain by foreign firms; 4) the impact of 
joining on the UK’s financial services industry; and 5) the impact of joining on 
employment (HM Treasury, 2003). Only on meeting the economic tests, would the 
Government make the recommendation for Britain to join the single currency and agree 
to hold the referendum.
Public opinion on whether Britain should join the euro came to dominate the political 
and media debate surrounding EMU in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the time
15
when the proposal to the ESRC for the research undertaken in this thesis was written (in 
1999), it was widely believed that a euro referendum was inevitable, indeed imminent, 
and certainly likely to take place during the lifetime of the grant. In the end, however, 
the promised vote did not materialise. Widely referred to as the ‘sixth test’, the status of 
public attitudes towards Europe and the euro were viewed as the linchpin in the decision 
over not only whether to join, but also when the referendum itself would be held. 
However, similar votes held in Denmark in September 2000 and in Sweden in 
September 2003, resulted in majorities voting against joining (53% and 56% 
respectively), leaving the British government reluctant to hold a referendum until high 
levels of public opposition in Britain showed signs of abating. The first assessment of 
the economic tests was announced in June 2003 and the decision was that 4 out of 5 of 
the tests had not been satisfactorily met (though clear advantages for the UK’s financial 
services sector were evident). No case for UK membership could be made unless 
economic flexibility and convergence could be achieved (which would also help satisfy 
the remaining two tests concerning the impact of the euro on British jobs and the issue 
of foreign investment); and no case for membership could be made while public support 
was apparently so weak.
Overview of thesis
This thesis is about public attitudes towards European integration and specifically, about 
attitudes towards the introduction of the euro during the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
Labour government’s commitment to decide whether Britain should join the euro by 
means of a referendum placed public opinion at the forefront of political and popular 
debate about the issue. The strength and direction of public attitudes would decide not 
only the future of Britain’s economic and political relationship with Europe, but perhaps 
more importantly, would also determine when the conditions and timing were 
appropriate to hold such a vote. Understanding the nature of British public attitudes 
towards Europe and their determinants were matters of both academic and political 
interest.
British public opinion surrounding European integration held wider interest during this 
period because of the extent to which it deviated from the views held by citizens of 
other EU countries. Since the 1975 referendum on the EEC, public support for closer
16
integration in Europe remained consistently low, lower than almost anywhere else in the 
EU. In fact, in ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys carried out on behalf of the European 
Commission, British citizens not only exhibited the lowest levels of support for 
integration compared with other EU countries, but also showed they were the least well 
informed about EU-level politics and that they were the least likely to identify 
themselves as Europeans. The research conducted here was designed to explore the 
relationship between these findings.
Studies of public opinion towards European integration have been carried out across a 
range of disciplines within the social sciences, including political science, media and 
communications research and psychology. This research has mainly been descriptive in 
nature, taking as its starting point data from opinion polls and comparative surveys to 
develop and test theories about the causes of widespread British opposition to closer 
integration in Europe. The opportunities for analysis presented by such data are 
appealing, but the findings sometimes present an image of public attitudes as being 
relatively static and unchanging. Public opinion data is often analysed and interpreted 
as such, while the question of how attitudes are formed and changed, how they are 
expressed and the reliability and validity of their measurements tend to be neglected. 
This thesis adopts a social psychological approach to understanding public opinion, 
which is based on theories of attitude change. As such, the underlying assumption of 
the research undertaken is that attitudes can be relatively labile; their expression 
vulnerable to contextual influences. I argue that in order to understand the nature of 
public attitudes towards EMU, it is necessary to examine the psychological processes by 
which attitudes are formed and changed and the factors that influence those processes. 
This background to the thesis is presented in chapter 1.
In particular, I explore three factors that have been shown to be important to 
understanding variation in public support for European integration: (1) the nature of 
information about Europe disseminated by the British media, (2) people’s involvement 
in the political and economic issues involved in EMU (i.e. how much they know about 
the issues and how interested they are in them), and (3) their sense of British national 
identity. In order to examine how these three factors influence public opinion, I turn to 
social psychological theories of persuasion, which provide a basis for understanding 
how people’s attitudes are formed and changed. Specifically, I adopt the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986) as the overarching framework for
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the thesis, because it provides a theoretical account of attitude change in response to 
information, at varying levels of issue involvement. To understand the role played by 
national identity, I turn to the social identity paradigm (e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 
Hogg and Abrams, 1988), and in particular, self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985; 
1987), which helps to explain how people’s attachment to their national identity can 
influence their attitudes and the way in which they respond to information relevant to 
the debate surrounding EMU. Together these approaches provide a model for 
understanding public attitudes towards the euro that integrates the different roles played 
by information, identity and involvement. In chapter 2, I present an overview of the 
theory behind the thesis, describing in detail the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 
and some of the controversies surrounding it -  including the way in which it treats the 
role played by social identities in persuasion. In this context, I introduce the social 
identity approach.
The empirical content of the thesis consists of four separate studies, which are 
introduced in chapter 3. In the first two studies (A and B), I consider the nature of 
information disseminated by the British media. In study A (chapter 4), I focus on the 
amount of coverage given to the EMU issue by newspapers during the 1990s and its 
relationship to public concerns about European integration during this period. In study 
B (chapter 5), I examine the content of that coverage, in an analysis of the different 
arguments about the euro circulated by the pro- and anti-European press at the time of 
key events that marked the course of the debate. In the following two studies, I test 
predictions derived from the theoretical approaches adopted in the thesis using data 
from two pieces of research. In study C (chapter 6), the data came from a public 
opinion field experiment -  a deliberative poll on Europe that was carried out by the 
UK’s National Centre for Social Research in 1995. I present a secondary analysis of the 
data, in which I test hypotheses based on the tenets of the ELM concerning the effect of 
information on attitudes at varying levels of issue involvement. In study D (chapters 7 
and 8), I collected my own data in an ELM-style experiment, in which I investigate the 
effect of information, involvement and identity on attitudes and the psychological 
processes by which attitudes are formed and changed. The results of these empirical 
studies are discussed in chapter 9, in which I draw conclusions about the nature of 
public attitudes towards EMU and the robustness of the theoretical approach used to 
investigate them in this thesis.
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1 UNDERSTANDING VARIATION IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I provide an introduction to the substantive focus of the thesis. I start by 
discussing what is meant by the terms ‘attitude’ and ‘public opinion’. I present an 
overview of the status of British public opinion towards Europe and the single currency 
up to and during the period of investigation, showing how it compared with public 
opinion across the rest of the European Union at this time. I then review the literature 
relating to three separate fields of inquiry that have sought to explain variation in public 
attitudes towards European integration and which have motivated and informed the 
development of the thesis. Each one concerns the role of a different factor relevant to 
understanding variation in public attitudes towards European integration, and 
specifically, the single currency. In this thesis, I refer to these factors as (1) information 
about Europe circulated by the media, and in particular, information found in 
newspapers; (2) people’s sense of national identity; and (3) public involvement in the 
issues surrounding EMU and their issue-relevant knowledge. The overall aim of the 
thesis is to investigate variations in public attitudes towards the single currency, by 
introducing a social psychological perspective that integrates each of these three factors 
into a single model. The theoretical framework for the thesis is introduced in chapter 2 
and the specific aims and objectives of the empirical work are presented in chapter 3. 
This chapter describes the background to the research undertaken.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Defining attitudes and public opinion
Before considering the status of public opinion about Europe and the euro during the 
period in which the empirical research was carried out, it is important to clarify the 
focus of this thesis by defining what is meant by the terms ‘attitude’ and ‘opinion’. For 
the most part, I use the two terms interchangeably throughout the thesis to refer the 
same thing. However, it is helpful to consider some more formal definitions, to ensure a 
common understanding of these concepts individually.
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The study of attitudes has been a central concern within social psychology for over 80 
years. A variety of definitions have been proposed during this time, but current thinking 
in the field generally agrees on the idea that attitudes are cognitive representations of a 
person’s positive or negative evaluations of different ‘objects’, including physical 
objects, people, behaviours, issues or policies (Wegener and Carlston, 2005; p. 493; 
Bern, 1970; Oskamp, 1977; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). A 
distinction is often made in earlier theories between three components of attitudinal 
responses -  the affective, behavioural and cognitive components (Allport, 1954). The 
thesis developed here is primarily focused on the cognitive component of attitudes, 
though the three are generally viewed as being intrinsically linked with one another.
Attitudes can be regarded as a summary of the variety of beliefs people hold about a 
particular object. Beliefs consist of information a person has about the object that may 
be either fact or opinion and “may have positive, negative or no evaluation implications 
for the target of the information” (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; p.7). Attitudes are 
generally stored in memory, but where they do not already exist, are assumed to be 
constructed at some point (Wegener and Carlston, 2005). Attitudes vary not only in 
terms of their ‘valence’ (how positive or negative they are), but also in terms their 
strength (Krosnick and Petty, 1995) and accessibility in memory (e.g. see Fazio, 1995 
for a review), in terms of the knowledge base that underpins them and their importance 
to the person holding them (Krosnick, 1990). Central concerns of the field of attitudes 
include the different functions attitudes serve (e.g. Katz, 1960; Maio and Olson, 1990), 
the confidence with which they are held (Berger, 1992) and the relationship between 
attitudes and behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). These issues are not included in the 
scope of this thesis. Instead, the focus here is on the question of how attitudes are 
formed and changed and the strength with which they are held.
The reason for using the term ‘public attitudes’ synonymously with the term ‘public 
opinion’ is that the study of public opinion is concerned with “the formation, 
communication and measurement of citizens’ attitudes toward public affairs” (Glynn et 
al., 1999; p. 17). As with research into attitudes, research into public opinion has also 
defined its subject matter in a variety of different ways. The mainstream perspective 
conceptualises public opinion as the aggregate expression of individual opinions 
distributed through the population (Glynn et al., 1999). These opinions are assumed to
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be measurable using conventional survey methods. Alternative approaches have argued 
that public opinion is a reflection of majority beliefs (e.g. Noelle-Neumann, 1984) or of 
elite or media opinion (e.g. Lippman, 1922). However, the mainstream definition is 
adequate for the purposes of the present research. Nevertheless, this definition is 
adopted in recognition of the observation that “public opinion is clearly more than 
responses to public opinion polls. It is the verbal expression of culture, of social 
interactions, of psychological processes.” (Glynn et al., 1999; p.207).
A distinction is sometimes drawn between attitudes, opinions and values in terms of the 
strength with which they are held. For example, Worcester (2000) has argued:
“Opinions are the ripples on the surface o f the public’s consciousness, shallow 
and easily changed. (...) Attitudes are the deeper and stronger currents below 
the surface (...). Values are the deep tides o f public mood, slow to change, but 
powerful. ” (Worcester, 2000; p. 18)
It is helpful, therefore, to consider the conviction with which a particular viewpoint is 
held as well as the way in which it has been measured. Opinion polls typically use 
single-item measures to record people’s opinions about specific objects because this 
usually provides a quick and adequate description of what people think. Researchers 
interested in attitudes tend to use more sophisticated multi-item scales -  or sometimes 
what are called ‘indirect’ techniques (e.g. Greenwald et al.’s (1998) implicit association 
test) -  to tap into the attitude underlying a person’s opinions and beliefs. In chapter 2 ,1 
describe the methods typically used to measure attitude formation and change. The next 
section presents the findings of surveys that have used single-item measures of public 
opinions about Europe and the euro.
1.2.2 British public opinion about Europe and the Euro
One of the most significant and widely-used sources of information about public 
opinion on European integration is the Eurobarometer survey. This survey, which is 
fielded bi-annually, is funded by the European Commission and was set up in 1973 to 
provide time-series data on a range of different topics across the different Member 
States of the EU. One of the longest running questions in the Eurobarometer series asks 
respondents whether they consider their country’s membership of the European Union
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to be a ‘good thing’, ‘a bad thing’ or ‘neither good nor bad’. Figure 1.1 shows trends in 
support for the EU in Britain using data from this question from 1985 to 2003.
Figure 1,1 Public support for the European Union in Great Britain (1985-2003)
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Support for the European Union among British citizens grew over the course of the 
1980s (apart from an anomalous dip in 1987), reaching a high point in the early 1990s. 
In spring 1985, 37% of British adults thought UK membership of the EU was ‘a good 
thing’, and this proportion had risen to 57% by 1991. In the autumn of 1992, support 
fell sharply to 43%, following British withdrawal from the ERM, marking the start of a 
more gradual period of decline during the 1990s. From 1997 to 2003, the proportion of 
people who considered EU membership to be a good thing dropped to some of its 
lowest recorded levels. In autumn 2003 (Eurobarometer 60), just 28% of UK citizens 
supported their country’s membership of the EU, while 29% believed UK membership 
of the EU to be a bad thing. It is noteworthy that the proportion believing EU 
membership to be ‘neither good nor bad’ (30% in autumn 2003) had also risen, 
suggesting that many British people remained uncertain of their views about European 
integration.
A further measure of support for European integration asks respondents whether they 
believe the country has benefited or not from membership of the EU (figure 1.2). The
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Eurobarometer has been fielding this question since 1984. Once again, it is clear from 
figure 1.2 that the trends in British public opinion about EU membership have been far 
from constant. These data, however, depict a slightly more positive picture of British 
public opinion about Europe than that shown in figure 1.1. From 1992 to 2003, the 
proportion of British citizens who believed that the UK had benefited from EU 
membership was greater than for those who felt the country had not benefited. In 
autumn 2003, 45% of the public had a positive view of the benefits of EU membership, 
compared with 30% who thought Britain had not benefited. Note, however, that the 
proportion of the public who reported that they did not know whether Britain had 
benefited or not from the EU more than doubled over the course of a decade from 13% 
of British adults in 1993 to 30% in 2003.
Figure 1.2 Percentage o f British adults believing Britain has benefited or not 
benefited from EU membership (1985-2003)
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One of the advantages of using Eurobarometer data to examine support for European 
integration stems from the opportunity it provides for comparative analysis. It is only 
by comparing data from the British sample with those collected elsewhere that a fuller 
picture of the nature of British public opinion about Europe can be gained. The 
proportion of British citizens stating that EU membership is a ‘good thing’ has, in 
general, followed a similar trend over time as that for the EU as a whole. However, 
despite similarities in the trend lines, it is immediately apparent from figure 1.1 that the
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proportion of British people who consider EU membership to be a good thing is 
significantly lower than that for the EU as a whole, and it has remained so, throughout 
the past 20 years (data for the EU average is only shown here for surveys conducted 
since 1999). While 28% of British citizens thought EU membership was a good thing 
in 2003, this compared with an average for the EU as a whole of 48%. Similarly, with 
respect to beliefs about whether or not Britain has benefited from membership of the 
EU, the profile over time is broadly similar to that for the EU as a whole. Again, 
however, considerably lower proportions of British citizens believe that their country 
has benefited from EU membership (32% in 2003) compared with the figures for the 
EU as a whole (50% in 2003).
Measures of support for the single currency among EU citizens showed a similar pattern 
of results during this period, with lower levels of support in Britain, compared with the 
EU countries that had already adopted the euro, as well as with Denmark and Sweden, 
which, like Britain, opted out of participation at the first wave. In 1994, over half (53%) 
of all EU citizens supported EMU. By 2003, this had risen to two thirds of all EU 
citizens (66%). Of those living inside the eurozone (i.e. in countries that had already 
adopted the euro as their currency) three quarters (75%) supported economic and 
monetary union with a single currency, compared with 53% of Danes, 41% of Swedes 
and just 24% of Britons.
Knowledge about EU affairs and European identity
People in Britain not only held the least favourable attitudes towards the EU and the 
single currency in Europe, they also stood out from their European counterparts on a 
number of other measures included in the Eurobarometer surveys. Two in particular are 
highlighted here -  measures of knowledge and awareness about EU affairs and 
measures of strength of identification with Europe.
One indicator of how knowledgeable people are about European integration asks 
respondents to rate on a scale of one to ten how much they feel they know about the 
European Union, its policies and its institutions. In Spring 2003, the EU average score 
on this scale (where 1 means ‘knowing nothing at all’ and 10 means ‘knowing a great 
deal’) was 4.25 (across the 15 EU Member States at that time). The highest levels of
24
self-rated knowledge were found in Austria, where the average score was 5.12. The 
lowest levels of knowledge were found in Britain, where the average was 3.68. This 
compared with mean scores of 4.69 for Denmark and 4.54 for Sweden (though it should 
be noted that their scores may have been higher because citizens of both these countries 
would have benefited from information campaigns associated with their euro 
referendums). Just one fifth of British citizens gave themselves a score above six on the 
scale, compared with over two fifths of citizens in the highest scoring nation, Austria.
Eurobarometer questions about the extent to which people in the EU identify themselves 
as Europeans and feel proud to be European and the concerns people have that closer 
integration will result in a loss of national identity, have received particular attention in 
the psychological literature considered in more detail later (e.g. Breakwell, 1996; 
Breakwell and Lyons, 1996). In order to find out whether Europeans feel European, the 
Eurobarometer asks respondents, ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as [British], 
[British] and European, European and [British] or European only?’ In 2003, two fifths 
(40%) of all EU citizens claimed they would continue to view themselves as their own 
nationality only. The remainder identified themselves as European and their own 
nationality (44% choosing their own nationality first, followed by European). In the 
UK, however, the findings once again were in stark contrast to those from the other 
Member States. Nearly two thirds (64%) of UK respondents claimed they would 
continue seeing themselves as British citizens only, and less than a quarter (24%) 
considered themselves to be both British and European.
Voting intentions in a referendum on the euro
The major opinion research organisations in Britain (including Gallup, ICM, Ipsos- 
MORI (then MORI) and GfK NOP (then NOP)) were all regularly polling the public on 
issues relating to Europe during the period of investigation. The polls conducted by 
MORI are of particular interest here, because they provide a long-running time series on 
voting intention in a euro referendum (starting in 1991) and was one of the most widely 
used indicators of the British public’s position on EMU by the media.
Figure 1.3 shows the trend in responses to these polls from 1991 to September 2003 
(although note that the lower frequency of polling on this issue in the early part of the
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1990s gives the impression of a smoother trend line prior to May 1997). One of the 
most striking features of these data is, once again, the extent of public opposition in 
Britain towards a single currency. In November 1991, as the debate surrounding British 
membership of a single European currency first really entered the public arena around 
the time of the Maastricht summit, over half of British adults (54%) stated that they 
would vote against Britain participating in such a project. One third of the public were 
in favour of a single currency and 13% were uncertain which way they would vote in a 
referendum. By September 2003, opposition had risen to 61%, with just under a quarter 
(24%) reporting that they would vote in favour of joining.
Figure 1.3 Voting intentions in a referendum on the euro (1991-20031)
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Figure 1.3 is also striking because of the consistency of the picture of public opinion on 
the euro that is depicted. During the twelve-year period shown in the chart, public 
opinion remained relatively constant, with similar proportions of respondents selecting 
each of the answer options throughout. In particular, opposition remained at a high 
level throughout this period, as did the proportion of the public stating that they did not 
know how they would vote in a referendum on the euro.
1 It is interesting to note that since 2003, this question has only been fielded on a few occasions, most 
recently in 2005, when 57% reported they would vote against joining the euro, 26% in favour, and 16% 
did not know.
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1.2.3 Variation in attitude valence and attitude strength
Because attitudes towards the euro remained relatively constant during this period, it 
was often assumed that they were fixed and stable. Indeed, this assumption not only 
underpinned the government’s decision to delay a referendum on British membership of 
EMU but also much of the research in the field, which explored the different 
background variables that predicted variation in people’s attitudes, both within and 
between countries. For example, Ahrendt (1999) analysed data from the Eurobarometer 
and Continuous Tracking Survey (also collected by the European Commission’s 
Opinion Analysis Unit) collected between 1995 and 1998 and found significant 
differences in support for the euro on the basis of sex, age, education and socio­
economic status. More favourable attitudes towards the euro were found among men, 
among those aged 54 and under, among those with higher levels of education and 
among those employed as managers, compared with those in manual occupations 
(Ahrendt, 1999). More recent data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey also 
supports the finding that the key demographic characteristics associated with varying 
levels of support for the euro in Britain at this time were sex, education and class 
(Evans, 2001; 2003).
One limitation of analyses of this kind, however, is that they tend to overemphasise 
differences in the direction or valence of attitudes, while failing to take into 
consideration variations in their strength. This problem is confounded by the tendency 
for expressed attitudes to vary as a function of relatively subtle changes to question 
wording in survey research (Schuman and Presser, 1981). One example of this is 
provided by a question fielded by MORI to capture variability in the strength of 
attitudes towards the euro. Respondents were asked to choose the response closest to 
their view of British participation in EMU. The options included ‘strongly support’ (A 
in figure 1.4), ‘strongly oppose’ (D in figure 1.4), and ‘don’t know’ (not shown in 
figure), as well as ‘generally in favour...’ (B), and ‘generally oppose...’ (C) ‘...but 
could be persuaded to change my mind if the government said it would be bad/ good for 
the economy’2. The question was intended to identify respondents who had not yet
2 Full question wording:
Q: Which of the following best describes your own view o f British participation in the single currency? 
A: I strongly support British participation
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made up their minds on the euro issue -  the so-called “waverers” (Worcester, 1999; 
2000; Mortimore and Atkinson, 2003) -  by giving them the opportunity to express 
uncertainty about their views. The results indicate that people are happy to admit that 
their attitudes are not as fixed as they might appear when they are measured using a less 
‘sophisticated’ polling question. Trend data from the ‘waverers’ questions are shown in 
figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4 Views on British participation in single currency (1990-20033)
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Analysis of the ‘waverers’ question identifies a majority of the electorate who are still 
undecided in their attitudes and who claim to be open to persuasion on the issue of 
British participation in the euro -  a group great enough in number to influence the 
outcome of a referendum. Mortimore and Atkinson (2003) identified the key 
characteristics of this segment of the electorate. By classifying voters according to their 
responses to the ‘waverers’ question and their intentions to vote in a referendum and in 
the next general election, their analysis identified six different types of wavering voter 
and explored the different characteristics of each. Like Ahrendt (1999) and Evans 
(2003), they also found that sex, education and socio-economic classification were
B: I am generally in favour o f  British participation, but could be persuaded against it i f  I thought it would 
be bad for the British economy.
C: I am generally opposed to British participation, but could be persuaded in favour o f  it i f  I thought it 
would be good for the British economy.
D: I strongly oppose British participation.
3 By 2005, the proportion o f  waverers had increased: A: 10%; B:21%; C: 27% and D: 25%.
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important variables associated with the strength and direction of people’s attitudes 
towards the euro. In addition, however, the authors found newspaper readership to be a 
powerful predictor of British voters’ attitudes. For example, a group they labelled the 
‘diehards’ consisted of those who claimed to be certain they would vote in a referendum 
and who claimed to be either strongly in favour or strongly against joining the euro. 
Those who were strongly against EMU were significantly more likely to be regular 
readers of right-wing newspapers, The Daily Mail and The Mail on Sunday and The 
Daily Telegraph. By contrast, those who strongly supported British participation in the 
euro were more likely than average to read left-wing newspapers, the Daily Mirror, The 
Guardian or The Observer. These findings were also backed up by Evans’s (2003) 
analysis of BSA data, in which he highlighted the significance of newspaper readership, 
and in particular, the distinction between reading tabloids and broadsheets, as a key 
predictor of variation in attitudes towards the euro (broadsheet readers being more likely 
to support British membership of EMU).
1.2.4 Summary
In summary, British public opinion about Europe throughout the 1990s and the early 
2000s was characterised by high levels of opposition towards membership of the EU 
and joining the single currency, low levels of knowledge about European integration 
and reluctance among British people to identify themselves as ‘European’. Opposition 
levels were highest among women, among those with lower levels of education and 
among those in manual occupations. Opposition was also stronger among regular 
readers of anti-European newspapers. Nevertheless, closer inspection of the data 
reveals a high proportion of respondents who claimed not to know their opinion on 
EMU and when asked, a majority of the public claimed to be ‘open to persuasion’ and 
apparently undecided in their views.
1.3 Explaining variation in support for integration
The comparative dimension of Eurobarometer data has made the survey particularly 
appealing to researchers interested in exploring cross-national differences in attitudes 
towards European integration (e.g. Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991;
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Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998a; Ahrendt, 1999). Secondary analyses of 
Eurobarometer data constitute a significant part of the literature and have helped 
provide a picture of the dynamics of public opinion across all Member States 
throughout the history of the survey, as well as led to the development of a number of 
different theoretical accounts of variation in aggregate levels of support across the EU 
(particularly among political scientists such as Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Gabel 
and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998a; 1998b; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 1999). These 
researchers present some of the most theoretically formalised explanations of aggregate 
variation in public attitudes towards European integration and specific integrative 
policies such as EMU. For example, according to Inglehart’s (1970; 1990) ‘silent 
revolution’ theory, support for integration is associated with people’s value orientations 
towards economic and political issues that are developed during the formative years and 
shaped by socio-economic conditions. As living conditions have continued to improve 
since the mid-twentieth century, Inglehart (1970) argues that the values of EU citizens 
have become less oriented towards materialist concerns such as economic and physical 
security towards what he terms ‘post-materialist’ values, characterised by priorities such 
as intellectual fulfilment and self-actualisation. Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1991) argue 
that the EU is more appealing to people who hold post-materialist values -  people who 
tend to be younger and better-educated citizens -  because their political values match 
more closely those that underpin the integrative process.
Other accounts of variation in aggregate levels of support for integration across Europe 
have emphasised the significance of cognitive mobilisation, which is associated with 
increased familiarity with the workings of EU institutions and EU affairs (e.g. Inglehart 
and Rabier, 1978; Anderson, 1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996) and economic 
variables relating to the micro- and macro-level benefits to be derived from EU 
membership (e.g. Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 19965; Gabel, 
1998a; 1998b; Anderson, 1995; Banducci and Karp, 2001). Some of these approaches 
are considered further in section 1.6, but an extensive review of this literature is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. Instead, the remainder of the chapter focuses on three areas of 
inquiry that have investigated in more detail the relationships observed in opinion poll 
findings about British public attitudes towards the EU and EMU, and in particular, 
sought to explain the reasons behind widespread opposition in the UK towards closer 
European integration. The first addresses the influence of the media on public attitudes 
towards Europe, the second considers the role played by national identity and the third
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explores the significance of low levels of knowledge about integration processes. In 
each section, I draw conclusions about the implications findings from each area of 
inquiry have for understanding British attitudes towards the euro.
1.4 The role of the media in public attitudes towards European integration
The media have been said to influence public opinion in at least four different ways 
(Glynn et al., 1999; McQuail, 2000): firstly, they are assumed to play a role in 
determining the salience of different issues on the public agenda by drawing public 
attention onto and away from different topics; secondly, they play a role in informing 
the public about issues; thirdly, they have the capacity to affect change in people’s 
attitudes and behaviour; and fourthly, they are assumed to influence the formation of 
social values and norms. While there is continued debate about the extent of media 
influence on public opinion and the nature of that influence, it is these four spheres of 
influence, which have received the greatest attention in the literature. Research looking 
at how the mass media communicate European integration to the public, and the way 
this relates to attitudes burgeoned during the period in which the empirical research for 
this thesis was undertaken (e.g. Statham and Gray, 2005; Firmstone, 2003; Gray, 2003; 
de Vreese, Peter and Semetko, 2001; de Vreese, 2001). Prior to this, the majority of 
studies had focused on the informational role played by the media and the content of 
media reports about Europe. This section highlights some key findings from these 
earlier studies, focusing in particular on the nature of information about European 
integration and the euro disseminated by the print media.
There are a number of reasons to focus only on the print media, rather than on the 
broadcast media (or indeed, on new web-based media). Firstly, there is evidence to 
suggest that people are less good at integrating information from television news than 
they are from the print media news (e.g. see Glynn et al., 1999). This would suggest 
that despite the finding that television is more widely used as a source of information 
about the European Union (Gavin, 2000; de Vreese, 2002) and that people consider it 
their preferred source when asked in Eurobarometer surveys, it is arguably a less 
influential source of information about Europe compared with what people read in 
newspapers (though it may play an important role in the three other areas of influence 
on public opinion outlined above).
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Secondly, the print media in Britain are quite distinct from those found in other 
countries. For one, newspaper readership is relatively high in the UK compared with 
other EU countries. British newspapers are also unusually partisan, making them 
especially interesting to researchers interested in media influences on political attitudes. 
One outcome of this partisanship is that a large sector of the press has adopted a 
strongly ‘eurosceptic’ stance -  a position that has found expression in overt hostility 
towards European integration and, at times, open xenophobia towards citizens of other 
European countries. This has not only earned the British print media a reputation for its 
bias on the continent, but it has also attracted a substantial quantity of research interest 
(e.g. Gavin, 2002; Hardt-Mautner, 1995; Anderson and Weymouth, 1998; Wilkes and 
Wring, 1998;). Amidst the general proliferation of research into Britain’s antagonistic 
relationship with Europe and studies of the factors underlying widespread British 
opposition to the EU, a number of key studies have emerged, focusing attention on the 
role played by euroscepticism in British newspapers.
A third reason for focusing on the press rather than on other media sectors stems from 
the finding that there is a relationship between newspaper readership and attitudes 
towards the euro (Evans, 2003). People who regularly read broadsheet newspapers 
(independent of which title they read) are significantly more likely to be in favour of 
European integration and the single currency than readers of the tabloid press. This 
finding is not independent of educational and socio-economic background, both of 
which account for variance in attitudes towards EMU, so naturally it should be 
interpreted with caution. However, Atkinson and Mortimore (2003) also found greater 
numbers in support of British participation in the single currency among broadsheet 
readers than among tabloid readers, in their analysis of responses to the ‘waverers’ 
question. Over one third (35%) of tabloid readers were opposed to the euro, compared 
with just under a quarter (24%) of broadsheet readers. By contrast, the authors found 
only 17% of tabloid readers strongly in support of British participation in the euro, 
compared with over a quarter (27%) of broadsheet readers (Mortimore and Atkinson, 
2003). These authors also found that when the electorate was segmented according to 
their responses to the ‘waverers’ question and their voting intentions, readership of 
particular titles was an important characteristic of the different segments identified.
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1.4.1 Euroscepticism in the British press
The press sector in Britain is, commercially speaking, highly successful. Despite the 
fact that there has been an overall decline in newspaper readership in the last fifty years, 
the press today enjoys a circulation of around twenty-seven million readers. The market 
is also highly competitive, consisting of only nineteen daily and Sunday titles and, as in 
other EU countries, these newspapers are owned by just a few large companies (four in 
the UK). Of the so-called quality newspapers -  the broadsheets -  The Daily Telegraph 
is the most popular, with a daily circulation of over 900,000, followed by The Times 
with a circulation of nearly 700,000 (Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations). By 
comparison, the tabloid press enjoys a far greater share of the market. To illustrate, The 
Sun had a circulation of over 3 million in November 2005.
In terms of their political orientation, over half the titles are right-wing and this 
imbalance is exaggerated in terms of the actual circulation of the different newspapers, 
with just five million consumers purchasing centre-left publications. The right-wing 
newspapers also tend to be the anti-European newspapers, meaning that there is a strong 
anti-European bias in the print media, not only in terms of the number of eurosceptic 
titles, but -  more significantly -  in terms of actual circulation. Both market leaders -  
The Daily Telegraph and The Sun -  are right-wing (although The Sun switched to 
support the Labour party prior to the general election campaign in 1997) and both are 
staunchly anti-EU.
It is interesting to note, however, that this partisanship and anti-European bias in the 
British press is a relatively recent phenomenon. The alignment of the different titles 
into their now established positions on Europe did not properly emerge until the mid- to 
late-1980s (Wilkes and Wring, 1998). This is argued to have occurred partly in 
response to events like a speech made by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Bruges, 
in which she expressed her opposition to Delors’ federalist vision for the EU and 
arguably ignited the debate over national sovereignty (Leonard and Leonard, 2002). 
Two years later, prior to Thatcher’s resignation, The Sun published its now infamous 
headline -  ‘Up Yours! Delors!’ -  referring to the then president of the EC. The article 
had the effect of awakening public attention to European matters and illustrates the 
fervour with which certain sectors of the press adopted their positions on the European 
issue. Later, the Maatricht summit in December 1991 and Britain’s withdrawal from
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the ERM in September 1992 helped to further establish the split on Europe that is 
evident in the British press today (Wilkes and Wring, 1998).
The concentration of ownership of the different news titles and its associated 
commercial pressures are argued to have had an impact on the content and style of 
British newspapers and in particular, on the way in which euroscepticism finds its 
expression (Anderson and Weymouth, 1998). Both the tabloids and broadsheets alike 
have adopted an increasingly informal style of discourse in their writing, in order to 
appear more accessible to the public (Hardt-Mautner, 1995). To examine the impact 
this has had, it is useful to consider a distinction made by Fairclough (1995) between 
different functions served by discourse in the press. Fairclough identifies three key 
discourse functions: a ‘representational’ function, a ‘social identities’ function and a 
‘social relations’ function. Representational discourse serves to convey information to 
the reader and used to be the dominant style adopted in British newspaper journalism. 
By contrast, the ‘social identities’ function of discourse serves to heighten the sense of 
shared identity between the writer and reader, and the ‘social relations’ function of 
discourse serves to give the impression of a close and informal relationship between the 
two. Newspaper discourse has become increasingly ‘conversationalised’ in response to 
the demands of the market, such that the relative importance of these three functions has 
shifted. The information role of the press (served by representational discourse) has 
been reduced and greater emphasis has been placed on developing a style of reporting 
that serves the social identities and social relations functions, in order to build up a loyal 
readership.
One effect of this change in journalistic style has been to diminish the responsibility of 
the press to provide factually accurate and unbiased information (Hardt-Mautner, 1995). 
The reduced informational content of newspapers is evidenced in reporting about the 
relationship between Britain and Europe and moves towards closer integration in 
Europe. For example, Hardt-Mautner (1995) compared how the provisions of the 
Maastricht treaty were communicated to readers in an article that appeared in The Sim 
to the precise wording of the treaty itself. She found that the information included in 
the news article had not only been markedly over-simplified, but that in the process, the 
journalist had succeeded in distorting its original meaning. The outcome was an 
inaccurate and biased portrayal of the intended content of the treaty. Hardt-Mautner 
argues that, in this way, developments in EU politics end up being portrayed in British
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newspapers (tabloids and broadsheets alike) as too complex for the public to understand 
and this has led to a “growing chasm between the discourse of elites actively shaping 
European politics and the lay discourse of the electorate” (Hardt-Mautner, 1995; p. 199).
The distortion of facts about integrative policies has meant that the informational 
content of news reports about Europe has become increasingly impoverished (and this is 
especially true for the anti-European tabloid press). In addition to this, however, the 
range of events considered newsworthy has also narrowed (Gavin, 2000; 2002). 
Newspaper reporting on Europe tends to focus on a number of recurring themes, centred 
on concerns about the economic consequences of integration, concerns about political 
issues and concerns about the historical and cultural implications of integration 
(Anderson and Weymouth, 1998). For example, in their sample of anti-European 
broadsheet articles about the economic consequences of EMU (selected from coverage 
of a series of issue-relevant events in the 1990s), Anderson and Weymouth (1998) 
found that there was a disproportionate focus on the difficulties experienced by 
countries in the Eurozone in achieving the Maastricht criteria for joining the single 
currency at the first wave. Similarly, the articles about the political issues associated 
with EMU were focused mainly on the problem of sovereignty and the impact closer 
integration would have on this. By comparison, the sample of pro-European newspapers 
included in the analysis tended to focus more on the positive benefits of integration, 
such as the perception of the EU as a “provider / facilitator” in international relations.
The eurosceptic discourse of the anti-European press is not only lacking when it comes 
to conveying information about integration to readers, it is also imbued with historical 
and cultural concerns about integration (Anderson and Weymouth, 1998). This is 
evidenced in the use of national stereotyping in news relating to the EU, particularly of 
the French and the Germans (Hardt-Mautner, 1995). In addition, this aspect of 
euroscepticism is expressed through a range of more subtle discursive strategies, such as 
through the use of linguistic devices that create a sense of separation and distance 
between Britain and Europe. For example, the use of “clusters of dichotomous 
relationships grouped around a juxtaposition of ‘inside’ vs ‘outside’” (Hardt-Mautner, 
1995; p.181), such as ‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘in’ the euro, or ‘out’. Journalists also use 
metaphors to similar effect. These manifestations of eurosceptic discourse are argued 
to have the effect of raising the salience of British national identity in news reporting on 
Europe and, thereby, hindering the development of a European identity.
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In addition to these overt expressions of euroscepticism, articles about Europe also 
employ a “covert level of representation” (Anderson and Weymouth, 1998), which 
serves to communicate the newspaper’s ideological position on European issues. 
Journalists invoke knowledge and understanding about political issues that are believed 
to be shared between the newspaper and the reader. Thus, articles about Europe rely on 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the issues surrounding integration and the various 
relationships involved in it. For example, Anderson and Weymouth identified some of 
The Daily Telegraph’s key ideological assumptions about the single currency in the 
sample of texts that they analysed. In the Telegraph, the single currency was viewed 
variously as a threat to sovereignty, a potential source of social unrest, and as a project 
being driven forward by Germany, linked historically to German dreams of expansion 
in Europe. These assumptions had become normalised within the ideology of the 
newspaper and formed part of a shared repertoire of discourse between the newspaper 
and reader -  an effect which may partially account for differences in public attitudes by 
newspaper readership.
1.4.2 Summary
The preceding discussion highlights a number of reasons why the media appear to be an 
important factor in understanding British public opinion about Europe. However, the 
precise mechanisms by which the media exert an influence on attitudes have not been 
addressed in these studies. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of euroscepticism in British 
newspapers seems likely to be influential in public opinion formation in at least two 
ways. Firstly, newspapers provide a source of information about the EU. However, the 
way in which that information is communicated by the print media may provide some 
explanation as to why British citizens are concerned about their level of factual 
knowledge about matters relating to European integration being inadequate. The 
information about the EU that is available tends to be ‘dumbed-down’ and, as a result, is 
often factually inaccurate. Secondly, eurosceptic discourse makes liberal use of 
national stereotypes and linguistic devices that serve to emphasise the difference 
between Britain and Europe and, thereby, heighten the salience of British national 
identity. One effect of this may be to hinder the development of a European identity, 
but the mechanism by which this works has not been explored in any depth in the
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existing literature. These two sources of influence are investigated further in the present 
thesis in relation to people’s attitudes towards the euro. Specifically, the research 
addresses the questions of how media information about the euro influences attitudes 
and what is the effect of heightening the salience of national identity in information 
about Europe. The next section considers the relationship between national identity and 
attitudes towards Europe in more detail.
1.5 National identity and attitudes towards EMU
The second area of inquiry investigating variation in support for European integration to 
be considered here concerns the relationship between attitudes and national identity. As 
we saw in section 1.2.2, in addition to the high levels of opposition towards integration 
reported in surveys, British citizens are also among the least willing to identify 
themselves as ‘Europeans’, believing instead that in future they will continue to view 
themselves as British first and, if at all, European second. In 2003, among those who 
considered their country’s membership of the EU to be a good thing, three-quarters of 
EU citizens saw themselves as their own nationality and European (75%), whereas only 
23% of those who saw EU membership as a bad thing identified themselves in this way. 
Breakwell (1996) analysed the relationship between support for integration and national 
identity further using data from a Eurobarometer question asking whether respondents 
thought that the creation of the EU would mean their sense of national identity would 
disappear and end up being replaced by a sense of European identity. The majority of 
respondents did not believe that their national identity would disappear and were 
content that a European identity was compatible with their existing national identity. 
However, there was considerable variation across member states and there were high 
proportions in some countries that were concerned that their national identity would end 
up being usurped by a European identity. The highest proportion holding this view was 
found in the UK, where 38% of respondents feared a loss of national identity compared 
with an EC average of 23% - a finding which echoed earlier conclusions by Hewstone 
from the mid-1980s that the British at this time were “still concerned with matters of 
national sovereignty”, and reluctant to “give lasting commitment to the community” 
(Hewstone, 1986; p.38). Thus, people’s feelings about their national identity appear to 
be an important component of their attitudes towards European integration.
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European integration poses a challenge to national identity on a number of different 
levels. Firstly, the unification of Europe raises fundamental questions about the future 
sovereignty of nation states, as political and economic decision-making becomes 
increasingly centralised at a European level. This centralisation of political power -  
which has motivated the British government’s concerns about the European project over 
the years -  is underpinned by the ideological motivation to create a ‘supra-national’ 
community, which taken to its logical conclusion (one might argue) would accomplish a 
‘federal superstate’ of European nations. In this sense, the creation of the EU poses a 
direct challenge to the independence of the nation states of which it is composed and 
thereby, to the unique sense of identity associated with those independent nation states. 
Secondly, because the single currency was intended as a symbol of this union of nation 
states, EMU cannot be viewed as a purely economic endeavour. The euro was intended 
to provide the citizens of participating countries with “clear proof of the fact that [they] 
all belong to a continent, which is uniting and asserting itself’ (EC documentation, 
1997). In this sense, not only does integration involve asking European citizens to 
accommodate a new supranational identity alongside their existing national identity, but 
also to accept a symbol of that identity to replace their own national currency (Routh 
andBurgoyne, 1998).
In Britain, both political and popular discussion about Europe and the euro have fused 
issues surrounding European integration with questions about national identity since the 
debate began. In the context of political devolution in the United Kingdom and the 
introduction of the euro towards the end of the 1990s, this feature of the debate became 
especially prominent. Heightened media attention and a proliferation of writing on the 
topic (e.g. Paxman, 2001; Weight, 2002) sought to address questions such as how we 
define British national identity and how Europe challenges this definition. In this 
context, social psychologists began to investigate the implications of political and 
economic change in Europe for the way different people experience national identity 
and how this, in turn, relates to their views about the process of integration (e.g. 
Breakwell and Lyons, 1996). Before considering the findings of their research, I first 
consider what is meant by ‘national identity’ and how different theorists have defined 
the concept.
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1.5.1 Defining nation and identity
Smith (1991) differentiates two ways of conceptualising nation states. According to the 
standard Western model, the nation is conceived of as an historic community with legal 
and political equality of its members. By contrast, the ‘ethnic model’ emphasises the 
importance of shared genealogy, languages and traditions. Both of these 
conceptualisations share the notion that “nations are territorially bounded units of 
population” (Smith, 1991; p. 17). In accordance with this definition, the fundamental 
features of national identity can be identified as the existence of an historical territory, 
common myths, a common mass public culture, shared legal rights and duties and ‘a 
common economy with territorial mobility for members” (p. 14). National identity acts 
as a ‘multi-faceted power’ providing citizens with both external functions (e.g. 
territorial, economic) and internal functions (such as socialisation). These internal 
functions are underpinned by shared symbols such as flags, anthems, passports and 
currency that remind members of a nation state of their common heritage and sense of 
common identity. Thus, national identity is intrinsically tied up with the visible markers 
of nationhood, which serve to symbolise that shared identity.
In fact, these markers of nationhood are comparatively modem creations (Billig, 1996), 
and are widely accepted to be social constructions (Jackson and Penrose, 1993). 
Changes in the geopolitical boundaries of European countries over the past decade or 
more illustrate the extent to which nations are created and are not naturally 
predetermined. However, the psychological importance of such markers cannot be 
overemphasised. National symbols underpin the ideology on which nationalism rests. 
They serve to ‘naturalise’ the contemporary world of nation states (Billig, 1996; 185) 
and make possible the collective act of “imagining the community” (Anderson, 1983) 
necessary for national identity to exist. Most of the literature in this field subscribes to 
Anderson’s idea, that nation states are no more than ‘imagined communities’ (1983). 
Nations provide collective identities that extend beyond people’s immediate 
communities and require people to imagine the boundaries and content of the national 
community (Hopkins and Reicher, 1996). Thus, countries are not “‘natural’ or ‘given’, 
but produced and reproduced through a series of social practices” (Hopkins and 
Reicher, 1996; p75). For this reason, national identity is better viewed not as being 
formed of the external markers of nationhood as in Smith’s conceptualisation, but rather 
as being socially represented through acts of collective imagination.
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This conceptualisation of national identity has implications for understanding people’s
resistance towards Europe and the euro. Currency plays an important symbolic function
in enabling citizens to socially represent the community in which they live. According
to Burgoyne, Routh and Ellis (1999),
“the national currency embodies both symbolic and economic referents in a 
very concrete way: on one side o f the coin (in many cases) we find the value o f 
this particular ‘unit o f exchange ’ in economic transactions (one pound, fifty 
pence, and so on), and on the other, the image o f the Head o f State, 
symbolising the authority and legitimacy o f the currency, at the same time as 
national sovereignty ” (Burgoyne, Routh and Ellis, 1999; p95).
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to find that people’s resistance to the euro is 
bound up in their national identity and their sense of pride in national symbols such as 
the pound sterling or the image of the Queen’s head. At the same time, the notion of an 
‘imagined community’ helps to explain variation in how citizens of different nation 
states experience a sense of common identity both at the national level and at the 
supranational, European level. Variation in the status of the existing national identity 
(in terms of the historical basis and strength of that identity) and in the way in which the 
European identity is socially represented both appear to influence how people think 
about European integration (Breakwell, 1996; Cinnirella, 1993; 1996).
1.5.2 Aggregate differences in the strength and nature of attachment to nation
Based on the survey findings presented at the start of this section, we might hypothesise 
that British citizens show more resistance to Europe because they have a stronger sense 
of national identity than their European counterparts, and hold a more negative image of 
the European identity; in other words, the stronger people’s attachment to their national 
identity, the weaker their support for integration. Yet the relationship between national 
identity and attitudes is more complex than it first appears. Unfortunately, 
Eurobarometer data are insufficient when it comes to testing this hypothesis. Some 
alternative data provide some insight however. For example, Cinnirella also examined 
differences at the national level in how people felt about their European identity. He 
found that citizens of Italy and Britain varied not only in the strength of their 
attachments to their national and European identities, but also in the nature of their 
attachments to the two (Cinnirella, 1996). Among the British participants in his
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research, national identity was found to be stronger than the European identity, and 
people were more likely to consider the two identities to be mutually incompatible with 
one another. By contrast, for the Italian participants in the study, the sense of European 
identity was stronger than their national identity and it was far stronger than that of the 
British participants. Italians in the study were also more likely to see their national and 
European identities as “compatible and even mutually reinforcing” (p. 259).
Participants in Cinnirella’s research (1993; 1996) also varied in the nature of their 
attachment to their national and European identities. Distinguishing between 
sentimental and instrumental orientations to nation, he found that Italian participants 
were more likely to hold instrumental attachments to their national identity, which made 
it easier for them to accommodate a European identity. By contrast, the British 
participants in the study held strong sentimental attachments to their national identity 
and were consequently less keen to integrate the European identity into their self- 
concept. The British participants were also more likely to express instrumental 
attachments towards the European identity and there was little evidence of sentimental 
attachment towards Europe. It is these differences in how people oriented themselves 
towards their national identity and towards Europe that appeared to account for 
differences in the willingness to support European integration among Britons and 
Italians.
Routh and Burgoyne (1998) tested Cinnirella’s hypothesis that the nature of attachments 
to nation and to Europe is an important determinant of how people feel about 
integration. Using UK data only from a Europe-wide survey of the psychological factors 
underlying attitudes towards the euro (Mueller-Peters et al., 1998a; 1998b), their 
analysis showed that only sentimental attachments to Britain seemed to have a direct, 
negative influence on attitudes to EMU. The influence of attachment on attitudes was 
mediated, however, by people’s evaluation of the potential for the euro to provide 
participating nations with benefits. People who held sentimental attachments towards 
Britain were more likely to hold negative evaluations of the benefits of EMU 
membership, whereas those who held instrumental attachments to Britain tended to hold 
more favourable views of the benefits of EMU. Thus, the way in which people feel 
about their country, as well as about Europe, has the capacity to influence attitudes both 
directly and indirectly (Mueller-Peters, 1998; Van Everdingen and Van Raaij, 1998).
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Analyses of cross-cultural variations in attachment to nation are limited to the extent 
that they assume a degree of homogeneity in the way in which national identity is 
experienced within different nations. Routh and Burgoyne’s analysis demonstrates, 
however, the extent to which individual variations in attachment to Britain and Europe 
are associated with varying levels of support for the euro. It is especially important not 
to assume national identity means the same thing to all citizens in a nation like the UK, 
itself a union of different countries, each with its own separate identity. Exploring 
differences between UK identities reveals some interesting variations in what 
‘Britishness’ means to different people and demonstrates the multi-dimensional 
structure of national identity, which accounts for individual-level differences in the 
nature and strength of people’s attachment to nation.
1.5.3 Variation in the experience of national identity in the UK
Using data from the 1995 British Social Attitudes survey, Dowds and Young (1996) 
distinguished two dimensions of national identity in order to construct a typology of 
different ways of “being British” (p. 149). The two dimensions differentiated the more 
positive manifestations of nationalism, such as pride in the nation, its achievements and 
institutions) from its more negative manifestations (such as xenophobia and 
discrimination against outsiders). This distinction represents an important focus in the 
literature on national identity between on the one hand, sentiments associated with 
‘patriotism’ and, on the other, what is commonly associated with nationalism, or ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ forms of nationalism (Kosterman and Feshbach, 19989; Schatz, Staub and 
Lavine, 1991; Mueller-Peters, 1998; Memmendey, Klink and Brown, 2001; Hopkins, 
2001; Condor, 2001). The first, positive dimension of nationalism is referred to by 
Dowds and Young as ‘inclusive nationalism’ and encompasses two distinct elements: 
pride in national heritage and culture, and pride in the way the nation functions, both at 
home and abroad. The more negative manifestations of national identity are 
encapsulated in the second dimension of ‘exclusive nationalism’. This comprises 
attitudes that promote cultural and economic protectionism (such as putting limits on 
imports to protect the economy or giving preference to British television programmes 
over American ones) and xenophobic sentiments, such as those based on the idea of 
exclusion and discrimination against the ‘other’. Defining national identity as multi­
dimensional in this way reveals some interesting findings about how people vary in
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their experience of ‘Britishness’ across the United Kingdom, and in particular, some 
marked differences between citizens of Northern Ireland and those of Great Britain. It 
also reveals some interesting systematic relationships between different ‘types’ of 
national identity and attitudes towards Europe.
Dowds and Young (1996) constructed a typology of four distinctive versions of British 
national identity, based on where survey respondents were located on the two 
dimensions of nationalism described above, and their views about Britain’s relationship 
with Europe. The first group identified by the typology -  labelled the ‘Supra- 
nationalists’ -  were low in both the inclusive and exclusive dimension of national 
identity and held the most pro-European attitudes (with 28% agreeing there should be a 
single currency). The second group termed ‘Patriots’ because of their high national 
sentiment and low exclusiveness, also tended to be more pro-European than their 
counterparts, with 16% in favour of a single currency. The other two groups -  named 
the ‘Belligerents’ and the ‘John Bulls’ -  showed high levels of exclusive nationalism 
and these sentiments appeared to stand in the way of adopting favourable attitudes 
towards European integration. Both of these groups held similar views about Europe. 
They were less likely to believe that Britain benefits from the EU, less likely to support 
closer links with the EU (in particular, the introduction of a single currency), and were 
more likely to believe that Britain should leave the EU altogether. Similarly, Mueller- 
Peters’ (1998) analysis, which used the dimensions of ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ in 
order to capture variation in the way people feel about their country, found that feeling 
‘patriotic’ or proud about one’s country had no relationship to attitudes towards the 
euro, whereas nationalistic sentiments were negatively associated with attitudes towards 
the euro. Feeling patriotic towards Europe, however, helped to foster positive views of 
the single currency.
As we shall see in chapter 2, social psychological accounts of the processes underlying 
social identity -  notably, social identity theory (e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and 
Abrams, 1988) and self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, and Wetherell, 1987) -  provide a theoretical basis for understanding these 
findings. In brief, according to social identity theory, people’s membership of social 
groups contributes to their sense of self-esteem (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). For positive 
benefits to be gained people must engage in inter-group comparisons in order to 
establish the groups to which they belong (their ‘in-groups’) as superior to other groups
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(‘out-groups’). Actively identifying oneself as a member of a group -  referred to as 
self-categorisation (Turner, 1987b) -  results in a number of psychological effects. Of 
particular interest here are a) inter-group bias, in which group members show preference 
for other members of their in-group and denigrate members of out-groups; and b) the 
internalisation of the perceived belief structures of the group. These psychological 
effects of self-categorisation help to explain inclusive and exclusive forms of 
nationalism and feelings of patriotism, and identify a link between social identity and 
attitudes (considered in more detail in chapter 2).
A further implication of the social identity and self-categorisation theories is that 
because people are members of a range of social groups, they hold a collection of 
different social identities, not all of which will be relevant or ‘salient’ at any given time. 
Variation in the salience of different social groups at different times means that national 
identity is not only multi-dimensional, but also situation-specific, in that its significance 
for a person’s self-concept is not constant, but varies temporally, from one situation to 
the next. Examples of this abound -  such as the power of international sporting events 
to temporarily arouse strong sentiments linked to nationhood. As particular social 
categories become more salient, people become more likely to categorise themselves as 
members of the salient group. This means that the psychological effects of self­
categorisation just described are also context-bound, linked inextricably to fluctuations 
in the salience of social categories from one moment to the next.
1.5.4 Summary
The aim of this section was to highlight some of the ways in which understanding 
national identity helps to explain variation in public attitudes towards the euro. Citizens 
of different EU countries have been shown to vary in the strength and nature of their 
attachment to their nation and to Europe. These variations are, in turn, associated with 
different levels of support for European integration. In the UK, variations in the way in 
which different people experience their national identity/ identities are also associated 
with different attitudinal positions relating to the EU and EMU. Simply put, while 
nationalist sentiments tend to be associated with more negative views about Europe, 
feeling patriotic about Britain does not seem to stand in the way of positive attitudes 
towards membership of the EU and British participation in EMU. In this sense, national
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identity can be described as multi-dimensional, in that it captures a range of different 
sentiments relating to a sense of belonging to nation and this multi-dimensionality has 
implications for understanding attitudes towards European integration.
In addition to the multi-dimensional nature of national identity, however, people’s 
attachment to nation is also experienced differently from one situation to the next. This 
idea suggests that any analysis of the relationship between identity and attitudes must 
take salience into account because the basis of the relationship -  if indeed there is any -  
is likely to vary situationally. In other words, like attitudes, the strength and nature of 
national identity should not be viewed as fixed and stable but as something fluid and 
ever-changing as a function of salience. As we saw in the previous section, the media 
appear to play an important role in manipulating the salience of national identity in 
reports about European integration -  a conclusion also drawn by Cinnirella (1996). In 
this thesis, I consider the implications of this finding for understanding British attitudes 
towards the euro. The postulates of social identity theory and self-categorisation theory 
are considered in more detail in chapter 2.
1.6 Issue-relevant knowledge and attitudes towards European integration
The final section of this chapter considers the relationship between public knowledge of 
the issues surrounding European integration and public opinion. As we have seen, one 
of the key findings to have emerged from Eurobarometer surveys of attitudes towards 
Europe and the euro during the period of interest was that UK citizens stood apart from 
their EU counterparts at the time on a number of different dimensions. Not only did 
they hold the least favourable attitudes towards closer integration, but they also revealed 
themselves to be among the least well-informed about the political and economic issues 
involved (e.g. Mueller-Peters et al., 1998a; Sinnott, 2000; Worcester, 2000). This 
section considers the relationship between these two findings in more detail and 
discusses their implication for our understanding of public attitudes towards the euro.
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1.6.1 Issue-relevant knowledge and attitude valence
Data from a number of sources suggest there is a positive relationship between 
knowledge and attitudes among EU citizens. Those who feel more knowledgeable 
about the European Union also tend to hold more favourable attitudes towards it. This 
relationship has been observed both at the aggregate level, with countries where 
knowledge levels are highest showing higher levels of support for integration, and at 
individual level. For example, looking at Eurobarometer data, Worcester (2000) found 
that in member states where levels of awareness of EU institutions and policies were 
highest, levels of support for the EU were, on average, 11% higher. It has also been 
shown that among those British citizens who rate their knowledge of EU affairs at the 
higher end of the scale (scoring eight to ten), a significantly higher proportion than at 
the lower end of the scale believe that their country’s membership of the EU is a good 
thing. In autumn 2003, 72% of UK citizens rating their knowledge at the high end of 
the scale considered their country’s EU membership to be a good thing, compared with 
41% of those scoring themselves at the lower end of the scale. By the same token, a 
higher proportion of respondents with lower knowledge scores considered EU 
membership to be a bad thing. Of those scoring below eight on the scale, 32% stated 
that their country’s membership of the EU was a bad thing, compared with 15% of those 
scoring above eight (Eurobarometer 60.1, UK national report, 2003). Similarly, surveys 
show that those socio-demographic groups who hold more negative attitudes towards 
Europe (i.e. women, those with lower levels of education and employed in manual 
occupations), also tend to have lower levels of knowledge about EU politics (Ahrendt, 
1999; Evans, 2003).
The conclusion that greater issue-relevant knowledge leads to more favourable attitudes 
towards integration forms the basis of the cognitive mobilisation theory (e.g. Inglehart, 
1970), which proposes that as people become more familiar with the consequences of 
European integration and the impact of integrative policies on their lives, they develop 
more favourable attitudes towards it. Inglehart and Rabier (1978) analysed public 
opinion data from 1950 to 1975 and observed that length of EU membership was a 
significant predictor of aggregate levels support for the EU. In particular, levels of 
support were found to be higher among the original six members of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, than among those joining later (see also Anderson, 1995; 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996). One explanation for this is that over time, EU
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citizens become more aware and knowledgeable of EU affairs and with that, become 
more familiar with the benefits to be gained from EU membership (Anderson, 1995) -  a 
process that has been referred to as ‘cognitive mobilisation’ (Inglehart, 1970). As 
people become more familiar with the issues involved in integration, they are assumed 
to develop the requisite cognitive skills for understanding the often complex and 
abstract information they receive about EU affairs. With this, people start to feel less 
threatened by the integration process, and therefore more likely to look favourably on it 
(Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Janssen, 1991).
The postulates of the cognitive mobilisation theory are also consistent with the 
interpretations of Mueller-Peters and her colleagues (1998), in their survey of attitudes 
towards the euro. They argued that low levels of awareness about the economic 
consequences of introducing a single currency left citizens feeling unable to control the 
transition to a single currency. By contrast, having knowledge of the issues involved in 
EMU, or more importantly, feeling knowledgeable about them, better equipped people 
for the changeover, by giving them a sense of ‘secondary control’ over the transition to 
the euro (Rothbaum et al., 1982). As a consequence, they were more likely to view 
EMU favourably.
Further support for the conclusion that low levels of public knowledge about European 
integration and the issues involved in EMU help to explain opposition to the euro is 
provided by the results of a deliberative poll conducted by the National Centre for 
Social Research in 1995. This method of polling involves measuring the attitudes of a 
nationally representative sample (in this case, towards the future of Britain’s 
relationship with Europe), before and after participation in a weekend event designed to 
increase participants’ factual knowledge and understanding of the polling issue. During 
the weekend, participants were given the opportunity to learn about and discuss 
different sides of the debate. The study found participants’ attitudes became more 
favourable towards closer integration as a result of participation in the deliberative event 
(Curtice and Jowell, 1998). In other words, increasing people’s knowledge and 
involvement in the issues surrounding the EU, helped to increase support for integration 
among the deliberative poll participants. (A secondary analysis of data from this study is 
presented in chapter 6.)
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Yet there are a number of difficulties with the conclusion that opposition to the euro 
results from low levels of knowledge about the issue and that simply improving 
knowledge will lead to more favourable public attitudes. First and foremost, there are 
some inconsistencies in the research findings relating to knowledge about EMU and 
attitudes to the euro that have not yet been considered. Much of the research that has 
found a positive linear relationship between knowledge and attitudes (e.g. Mueller- 
Peters et al., 1998a; 1998b; Ahrendt, 1999; Worcester, 2000) has focused on aggregate- 
level effects, whereby countries in which issue-relevant knowledge is highest, tend to 
show higher levels of support. This aggregate result is not always found when 
exploring within-country, individual-level variations in attitudes, however. For 
example, Worcester’s (2000) analysis of Eurobarometer data found that it was not 
always the case in the UK that those with more issue-relevant knowledge held more 
favourable attitudes towards the EU. He argues that those who are most interested in 
the issue and most knowledgeable about it tend to be more motivated to seek out 
information about it, often out of concerns about the negative impact EMU might have. 
This group -  which in Worcester’s analysis was predominantly made up of older, 
middle-class, Conservative men who read the Daily Telegraph -  held strong values 
concerning the relationship between Britain and Europe, and this drove not only their 
interest in the issue and issue-relevant knowledge, but also their opposition towards 
British participation in the euro (Worcester, 2000).
1.6.2 Issue-relevant knowledge and attitude strength
More recently, the dominant approach in the political science literature on attitudes 
towards European integration maintains that people structure their attitudes to European 
integration along utilitarian dimensions, which involves them actively weighing up the 
costs and benefits of the economic consequences of particular integrative policies 
(Gabel, 1998a; 1998b). According to Gabel (1998a), the economic consequences of 
integration influence the welfare of citizens differentially depending on their economic 
and political interests. These in turn, vary as a function of a person’s socio-economic 
position (hence the relationship observed between socio-demographic characteristics 
and attitudes towards integration). Accordingly, people are able to evaluate integrative 
policies in terms of the benefits they stand to derive from them and form their attitudes 
consistent with these evaluations. Evidence in support of this approach has been found
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in relation to attitudes towards the euro by Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) (see also 
Banducci and Karp, 2001). They found that Europeans rely on economic indicators 
such as inflation and unemployment and trade to inform their calculations of the costs 
and benefits of EMU and other monetary policies.
The utilitarian theory was also partially supported by Mueller-Peters and her colleagues 
(1998a), whose findings showed that people’s expectations about the consequences of 
the introduction of the euro at the micro- and macro-economic level influenced their 
attitudes towards their country joining the euro. However, their findings also called into 
question the extent to which people are able to form their attitudes based on their 
economic expectations (Pepermans and Mueller-Peters, 1999). Indeed, they found that 
around a quarter of their sample were unable to draw any conclusions about the 
potential economic consequences of EMU because they felt insufficiently informed 
about it. In fact, they found strikingly low levels of knowledge and awareness about 
EMU among their respondents -  both when respondents were asked to subjectively rate 
how well informed they felt, as well as in their performance on a short quiz about the 
euro. Once again, it was the UK sample that stood out in particular, with a mean score 
on the six-point scale derived from the quiz, of just 0.78 (findings that are consistent 
with the results of the Eurobarometer surveys reviewed earlier and with the analyses of 
others in this field (e.g. Sinnott, 2000; Worcester, 2000)4.
It is not uncommon in public opinion research to find that the majority of people know 
and, indeed, care very little about political issues (Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996). 
Concerns about the implications of this for the quality of public opinion about political 
issues have dominated the field for many years. Political attitudes -  and in particular, 
those relating to foreign policy - are argued not only to lack an adequate knowledge 
base, but also to be both unstable and unstructured, a finding that has challenged the 
notion that mass political opinion should be allowed to influence the policy process 
(Sinnott, 2000). Central to this view is Converse’s (1964) analysis of the nature of 
people’s belief systems. According to Converse, few people appear to hold any real 
opinions at all on many political issues and nor are they always aware of how different 
issues and different beliefs fit together to form ‘constrained’ ideological positions. 
Instead, mass political opinions tend to be largely disorganised and highly labile
4 Research by economic psychologists (e.g. Lea, Tarpy and Webley 1987; Lewis, Webley and Fumham, 
1995) has also questioned the assumption that people are able to make rational assessments of their 
economic interests and to behave consistently with them.
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(meaning that the responses people give to opinion polls change over time, seemingly at 
random). Converse (1970) concluded that when people are asked their opinion on 
political issues, rather than acknowledging their uncertainty about a question (e.g. by 
selecting ‘Don’t Know’ response options), they tend to select responses at random -  that 
is, they express what he termed ‘non-attitudes’.
Converse’s theory has a number of implications for how to approach the study of 
people’s attitudes towards EMU, given low levels of public knowledge about the issue. 
Yet if research into attitudes about the euro were measuring nothing more than people’s 
random, uninformed responses, then one might expect to see the following effects in the 
data: firstly, a relatively low proportion of people would express ‘Don’t Knows’ 
(because most people would rather randomly select a valid response, than admit to not 
knowing); secondly, there would be a high level of variability in attitudes over time. In 
fact, these predictions are not bome out by the evidence. In surveys measuring attitudes 
to Europe and the euro, a high proportion of British respondents do select the ‘Don’t 
know’ response option and attitudes towards the euro appear to have been relatively 
stable, in aggregate terms, over time. Furthermore, the ‘Waverers’ question devised by 
MORI (Worcester, 2000; Atkinson and Mortimore, 2003), which was described earlier, 
goes some way towards addressing the possibility that people with lower levels of issue­
relevant knowledge may express non-attitudes. Analysis of data from this question 
shows that people report their attitudes differently depending on how they are asked and 
the extent to which the question enables them to admit that their views about the euro 
are not yet ‘fully formed’.
Attempts to address the potential problem of non-attitudes methodologically, as in the 
‘waverers’ question, make the assumption that people do indeed hold attitudes on issues 
about which they are poorly informed, but that standard survey questions are not 
sophisticated enough to measure them. An alternative to Converse’s theory suggests 
that rather than expressing non-attitudes in political opinion research, a large proportion 
of people with lower levels of issue-relevant knowledge spontaneously form their 
opinions actually during questionnaire completion, guided by ideas made salient by 
particular questions (Zaller and Feldman, 1992; Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996). 
According to this approach, a lack of stability and constraint in public attitudes towards 
political issues is a function of the way in which people form their attitudes, rather than 
an outcome of people not holding attitudes at all. In this sense, attitudes can be said to
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vary in the extent to which they are more or less ‘real’ or ‘random’ (Sinnott, 2000), 
depending on whether they are pre-formed or formed ‘on the spot’ in a survey interview 
(Zaller, 1992).
The idea that attitudes towards European foreign policy can be located on a ‘real to 
random’ continuum, depending on people’s knowledge about European affairs was 
tested by Sinnott (2000) in an analysis of Eurobarometer data. He found that at higher 
levels of issue-relevant knowledge, the inter-relationship between people’s attitudes 
towards EU foreign policy showed a more coherent structure, whereas at lower levels of 
knowledge about EU affairs, attitudes were less consistent and influenced by contextual 
cues in the questionnaire. He concluded that the “net outcome is that, among four fifths 
of respondents, and in the area of attitudes to a European foreign and security policy in 
particular, what is being measured is suspiciously close to the random end of the real-to- 
random continuum” (Sinnott, 2000; 131).
1.6.3 Summary
Gabel (1998a; 1998b) concludes that evidence in support of the utilitarian approach to 
understanding variation in attitudes towards integration also makes it possible to dismiss 
the idea that poor levels of public understanding of European integration lead to non­
attitudes. The assumption that people engage in cost-benefit analyses of different EU 
policies in relation to their own political and economic interests precludes the possibility 
that existing survey data on which the theory is based consist merely of people’s 
random responses to different questions. Yet, as we have seen, the fact that public 
opinion about EMU is underpinned by low levels of issue-relevant knowledge among 
the majority of voters means that many people have limited capacity to engage in 
utilitarian-based evaluations of different EU policies. This does not mean necessarily 
that people with lower levels of issue-relevant knowledge are unable to form attitudes 
towards European issues at all, though it does raise questions about the reliability and 
validity of survey measures of people’s attitudes towards European integration on which 
previous analysis of variation in attitudes have been based. Rather, an alternative to the 
conclusion that people express non-attitudes in surveys is the idea that attitudes are 
formed on the basis of salient contextual cues available during questionnaire completion 
(Zaller, 1992; Sinnott, 2000).
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The implication of this alternative explanation is that people’s attitudes towards the euro 
vary in terms of how strongly-held they are and the basis on which they have been 
constructed. This conclusion is partially supported by the finding that those who have 
made up their mind on the euro issue, tend also to be those who are generally more 
politically engaged with it (Atkinson and Mortimore, 2003). Based on this discussion, it 
is not possible to conclude that there is a direct positive relationship between levels of 
knowledge about EMU and the favourability of attitudes. However, there is substantial 
evidence to support the conclusion that attitudes to the euro vary in quality, as a 
function of variation in the amount of issue-relevant knowledge people hold and the 
contextual cues available to them during survey participation. The relationship between 
issue-relevant knowledge and attitudes towards the euro forms a central focus of the 
empirical research undertaken for this thesis and is considered further in chapter 2.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided an introduction to the substantive focus of the thesis -  British 
attitudes towards European integration, and specifically, British participation in the 
single currency. I started by presenting opinion poll results from surveys carried out 
during the 1990s and early 2000s when the debate surrounding the launch of EMU was 
at its height. During this period, the single currency issue dominated political debate in 
Britain. Plans to hold a referendum -  the first of its kind for over 30 years -  focused 
both elite and popular attention on public attitudes about the euro and people’s voting 
intentions in such a poll. In this context, the impetus to understand variation in public 
opinion -  which would not only determine the outcome of a referendum, but 
importantly, whether and when such a vote would take place -  was overwhelming. 
People’s attitudes at this time were strongly opposed to adopting a single currency, and 
public support in Britain for closer integration in Europe was at one of its lowest 
recorded points in history. Notably, British citizens stood apart from their fellow EU 
citizens on a range of dimensions: support for EU membership, beliefs about the 
benefits of EU membership, support for the single currency, knowledge and awareness 
of EU affairs and acceptance of a European identity. In each case, British respondents 
held the lowest scores across Europe, highlighting further the need to understand in 
more detail the different factors underlying these trends.
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Three areas of inquiry into the factors underlying public opposition to European 
integration in Britain were reviewed in this chapter. The first consists of research into 
the influence the media -  and in particular, the British print media -  have on public 
attitudes. Prior to the empirical research undertaken here, relatively few studies had 
explored the impact on public opinion of media reports about Europe, though since then 
the number of studies in this field has proliferated. Most of the research had focused on 
the informational role played by the media in communicating the issues and events 
relating to European integration. Within that, most studies had examined specifically 
the manifestation of euroscepticism in the press and the possible effects this has on 
public opinion. One finding suggests that eurosceptic discourse in reports about 
integration contributes to public opposition to Europe by raising the salience of British 
national identity and impeding efforts to foster a sense of European identity among 
British citizens. However, few studies have specified the mechanisms by which people 
are affected -  if indeed, they are at all -  by media attention to issues surrounding 
integration, nor the processes by which information in the press influences public 
attitudes.
The second area of inquiry concerns the relationship between people’s sense of national 
identity and their attitudes towards European integration. Most of the research in this 
field prior to the present research suggested that the relationship between national 
identity and attitudes depends on the strength and nature of people’s attachment to 
nation. Two forms of national identity were highlighted in particular -  one comprised of 
nationalistic sentiments, which typically stand in the way of positive views of 
integration, and one consisting of patriotic sentiments and pride in one’s nation, which 
by comparison need not entail a rejection of closer integration with other countries. As 
well as being multi-dimensional in character, social psychological approaches to the 
study of identity suggest that people’s attachment to nation will also vary as a function 
of the salience of national identity in any given situation. This implies that the 
relationship between national identity and attitudes towards the euro may not be as 
stable as it appears and few studies of this relationship have taken this into 
consideration.
The third area of inquiry reviewed here concerns the stability of people’s attitudes 
towards the euro and its relationship with how much knowledge people have about the
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issue. Despite the apparently smooth trend lines in poll data on people’s voting 
intentions in a referendum on the euro (figure 1.3), a large proportion of British people 
confess to not knowing their views about British participation. A majority claim they 
could be persuaded to change their mind about the euro and more than anywhere else in 
the EU, British citizens feel insufficiently informed about the issues relating to 
European integration -  a perception that has been ‘objectively’ confirmed in survey 
quizzes that test people’s factual knowledge about the issue. Low levels of issue­
relevant knowledge bring into doubt the reliability and validity of survey measures of 
people’s attitudes. Attitudes reported in surveys that are underpinned by low levels of 
knowledge tend to be highly susceptible to change and sensitive to persuasive cues, as 
people construct their attitudes ‘on the spot’ during questionnaire completion. These 
conclusions call into question the foundation of research into variation in public 
attitudes towards European integration. If attitudes are unstable, then so too must be 
their observed relationship with other variables.
The overall aim of this thesis is to try to draw these findings together into a single 
model for understanding attitudes towards the euro. In particular, I argue that to 
understand variation in attitudes, it is necessary to study not simply the relationship 
between reported attitudes and covariates, but the dynamics of attitude formation and 
change. Each of the areas of inquiry reviewed concerns a different component of this 
model: the first concerns the role of information in how attitudes are formed and 
changed, the second concerns how identity processes influence this process, and the 
third concerns the importance of issue-relevant knowledge -  or more generally, people’s 
involvement in the issue -  in determining the processes by which attitudes are formed 
and changed. The theoretical framework underpinning this model is presented in the 
following chapter.
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2 THE ROLE OF INFORMATION, INVOLVEMENT AND IDENTITY IN 
ATTITUDE CHANGE
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I introduced the substantive focus of the thesis and reviewed the 
literature relating to three different fields of inquiry that inform our understanding of 
variations in public attitudes towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): 
information, involvement and identity. In this chapter, I introduce two social 
psychological approaches, which together provide the theoretical framework for the 
thesis. The first of these approaches -  the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1981; 1986) -  comes from the tradition of persuasion research and consists of 
a theory of how attitudes are formed and changed based on individual responses to 
information. The model emphasises the role of ‘issue involvement’ as a key variable 
determining a respondent’s ability and motivation to process issue-relevant information. 
The second approach of interest here is Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1985; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell, 1987), which was developed from Social 
Identity Theory (e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and Abrams, 1988), and provides a 
basis for understanding the mechanism by which identity influences attitudes. As the 
ELM forms the dominant approach in the research undertaken, I focus in some detail on 
the different elements of the model and the methodological paradigm that underpins it. 
I discuss the model’s relationship with other theories of persuasion and consider some 
of the key issues and controversies relevant to its application to the study of ‘real-world’ 
attitudes. Two of these issues have been informed by research into how the social 
context -  notably group membership -  influences persuasion processes: the role of 
variables outside of the persuasive message (including source identity) in persuasion 
and the question of what makes arguments persuasive. The social identity approach is 
introduced in this context. To begin with, I describe the field of social psychological 
research into persuasion and the context in which the Elaboration Likelihood Model was 
developed.
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2.2 Social psychological theories of persuasion
The study of attitude formation and change and the factors that influence persuasion 
constitutes one of the largest fields of research in social psychology. Today, four main 
approaches dominate, the development of which was motivated by the need to account 
for the diverse findings generated by previous empirical research in the field. In this 
thesis, I focus on just one of these: the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) developed 
by Petty and Cacioppo (1981; 1986). This section introduces the ELM alongside 
alternative accounts of the processes underlying attitude change and describes the 
historical context in which it was first devised.
Petty and Cacioppo (1981) identify seven major approaches to the study of attitude 
change that preceded their development of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM): 
including conditioning/modelling approaches, the message-learning approach, 
judgmental approaches, motivational approaches, attributional approaches, combinatory 
approaches and self-persuasion approaches (pp.35-6). Early approaches emphasised the 
role of learning processes such as classical and operant conditioning, as well as 
modelling (e.g. Razran, 1940; Staats and Staats, 1957). Research in the field at this time 
was mainly exploratory, however, and it was not until the work of Hovland and his 
colleagues (e.g. Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953), carried out as part of the Yale 
Communication and Attitude Change Program, that the field became more organised 
from both a theoretical and methodological point of view (Johnson, Maio and Smith- 
McLallen, 2005). Though their ideas were never fully developed in a formal theory 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), the ‘message learning approach’ to the study of persuasion 
had a lasting impact on how social psychologists thought about and researched attitude 
change. Their focus was on three main elements of persuasive communications: the 
source of the message, the message itself and the message recipient; as well as the 
processes by which persuasion is achieved and the persistence of its effects.
Later, members of the Yale group continued to work in the same field, developing new 
but related theories of persuasion. For example, McGuire’s information processing 
theory (1968; 1989) focused on three main steps involved in persuasion, including 
attention to the message, comprehension of the message and yielding, whereas Muzafer 
Sherif and his colleagues’ Social Judgement Model (e.g. Sherif and Hovland, 1961;
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Sherif and Sherif, 1967) emphasised the role a person’s existing attitudes played in 
providing an interpretive context for persuasive communications (Johnson et al., 2005). 
These approaches proved to be particularly influential, through their emphasis on 
process and the importance of ‘involvement’ as a mediator of attitude change.
Motivational models e.g. balance theory (Heider, 1946) and cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957), emphasised the role of motives as mediators of attitude change, while 
attributional accounts (e.g. self perception theory -  Bern, 1967) focused on the 
inferences drawn by message recipients about the communicator’s or their own 
behaviour (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981). What Petty and Cacioppo (1981) describe as 
‘combinatory approaches’ -  including Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned 
Action -  focused on how people evaluate and integrate (or combine) new information 
into existing knowledge and attitudes; and finally, self-persuasion approaches focused 
on people’s thoughts about persuasive communications and the message topic and the 
way in which this self-generated information influences attitudes. Each one of these 
approaches to the study of persuasion was distinct in that it provided a different 
explanation of how attitudes can be changed. However, not one satisfactorily accounted 
for the different empirical findings of the research literature; each applied in some 
situations, but not in others (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; p.255).
The development of self-persuasion approaches and notably, the cognitive response 
model of persuasion represented a second important turning point in the field of attitude 
change research (Johnson et al., 2005). Greenwald (1968) first introduced the idea that 
attitude change is mediated by the thoughts message recipients generate in response to a 
persuasive message. Two sets of research findings from this tradition appear to have 
been particularly influential for the authors of the ELM. Firstly, empirical studies had 
shown that the valence of cognitive responses to a persuasive communication -  in other 
words, whether the message induced favourable thoughts or counter-argumentation -  
was highly correlated with people’s attitudes (Johnson et al., 2005). Secondly, research 
findings providing evidence of ‘anticipatory attitude change’ (e.g. Cialdini and Petty, 
1981) suggested that people sometimes modified their existing attitudes even in the 
absence of a persuasive message, simply as a result of being told they would be 
presented with a communication that would be either pro- or counter-attitudinal. In this 
situation, attitudes tend either to polarise -  i.e., become more extreme -  or to attenuate 
and become more moderate, depending on how involved the recipient is in the message
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topic/ issue. Where the issue is highly important or involving for the message recipient, 
anticipation of a counter-attitudinal message encourages issue-relevant thinking, so the 
recipient can prepare to defend their existing attitude. As a result of this issue-relevant 
thinking, the attitude becomes more extreme. By contrast, where the issue is of low 
importance and not very involving, motivation to engage in issue-relevant thinking is 
low and the recipient is motivated more by impression-management concerns, resulting 
in the expression of more moderate attitudes. Thus, attitude change for recipients with 
low involvement in the message topic tends to be influenced more by “features of the 
persuasion situation that are irrelevant to the issue” than by engaging in issue-relevant 
thinking (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; p. 258). Furthermore, the persistence of these 
attitude change effects also appeared to depend on how cognitively involved the 
research participants had been in the attitude issue, leading the authors to conclude that 
“enduring attitude change (...) appears to depend on the likelihood that an issue or 
argument will be elaborated upon (thought about)” (p. 263).
The ‘Elaboration Likelihood Model’ was intended to provide an overarching framework 
for understanding attitude change that would be able to explain the existing empirical 
findings of persuasion researchers. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1981), these 
findings seemed to point towards two different ways in which persuasion could be 
achieved. One way involved relatively careful consideration of information relevant to 
the target attitude object (typically, arguments contained in a persuasive message), 
while the other way involved other types of processing that did not require the research 
participant to think about the issue. These two different ‘routes’ to attitude change -  
referred to as the ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ routes -  constitute one of the core elements 
of the ELM.
2.2.1 Contemporary approaches to the study of persuasion
Along with the ELM, three other theories of persuasion currently dominate the field. 
Developed contemporaneously with the ELM, the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) 
(Chaiken, 1980; 1987; Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989) is arguably the most 
important of these. The two models share many similarities. Importantly, like the
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ELM, the HSM similarly emphasises two different processes5 by which attitude change 
occurs in response to information, one characterised by systematic thought, the other by 
simple decision rules or heuristics -  such as ‘always trust expert sources’. However, 
they also diverge on a number of points: notably, the HSM places more emphasis on 
heuristic processing than does the ELM on the peripheral route; it also emphasises 
different underlying motives for attitude change, and allows for the possibility of 
parallel or simultaneous heuristic and systematic processing, whereas the central and 
peripheral routes in the ELM are considered to be mutually exclusive (see Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993 for a detailed discussion of how the two models compare). Nevertheless, 
despite their differences, the ELM and the HSM are often paired because they share the 
same underlying premise that persuasion can be achieved in two qualitatively different 
ways.
More recently these so-called ‘dual process’ models (Chaiken and Trope, 1999) have 
been challenged by two alternative accounts, that offer arguably more parsimonious 
explanations of the persuasion process. Both similarly make the distinction between 
‘relatively effortful’ modes of processing and modes ‘that are much less effortful’ 
(Johnson et al., 2005; p.624). However, the ‘Unimodel’ (Kruglanski and Thompson, 
1999; Kruglanski, Thompson and Spiegel, 1999) maintains that the empirical findings 
from persuasion research can be accounted for by a single mode rather than two 
qualitatively different ones, while the Cognition in Persuasion Model (CPM) developed 
by Albarracin (2002) argues that persuasion takes place through a sequence of 
processes, irrespective of effort (Johnson et al., 2005). However, as relative 
newcomers to the field, the Unimodel and the CPM are still relatively under-researched 
and there has so far not been sufficient empirical support for either to reject dual- 
process accounts of persuasion altogether (Eagley and Chaiken, 2005).
Theories of persuasion all share a common focus on the different variables that are 
responsible for attitude formation and change -  e.g. message source, recipient and 
contextual factors (Petty and Wegener, 1999). The empirical tradition of research in the 
field is almost entirely experimental, and typically adopts one of two different research 
designs (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; Johnson et al., 2005). Both involve examining the 
effect on attitudes of a specially constructed message consisting of arguments
5 Although unlike the HSM, which posits two processes, the ELM allows for multiple processes that can 
be categorised as either central or peripheral (Petty and Wegener, 1999; Johnson et al., 2005).
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supporting a specific recommendation. The first type of research design involves 
measuring attitudes both before and after message exposure to see the relative 
difference in within-subject attitudes, whilst controlling for variables such as the 
personal relevance to participants of the message topic. The second and more common 
type of design involves a single measure of attitudes from a control and an experimental 
group, but for the latter, this measure is taken after message exposure, to assess the 
relative impact of the message on attitudes. Pre-message attitudes in both groups are 
assumed to vary randomly, so random allocation to the treatment group assumes that 
any differences in attitudes observed between groups results from message exposure.
Relatively few studies in the field of persuasion have deviated from this paradigm and 
relatively few have attempted to apply persuasion theories to study attitude change 
outside of the laboratory. The research undertaken here represents such an attempt. In 
this thesis, I have chosen to adopt the ELM as a theoretical framework for 
understanding British attitudes towards the single currency. The reasons for choosing 
the ELM over other approaches were as follows. As noted, neither the Unimodel nor 
the CPM was sufficiently developed at the time the research was undertaken to offer a 
convincing alternative to either of the dominant dual-process models. Of these, my 
preference for the ELM was based on two (mainly pragmatic) considerations. Firstly, 
though in many respects certain features of the HSM arguably make it a more flexible 
model than the ELM -  e.g. it allows for multiple motives behind attitude change and the 
possibility that heuristic and systematic modes of processing can co-occur (Chen and 
Chaiken, 1999) -  the ELM has proved to be far more popular and has stimulated an 
enormous amount of research (and far more than any other theory of persuasion, 
including the HSM). One explanation for this is that the model provides a very concise 
and comprehensive framework for making predictions about how different variables 
interact in the persuasion process and a clearly explicated experimental method (see 
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) for testing these predictions. These aspects of the model 
make it equally appealing to my own research. This (ever expanding) empirical base 
has also ensured its establishment as a leading paradigm for research in this field, and its 
impact has been far-reaching. For example, the model has found considerable favour in 
the world of marketing and advertising and it has been applied across a diverse range of 
fields of research, from health psychology (e.g. Shadel, Niaura and Abrams, 2001) to 
political psychology (e.g. Kerkhof, 1999; McGraw and Hubbard, 1996). Secondly, as 
we shall see, certain features of the ELM -  particularly its predictions relating to
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elaboration likelihood -  make it particularly suitable to understanding the dynamics of 
public attitudes towards the euro in Britain, based on our understanding of those 
attitudes from chapter 1. After describing the key postulates of the model, I will discuss 
the rationale behind this application in more detail.
2.3 The Elaboration Likelihood Model
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) describe the main postulates underlying their model of 
attitude change (see also a later description by Petty and Wegener, 1999). The first of 
these is that people are motivated to hold ‘correct’ attitudes (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1986)6. This underlying assumption reflects the idea that optimally, humans will 
engage in a rational consideration of all available information in order to construct their 
attitudes. According to Petty and Wegener (1999), ‘the correctness of one’s attitude is a 
subjective assessment and can be based on a wide variety of “evidence”’ (p.44). It is 
assumed, however, that this motivation would, under ideal conditions, lead a person to 
find out about an attitude issue and carefully appraise the evidence on either side of that 
issue, in order to reach an informed evaluation.
The second postulate of the ELM maintains that the amount and nature of issue-relevant 
thinking in which people are able or willing to engage in to appraise the information 
contained in a message varies with both individual and situational factors (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999; p.44-45). People are described in the social 
cognition literature as ‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), meaning we 
typically try to constrain the amount of effort required to make sense of the world 
around us by using a variety of mental shortcuts. But some people seem to enjoy 
thinking more than others (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982) and some people are clearly more 
able to do so than others, depending on their natural abilities and level of education, 
contextual factors affecting the degree of cognitive burden on the recipient during 
message processing (e.g. the presence of distraction -  see Petty, Wells, and Brock, 
1976) and the actual content of the message. Crucially, the ability to elaborate on 
information varies according to the message topic and the amount of prior knowledge 
the recipient has about it. Similarly, the motivation to process depends not only on
6 As noted, the HSM allows for a variety of motives for attitude change (Chen and Chaiken, 1999), 
including for example impression management and self-defence.
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individual differences, but also on contextual factors and the message topic. Issues 
people consider to be more important or personally relevant will motivate more careful 
thinking about the message content.
The likelihood of message elaboration can be said to vary along a continuum. At one 
end, where motivation and ability to elaborate are low, people will be unlikely to 
expend the effort to think carefully about the issue and the arguments contained in the 
message. At the other end of the elaboration likelihood continuum, where motivation 
and ability to process information are high, people will be much more likely to take the 
time to think carefully about the issue and the message contents. In other words, people 
will vary along this continuum in terms of the amount of thinking they are likely to 
engage in for any given message topic. Factors influencing a person’s ability and 
motivation to think will determine their position on the scale. Petty and Cacioppo 
(1979a; 1986) argue that the most important determining factor is issue involvement -  or 
the extent ‘to which the attitudinal issue under consideration is of personal importance" 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1979a, p. 1915). Issue involvement therefore maps directly onto 
the elaboration likelihood continuum and attitude change can occur anywhere along this 
scale.
As previously noted, attitude change can be achieved via two different ‘routes’, each
characterised by different types of cognitive process. The central route involves
carefully attending to the arguments contained in a persuasive communication, thinking
carefully about them and evaluating them (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; p255). In this
way, new information is integrated into “a coherent and reasoned position” (Petty and
Cacioppo, 1981; p.256) and consequently, the effects of persuasion via the central route
(which are a result of active thought) tend to be more enduring. By contrast, the
peripheral route does not require the individual to engage in thoughtful processing of
the various components of a persuasive message. Instead, this persuasion route occurs
when the individual reaches his/her position vis-a-vis the attitude object as a result of
cues in the persuasive communication which prompt, for example, the use of simple
heuristics/ decision rules (Chaiken, 1987), or simple associations such as in a
conditioned response (Staats and Staats, 1957). According to Petty and Cacioppo,
"These cues (...) allow a person to evaluate a communication or decide what 
attitudinal position to adopt without engaging in any extensive cognitive work 
relevant to the issue under consideration. ” (1981; p. 256).
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Attitude change via the peripheral route is generally only short-lived, although through 
repeated persuasive attempts, enduring attitude stability can be achieved.
Figure 2.1 The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1981; 1986)
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Where elaboration likelihood is high, central route processing is more likely to occur, 
whereas where elaboration likelihood is low, it is more likely that persuasion will occur 
via the peripheral route. Thus, the two extreme points of the elaboration likelihood 
continuum are broadly associated with each of these two distinct processes of 
persuasion (see figure 2.1). However, early interpretations of the ELM wrongly 
assumed that persuasion via the central route could only be achieved at the high end of 
the elaboration likelihood continuum, whereas persuasion via the peripheral route only 
occurred where elaboration likelihood was low. In fact, the assumption that low 
elaboration likelihood will lead people to default to the ‘peripheral route’ to form their 
attitude about the target issue is incorrect, and it is indeed possible for people with low 
elaboration likelihood to engage in central route processing. Petty and Wegener (1999) 
distinguish between ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ differences in message processing, 
according to which either the amount of processing varies with elaboration likelihood, 
or the type of processing. Thus, the model predicts that the processing of recipients 
with low elaboration likelihood will differ quantitatively from that of recipients with 
high elaboration likelihood. For example, the recipient might process fewer arguments
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in the persuasive communication, or during message elaboration, generate fewer 
favourable thoughts (the cognitive responses assumed to underlie attitude formation and 
change) than somebody with more issue-involvement (Petty and Wegener, 1999). 
Peripheral processing, by contrast, is conceptualised as a qualitatively different mode 
altogether, which although not uniquely confined to the low end of the elaboration 
likelihood continuum, is more likely to occur when ability and motivation to process is 
low.
2.3.1 Testing the predictions of the ELM
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) describe the experimental method used to test the predictions 
derived from the model. The method is considered in more detail in chapter 7 of this 
thesis. This section introduces the reader to its key elements to allow a common 
understanding important to a later discussion of some of the model’s limitations.
Most ELM studies have followed the second of the two types of research designs used 
in persuasion studies that were described above. Research participants are randomly 
assigned to the experimental groups and a single measure of attitudes is taken after 
exposure to a persuasive communication. Differences in post-message attitudes (the 
main dependent variable) are attributed to the different experimental treatment in each 
group. Two experimental manipulations are central to the method. Firstly, the extent to 
which the message topic is personally involving for participants is manipulated to be 
either high or low in order to control the participants’ elaboration likelihood. Secondly, 
the quality of the arguments presented in the persuasive message is manipulated to be 
either strong or weak. Two persuasive messages are specially prepared, one consisting 
of strong arguments that have been shown in a pre-test to elicit predominantly 
favourable thoughts among a panel of judges and one consisting of weak arguments that 
have been shown to elicit predominantly negative thoughts (or counter-argumentation) 
among the judges.
The model predicts that participants who are highly involved in the message topic will 
be more likely to elaborate on the arguments contained in the persuasive message. A 
message recipient engaging in central route processing will be able to distinguish 
between arguments that are relatively compelling and arguments that are relatively
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specious, and consequently, be less likely to be persuaded by weaker arguments. 
Evidence of central-route processing is provided, therefore, by post-message attitudes 
that differentiate on the basis of argument quality. By contrast, a recipient engaging in 
peripheral route processing will be unaware of the quality of the message arguments 
because persuasion is activated by cues other than the message content. Consequently, 
evidence of peripheral-route processing is provided by post-message attitudes that fail 
to differentiate on the basis of argument quality. This basic design makes it possible to 
test the effect of a third variable on attitude change and on the quantity and quality of 
message elaboration.
2.3.2 The ELM and attitudes towards the euro
Three characteristics of the ELM make it particularly suitable as a theory for 
understanding the dynamics of British attitudes towards the euro. Firstly, the model 
defines the mechanism by which information influences attitudes. Attitude change is 
mediated by people’s thoughts about or cognitive responses to arguments contained in 
persuasive messages. This provides a framework for understanding one of the ways in 
which media information influences public opinion. Secondly, according to the model, 
the quantity and quality of issue-relevant thinking that people engage in when 
confronted with information about the attitude object depends on their involvement in 
the issue. This means that in order to understand how media information influences 
attitudes towards the euro, we need to consider the effect of issue involvement on the 
way in which and extent to which people think about the attitude object (see below). 
Thirdly, based on the description of the model provided, it is possible to derive 
hypotheses about the effect of a third variable on persuasion. This means that the model 
allows us to investigate how national identity influences public attitudes towards the 
euro, by examining its effect on how people think about the issue and respond to new 
information about it. These ideas form the central focus of the empirical work 
undertaken here.
In this thesis, I have used the term ‘involvement’ to refer to factors influencing people’s 
ability and motivation to think about the issue of British participation in the single 
currency. As in Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) definition of the term, perhaps the most 
significant of these is the extent to which the attitude object is important -  i.e. the extent
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to which people are interested in the issue and consider it personally relevant to them. 
However, the term ‘involvement’ has been used elsewhere to refer to different types of 
relationship people have towards an attitude object (see Johnson and Eagly, 1989; Maio 
and Olson, 1995). For example, Johnson and Eagly (1989) make the distinction 
between ‘outcome-relevant involvement’ (concerned with the outcomes of a particular 
advocacy for the message recipient) and ‘value-relevant involvement’ (which occurs 
where the attitude object is related to a person’s important values). Each of these types 
of involvement appear to be relevant to attitudes towards the euro (recall from chapter 1 
that people’s attitudes are shaped by expectations about the likely costs and benefits a 
single currency will bring and by values), so the use of the term here is intended to 
capture these ideas also. As the ELM predicts, when an attitude is psychologically 
important to someone, they will be more motivated to seek out information about it and 
become informed about it (see also Krosnick, 1988). In turn, issue-relevant knowledge 
becomes an important determinant of elaboration likelihood. Based on the postulates of 
the ELM, therefore, we can predict that being highly involved in the issues surrounding 
Britain’s relationship with Europe -  i.e. being interested in them and being more 
knowledgeable about them -  increases the likelihood that a person will think carefully 
about issue-relevant arguments they are presented with.
2.3.3 Limitations of the ELM
The ELM has been hugely influential in the field of persuasion research for more than 
two decades. Yet it has not been without its critics and a number of enduring 
controversies render aspects of the model problematic. Some criticisms that have been 
directed at the model were addressed briefly earlier: for example, whether the desire to 
hold ‘correct’ attitudes is the only motivating factor in attitude change (see Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993); whether message recipients can engage in parallel processing using 
both central and peripheral modes simultaneously (Stiff, 1986; Stiff and Boster, 1987); 
and whether empirical findings on attitude change can only be explained by two 
processes, or whether one process is sufficient (e.g. Kruglanski and Thompson, 1999) . 
These are issues that have become key debates among contributors to the field, but are 
not immediately relevant to the application of the model in the present thesis. However,
7 Or indeed, the fact that the ELM actually comprises multiple processes, rather than just two, as in the 
HSM, making the label ‘dual-process model’ not strictly appropriate (Johnson et al., 2005).
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two issues are more concerning, so I address these in the remainder of the chapter. The 
first concerns the model’s account of how so-called ‘extra-message’ factors (i.e. 
variables in the persuasion setting not including the arguments contained in the 
message) influence persuasion and has implications for understanding the role played 
by identity in attitude formation and change. The second issue concerns the model’s 
definition of ‘argument quality’ -  or what makes an argument persuasive (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986) and has important implications for our understanding of how 
information affects attitudes in real-world settings.
2.4 The role of identity in persuasion
Early investigations into the role played by identity in persuasion by ELM researchers 
(and similarly, by those working within the HSM) were focused predominantly on 
characteristics of the message source -  notably, source expertise and source 
attractiveness (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 1984a; DeBono and Hamish, 1988). According 
to Petty and Cacioppo’s earlier accounts of the model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 
p.256), variables of this kind, that were separate from the arguments contained in the 
message, could only influence attitudes by acting as peripheral cues. Because 
peripheral route persuasion was associated with only short-term effects on attitudes, 
extra-message variables, including source identity, were deemed to be relatively 
unimportant factors in persuasion. By contrast, because central-route persuasion 
resulted from recipients carefully processing the information contained in the message 
and integrating it into their existing structure of beliefs (with relatively enduring 
results), extra-message variables were assumed to play no part in central processing. 
Subjective evaluations of the validity of the message content -  assumed to be made by 
recipients independently of the social context in which the message was communicated 
(van Knippenberg, 1999) - were deemed to be the most important variables influencing 
the effectiveness of any persuasion attempt.
These assumptions were challenged, however, because they appeared to be so at odds 
with research findings elsewhere in social psychology. In fact, the social context in 
which persuasion attempts are made and the importance of significant others in shaping 
attitudes and behaviour have been researched extensively for over fifty years in the 
fields of social influence, conformity and inter-group behaviour (Mackie and Skelly,
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1994; Mackie and Queller, 2000). For example, one of the earliest studies which 
highlighted the influential power of significant others on people’s beliefs and attitudes 
was that of Newcomb (1943), who showed how the political views of students at 
Bennington College became progressively liberal as a result of interaction with peers 
during the course of their studies. Similarly, Festinger’s studies of attraction (e.g. 
1950), from which he developed his theory of social reality testing also highlighted the 
significant informational influence of similar others for individuals seeking to gain 
subjective validity for their views (Mackie, Worth and Asuncion, 1990). However, the 
main impetus behind challenges to social cognition accounts of how identity influences 
persuasion has come from the field of group processes, and in particular, the social 
identity paradigm (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). The next section provides a brief overview 
of the central elements of this theoretical approach before we turn more specifically to 
the critique of the ELM.
2.4.1 Key ideas from the Social Identity paradigm
Two approaches to the study of identity have come to dominate research by social 
psychologists into group processes during the last three decades: Social Identity Theory 
(e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) and Self-Categorisation Theory 
(Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Because the latter was developed out of the former 
and can be seen partly as an extension of it, the two approaches are often treated 
together, forming a single paradigm for understanding how people behave in inter-group 
contexts.
According to social identity theory, people’s membership of social groups is central to 
their self-concept. People define themselves as much by their membership of different 
groups (or ‘categories’) as by their individuality. As such, the groups to which people 
belong contribute to a sense of positive self-esteem and have psychologically distinctive 
effects on social behaviour (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; p. 11). In order to achieve this 
positive benefit of group membership, people engage in inter-group comparisons 
through which they try to establish the groups to which they belong as superior to other 
groups. Where this is not possible, people typically attempt to redefine the groups to 
which they belong in order to achieve what is referred to as “positive distinctiveness” 
for those groups (see Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1987).
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The basic tenets of social identity theory were developed further by Turner and his 
colleagues (Turner, 1985; Turner, 1987) in Self-Categorisation Theory. According to 
this approach, self-categorisation (the process by which a person defines him/ herself as 
a member of a particular group) results in depersonalised perception, which involves a 
shift from perceiving oneself as an individual to perceiving oneself as a member of a 
group. This process involves ‘self-stereotyping’ -  i.e. stereotyping oneself as a typical 
member of a group. In turn, this involves the internalisation of the perceived belief 
structures of the group and the acceptance of these as one’s own. In this sense, self- 
categorisation can have an important influence on how individuals think and feel about 
different issues. It also has an important impact on inter-group behaviour. The process 
of categorisation underpins all inter-group comparisons and depersonalised perception 
results in the differences between groups being accentuated, while those within groups 
are minimised. Outgroups (the groups of which we are not members) are, thereby, 
perceived to be more homogeneous than ingroups (the groups of which we are 
members). This inter-group bias results in a greater propensity for ingroup favouritism 
and a tendency towards denigrating outgroups.
Because people are members of a range of social groups, they hold a repertoire of 
different social identities, not all of which will be salient at any given time. When a 
social category becomes salient, people are more likely to categorise themselves as 
members of the salient group and to seek to enhance the evaluation of that group. Thus, 
in intergroup contexts -  i.e. situations in which category salience is enhanced -  “group 
behaviour represents a shift of self-definition to a salient categorisation” (Abrams and 
Brown, 1989; p. 311). In other words, people cease to perceive themselves as 
individuals and instead start to view themselves as interchangeable with other members 
of the shared category. The results of this shift in self-definition are the cognitive 
psychological effects described above -  i.e. depersonalised perception, self-stereotyping 
and the internalisation of group beliefs.
Variation in the salience of groups at different times operates differently depending on 
the type of social category and the context in which social-identification occurs. For 
example, in the home, it is often one’s family group, which is the salient social category 
guiding one’s thoughts and behaviour in relation to other groups. At work, social 
identity is more likely to be tied to occupation. By interacting with other members of
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these groups, we become familiar with the shared belief structures within them, and 
these belief structures are easily communicated among group members. As Van 
Knippenberg (1999; p.317) describes it, “what we deem to be true tends to be 
determined by what is considered to be true within the groups to which we belong.” 
With large-scale categories such as nation, the mechanisms that influence the salience 
of the category and the diffusion of group beliefs operate somewhat differently to with 
smaller groups, with the mass media playing a key role in both (Cinnirella, 1996). The 
psychological effects of salience operate in the same as with smaller groups, however; 
both result in the individual categorising and self-stereotyping him/herself as a member 
of the salient group.
2.4.2 Social identity and persuasion
As van Knippenberg (1999) notes, while research into social influence, conformity and 
group processes highlights the significance of the social context in shaping attitudes and 
behaviour, these approaches within social psychology have all tended to neglect the role 
of information in persuasion. At the same time, the social cognition approaches to 
attitude formation and change -  notably the ELM and the HSM -  have over-emphasised 
the role of information, while neglecting the social context in which persuasive 
communications take place (see also Mackie and Queller, 2000). To bridge this 
impasse, a number of researchers began to explore the role of social identification 
processes in persuasion, using the experimental paradigm provided by the ELM (e.g. 
Mackie, Worth and Asuncion, 1990; van Knippenberg and Wilke, 1991; 1992; Mackie, 
Gustardo-Conaco and Skelly, 1992; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson and Turner, 1994; 
Platow, Mills and Morrison, 2000). In particular, these researchers looked for evidence 
of central-route/ systematic processing -  such as greater number of issue-relevant 
thoughts reported in a thought-listing task; close correlation between the favourability 
of cognitive responses to a message and post-message attitudes; and differentiation of 
post-message attitudes and cognitive responses on the basis of argument quality (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986; van Knippenberg, 1999) among participants presented with 
messages attributed to ingroup sources compared with participants presented messages 
from outgroup sources.
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Mackie, Worth and Asuncion (1990) were the first to highlight the possibility that 
information regarding the ingroup-outgroup status of a message source might in fact 
induce intensive systematic processing, rather than acting simply as a peripheral cue. 
They conducted two studies to investigate processes mediating the persuasive impact of 
messages representing ingroup opinions (Mackie et al., 1990). Both studies employed 
ELM-style methodology, using an argument quality manipulation to establish the 
relative quantity of attitude change from strong and weak messages, as well as the 
extent of message processing (i.e. whether central or peripheral). The first study 
indicated an increased propensity for participants to engage in argument based 
processing of ingroup messages (strong messages being more persuasive than weak 
messages). In the second study, the authors introduced a manipulation of the group 
relevance of the message advocacy. Where group relevance was high, strong ingroup 
messages were more persuasive than weak ones. However, where group relevance was 
low, no argument quality effect was established, suggesting that group membership had 
served as a peripheral cue in the persuasion context. Thus, the authors concluded that 
attitude change mediated by group membership concerns could not only be systematic, 
rigorous and even objective, but could also induce powerful long-term persuasive 
effects (Mackie et al., 1990; p.822).
Van Knippenberg and Wilke (1991; 1992) similarly showed that ingroup sources 
stimulated central-route processing. Their participants generated more message-related 
thoughts when presented with an ingroup communication, the favourability of cognitive 
responses better predicted post-message attitudes for ingroup sources than for outgroup 
sources, and they recalled more ingroup arguments than outgroup arguments (van 
Knippenberg, 1999). Participants receiving ingroup messages were also more likely to 
distinguish between strong and weak arguments. In particular, strong ingroup messages 
were more persuasive than weak ingroup messages and elicited more favourable 
cognitive responses. Meanwhile, participants failed to differentiate in the same way 
between strong and weak arguments from outgroups (van Knippenberg and Wilke, 
1991; 1992).
Mackie et al.’s (1990) research was replicated and extended by McGarty, Haslam, 
Hutchinson and Turner (1994), who integrated the findings into a social identity account 
of the cognitive mediation of attitude change. These authors conducted two studies to 
explore the ability of group-membership information about a message source to induce
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thoughtful content-based processing, in conditions of both low and high category 
salience (McGarty et al., 1994; Haslam, McGarty and Turner, 1996). Their results led 
the authors to conclude that the dual-process approach to persuasion of the ELM had 
inadequately accounted for the ability of category membership to induce central-route, 
systematic processing under conditions of high category salience, but that under 
conditions of low salience, the group information appeared to function in the manner 
specified by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), as a cue to a peripheral mode of processing.
In summary, the results of these studies posed a direct challenge to early accounts of the 
ELM that implied that extra-message variables including source characteristics could 
only achieve relatively short-lived persuasive effects by acting as peripheral cues. In 
fact, information about the ingroup/outgroup status of a message source appears to play 
an integral part in determining the likelihood of message elaboration. People are more 
likely to centrally-process messages from ingroup sources - assuming the relevant 
category is salient (McGarty et al., 1994; Haslam, McGarty and Turner, 1996) -  
particularly when the message topic is relevant to the concerns of the group (Mackie et 
al., 1990) and where the message is ‘group prototypical’ -  i.e. where it represents 
ingroup consensus (van Knippenberg and Wilke, 1992; van Knippenberg et al., 1994; 
van Knippenberg, 1999).
2.4.3 Multiple roles for persuasion variables
Challenges to the ELM concerning the role of extra-message variables such as source 
characteristics in persuasion prompted the authors of the ELM to clarify the basis of the 
model in their later descriptions of it (e.g. Petty, 1997; Petty and Wegener, 1999; 
Fleming and Petty, 2000). These authors argue that early interpretations of the model 
wrongly assumed that ‘non-content variables’ (van Knippenberg, 1999) such as source 
attractiveness, expertise and identity could only affect attitudes by serving as peripheral 
cues to persuasion (Petty, 1997). In fact, the model maintains that persuasion variables 
can function in any of four different ways to effect attitude change. To summarise, the 
so-called ‘multiple roles postulate’ of the ELM maintains that persuasion variables can 
act in either of the following ways: (1) by influencing the quantity of central-route 
processing; (2) by influencing the quality of central-route processing (i.e. producing a
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bias in elaboration); (3) by serving as a ‘cue’ for peripheral processing; and (4) by 
serving as an ‘argument’ in central processing (Petty and Wegener, 1999).
Clearly, an infinite number of variables exist in any given persuasion context, each with 
the capacity to exert an influence over how people respond to persuasive messages. In 
ELM experiments, the number of these variables is restricted so that just one forms the 
focus of investigation (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The experimenter seeks to identify 
the specific effect that this variable has on persuasion under specific conditions. By 
constraining issue involvement (i.e. elaboration likelihood) to be either high or low, and 
the quality of the arguments in the persuasive communication to be either ‘weak’ or 
‘strong’, it is possible to examine the effect of the variable under investigation on 
attitude change. The model predicts that the role the variable of interest (e.g. source 
attractiveness; source identity, etc.) will take in persuasion depends on the recipient’s 
elaboration likelihood. Thus, under conditions of low elaboration likelihood (i.e. where 
issue involvement is low), then it is more likely that the variable will act as a peripheral 
cue, because the recipient is either unmotivated or unable to systematically process the 
arguments contained in the message. By contrast, under conditions of high elaboration 
likelihood (i.e. where issue involvement is high), the recipient is expected to be able and 
motivated to engage in extensive cognitive work in order to appraise the different 
arguments in the message and, thereby, the overall merits of the advocated position. 
Because the recipient is assumed to be systematically evaluating the arguments 
contained in the message, then other variables in the persuasion context are expected to 
be evaluated in the same way. The variable of interest is said to act as an argument in 
its own right, providing issue-relevant information for the high-elaborator to think about 
in order to decide his/ her attitudinal position (Fleming and Petty, 2000). Processing 
remains systematic/ central, but the information regarding source attractiveness or 
identity is also treated as a relevant argument in the appraisal of the message.
This depiction of central-route processing assumes that it is relatively objective. 
However, under conditions of high elaboration likelihood, it is also possible that the 
persuasion variable can serve to bias issue-relevant thinking -  in other words, influence 
the quality of issue-relevant thinking. Under these conditions, the variable influences 
the favourability of cognitive responses to the arguments contained in the message, or 
the number of counter-arguments the recipient generates in response to the message. By 
contrast, between the two opposite ends of the elaboration likelihood continuum, at
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moderate levels of issue involvement, persuasion variables are predicted to act as an 
influence on whether or not the persuasive communication is elaborated on in the first 
place -  i.e., to influence the quantity or likelihood of elaboration. Thus, any persuasion 
variable can serve multiple roles in persuasion (Petty and Wegener, 1999), which means 
the model can indeed accommodate factors that were originally conceptualised as 
‘peripheral’ variables (e.g. source attractiveness or source identity) as equally capable of 
effecting changes in attitudes via the central route to persuasion.
Critics of the ELM (e.g. Stiff and Boster, 1987) have argued that the multiple roles 
postulate renders the theory virtually untestable, because it can be used to explain, post- 
hoc, any possible outcome from a persuasion experiment. Petty and Wegener (1999) 
maintain, however, that this is not the case, and that the task for persuasion researchers 
is to determine the various conditions under which different variables act in each of the 
different roles. As van Knippenberg (1999) notes, because the ELM allows extra- 
message variables to function in multiple roles in persuasion, the findings of social 
identity researchers who have studied how source identity affects attitudes do not 
fundamentally challenge the ELM (p.324). However, van Knippenberg does critique 
the idea that extra-message variables can only influence the quantity of issue-relevant 
thinking at moderate levels of elaboration likelihood. He argues that to a certain extent 
this assumption is true of all variables (given that at the extremes of the elaboration 
likelihood continuum, the routes to persuasion are more predictable), and believes the 
processing-motivating potential of extra-message variables such as ingroup sources 
“need not be restricted to a limited set of situations” (1999; p. 323).
2.5 Argument quality in the ELM
The second issue which has stimulated some controversy surrounding the ELM 
concerns the empirical definition of argument quality used in ELM studies. This section 
describes Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) method of constructing strong and weak 
messages for their experiments and discusses some of the reasons why this has been 
challenged and their implications.
The authors of the ELM developed an empirical method for distinguishing between 
“arguments that people find compelling and those that are counterarguable” for use in
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their experiments (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; p.32). Their solution stems from the 
cognitive response approach in persuasion: arguments that elicit negative thoughts, with 
which people find it easy to counter-argue, are considered to be less likely to achieve 
effective persuasion than strong and compelling arguments that elicit positive thoughts 
(Petty, Ostrom and Brock, 1981). In order to develop strong and weak messages on a 
particular topic, Petty and Cacioppo’s method involves generating a pool of ‘intuitively 
compelling and specious’ arguments, which are then rated by ‘members of the 
appropriate subject population’. Arguments with higher persuasiveness ratings are then 
used to construct a strong message and arguments with lower ratings are combined to 
form a weak message. These messages are then evaluated by a further group of judges, 
who are asked to complete a thought-listing task, to ensure that each one elicits an 
appropriate profile of favourable, unfavourable or neutral cognitive responses (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986; p.32). For example, messages are deemed to be strong, if they 
generate 65% favourable thoughts, whereas messages deemed to be weak generate only 
35% favourable thoughts (Mongeau and Williams, 1996).
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) were aware of the problematic nature of the concept of 
argument quality and that the empirical solution they proposed did not fully address 
this. In their explication of the ELM methodology, they state that, “one of the least 
researched and least understood questions in the psychology of persuasion is: What 
makes an argument persuasive?” (1986; 31). They cite Fishbein and Ajzen (1981; 359), 
who argue that “the general neglect of the information contained in a message...is 
probably the most serious problem in communication and persuasion research”. Yet 
because distinguishing between strong and weak arguments formed such a central part 
of their experimental method, they chose to ignore the conceptual issue in favour of a 
more pragmatic solution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, their method, and their 
failure to address the question of what distinguishes persuasive arguments from 
unpersuasive ones, has come under criticism from a number of different sources.
Notably, Johnson and Eagly (1989) conducted a meta-analysis of ELM studies and 
found that studies conducted by Petty, Cacioppo and their colleagues yielded results that 
were consistent with the predictions of the ELM, while other researchers produced 
inconsistent results (Mongeau and Williams, 1996). Petty and Cacioppo’s (1990) 
explanation for this anomaly was that other researchers do not follow precisely the same 
method for constructing strong and weak arguments for their experiments as they
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themselves do. Mongeau and Williams (1996) distinguish between ‘cognition-based’ 
definitions of argument quality and ‘message-based’ definitions, in a study that was 
designed to test the hypothesis that varying definitions of argument quality would 
produce different results in ELM studies. Their message-based definition focused on 
two factors: argument relevance (how important the argument is to the recipient) and 
the expertise of the sources cited as evidence for the argument. The results of studies 
using both kinds of manipulations were found to be inconsistent with the predictions of 
the ELM, but they showed how varying argument quality manipulations influenced the 
kind of results generated in persuasion research.
Areni and Lutz (1988) analysed the strong and weak arguments used in one ELM study 
(Petty et al., 1983) and identified one problem in particular with Petty and Cacioppo’s 
definition of argument quality. The ‘message’ in question was an advertisement for a 
disposable razor. The authors found that strong messages included arguments that 
highlighted positive characteristics of the product, whereas weak messages highlighted 
negative characteristics of the product. In other words, the definition of argument 
‘strength’ (whether the message was strong or weak) was confounded with argument 
‘valence’ (whether the message was positive or negative). As these authors note, the 
problem with this is that “there is the potential for ‘strong arguments’ to come to mean 
‘anything in a persuasive message that elicits a positive response’ and ‘weak arguments’ 
to mean ‘anything in a persuasive message that elicits a negative response’” (Areni and 
Lutz, 1988; p.201) -  irrespective of the logical features of the arguments themselves. 
On this basis, Areni and Lutz argued that as an alternative to using recipient-based 
criteria (i.e. cognitive responses) to determine argument quality, message-based criteria 
(i.e. some logical feature of the argument) should be used instead for distinguishing 
between strong and weak arguments. Drawing on McGuire’s (1960) work, which 
analysed persuasive communications in terms of logical syllogisms, and the model of 
beliefs and attitudes developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), they define argument 
strength as the likelihood that the ‘target belief or conclusion of the advocacy is 
accepted. Underlying the target belief are support beliefs or premises, which determine 
the likelihood of accepting the target belief. Thus, altering argument strength should 
involve altering the nature of the supporting evidence in an argument (while controlling 
for how desirable the target belief in the message is portrayed).
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Areni and Lutz’s work was extended by Boiler, Swasy and Munch (1990) who proposed 
an alternative definition of the structure of arguments as a way of defining argument 
quality on the basis of message characteristics, rather than recipient responses. Drawing 
on Toulmin’s (1958) model of argument structure (see chapter 5) which identifies six 
components of arguments, they proposed that arguments be evaluated according to their 
structural integrity. In particular, they focused on factors such as the evidence used to 
support an argument claim and the ‘warrant’ or authority linking the evidence to the 
claim as important structural elements for understanding variation in argument 
persuasiveness. They argue that manipulating structural features of arguments to vary 
quality can be done in different ways, so future analyses need to focus on the question 
of “‘Which component parts of an argument structure manipulation will influence the 
nature of receivers’ elaboration?” (Boiler et al., 1990; p.327). They also highlight the 
importance of the recipients own representation of the arguments they are presented 
with during message elaboration, stating that “If we are to better understand persuasion 
and argument elaboration, we need to begin to see the necessary relationships between 
the logical structure of the argument and the argumentative structure of receivers’ 
processing.” (p.327).
A more fundamental challenge to the ELM definition of argument quality based on 
cognitive responses, which applies equally to message-based definitions of argument 
strength, came from the same group of researchers who challenged the ELM’s treatment 
of how source identity influences persuasion (e.g. Mackie, Worth and Asuncion, 1990; 
van Knippenberg and Wilke, 1991; 1992; McGarty et al., 1994). These contributors 
criticised social cognition approaches to persuasion (including the ELM and the HSM) 
for failing to address the question of what makes some messages more persuasive than 
others, arguing that without an adequate account of what confers validity on information 
they ‘fall short of providing a complete theory of persuasion’ (Mackie and Skelly, 1994, 
p. 271; Eagly and Chaiken, 1984). The recipient-based definition of argument quality 
used in ELM studies is described as inadequate because it ignores the social context in 
which persuasion attempts are made. As has been shown in a number of studies, the 
social context (and particularly the ingroup/outgroup status of a message source) 
provides people with cues that can not only elicit persuasion via peripheral processes, 
but also act as a powerful determinant of the likelihood of central-route processing. 
Evidence of central-route processing instigated by source identity manifested itself in 
these studies in a variety of ways. Notably, participants rated arguments from ingroup
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sources as more persuasive than arguments from outgroup sources and were more likely 
to differentiate strong arguments from weak arguments where the message was from an 
ingroup source than when the message was from an outgroup source. In other words, 
information about the source of a message was shown to not only influence elaboration 
likelihood, but to co-determine the subjective validity (or persuasive quality) of the 
arguments contained within it (van Knippenberg, 1999).
Mackie and Skelly (1994) argue that social consensus is the mechanism underlying the 
enhanced persuasive influence of ingroups over outgroups. Rather than deriving the 
validity of information through processing itself (as is implied by the ELM’s recipient- 
based definition of argument quality), recipients look to significant others to decide 
whether new information should be accepted as valid. Specifically, they argue that in 
the social world “consensus confers correctness” (Mackie and Skelly, 1994; p.277), 
because “consensus suggests that what is agreed upon reflects reality” p.276). This idea 
is extended by McGarty and his colleagues (1994; see also Haslam, McGarty and 
Turner, 1996), who provide a social identity explanation for the basis of argument 
quality. They argue that under self-categorisation theory, “the persuasiveness of a 
person’s arguments is a function of the degree of relative consensual support for his or 
her position with respect to a currently salient frame of reference.” (p.272). In other 
words, what is important is not simply social consensus, but the extent to which the 
message recipient believes the source is informative about reality (p.286) and 
importantly, a “more valid source of information than the outgroup” (Haslam, McGarty 
and Turner, 1996; p.52).
Argument quality constitutes one of the key elaboration likelihood variables, central to 
the experimental design of ELM research. By manipulating argument quality (along 
with the research participants’ level of involvement in the target issue), it is possible to 
examine the effect of the specific persuasion variable under investigation. This 
experimental design relies on the possibility of identifying arguments that can be 
objectively defined as ‘strong’ and arguments that can be objectively defined as ‘weak’, 
where the former is assumed to have a greater impact on persuasion than the latter when 
elaboration likelihood is high. If the argument quality manipulation in ELM studies is 
confounded with other variables in the persuasion context -  such as source identity, or 
even argument valence -  then the degree of experimental control required to determine 
the impact of persuasion variables on attitude change is reduced. The way in which
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argument quality is operationalised, therefore, is fundamental to determining the 
validity of the conclusions that can be drawn from persuasion research. However, the 
implications of these developments of the concept of argument quality extend beyond 
the reliability of ELM experiments. Defining what makes an argument persuasive also 
has implications for how attitude change is assumed to function in the real world, and 
the factors that determine how new information about attitude objects are processed 
outside of the social psychology laboratory. This is particularly pertinent for how 
political campaigns persuade voters of the advantages and disadvantage of a particular 
policy, and especially one with such widespread import that it will be decided in a 
referendum.
2.6 Conclusions
In chapter 1, I showed how British opposition towards the euro during the 1990s and 
early 2000s was underpinned by low levels of issue-relevant knowledge and concerns 
about the threat of European integration to national identity. Information about 
economic and monetary union circulated by the British print media appeared to play a 
part in maintaining these sentiments, partly because it was shown to contain factual 
inaccuracies, but also because eurosceptic discourse in news articles appeared to serve 
to raise the salience of British national identity instead of helping to foster a shared 
sense of ‘Europeanness’ (e.g. Hardt-Mautner, 1995). However, the psychological 
mechanisms by which media information achieves these effects on public opinion had 
not been clearly articulated in previous studies. In the present chapter, I introduced two 
social psychological approaches, which taken together, provide a theoretical framework 
for understanding these processes.
The ELM describes how attitude formation and change is mediated by individual 
cognitive responses to information. The way in which information is processed by 
recipients is said to vary as a function of issue involvement. Where levels of 
involvement in the issue are low, recipients are less likely to think carefully about the 
arguments contained in a message and more likely to form their attitudes on the basis of 
simple cues in the persuasion context. Based on this reading of the ELM, we would 
predict, therefore, that people with low involvement in the euro issue would be more 
likely to form their attitudes via peripheral processes, based on factors other than the
79
informational content of the message. Self-categorisation theory describes one such 
process: when a particular social category is made salient (as is the case with British 
national identity in eurosceptic media discourse), people start to perceive themselves not 
as individuals but as interchangeable members of the group. The process of stereotyping 
oneself as a prototypical member of the ingroup involves the adoption of group beliefs, 
without the need for careful processing of the information presented.
However, as was shown in this chapter, this interpretation of the ELM and of the role 
that identity plays in persuasion is overly simplistic. In fact, social identity processes 
can influence persuasion in a variety of ways. In particular, where information is highly 
relevant to a person’s ingroup or where the source of the information is a member of a 
person’s ingroup, self-categorisation as a member of the salient group can influence 
both the quantity and quality of elaboration likelihood itself. This means that although 
people may be uninterested in and lack knowledge about the euro, their motivation to 
process the information may be derived from the importance of that information to the 
interests of their ingroup (e.g. the ‘British public’) or the validity conferred on the 
information by the identity of its source (e.g. The Sun, The Daily Telegraph). While 
previous studies have gone far to specify the conditions under which group identity 
motivates processing and the limiting conditions of this processing-motivating effect 
(van Knippenberg, 1999), no research has specifically applied these theoretical 
conclusions to the study of persuasion in the real-world.
The predictions derived from the theoretical approaches presented in this chapter 
informed the focus of the empirical research conducted for this thesis. In fact, the 
empirical studies each address different aspects of the topics covered so far. The first 
two studies (A and B) look at information about the euro circulated by the media, and 
consider the different ways in which it may influence public opinion. The third and 
fourth studies concentrate more specifically on testing the predictions of the ELM 
described above, with respect to the role of involvement and the processing of 
information (study C) and the role of identity (study D). The following chapter 
introduces these four studies in more detail, describing their theoretical rationale and the 
methodological approaches adopted in each.
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2 introduced the contextual and theoretical background to the research. 
This chapter provides an introduction to the empirical content of the thesis. The 
research consists of four separate empirical investigations, addressing different 
questions about the role of information, involvement and identity in the processes by 
which people form and change their attitudes towards European integration, and 
specifically, the single currency. In this chapter, I briefly describe the aim of each 
study, the research questions and give a brief outline of the design of each investigation. 
Because each study is methodologically quite distinct, the empirical chapters 
themselves contain a more detailed description of the methods used, and the theoretical 
framework underpinning each. The purpose of the present chapter, therefore, is simply 
to introduce the research, the different approaches that were adopted and the reasons for 
selecting these approaches.
The studies presented in chapters 4 to 8 bring together a range of empirical evidence 
from the media and from public opinion and draw on a number of theoretical 
frameworks. Together, these studies can be seen as an integration of insights from 
political science, public opinion research and social psychology that may enhance our 
understanding of the way the debate surrounding the single currency has progressed in 
Britain. Each study is relatively self contained, however, and can be read as such. The 
first two studies deal with the media. How much coverage has the public been exposed 
to and what is the content of this coverage, particularly in relation to forms of 
persuasive argument employed by press outlets of differing political outlooks? The 
third study is an analysis of a public opinion field experiment, a Deliberative Poll. Here 
the main emphasis is on examining the effect that political information has on attitudes 
and attitude change within a representative sample of the British public. Finally, in 
chapter 7 and 8 ,1 present results from an online experimental study that builds on the 
findings of chapters 4 to 6. In this study, I test explicitly the theoretical framework I 
have proposed in chapter 2, based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).
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3.2 Study A: Content analysis of the press
The first study explores the media context in which information about the single 
currency has been communicated to the British public. Focusing on a ten-year period 
starting in 1991, it aims to chart the course of the debate surrounding British 
membership of the euro, by looking at the salience of the issue in the press at different 
points in time. Specifically, it addresses the following 3 questions:
1. How much press coverage did the euro issue attract during this period?
2. What events relating to the issue attracted the most attention?
3. How concerned was the public about the issue during the same period?
In answering these questions, the study aims to establish how salient the issue has been 
in the public arena over the course of the debate, to identify the pivotal points around 
which the debate has revolved, and to examine the relationship, if any, between the 
salience of the issue in the media and public opinion.
The study consists of a content analysis of articles in leading British newspapers 
representing different sides of the debate. The data were collected using the online 
search facility FT-Profile, which provides access to press publications for a wide range 
of titles. The number of articles making reference to the search term ‘single currency’ 
was recorded for each month of a ten-year period starting in December 1991, at the time 
of the Maastricht Summit. The analysis included a range of pro- and anti-European, 
broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, in order to allow comparisons across different types 
of publication. On the basis of this analysis, I describe the course of the debate during 
this period, examining the different events and issues relating to EMU that stimulated 
the greatest amount of news coverage. These ‘intensity data’ are then compared with 
data on the issues considered most important by the public during the same period. The 
public opinion data were obtained from MORI (now Ipsos-MORI), who, during the 
period covered by the content analysis, regularly fielded a question asking ‘What are the 
most important issues facing Britain today?’ Data show the proportion of respondents 
who mention Europe and the single currency as one of the most important issues. The 
purpose of this comparison is to look at the relationship between the salience of the euro 
issue on the public agenda and its salience on the media agenda.
The study is underpinned by the theoretical framework provided by the agenda-setting 
approach (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). According to this approach, the media play an
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important influential role in opinion formation by directing public attention onto 
different issues at different times. The salience of an issue in the media is said to be 
directly related to the salience of the issue on the list of concerns of the electorate, 
which is why the intensity data here are compared with public opinion data on issue 
salience. One advantage of adopting this approach is that it enhances our understanding 
of attitudes towards the euro by specifying one of the mechanisms by which the media 
can influence public opinions. While an agenda-setting influence may be minimal, it is 
nevertheless important because when issues are salient, public involvement in them is 
also likely to be enhanced, and with that, the elaboration likelihood of issue-relevant 
information. Study A also serves an important descriptive function, however, mapping 
out the ‘landscape’ of the EMU debate (Bauer et al., 2001) over a significant part of its 
life course and setting the scene for the later empirical research presented in this thesis.
3.3 Study B: Argumentation analysis of leading articles
The second study examines the content of newspaper coverage of the euro issue in 
Britain during the same ten-year period analysed in study A. Concentrating on eight 
different events that were significant milestones in the history of EMU, it aims to 
explore how the opinion-leading press has portrayed the debate surrounding British 
membership of the euro to its readers. In particular, the focus of the analysis is on the 
structure and content of arguments used to communicate the editorial position of the 
newspapers vis-a-vis EMU. By focusing on arguments, the research aims to identify 
how press outlets on either side of the debate have framed the euro issue, and thereby, 
gain insight into how the public may have come to think about the issue. A second aim 
is to examine the persuasive quality of information about the euro circulated by the 
media, in order to enhance our understanding of the basis on which public attitudes are 
formed and changed.
The study involves an analysis of leading articles published in The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph (and their Sunday equivalents, The Observer and The Sunday 
Telegraph). The decision to look at broadsheet papers was based on the argument that 
the quality press play a significant role in terms of leading public opinion (Bauer et al. 
2001; p.36). Despite the comparatively limited circulation of broadsheet titles, they are 
read by opinion-leaders, including policy makers, business leaders and those producing
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other print and broadcast media. In this way, the stance newspapers take on key 
political issues and the way in which they represent those issues, is said to eventually 
filter through to the general public. These specific titles were chosen because they 
represent two opposing sides of the debate on EMU. The Daily Telegraph is 
traditionally a right-wing publication, which adopted a firmly ‘eurosceptic’ position on 
the single currency during the period under investigation. By contrast, The Guardian, 
traditionally a strong supporter of Labour policy, has generally taken a positive stance 
on matters relating to European integration (though its position on the euro has at times 
been more ambivalent).
The study draws on the theoretical framework provided by Toulmin’s (1958) model of 
argument and on the work of other social psychologists who have applied his model to 
analyses of media content (e.g. Liakopoulos, 2000a; 2000b; van Bavel, 2001). The 
model identifies six different components of argumentative discourse. For the purposes 
of the present study, the most important of these argument components are the claim 
(the point being argued) and the evidence provided in support of the claim. In addition 
to claims and evidence, arguments rely on warrants -  the justification for the 
relationship between the claim and evidence. In a leading article, the newspaper’s 
editor, a senior journalist or other prominent figure typically develops a single argument 
or series of arguments about a particular issue or in relation to a particular event. These 
arguments serve as a vehicle -  either explicitly or implicitly - for communicating the 
overall position of the newspaper with respect to some overarching issue. The principal 
aim of the analysis undertaken here was to examine in detail how arguments in the 
selected articles are constructed (by identifying and coding the constituent elements in 
Toulmin’s model), then to see how each argument communicates the main advocacy of 
the newspaper with respect to EMU. Specifically, the purpose of the analysis was to 
answer the following:
1. What claims are made by each newspaper about EMU and the single currency 
over the course of the different events?
2. How have claims about EMU changed over the course of the debate?
3. What evidence is invoked in the articles to support the newspapers’ positions on 
the euro?
4. What are the warrants on which arguments about EMU are founded?
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The rationale behind the use of argument analysis in the study is twofold. Firstly, from 
the point of view of understanding the way in which people form and change their 
attitudes in response to information, it is appropriate to conceptualise that information 
as consisting of ‘persuasive units’ or arguments. This idea is central to cognitive 
theories of persuasion such as the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986). In order to 
study the informational content of people’s attitudes, it is necessary to identify the 
arguments about the euro that people have been exposed to. Arguments circulated by 
the media form one of a range of informational influences on people’s attitudes. 
However, in relation to an issue like EMU, where people have few opportunities to 
experience the economic and political developments of integration firsthand (Gavin, 
2000), the informational role of the media is considered to be especially important. 
Secondly, Billig (1987) and others researching in the field of social representations 
theory have argued that in terms of their structure, arguments provide us with a model 
for human thought processes. According to this approach, studying argumentation in 
newspapers can provide an insight into the ways in which political issues are 
constructed and framed by the media and thereby, into how they come to be represented 
cognitively and socially by the public.
3.4 Study C: Secondary analysis of data from a deliberative poll
Whereas studies A and B look at the information about EMU that has been circulated by 
the media, studies C and D both focus on the impact of information on attitudes. Study 
C is a secondary analysis of data from a ‘deliberative poll’ -  a public opinion field 
experiment looking at attitudes towards the future of Britain’s relationship with Europe. 
The twin aims of the analysis are to test predictions about the effect of information on 
attitudes and to examine the role of issue involvement in attitude change.
The theoretical framework for this study is provided by the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1981; 1986), reviewed in the previous chapter. To recap, the model postulates that 
people form new attitudes and evaluate existing ones in response to information. The 
amount of effort a person makes to evaluate new information depends on the content of 
that information and its persuasive quality. If the recipient is highly involved in the 
issue to which the information relates, he/she will be more likely to make the effort to 
evaluate the information carefully. By contrast, if the recipient has no involvement in
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the issue to which the information relates, he/she will be less likely to make the effort to 
evaluate the information carefully. The amount of effort expended to evaluate issue­
relevant information has implications for the strength of attitudes formed and for the 
cognitive process by which they are formed. Thus, we can differentiate people 
according to their level of involvement in an issue and test predictions derived from the 
model about differences in their attitudes and their responses to issue-relevant 
information.
The concept of ‘issue involvement’ in this context is closely related to the idea of 
‘political sophistication’ used by political scientists to explain differences in people’s 
political attitudes (e.g. Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1987). The more knowledgeable a 
person is about politics and the more interested they are in political issues, the more 
likely it is that they will hold strong political attitudes (Krosnick and Petty, 1994). By 
contrast, those who are less politically sophisticated, who have little knowledge about 
political issues and who are not interested in politics, will be more likely to hold weak 
attitudes (or, indeed, no attitudes at all). Weak attitudes are more labile and susceptible 
to change; while ‘no attitudes’ are often expressed as ‘non-attitudes’ in surveys: the 
random selection of the first available satisfactory response (Converse, 1964; Krosnick, 
1991).
A deliberative poll provides the perfect research setting for testing such predictions. 
The method, developed by Fishkin (1991), consists of an initial household survey of a 
random probability sample of the population, to measure people’s attitudes on a 
particular target issue. A representative sub-sample of respondents to the survey then 
takes part in a weekend event for which they are provided detailed briefing material 
about the issue to read before taking part. During the weekend, participants are 
provided with further information about the issue and there are opportunities for debate 
and discussion with experts and other participants. At the end of the event, the 
participants complete a second questionnaire to measure their attitudes towards the issue 
that has formed the focus of the deliberative event. Comparing data from the two time 
points makes it possible to evaluate the impact of information and deliberation on 
attitudes.
The data used in this study come from a deliberative poll on the future of Britain’s 
relationship to Europe, carried out in 1995 by the National Centre for Social Research,
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on behalf of Channel Four Television and The Independent newspaper. The data had 
not previously been subjected to secondary analysis by any other researcher (the only 
analysis prior to study C was conducted for the purposes of the television broadcast of 
the event), so this was a unique opportunity to examine attitude change outside of the 
context of a conventional persuasion experiment. The questionnaire contained a range 
of attitudinal measures about the future of Britain’s relationship with the European 
Union. Respondents were also asked about how interested they are in politics and in 
Europe, and a series of true/false quiz questions designed to test their knowledge of 
European politics. These latter questions are used in the analysis to construct an ‘index 
of issue involvement’, which I use to divide the weekend participants into two groups: 
those who are highly involved in European integration and those with low levels of 
involvement. Analysing data from these two sub-samples, I address the following 
research questions:
1. What are the key socio-demographic differences between low- and high- 
involvement participants? In other words, what explains involvement in the 
issue of Britain’s relationship with Europe?
2. How do low- and high-involvement participants differ in terms of their opinions 
about the future of Britain’s relationship with Europe, their underlying beliefs 
about European integration and specifically, their attitudes towards the euro?
3. What is the effect of receiving issue-relevant information on the attitudes of low- 
and high-involvement participants? How susceptible are the two groups to 
persuasion and how do their attitudes change as a result of taking part in the 
event?
As was shown in chapter 1, analyses of public opinion about Europe have tended to 
assume that people’s attitudes are fairly fixed and stable, despite the finding that people 
are relatively uninformed about political and economic integration. The deliberative 
poll, however, is an explicit test of the hypothesis that people lack adequate factual 
information on which to base their views about political issues. The measure of 
attitudes taken at the end of the weekend event is intended to provide a more accurate 
reflection of the views of a well-informed public. The analysis undertaken here takes 
this further. Drawing on social psychological theories of persuasion, it argues that the 
way in which information is used by people to form and change attitudes and, therefore,
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the impact information has on attitudes depends on a person’s prior level of 
involvement in the target issue.
3.5 Study D: Design and analysis of an Internet experiment
Study D investigates further the roles of information and involvement in attitude 
change. However, it goes further than study C by also examining the influence of 
national identity on attitudes towards the euro and by focusing on the cognitive and 
social-cognitive processes involved in persuasion. The research undertaken was an 
experiment developed, designed and conducted by me especially to test the theoretical 
framework I presented in chapter 2. Specifically, the study aims to answer the 
following questions:
1. What are the psychological processes by which people’s attitudes towards the 
euro are formed and changed in response to information?
2. How does issue involvement influence these processes?
3. What is the effect of manipulating the salience of national identity in 
information about the euro on the psychological processes involved in attitude 
change?
Once again, the theoretical framework for the study is provided by the ELM, according 
to which individuals evaluate their attitudes in response to issue-relevant information by 
either central or peripheral processing. The nature of the cognitive process depends on 
the person’s involvement in the target issue, which affects their ability and motivation to 
think about the information being presented.. Whereas in the political science literature 
the concept of involvement tends to be considered as part of political sophistication -  
being knowledgeable about and interested in politics (e.g. Luskin, 1987) -  in 
psychology, involvement also encompasses the notion of how personally relevant an 
issue is (e.g. Johnson and Eagly, 1989; Krosnick, 1990). Critiques of the ELM by 
social identity theorists (e.g. van Knippenberg, 1999; McGarty et al., 1994) have 
extended this notion of involvement to incorporate the relevance of an issue to groups of 
which a person is a member. According to this formulation, group identity plays an 
important role in influencing a person’s motivation to process (along with individual 
factors such as need for cognition (Cacioppo and Petty, 1992) and need to evaluate
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(Jarvis and Petty, 1996) and can be as important a component of involvement as ability. 
In study D, I explore this idea further by looking at how the strength of people’s 
national identity8 influences their motivation to centrally process group-relevant 
information. Based on this, a further aim of the study can be specified as:
4. To what extent does the strength of people’s national identity influence the 
elaboration likelihood of information about the euro?
The experimental design was adapted from the original methodology developed by the 
authors of the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). To recap, in a typical ELM 
experiment, participants’ attitudes towards a target issue are measured after they have 
been presented with a ‘persuasive message’ about the issue. Other measures of the 
participants’ cognitive responses to the message are taken to indicate the extent of 
message elaboration that has taken place during the presentation. The message is 
especially constructed to be either weak or strong; participants’ involvement in the 
target issue is manipulated to be either high or low. By controlling for these two 
variables (argument quality and involvement), the effect of a third independent 
persuasion variable on attitude change can be measured.
The present study was based on the same basic design, but with a number of important 
modifications. Most importantly, the experiment took the form of a survey 
questionnaire administered via the Internet. The main reason for this choice of method 
was to gain access to a widely-distributed sample of British adults, which would not 
have been possible had the experiment been conducted with students at the London 
School of Economics. The Internet also offers a highly cost-effective method of 
collecting data quickly from a large sample and the simple technological means for 
randomising the data collection instrument in accordance with an experimental design. 
[The decision to use a web-based survey questionnaire entailed a number of further 
adaptations to the classical ELM methodology however, and these are described in 
detail in chapter 7. Notably, it was not possible to directly manipulate involvement in 
the euro issue, so this was measured by a range of questions tapping its different 
dimensions and analysed as a covariate.]
8 The decision to focus on the strength o f national identity as opposed to looking at the nature of 
attachment to nation is discussed in chapter 7.
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The questionnaire contained measures of respondents’ attitudes towards the euro and 
European integration. Because the main dependent variable was attitude change, half 
the respondents were asked about their attitudes before reading the arguments and half 
were asked about their attitudes afterwards. The study was also designed to test the 
impact on attitude change of national identity salience in communications about the 
euro. Thus, half the sample was randomly allocated to a ‘high salience’ treatment 
group, in which the questionnaires included a priming procedure intended to increase 
the salience of participants’ British national identity. The resulting experimental design 
included 8 treatment groups in total -  a 2x2x2x2 design, consisting of an argument 
quality manipulation {strong versus weak); a national identity salience manipulation 
(high versus low); with half the participants responding to the attitudinal measures 
before message exposure and half responding afterwards (pre- versus /?05f-attitude 
measurement). Low- and high-involvement participants and participants with strong and 
weak national identity were then compared across each of the experimental conditions, 
to test hypotheses about attitude change, message elaboration and the effect of identity 
salience on persuasion.
3.6 Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the empirical content of the thesis and describes 
and introduces the different theoretical and methodological approaches adopted in each 
of the four studies undertaken. Though they are inter-related, each study is quite 
distinct, so the empirical chapters can be read as ‘stand alone’ descriptions of the 
research undertaken. Each one contains its own description of the rationale and 
background to the research, the method and results and a discussion of the principal 
findings. In the following chapter, I begin with Study A.
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4 ISSUE SALIENCE AND THE AGENDA-SETTING ROLE OF THE PRESS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present study A -  an analysis of the intensity of British newspaper 
coverage of the single currency issue over a ten-year period from 1991 to 2001, during 
which the debate surrounding British membership of EMU was at its height. The 
research has two aims. Firstly, it serves a descriptive purpose, providing an illustration 
of the salience of the euro issue at different points in time over much of the life-course 
of the debate, along with a chronological account of the key issue-relevant events that 
stimulated the greatest amount of press coverage. This helps to set the scene for the rest 
of the empirical work, by describing the context in which persuasive communication 
about the euro took place. Secondly, the research aims to examine one of the 
mechanisms by which media communications influence public opinion, by exploring 
the so-called ‘agenda-setting’ function of the media (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). 
According to the agenda setting approach, the salience of an issue on the media agenda 
is related to the salience of the issue on the public agenda. Public attention towards 
particular issues is said to be influenced by the intensity of news coverage those issues 
receive. Study A explores this mechanism by comparing a measure of the salience of 
the euro issue on the news agenda with data on the issues that dominated the public 
agenda during this period.
In chapter 1, it was argued that much of the research into media reports about European 
integration has focused on the content of news coverage and in particular, on the nature 
of eurosceptic discourse (e.g. Hardt-Mautner, 1995; Anderson and Weymouth, 1998), 
but it has tended to neglect the question of how eurosceptic media reports actually 
influence public attitudes. In this chapter, I attempt to address this neglect by focusing 
on just one possible mechanism by which the media are hypothesised to play a part in 
public opinion formation: the capacity of the media to direct public attention towards 
particular issues at certain times.
The chapter begins with an introduction to the literature on agenda setting, which 
provides the theoretical rationale for studying variation in issue salience over time. I 
then review some applications of this model to the study of media communications 
about European integration (Norris et al., 1999; de Vreese, 2001), before introducing the
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data that were analysed here. The results are presented along with an account of the key 
events that stimulated the most press attention over the course of the period of 
investigation. Measures of the intensity of news coverage of the euro issue are then 
compared with fluctuations in public perceptions of the importance of the issue and 
public opinion about Europe and the single currency during the same period.
4.2 Theoretical background
The rationale behind examining the salience of an issue in the news media is drawn 
primarily from the literature on agenda setting. This field of research focuses on the 
way in which the importance of different issues is communicated between 
policymakers, the media and the public. According to the basic agenda-setting 
hypothesis, the salience of an issue in the news media (i.e. the amount of attention it 
receives) is indicative of the salience of that issue on the public agenda (i.e. how 
important people think it is). This hypothesis is of interest here because, by defining the 
priority of major political issues in this way (Norris et al., 1999), the manipulation of 
issue salience by the media plays a fundamental role in the process of political 
communication. As salience increases, so does the quantity of available information, 
and, with it, public awareness of the problem. As was argued in chapters 1 and 2, the 
more important people consider an issue to be, the more motivated they will be to 
process new information about it and to integrate that information into their existing 
framework of beliefs and attitudes. Thus, heightened salience may ultimately lead to 
attitude change, especially where it occurs in the context of an electoral or referendum 
campaign.
The idea that the media shape the way we view the world is not a new one (it can be 
traced originally to Walter Lippman’s (1922) ‘Public Opinion’). It became popular 
during the 1970s when the agenda-setting hypothesis was empirically tested for the first 
time by McCombs and Shaw (1972) in a study comparing the issue priorities of the 
mass media and those of voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, during the 1968 
presidential campaign. The study built on earlier research, which had investigated 
learning amongst voters during electoral campaigns (e.g. Trenaman and McQuail, 
1961), and had found that people seem to learn in direct proportion to the differential 
emphasis placed on the campaign issues by the mass media. McCombs and Shaw
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(1972) conducted interviews with 100 undecided voters (assumed to be more
susceptible to influence by the media) in order to establish what they considered to be
the most important issues in the campaign. Through a content analysis of the main
news publications and television broadcasts that the community relied upon for the bulk
of their political information during the campaign, the authors established a correlation
between issue emphasis in the media and voter issue emphasis of over 0.95. From this
compelling finding, they concluded that people
“...learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach 
to that issue from the amount o f information in a news story and its position.
In reflecting what candidates are saying during a campaign, the mass media 
may well determine the important issues — that is, the media may set the 
“agenda ” o f the campaign. ” (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; p. 176)
McCombs and Shaw’s study was popular because it proposed an alternative way of 
looking at the effects of mass media exposure on the public. The mixed findings of 
research into persuasion (in particular concerning the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour) had left many theorists in the field of mass communication frustrated 
(Kosicki, 1993) and the agenda setting approach offered a promising new alternative for 
researching media effects. In particular, by moving away from the study of media 
influence on public attitudes, agenda setting research enabled a shift in emphasis in how 
the nature of media influence was conceptualised. Agenda setting research focuses on 
the media’s capacity to tell people “what to think abouf\ rather than on whether they 
are influential in “telling people what to think” (Cohen, 1963; p. 13). In this sense, 
whilst agenda setting is interesting because it might indirectly result in attitude change, 
researchers in the field are concerned primarily with how salience is transmitted 
between policy, media and public agendas. Agenda setting research is, therefore, 
focused on the quantity of media coverage, rather than on its tone or content 
(McCombs, 1997; Norris et al., 1999).
The Chapel Hill study (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) was also influential because it 
prescribed a particular methodological approach for pursuing this new avenue for 
research. The basic design involved the measurement of the amount of space or time 
devoted to different issues by the media and an analysis of how this related to public 
perceptions of the importance of those issues (Kosicki, 1993). A strong correlation 
between media and public issue agendas was taken as evidence that the salience of 
issues in the news media had influenced the prominence of those issues in the public
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mind. It was assumed that with respect to political issues (such as those in an electoral 
campaign), the fact that people are unlikely to directly participate in the campaign 
makes it more likely that they will turn to the media for information about which issues 
are important. The simplicity of the model has inspired an enormous amount of 
research, and over the course of the past thirty years, the literature has grown into one of 
the leading contemporary approaches in mass communications research today. As such, 
it comprises a number of different sub-areas, including both policy and media agenda- 
setting research (both concerned with how issues come to be defined and selected as 
significant at the institutional level), and of primary interest here, the literature on public 
agenda-setting, which is concerned with the link between media content and public 
issue agendas.
4.3 Contemporary agenda setting research
Agenda setting evidence is complex and the rapid growth of the field led to demands for 
more sophisticated techniques for exploring the way in which issue salience in the 
media is communicated to the public (e.g. McQuail, 1987; Kosicki, 1993). Early 
research had been criticised for failing to provide clear and unambiguous evidence that 
the news media do, in fact, exert an influence on the salience of issues on the public 
agenda (e.g. McQuail, 2000), because of the difficulty of interpreting the correlational 
evidence that had been generated. As McCombs and Shaw (1972) point out in the 
discussion of the findings of their original study, “the existence of an agenda setting 
function of the mass media is not proved by the correlation reported here” (p. 184). 
This is because evidence of a correlation between the salience of issues on the media 
and public agendas is insufficient proof that one is the product of the other. Even if 
such a causal relationship does exist, the simplicity of the method employed in many 
agenda setting studies would fail to provide compelling evidence for the direction of 
such a relationship or rule out the possibility that a third variable independently 
accounted for the association. More recently, studies have used more innovative 
methods, such as the use of experimental designs in order to provide stronger evidence 
of the hypothesised public agenda-setting effect (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Norris 
et al., 1999; de Vreese, 2001).
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In addition to the problem of providing convincing evidence that the prominence of an 
issue on the public agenda is a function of the intensity with which it has been reported 
in the news media, the emphasis on direct, aggregate level effects represents a further 
weakness of earlier research, because it allows little opportunity for commenting on the 
extent to which the public have attended to the media content assumed to influence their 
perceptions of issue importance in the first place. In order to strengthen the claims for a 
causal relationship between issue emphasis in the media and public issue emphasis, 
therefore, it is necessary to provide evidence of the media consumption patterns of the 
population concerned. As Dearing and Rogers (1996) have argued, in order to study 
agenda setting in more detail, data need to be disaggregated. This means examining 
agenda setting effects at the individual level; looking at individual issue concerns and 
how these relate to individual patterns of media use, as well as the content of the media 
agenda to which the individual has been exposed.
The wealth of evidence produced by agenda setting research tends to support the idea 
that the media exert a significant influence on public perceptions of issue importance 
(McCombs, 1997). However, much of the evidence has been mixed, and this has 
encouraged researchers to examine the contingent conditions under which agenda 
setting effects occur. Unsurprisingly, explorations of this kind have revealed a number 
of significant dimensions along which individuals vary in terms of their susceptibility to 
media effects such as agenda setting. Examples include individual levels of political 
sophistication, variation in issue involvement, so-called ‘need for orientation’ (Weaver,
1977) -  i.e. individual habits of seeking information from the media; and interpersonal 
communications on the subject of political issues. Agenda setting effects have been 
found to be more likely where individuals are reliant on media information, where 
involvement and political sophistication are low and where people rely on others for 
information about which issues are important (as in Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two- 
step flow theory of communication).
Different issues are also likely to impose themselves on individual or public agendas in 
different ways. A key distinction made by Zucker (1978) concerns the level of 
obtrusiveness of an issue -  i.e. the extent to which people have direct experience of it, 
or are directly affected by some negative aspect of it in their everyday lives. Examples 
of obtrusive issues include unemployment, healthcare provision, and crime prevention, 
etc., as well as other issues affecting the local community, all of which may end up
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becoming salient on the public agenda, without the informational input of the media. 
By contrast, those issues that are described as ‘unobtrusive’ are likely to result in greater 
media orientation by the public. The economic and political developments of European 
integration provide a prime example of something, with which most people have little 
direct experience in their everyday lives. This is especially true for the euro ‘opt-out’ 
countries of Denmark, Sweden and the UK, where people have not experienced 
something as fundamental as the transition to a new currency to give the European 
Union more significance in their lives (Gavin, 2000). On this basis we might expect the 
agenda setting role of the media with respect to the single currency issue to be relatively 
potent, particularly for those with low levels of involvement in the issue and lower 
levels of political sophistication.
4.4 Agenda setting and European integration
Based on the accumulated research evidence, it is appropriate to view agenda setting as 
a process comprising a number of different subtle and contingent effects (Kosicki, 
1993). While there are many examples of the strong correlations between issue salience 
in media coverage and the salience of issues on the public agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972; Funkhouser, 1973; Winter and Eyal, 1981), the difficulties of interpreting such 
across-the-board effects, render them less compelling evidence for a media agenda 
setting function. By contrast, more sophisticated research designs have produced 
relatively mixed findings (e.g. Erbing et al., 1980; Roessler, 1999). Thus in examining 
the relationship between issue salience in the media and public perceptions of issue 
importance, it is necessary to recognise the complexity of the relationship between the 
two.
Nevertheless, agenda setting theory seems particularly appropriate to the study of how 
the media communicate information to the public about European integration. As we 
have seen, the capacity for the media to influence public perceptions about issue 
salience is enhanced where that issue is relatively unobtrusive (Zucker, 1978) -  that is, 
where an issue has little direct influence on people’s everyday lives. In addition, agenda 
setting effects are more likely to occur where people orientate themselves towards the 
media for information on a given issue. There is considerable evidence to suggest that 
this is the case with respect to matters relating to Europe, and in particular, in relation to
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the single currency. The public are said to be media dependent with respect to European 
integration (Gavin, 2000), and Eurobarometer data appear to support this claim. In 
Spring 2002, for example, 65% of the public preferred to obtain information about the 
EU from television, 44% from daily newspapers and 31% from radio, compared with 
just 21% preferring to learn about the EU from discussions with family and friends and 
4% using EU information in e.g. libraries and town halls (Source: Eurobarometer 57, 
Spring 2002). Thus, high levels of media orientation and the unobtrusiveness of 
European integration as an issue would suggest that the public will be particularly 
sensitive to fluctuations in the salience of the issue in the media.
Relatively few studies of media reporting on European integration have examined 
agenda setting, particularly in the British context. The majority have tended to focus on 
the content of news reports about Europe, in particular, concentrating on the way in 
which euroscepticism manifests itself in news discourse. This is unfortunate, as it has 
meant that the relationship between media content and public opinion has been rather 
weakly specified, with conclusions about the possible effects of anti-European discourse 
being based mainly on theory. As we have seen, agenda setting research represents a 
‘first step’ in conceptualising the relationship between the media and their audiences in 
practice.
Two studies that have explored the relationship between media reporting on EMU and 
public perceptions of the issue’s importance are reviewed here. The first, by Norris and 
her colleagues, formed part of a larger study of agenda setting during the 1997 British 
general election campaign. Their content analysis of the front pages of the main British 
daily newspapers found Europe to be the most important substantive issue in The 
Guardian, The Times, The Sun and the second most important in The Independent and 
the Daily Mail during the election campaign. However, it was not until halfway 
through the six week campaign that the issue came to dominate the front pages, after 
deep divisions in the Conservative Party came to light on the subject of EMU. The 
timing made it possible for the authors to examine the effects of a sudden increase in the 
salience of the issue in the media on the campaign issue priorities of the British public. 
Prior to the escalation in EMU coverage in the media, the issues people considered most 
important in deciding how they would vote were health and education. Just 2.8% of 
respondents to the British Election Campaign panel survey identified the EU as the most 
important issues in deciding how to vote at this point in the election campaign (1-10th
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April 1997). Afterwards, health and education remained the two most prominent issues 
for an even greater proportion of respondents, whereas the percentage identifying the 
EU as the most important issue had risen to just 3.1%. Thus, there was little evidence in 
this study that the dominance of Europe in the print media had influenced public 
perceptions of the issue’s importance in determining vote choice in the general election. 
The evidence suggests that press reporting on the issue had little impact on the overall 
issue concerns of the public.
One interpretation of this finding offered by the authors of the study is that people were 
unaffected by the barrage of anti-European press coverage halfway through the 
campaign because it was generally not uncommon for the Europe issue to periodically 
come to dominate the headlines in this way. The authors argue that people were 
somewhat jaded by the way in which the issue was being ‘over-reported’ in newspapers, 
and hence, the heightened media attention at this time made little impact on their issue 
priorities. Furthermore, they conclude that people had their own agenda when it came 
to deciding how to vote in the election -  and in this context, “Europe” remained 
something of a non-issue (except perhaps indirectly, by highlighting the problems in the 
Tory party at this time and, thereby, weakening support among traditional Conservative 
voters).
Given that EMU is a relatively unobtrusive issue, then it is perhaps unsurprising that it 
failed to influence vote choice during a general election. However, even in the context 
of the referendum campaign held in Denmark in September 2000, the single currency 
was still considered by Danish voters to be a less important issue than that of 
immigration (de Vreese, 2001). This was in spite of the prominence of the euro issue in 
the Danish media during the referendum campaign. De Vreese (2001) not only found 
limited support for an agenda setting effect at the aggregate level, but also when 
disaggregating the euro issue into the various sub-issues it encompasses, he found no 
evidence that the meaning of the euro issue was the same in the media as that 
understood by the public. At the individual level, news exposure (especially to 
television news) did increase the likelihood that participants in the research considered 
the euro issue to be one of the most important issues facing the country, but this effect 
was not found across all media types.
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from these two studies. Firstly, there has so far 
been little or no evidence of agenda setting effects in relation to the EMU issue, because 
in the euro opt-out countries, it remains low on people’s list of priorities. This means 
that, in spite of people’s apparent reliance on the media for information, they are 
unlikely to be persuaded of the issue’s significance by its dominance in the media per 
se. Being unobtrusive, the issue appears to be something that people simply do not care 
about. Secondly, the Norris et al. (1999) study suggests that we should expect little 
change in public concerns about the issue in response to fluctuations in its salience on 
the media agenda over a longer period of time, perhaps because people have become 
jaded by the relatively high levels of attention already given to the issue. Finally, it is 
not possible to discern the extent to which the weak relationship between public and 
media agendas results from a ‘failure’ on behalf of the media to convince the public of 
the significance of EMU, or from the fact that the debate has so far not demanded much 
public attention. Both the Conservative government prior to 1997, as well as the 
Labour government since then have adopted a so-called ‘wait-and-see’ policy on the 
euro, which has arguably served to relegate the issue on the public agenda until such 
point when they are asked to make a decision in a referendum vote.
4.5 The present study
The present study involved an analysis of the intensity of print media coverage about 
the single currency, over the course of a ten-year period from 1991-2001. This period is 
significant in terms of the history of the debate, as it was following the Maastricht 
summit in December 1991 that the concept of Economic and Monetary Union first 
entered the public arena. The decade spans the period in which the euro was bom, from 
the original plans for monetary union laid out at Maastricht to the launch of the single 
currency in 1999 -  a period in which both Conservative and Labour Governments 
grappled with the complexities of the question surrounding British membership of 
EMU. Examining press coverage allows us not only to trace the course of the debate, in 
terms of establishing which policy-relevant events stimulated the greatest amount of 
media attention, but also provides some measure of the attention the debate received in 
the outside world. The media data gathered here were collected for both pro- and anti- 
EMU publications, as well as for both tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, providing 
some interesting points for comparison.
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As well as drawing on the theoretical background of agenda setting research, the 
analysis presented here follows the method used by Bauer and his colleagues (2001), in 
their study of how the debate surrounding biotechnology evolved in the elite mass 
media. The authors present a number of arguments supporting the decision to examine 
media representations of the issue in the ‘elite’ press, which are also relevant here. In 
particular, they argue that while audiences for these publications are relatively small, the 
elite press play a significant role in opinion-leading, being important sources of 
information not only for the public, but also for those involved in policy making, for 
experts and decision-makers, and perhaps more importantly, for other media producers 
(Bauer et al., 2001). Thus, while the general public may not be the primary audience for 
these publications, the ideas and interpretations that are reported in them filter down to 
the public via these other agents. The authors argue that “by analysing the opinion- 
leading press, we can get a reasonably robust impression of how society processes 
meaning” (Bauer et al., 2001; p.36)
The analysis presented here was aimed at answering the following questions:
1. What events have marked the changing course of the debate surrounding British 
membership of EMU and how have the media responded them?
2. Is there variation in the level of coverage across newspaper type (broadsheet and 
tabloid) and/or the newspaper’s explicit stance on Europe (pro- or anti-EMU)?
3. How have the public responded to the debate?
4. To what extent can public response be attributed to media response?
5. What is the relationship between issue salience on the media and public agendas and 
fluctuations in public opinion about Europe?
4.6 Method
4.6.1 Measuring the salience of the euro on the print media agenda
The data used in the analysis were obtained from two sources. Firstly, as a measure of 
the salience of the euro issue on the print media agenda, monthly counts of the number 
of newspaper articles mentioning the term ‘single currency’ were obtained for a period 
of ten years, starting in January 1991 and ending in January 2001. Data were collected
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from six daily London-based newspapers -  three ‘tabloids’ and three ‘broadsheets’, 
where possible including their Sunday equivalents. The broadsheets group included 
The Independent and Independent on Sunday, which has been used elsewhere as a 
benchmark for measures of issue salience because, along with other broadsheet 
newspapers, it plays an opinion leading role with respect to other media operators (e.g. 
Bauer et al., 2001); The Daily Telegraph and The Sunday Telegraph; and The Guardian 
and Observer. The tabloids publications included in the analysis were The Sun and 
News of the World; The Mirror and Sunday Mirror; and The Daily Mail and Mail on 
Sunday.
The newspapers were selected to represent both extremes of the left-right orientation of 
British daily news publications, as well as to represent both sides of the EMU debate. 
Among the quality titles, the ethos of The Daily Telegraph (a traditionally Conservative 
publication) perhaps epitomises the staunchly sceptical, indeed antagonistic position on 
Europe (in particular on the euro), for which the British press has become renowned. 
By contrast, the Guardian (a traditionally Labour publication) has adopted a more 
enthusiastic position on Europe, as has the supposedly unpartisan Independent 
newspaper. Of the tabloids, the right-wing Mail and the Sun (which was previously a 
staunch supporter of the Tories, but which switched to support Labour prior to the 1997 
General Election) are both ardently anti-European, whilst the left wing ‘red-top’, the 
Mirror, represents the pro-European camp among the tabloid titles.
The data were collected using the online search engine ‘Lexis Nexis™’ which provides 
access to a number of different news media publications stored online. Unfortunately, 
because Lexis Nexis™ was a relatively newly developed resource at the time of data 
collection, not all of the titles included in the analysis were available for the full sample 
period. Data were available for all the broadsheet newspapers included, but for the 
tabloids, the database only contained records for more recent years. The Daily Mail and 
The Mail on Sunday’s database was the most comprehensive, starting in January 1992, 
while that for the Mirror/ Sunday Mirror started in January 1994. That for The Sun/ 
News of the World, however, only went back as far as January 2000. It is included here 
because of its significance in the British print media market, being the best selling 
newspaper in the country, although it is appreciated that the amount of data available 
limits the comparisons that can be made with other titles. It should be acknowledged 
that the newspapers included are arguably better described as ‘English’ newspapers,
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being all London-based publications. As such, they should not be viewed as being 
representative of the ‘British’ press, which includes key Scottish, Welsh and Irish 
publications, as well as many regional and local titles. Nevertheless, they are among the 
best selling in the UK, enjoying nationwide circulation. Table 4.1 provides summary 
information of the newspapers analysed.
Table 4.1 Summary information for newspapers included in the analysis
Title Average Net EMU Orientation Data Availability
Circulation (UK)* through Lexis
Nexis™
The Independent 187,845 Pro 1991
Independent on 185,152 Pro 1991
Sunday
The Guardian 353,907 Pro 1991
The Observer 396,383 Pro 1991
The Daily 891,261 Anti 1991
Telegraph
The Sunday 685,123 Anti 1991
Telegraph
The Mirror 2,338,620 Pro January 1994
Sunday Mirror 1,498,621 Pro January 1994
The Daily Mail 2,321,927 Anti January 1992
The Mail on 2,228,605 Anti January 1992
Sunday
The Sun 3,348,524 Anti January 2000
News of the World 3,578,623 Anti January 2000
*Source: Audit Bureau o f Circulations -  28.4.03-25.05.03
For each newspaper the search term utilised was “single currency”. A number of 
alternative search terms were tried out. However, the decision to employ ‘single 
currency’ was made so as to minimise the possibility of picking up non-relevant articles 
(which would have been the case with both ‘EMU’ and ‘euro’), as well as to select a 
term with fairly consistent usage throughout the ten-year period. The name ‘euro’ was 
not adopted until much later, and the acronym EMU is not always employed, especially 
by the tabloid press. Thus, it should be noted that the findings provide us with a 
schematic overview of the intensity of coverage and may lack some accuracy as 
measures of the ‘true’ coverage of the debate. Lexis Nexis™ yields all references 
containing any reference to the search term. No information is provided in the present 
analysis as to the length of articles, or whether the article mentioned the single currency 
once only, or was entirely devoted to the issue. Equally, the count tells us little about
the prominence afforded the issue overall by the newspapers at any point in time, for 
example, whether the article appeared on the front page or elsewhere in the newspaper, 
or how much attention it received in terms of the visual layout of the paper (i.e. the use 
of images and cartoons, the size of headlines, the proportion of the page taken up by the 
article and so on).
For each newspaper the total number of articles making reference to the term ‘single 
currency’ for each calendar month in the ten-year period was recorded (from 1.1.1991 
to 31.1.2001). These data were then compiled in order to plot the relative intensity of 
coverage for each newspaper (using Microsoft Excel). The outcome of this process is 
displayed in figures 4.1 and 4.2 for the broadsheet press and 4.3 for the tabloids. 
Plotting intensity of newspaper coverage on a graph makes it possible to quickly 
identify the periods at which attention on the issue was highest. The events reported 
during these periods have been labelled on figure 4.1. Table 4.2 provides a record of 
the events that occurred during peak periods of news coverage.
4.6.2 Measuring salience of the euro on the public agenda
The ‘public agenda’ data were gathered from published opinion polls conducted by 
MORI, in which respondents are asked, ‘What would you say is the most important 
issue (Mil) facing Britain today?’ and a supplementary question, ‘What do you see as 
other important issues facing Britain today?’. These questions have been fielded 
regularly since 1974, and for the period under investigation, monthly data are available 
for most years. Where data for a particular month were not available, missing values 
were imputed using the mean of the figures for the adjacent months. Unprompted 
responses to the items are coded and combined depending on their similarity, to produce 
an index of the salience of different issues on the public agenda. Thus, the data 
represent the percentage of respondents in each survey stating that the Common Market, 
the EU, Europe, or the Single European Currency (or some other similar term), was the 
single most important issue facing Britain at that time. Comparison Mil figures are 
provided for issues relating to the NHS/ hospitals; race relations/ immigration/ 
immigrants; education/ schools; crime/ law and order/ violence/ vandalism; and 
defence/ foreign affairs/ international terrorism (monthly indices for each of these issue 
categories are available in Appendix A). Finally, these data are compared with public
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opinion data from the Eurobarometer showing levels of support for the European Union, 
in order to provide a point of comparison between issue agendas and the direction and 
change of attitudes.
4.7 Results
4.7.1 Salience of the single currency issue in the opinion-leading press
The first part of the analysis was aimed at identifying which events, over the course of 
the period of interest, stimulated the greatest amount of coverage by the press. That is, 
it was designed to answer the question of how the media have responded to the 
changing course of the debate surrounding British membership of EMU. Figure 4.1 
shows the intensity of coverage of the single currency issue during the ten-year period 
under investigation (1991-2001). The intensity index here is the mean number of 
articles containing the search term (‘single currency’), published per month in the 
opinion-leading newspapers included in this analysis (The Independent, The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph, and their Sunday equivalents). The large fluctuations in 
salience across the decade are immediately apparent. Minimum values for the index 
were recorded for the months of July 1991 and August 1994 (just three articles each) 
and August 1992 (just four). Throughout the period, the issue was, unsurprisingly, 
afforded least salience during the summer months, reflecting the fact that political 
events are less likely to take place during this time, as well as the fact that issues such as 
EMU are less likely to be covered during the so-called ‘silly season’ of politics and 
journalism. The greatest number of articles was published during 1997, in particular, 
during the General Election campaign and in the aftermath of the election. April 1997 
saw a mean of 168 articles published by these broadsheet titles (the greatest number, 
recorded in the Daily Telegraph was 199), and this high intensity coverage continued 
after the election throughout May and June. In October 1997, the issue was once again 
highly prominent in the print media, with a mean of 141 articles mentioning the single 
currency published in the three newspapers analysed here (The Guardian printed 152 
during this month, and The Daily Telegraph, 148).
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The mean number of articles for the total period of analysis was 44 per month, and this 
is indicated on figure 4.1 by a horizontal line. The next section provides an account of 
the key developments in the debate surrounding EMU that developed during the sample 
period. It focuses on the events that stimulated greater than average news coverage. In 
order to facilitate interpretation of the fluctuations in issue salience, peak periods 
referred to in the text have been numbered on figure 4.1. The reader is referred to table
4.2 for a summary of the main issue-relevant events taking place during this period.
4.7.2 The early 1990s
Two key peaks in the salience of the single currency issues occurred in 1991, a year 
dominated by preparations for the summit in Maastricht and the historical changes that 
negotiations there resulted in. The first peak occurred in June, when a European 
Council meeting convened in Luxembourg, focusing on preparations for Maastricht (1). 
The second peak in press coverage occurred at the time of the Maastricht summit, held 
in December 1991 (2). The first of three stages for the implementation of Economic 
and Monetary Union, proposed in 1989 by the then head of the European Commission, 
Jacques Delors, had already started in 1990, with moves towards greater co-operation 
between national banks. In October of that year, Britain joined the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), which had been set up to try to contain fluctuations between 
participating currencies. In 1991, the drafting of the treaty of the European Union, 
resulted in the official change from the European Community into the European Union, 
and with it, committed Members to EMU. A timetable for EMU was established, along 
with criteria for adopting the single currency. In Britain, the debate centred on Prime 
Minister John Major’s role in the negotiation and his success (applauded by the left and 
right wing press alike) in securing an opt-out of EMU and the Social Chapter. 
However, the event re-opened existing divisions over Europe in the Conservative party 
and established the fault-lines on the subject of integration in the press and popular 
debate that are still familiar today.
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Table 4.2 Key issue-relevant political events during period of analysis (January 1991 
-  January 2001)
Date
28th-29th June 1991
9lh-10th December 1991
2nd June 1992
18th June 1992
September 1992
August 1993
May 1994
9-12* June 1993 
31st May 1995
26th-27th June 1995
December 1995
27th March 1996
29th March 1996 
13th-14th December 1996
Event
Luxembourg European Council confirms the need to 
conduct proceedings of the two Intergovernmental 
Conferences, centred on Economic and Monetary Union 
and aspects of political union in parallel on the basis of 
the draft treaty prepared by the presidency.
European Council meeting at Maastricht reaches 
agreement on the draft Treaty of the European Union.
Danish referendum results in a vote against ratification 
of the Treaty of the European Union.
Irish referendum results in a ratification of the Treaty of 
the European Union.
United Kingdom withdraws from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism.
United Kingdom ratification of the Treaty of the 
European Union.
Inaugural Conference held in Paris for a stability pact 
for Central and Eastern Europe.
European Parliament elections.
Commission adopts green paper on the practical 
arrangements for the introduction of the single currency.
European Council meeting in Cannes confirms transition 
to a single currency by 1st January 1999.
A European Council is held in Madrid, Spain. It sets 
29th March 1996 as the starting date for the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and confirms the 
introduction of the single currency (“euro”) for January 
1st 1999.
Commission adopts a decision on urgent measures to be 
taken for protection against BSE (Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy). It imposes a worldwide export ban on 
British beef and beef products.
IGC held in Turin to revise the Maastricht Treaty.
A European Council is held in Dublin. It reaches 
agreement on the various elements necessary for
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introduction of the single currency (legal framework, 
stability pact, new exchange rate mechanism).
1st May 1997 General Election in United Kingdom results in landslide 
Labour victory.
16th-17th June 1997 The European Council meets in Amsterdam and reaches 
a consensus on a draft Treaty. It approves various 
proposals facilitating a smooth passage to the third 
phase of the Economic and Monetary Union and adopts 
a resolution on growth and employment.
2nd October 1997 Ministers for foreign affairs of the Member States of the 
European Union sign the Treaty of Amsterdam.
20th October 1997 The Commission adopts the final report to the 
Parliament’s temporary committee of inquiry 
monitoring recommendations on BSE.
1st January 1998 The United Kingdom takes over the Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union.
25tb March 1998 The Commission adopts the convergence report and 
recommends that 11 Member States adopt the euro on 
1st January 1999.
3rd May 1998 A special Council decides that 11 Member States satisfy 
the conditions for adoption of the single currency on 1st 
January 1999. Following the decision, the Council 
adopts two regulations on technical specifications of 
euro coins and the introduction of the euro, the ministers 
and Central Bank governors of Member States adopting 
the euro as their single currency. The Commission and 
the European Monetary Institute set out conditions for 
determination of the irrevocable conversion rates for the 
euro.
26th May 1998 The governments of the Member States adopting the 
single currency appoint by common agreement the 
president, the vice-president of the other members of the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank.
31st December 1998 The Council adopts fixed and irrevocable conversion 
rates between the national currencies of the 11 
participating Member States and the euro.
1st January 1999 The euro is officially launched. Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain adopt the euro as 
their official currency.
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10“ June 1999 European Parliamentary elections are held in the United 
Kingdom.
June 2000 European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira, 
Portugal. The broad economic policy guidelines for the 
Member States and the Community for the year 2000 are 
adopted; Greece’s entry into the euro is approved.
22nd September 2000 The ECB, taking joint action with the US Federal
Reserve and the Bank of Japan, intervene in support of 
the euro.
28th September 2000 Denmark holds a referendum on the euro. The majority
rejects joining the single European currency.
June 2001 General Election in the United Kingdom for which 
Europe and the single currency were once again key 
campaign issues.
Source: History o f the European Union (European Union Online) 
httn://europa. eu. int/abc/historv/index eru him
By September 1992 (3), the single currency was once again a hot topic in the British 
press, after currency speculation on ‘Black Wednesday’ resulted in Britain having to 
withdraw from the ERM. The following summer, the ERM was suspended altogether, 
being replaced by an alternative, more flexible system. The events surrounding 
Britain’s withdrawal were widely deemed by the eurosceptic press as a sign of the 
failings of EMU, and the knock-on effect on public opinion about Europe was one of 
the most significant of the last fifteen years. Support for the euro fell from 54% to 30% 
between March 1991 and September 1992; the percentage of respondents agreeing that 
British membership of the EU is a “good thing” fell from 54% to 43% between March 
and September 1992 (Source: Eurobarometer).
4.7.3 The mid-1990s
In January/February 1995 (4), there was another peak in the salience of the EMU issue, 
followed by a second one in June (5), when the debate focused on practical 
arrangements for the introduction of the single currency. It was agreed that the currency 
would be introduced by January 1999, with a three to four year period of transition 
before the actual introduction of notes and coins. However, it was not until the
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December of 1995 (6) that the European heads of state agreed on the name for the single 
currency, the ‘euro’, at the European Council meeting held in Madrid. In the following 
March (7), at the time of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Turin, which was 
held in order to make revisions to the Maastricht Treaty, the newspapers were 
dominated by stories about the EC’s decision to impose a worldwide ban on the export 
on British beef and beef products (as a result of an outbreak of BSE). The events stirred 
up anti-European sentiment in the press, resulting in the heightened salience of issues 
relating to integration such as the single currency that is evident during this period. 
Towards the end of 1996 (8), the single currency was back in the press, when a meeting 
of the European Council in Dublin was held to agree on economic arrangements for the 
introduction of the euro, including its legal framework, the stability pact and a new 
exchange rate mechanism.
As noted, 1997 saw the greatest number of articles making reference to the single 
currency, in the month preceding the general election held that year (9), and in its 
immediate aftermath (10). The European Council meetings in Madrid and Dublin had 
played contributory roles in exacerbating the split within the Conservative party over 
European issues. They also highlighted their failure to agree on a fixed policy regarding 
Britain’s relationship with the EU and, particularly, with respect to the single currency. 
By the time of the general election, this problem had still not been resolved, and the 
issue of the main parties’ stance on Europe and the euro once again became the subject 
of intense media debate.
The landslide Labour victory on May 1st arguably marked the start of a new era in terms 
of Britain’s relationship with the EU, although the New Labour government’s policies 
on Europe were not markedly different to those of the Tories, opting -  as their 
predecessors had -  for a ‘wait-and-see’ policy on EMU. The promise of a referendum 
on the euro, however, signified a more positive outlook on Europe on behalf of the new 
Government. This change in outlook was evident at the Council meeting in Amsterdam 
just one month after the election (10), which stimulated considerable media attention in 
Britain, although this is likely to be in part due to the Tories’ decision to hold their 
leadership election at the same time.
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Later that year, in October (11), the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam led to greater 
press attention on the single currency issue, when the Labour government announced its 
policy on the EMU: broadly in favour of Britain joining, provided that five economic 
tests be passed before the decision could be put to the public in a referendum. Details 
of this policy were later published in the National Changeover Plan (1998).
4.7.4 The late 1990s
In January 1998 (12), Tony Blair took over the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union and later that year, in May (13), the council decided on which Member 
States had qualified to proceed to stage three of the single currency. Once again, the 
newspapers were full of stories about the euro, focusing in particular on the apparent 
fudging of the convergence criteria to ensure membership for certain countries, and on a 
row over who would head up the European Central Bank (ECB). These events 
rekindled concerns in the right-wing press concerning the political motivations for 
integration and how these might interfere with the economic success of EMU. The 
single currency issue remained salient through the remainder of 1998, culminating in 
the fixing of the exchange rates between the euro and the participating national 
currencies, and the launch of the euro on January 1st 1999 (14). Issue salience was 
heightened once again in June (15) that year, as the euro struggled against the dollar, 
and in response to an ongoing crisis in the European Commission resulting in mass 
resignations following allegations of mismanagement and corruption.
Two further peaks in the intensity of coverage are evident in June 2000 (16) and 
September 2000 (17). In June, a Council meeting was held in Portugal and Greece’s 
entry to the euro was approved. In September, the ECB, along with the US Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of Japan intervened to support the single currency, which had lost 
30% of its value against the dollar since its January launch. September also saw the 
first of the planned referenda on joining the euro of the three opt-out countries, taking 
place in Denmark (Sweden and the UK agreed to hold theirs at a later stage). The 
Danes voted against joining and the issue, once again, generated considerable attention 
from the press.
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4.7.5 Variations in the level of coverage across newspaper type
Figure 4.2 Intensity o f news coverage on the single currency in the broadsheet press
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Figure 4.3 Intensity o f news coverage on the single currency in the tabloid press
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3 respectively chart the intensity of news coverage in the broadsheet 
and tabloid newspapers. The preceding analysis focused on the broadsheet newspapers’ 
agenda jointly, taking the mean number of articles from all three as an index of issue 
salience in the opinion-leading press as a whole. The chart in figure 4.1 allows us to
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examine differences between the broadsheet titles in terms of the prominence afforded 
the euro issue at different points in time. In general, there was considerable agreement 
between the three titles. This is evidenced in the bivariate correlations between the 
three titles (values are for Spearman’s rho) shown in table 4.3, which were all over 0.9.
There was a slight tendency for the anti-EMU Daily Telegraph to contain more 
references to the single currency than either the (broadly pro-European) Independent or 
Guardian. Three periods where the titles diverged in the salience they afforded the issue 
are highlighted here. The first, in August 1993, when John Major ratified the 
Maastricht Treaty, received considerably greater attention in the Telegraph (58 articles, 
compared with 22 in The Guardian and 20 in the Independent). By contrast, The 
Guardian gave considerably greater attention to the decision over which Member States 
qualified for EMU in May ’98 (90 articles, compared with 71 for the Telegraph and 50 
for the Independent), as well as to events in December ’98 (126 articles, compared with 
79 for the Telegraph and 62 for the Independent) and in January ‘99 (90 articles, 
compared with 60 for the Telegraph and 84 for the Independent).
Table 4.3 Inter-correlations between newspapers’ intensity indices (Spearman’s rho)
I DT G M DM
The Independent (I)
Daily Telegraph (DT) 0.93
The Guardian (G) 0.94 0.92
The Mirror (M) 0.71 0.64 0.74
The Daily Mail (DM) 0.54 0.48 0.56 0.66
The Sun 0.86 0.73 0.79 0.61 0.84
The chart for the tabloid papers (figure 4.3) paints a slightly different picture. Most 
noticeably, there is a considerable difference between the numbers of articles printed in 
the anti-EMU Daily Mail/ Mail on Sunday compared with the pro-EMU Mirror/ Sunday 
Mirror. Interpretation of this difference should be cautious, however. Whilst the former 
is a Eurosceptic publication, the attention it gives to European issues is accounted for 
more by the fact that it is a more ‘middle-market’ tabloid than the other two ‘red-top’ 
tabloids in the sample, appealing to a different audience and espousing a different set of 
values. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the level of coverage that The Mail gave to 
European issues during the period of interest is exaggerated, whilst that of the ‘red-top’
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tabloids is surprisingly low. Inter-correlations between the tabloid newspapers were 
around 0.6 (see table 4.3) and the correlation between the intensity index of the opinion- 
leading papers as a whole, and that of the tabloids was 0.66.
Again, there is general agreement between the tabloid publications in terms of the 
events they considered newsworthy, although a period of about one year from around 
March 1996 until the general election in 1997 saw the number of articles in the Mirror, 
far outweigh the number printed in the Mail. It is unclear exactly what the reasons for 
this may be. However, during this period, in addition to a number of political events of 
interest in the development of EMU, the worldwide export ban imposed on British beef 
and beef products by the EC, and the Euro ’96, European football championships all 
captured the attention of the media. All of these could have stimulated discussion of 
European issues in this pro-European tabloid newspaper, and this may equally explain 
the Daily Mail’s apparent silence on European issues at this time. Clearly, closer 
analysis of news content during this period would help to shed light on this discrepant 
finding.
4.7.6 Salience of the euro issue on the public agenda
This section examines how the public has responded to the changing course of the 
debate surrounding EMU by looking at the salience of the issue on the public agenda 
and changes in public opinion during this time. Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of the 
public rating the issues of Europe, crime and disorder, education, unemployment and 
the National Health Service as the most important issues facing Britain during the 10- 
year period of interest. It is immediately apparent that throughout the period of inquiry, 
only a relatively small proportion of the public considered Europe to be a matter of 
serious concern, compared with the percentage who were concerned about other issues. 
People were far more likely to rate, unemployment, education and the NHS as ‘most 
important’, compared with issues relating to Europe. Only from 1997 onward, did a 
greater proportion of the public rate Europe as more important than crime. The 
percentage of the public concerned about Europe has ranged from as little as 3% (in 
February 1991) to as much as 43% during the general election campaign in April 1997.
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By contrast, the percentage choosing unemployment as the most important issue has 
ranged from as much as 81% in February 1993 to just 7% in December 2000.
According to the public agenda-setting hypothesis, variations in the salience of a 
particular issue on the public agenda are related to variations in the salience of the issue 
on the media agenda. Simply eyeballing the data reveals quite a close correspondence 
between the intensity of newspaper coverage in the opinion-leading press, and 
fluctuations in the proportion of people who considered Europe to be the most important 
issue facing Britain during this time. The trend line for ‘Europe’ closely tracks that of 
the intensity index and the correlation between the two data series is 0.78, indicating a 
strong, positive association between the salience of Europe on the public and media 
agendas over the course of the decade.
4.7.7 Public opinion and issue salience
The final part of the analysis examined the relationship between salience of the euro 
issue on the media and public agendas and public opinion relating to Europe. Table 4.5 
shows the correlation coefficients between the two measures of media and public issue 
salience used above and measures of opinion about membership of the European Union 
from the Eurobarometer survey, which was fielded bi-annually during the period under 
investigation. The last two rows of table 4.5 show that support for the EU and the euro 
was negatively correlated with issue salience during the period of investigation. This 
finding is illustrated in figure 4.5. However, the relationship is relatively weak and only 
at the time of Black Wednesday (September 1992) is there a marked correspondence 
between the data.
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Table 4.4 Inter-correlations between public opinion variables and salience variables
Support EU
good
EU bad UK
benefits
No
benefit
Public
salience
Support euro
EU good thing 0.81
EU bad thing -0.69 -0.75
UK benefits 0.84 0.86 -0.71
No benefit -0.35 -0.13 0.58 -0.44
Public salience -0.53 -0.66 0.46 -0.52 -0.10
Media salience -0.29 -0.41 0.36 -0.24 -0.02 0.78
Figure 4.5 Issue salience and public opinion on the EU
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4.8 Discussion
The analysis reported here had two aims. The first was to give an overview of the 
development of the debate surrounding British membership of the single currency, by 
looking at fluctuations in the intensity of media coverage it has received over the course 
of a ten-year period, and looking at the events that have triggered heightened media 
attention. As such, the analysis helps to ‘set the scene’ for the later empirical chapters,
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by describing the media context in which public attitudes to the euro have been formed 
and transformed over the course of the debate.
The second aim, however, was to begin to explore the relationship between media 
reporting on the euro and public attitudes by looking at one of the ways in which the 
media are said to influence people’s views. Alongside media coverage of the debate, 
the analysis looked at variations in the salience of ‘Europe’ (and issues surrounding 
integration) on the public agenda, using data from surveys asking people what they 
consider to be the most important issues facing Britain today. Comparisons of these 
data with the intensity of news coverage data showed a close correlation between media 
and public agendas.
While the proportion of the public for whom Europe constituted an important issue was 
comparatively small (with other issues taking priority for the majority), the data provide 
clear evidence of a consistent minority for whom the importance of Europe as an issue 
varied with fluctuations in the issue’s salience on the news agenda of the press. This 
would suggest some limited relationship between public and media issue agendas with 
respect to Europe, though it cannot of course shed light on the precise nature of that 
relationship (and the direction of any causative influence, if such an influence exists).
Indeed, the analysis presented here was not intended as an agenda setting study per se. 
If it were, it would undoubtedly fall short in terms of the methodological requirements 
for such a piece of work. However, the research builds on other agenda setting studies 
that have looked at the topic of EMU (e.g. Norris et al., 1999; de Vreese, 2001), lending 
further support to and extending the conclusions these other theorists have drawn. In 
particular, it supports the finding that, despite fluctuations in the significance of the euro 
on the print media agenda (it has frequently been one of the most prominent issues in 
the press, at least in terms of its dominance of the front pages), the issue of EMU is not 
generally viewed as important by the public. Other, more ‘obtrusive’ issues (Zucker,
1978) have remained prominent on the public agenda throughout the period of 
investigation, despite the media attention the euro has received. Nevertheless, a small 
proportion of the public does appear to have been sensitive to the ebb and flow of the 
issue’s salience in the press, as is illustrated in the close correlation between the press 
and opinion data. This agenda setting function of the press with respect to the single
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currency -  albeit only visible for a sub-group of the population -  was not observed in 
these previous studies, so the research extends what was previously known about the 
impact of media attention to EMU on public attitudes towards the euro.
The analysis further examined the relationship between the salience of the euro issue in 
the press and on the public agenda and public support for European integration. While 
attitudes regarding the benefits of EU membership appeared to change at the same time 
as the salience of EMU was heightened on both the media and public agendas (e.g. at 
the time of Britain’s withdrawal from the ERM), it is not possible to draw conclusions 
from the data presented here as to the nature of any relationship between the two. 
Closer investigation of how agenda setting relates to public opinion would require a 
more sophisticated research design. In particular, a clear limitation of the present data is 
that they provide us with no information about the other issues that were salient on the 
media agenda during the period of investigation, only about the relative salience of the 
single currency issue over the ten-year period.
Despite the limitations of the methodology employed here with respect to the agenda 
setting hypothesis, the analysis makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
British attitudes to the euro in a number of different ways. Firstly, it presents the 
broader picture of the media context in which communications about the euro take 
place. Previous studies have tended to focus on the content of coverage on European 
integration with a particular emphasis on anti-European discourse in the press (e.g. 
Hardt-Mautner, 1995). Bauer et al (2001) have argued, however, that this emphasis has 
encouraged researchers to adopt a normative position concerning the potential impact of 
non-objective discourse on public attitudes, and to neglect the broader issue of 
specifying the precise nature of the relationship between the mass media and public 
opinion. By drawing on the literature on agenda setting, and by positing a role for the 
elite press as opinion-leaders (Bauer et al., 2001), the present study represents an 
attempt to move beyond this impasse.
Secondly, research that has looked at media coverage of European integration has 
tended to restrict itself to single events or limited periods of media coverage (e.g. Hardt- 
Mautner, 1995; Anderson and Weymouth, 1998; Norris et al., 1999). Examining a 
longer period of time makes it possible to paint a bigger picture and get a clearer idea of
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what the ‘normal’ pattern of coverage about European integration might be. If it is 
indeed the case, as Norris and her colleagues argue, that the public is jaded by a surfeit 
of European coverage in the press then it is of interest to establish how this public 
sentiment has come about. The present analysis makes some contribution in this 
respect. It illustrates how, over the course of the 1990s, the single currency issue gained 
in overall significance, and reveals periods of rapid escalation in the amount of attention 
the issue received by the print media.
It is evident that the euro debate has followed its own course during the sampling 
period, moving between historical EU-level events that have stimulated high levels of 
news coverage. Thus, the debate has charted the course to a single European currency 
from the early planning stages at Maastricht, through to the launch of the euro in 
January 1999 (and since then, of course, to the introduction of euro notes and coins in 
January 2002). Yet the fervour with which the issue has at times been covered in the 
press, demonstrates the extent to which the debate has developed a life of its own within 
the media. This is perhaps most evident at those points where there has been greatest 
discrepancy in the intensity of coverage between the pro- and anti-EMU press, with 
positive events such as the launch of the single currency demanding considerable 
attention from the pro-EMU Guardian and the more negative events (such as Major’s 
ratification of the Maastricht treaty after Black Wednesday) being the focus of attention 
in the anti-EMU Daily Telegraph. The present analysis does not provide us with 
information about the extent of coverage of the euro issue in relation to other issues 
during the same period, but it is noteworthy that during the 1997 general election 
campaign the issue was found to be the most intensively-reported campaign issue 
(Norris et al., 1999). Whilst we might expect the number of articles on a range of issues 
to be elevated during this period, this example illustrates the way in which the debate 
about the single currency came to dominate the British print media at a number of 
points in time throughout the period of interest.
Examining the quantity of newspaper coverage and its correlation with the issue 
concerns of the public provides us with only a crude measure of the potential power of 
media effects. The present study sought not to make exaggerated claims about how the 
media influences public opinion, but rather to highlight its potential to do so, by 
providing what might be interpreted as evidence of media effects. At a minimum,
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examining changes in the intensity of media reporting provides us with a schematic 
overview of the life course of a public debate (Bauer et al., 2000). By identifying those 
periods in which the issue has been most salient in the public arena, it is possible to 
isolate the times at which people’s attention is most likely to have been oriented to that 
issue. In the study of attitude formation and change, it is precisely these moments of 
heightened salience that are of interest, as these are the times at which -  from a 
psychological point of view -  people are more likely to engage in the cognitive work 
required to formulate and adjust their attitudes and beliefs in response to new 
information. It is for this reason that an examination of the agenda setting capacity of 
the media is of interest from a social psychological perspective; for it is in the context of 
heightened issue salience that elaboration likelihood (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986) 
is raised, and attitudes are made and changed.
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5 ARGUMENT AND PERSUASION: AN ARGUMENTATION ANALYSIS OF 
LEADING ARTICLES ABOUT THE EURO
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided an overview of the history of the debate surrounding 
British membership of EMU by identifying the events that have received the greatest 
amount of attention in the British print media. It explored the relationship between 
media attention and public concerns about European integration, in order to gain insight 
into the capacity for the media to direct public attention on to certain issues at certain 
times. It was hypothesised that at times of heightened issue salience, public 
involvement in an issue also tends to be high, and with it, the likelihood that people will 
engage with information about that issue and in so-doing, form and transform their 
attitudes towards it. In fact, it was found that only a minority of the British public 
appeared to be influenced by variation in the salience of the single currency issue during 
the period of investigation. For the majority, other issues were more important at the 
time than those relating to European integration and the single currency. While study A 
investigated the relationship between the salience of the issue on the media and public 
agendas, the present study looked at the content of media reporting on EMU during 
times of heightened issue salience. This time, the aim was to gain some insight into 
how the media influence what people actually think about the euro.
In chapter 1, I reviewed the literature on how the print and broadcast media have 
reported on issues relating to European integration (e.g. Hardt-Mautner, 1995; Anderson 
and Weymouth, 1998; Wilkes and Wring, 1998). Research in this field has led to a 
number of conclusions about the ways in which the content and style of news reports 
might relate to public opposition to the EU, although few contributors have turned to 
theoretical accounts from the field of media and communications or social 
psychological theories of persuasion to explain how media information might influence 
public attitudes. According to Hardt-Mautner (1995), the ‘dumbing down’ of 
information about Europe in the popular press and on television may partially explain 
the public’s lack of knowledge about the issues involved in EMU, while the use of 
eurosceptic discourse in news reports (such as negative national stereotypes about other 
European countries) has been linked to public opposition because it serves to highlight
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people’s concerns about the threat of integration to British national identity. Anderson 
and Weymouth (1998) argue that news reports contain an ‘ideological component’ 
embedded in the discourse of newspapers, which consists of implicit assumptions about 
the world that are derived by readers through their history of engagement with a 
particular newspaper title. People are said to rely on this component in order to 
interpret the information they are presented with and to draw meaning from the text, 
making it particularly influential in the formation of attitudes. Through repeated reading 
people come to understand the world-view of the newspaper and integrate its ideology 
into their own attitudes. It is in this way that eurosceptic discourse is said to influence 
how people think about integration. Thus, in order to understand the content and 
provenance of people’s attitudes, it is necessary to identify this ideological component 
in the news discourse to which they are exposed.
In the present study, I look to theoretical accounts of media effects and social 
psychological theories of attitude formation and change to provide an explanation for 
how information in the press influences public opinion. In particular, I focus on how 
the media ‘frame’ information for audiences, making certain aspects of issues more 
salient than others, and thereby influencing how people think about those issues (the 
concept of framing is introduced in the next section). To investigate how the print 
media framed the single currency issue over the course of the debate surrounding 
British membership of EMU, I analysed arguments about EMU found in leading articles 
in two broadsheet newspapers (The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian). The analysis 
was aimed at identifying how the two publications (which are characterised by opposing 
stances on the issue of Britain joining the euro) have used their editorials to advocate 
their positions throughout the course of the debate and the way in which arguments in 
leading articles have framed the issue for their readers.
As well as serving a descriptive purpose, the focus on arguments was also motivated by 
a different goal: namely, to identify the persuasive quality of persuasive messages on 
either side of the debate surrounding British membership of EMU. As we saw in 
chapter 2, arguments form the basic building blocks of persuasive communication, 
providing the means by which information effects changes in attitudes. There is 
considerable disagreement about the way in which arguments achieve persuasion and 
about what makes some arguments more persuasive than others. Petty and Cacioppo’s 
(1986) empirical method of developing strong and weak messages for their experiments
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has been criticised for failing to distinguish different dimensions of argument quality 
and critics have advocated analysing the structure of arguments to disentangle 
persuasive strength from argument valence (its emphasis on positive or negative 
attributes of the target object) (e.g. Areni and Lutz, 1988; Boiler, Swasy and Munch, 
1990). In the present study, I used a structural analysis of argumentation (based on 
Boiler et al., 1990) to evaluate the ‘persuasiveness’ of pro- and anti-EMU messages, 
based on the quantity and quality of evidence presented in support of an argument 
claim. The approach to argumentation analysis used (described in section 5.2.1) also 
provided a way of identifying the shared knowledge and assumptions between the 
message source and recipient (in this case, newspapers and readers), enabling me to 
explore the significance of the ideological component of news discourse in public 
opinion formation highlighted in Anderson and Weymouth’s (1998) research.
5.1.1 Framing
The previous chapter looked at ‘agenda-setting’ -  the process by which the media 
influence ‘what people think about’ (Cohen, 1963) through fluctuations in the salience 
of different issues or objects in news media coverage. The field of ‘framing’ research 
has sought to examine the media’s influence on how people think about different issues, 
by looking at the way in which issues or objects are represented by the media. Like 
agenda setting, it has been argued (e.g. by McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997) that the 
process of representing an object involves the communication of salience -  not simply 
about the significance of the object, but about the significance of different attributes of 
that object. By making certain object or issue attributes more salient than others, the 
media direct public attention in certain ways, and by so-doing, influence the way in 
which people come to think about the object or issue in question. For this reason, these 
authors have argued that framing should be viewed as an extension of the agenda setting 
paradigm. Others have argued, however, that it is inappropriate to lump the two 
approaches together, and that framing research has grown up into a paradigm in its own 
right (e.g. Scheufele, 1999). This section is intended as a brief introduction to the 
framing approach.
The notion of framing refers to the ‘frames of reference’ an audience uses to interpret 
and discuss issues and events (Tuchman, 1978). These are influenced not only by the
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personal experiences of the individual and their interaction with others, but 
significantly, also by the mass media. A distinction is drawn in the literature, therefore 
(e.g. by Gitlin, 1980; Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999; de Vreese, 2002), between ‘media 
frames’ and ‘audience frames’. Entman (1993) describes the former in the following 
way:
‘To frame is to select some aspects o f a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and /or treatment 
recommendation for the item described. ” (p. 52)
In this way, the framing of events and issues in the news influences how news 
audiences come to understand those events and issues. By contrast, audience or 
‘individual’ frames refer to the cognitive meaning structures (e.g. schema, categories, 
scripts, stereotypes, representations, etc.) that people use to interpret new information. 
Research in the field of framing has explored both framing by the media, as well as the 
way in which the public frame different issues. The present research is concerned with 
the way in which the opinion-leading press in the UK have come to frame the issue of 
the single currency.
Media frames are significant because of their capacity to influence how the public come 
to think about an issue. Entman (1993) identifies four specific functions of frames: 
they define problems, diagnose causes of problems, make moral judgements about those 
causes and suggest remedies for them. Frames may be specific to a particular event or 
issue (“issue-specific news frames”), but they might also be more ‘universal’, in as 
much as journalists across the world come to rely on particular ways of portraying 
events in the news in similar ways (“generic news frames” -  de Vreese et al., 2001). 
For example, research in the US (e.g. by Gamson, 1992; Neuman et al., 1992) has found 
that news about economic and political events or issues tends to be rely on generic 
frames, such as a focus on conflict, or on the economic consequences of an event 
(which is said to make an event more relevant to the audience). De Vreese, Peter and 
Semetko (2001)’s study in four European countries found that general economic and 
political news tended to be framed more often in terms of conflict, while issue-specific 
coverage of the launch of the single currency in January 1999 was framed more in terms 
of economic consequences. The way in which frames manipulate the salience of ‘object 
attributes’ in this way is argued to influence the “probability that receivers will perceive 
the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory” (Entman,
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1993; p.53). In short, framing has the power to influence the public’s elaboration 
likelihood.
In the present study, I used a method of argumentation analysis to identify the way in 
which different ‘attributes’ of the euro issue have been made salient in different 
newspapers. Arguments frame information in both direct and indirect ways. Firstly, the 
explicit claims made in arguments have the capacity to directly communicate to readers 
how they should think about a particular issue. Secondly, the way in which arguments 
in editorials appeal to ideological assumptions shared between the newspaper and the 
reader provides an indirect means of emphasising the significance of certain issue 
attributes over others.
5.1.2 The significance of argumentation for understanding public opinion
Social psychological theories of persuasion have emphasised how people form and 
adapt their attitudes in response to persuasive communications, yet little attention has 
been given to how persuasive communications are produced in the first place (van 
Eemeren et al., 1997) and what exactly renders them persuasive (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1981; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Historically, however, such issues have been a 
central concern of philosophers studying logic and rhetoric, who have focused on the 
function of argument structure and content to convince others of a particular standpoint, 
and the degree to which some arguments achieve this while others do not. The turn 
towards language and discourse in critical approaches in social psychology has led to a 
recent revival of interest in ancient studies of rhetoric (e.g. Billig, 1987; Leach, 2000), 
and in philosophical theories of the structure and function of argumentation. In 
particular, a number of social psychologists have looked to these fields in order to 
challenge mainstream approaches to the study of attitudes and attitude change. Their 
work provides a valuable theoretical justification for the study of argument presented 
here. This section introduces Billig’s (e.g. 1987; 1993) rhetorical approach to social 
psychology, and the work of social psychologists who have sought to apply Toulmin’s 
(1958) model of argument to the study of social representations (Liakopoulos, 2000a; 
2000b; van Bavel, 2001).
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Billig’s approach argues that we should be looking to ancient theories of rhetoric to 
learn more about cognition and psychology. He maintains that argument provides us 
with a model of human thinking. Argumentative discourse is dialectic. It is 
characterised by arguments that are implicitly opposed by counter-arguments. 
According to Billig (1987), this dialectic represents the opposing cognitive processes of 
‘categorisation’ and ‘particularisation’. Categorisation is assumed to be one of the basic 
building blocks of human thought. It is the process by which we come to understand 
and recognise objects or entities -  by classifying them into pre-existing categories with 
other similar objects. But to understand the process of categorisation we need also to 
consider its opposite process, which Billig calls ‘particularisation’. Through 
particularisation, we are able to re-categorise objects as being different from other 
existing category members, or to choose not to categorise objects, recognising instead 
their unique attributes. Just as every argument implicitly carries with it a counter­
argument, to categorise an object implicitly involves a decision not to particularise it, or 
to recognise its separateness.
Billig (1993) relates his rhetorical approach to social psychology to Moscovici’s theory 
of social representations (e.g. Moscovici, 1981; 1984). According to Moscovici (1984), 
representations consist in knowledge that has been negotiated through ordinary 
communication and have a structure that corresponds to the form of that 
communication. For Billig (1993), the form of that communication is argumentation, 
for it is through argumentative forms of discourse that socially-shared knowledge and 
representations are counter-opposed to one another, allowing the individual to 
renegotiate their attitudes and views.
Social representation involves two key processes: anchoring and objectification 
(Moscovici, 1984). The process of anchoring refers to the way in which new and 
unfamiliar objects (such as the single currency) are made familiar. Billig (1993) 
believes that this is achieved through argument through processes of categorisation. A 
new and unfamiliar object is a “focus of controversy”, about which there will be 
arguments about “how anchors should be dropped” (p.50) -  i.e. about how the object 
will be categorised. Through argumentative discourse, decisions are made about 
categorisations, with counter-arguments suggesting alternative categorisations. Thus, it 
is precisely through the dialectics of argumentation that unfamiliar objects become 
anchored in existing knowledge and social representations come into being. By
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contrast, the process of objectification involved in social representation refers to the
way in which the representation comes to take on a specific and recognisable form.
According to Liakopoulos (2000a; 2000b) the analysis of argumentation provides
insight into how representations come to be objectified -
“Argumentation is the elaboration o f thought in a way that is easily 
understood by everyone. I f  argumentation is the elaboration o f thought, and 
thought consists o f dominant representations, then the argument can be seen 
as a vehicle for the process o f objectification. ” (Liakopoulos, 2000a; p. 93)
Based on this, he proposes that argument be brought to “the foreground of social 
research on public debates” (p. 152) because analysing argumentation allows us to better 
understand those factors which influence how debates develop.
Thus, it is through argumentative discourse that people come to form new knowledge 
and views about different issues, because it is in the context of controversy over new 
and unfamiliar ideas that understanding is negotiated via the processes of anchoring and 
objectification involved in social representation. In addition, Billig (1997) has argued 
that “the rhetorical analysis of argumentation can be used to investigate patterns of 
ideology, for it can reveal what is being taken for granted as common sense” (p.51). 
This allows the analyst to observe “not merely what issues are being overtly challenged 
by speakers and how these challenges are being discursively effected; the analyst can 
also note what is being left unchallenged or what is being presented as if 
unchallengeable.” (p.51). This means that the study of argumentation in the press 
should provide some access to the ideological component of newspaper discourse 
discussed earlier in relation to Anderson and Weymouth’s (1998) research. Indeed, this 
idea is supported by van Bavel (2001), who maintains that the study of argumentation 
provides the researcher with access to social representations, precisely because 
arguments appeal to people’s taken-for-granted knowledge and understanding of the 
world to validate them. In this sense, it is neither the structure nor content of 
argumentation that is important; rather what is implicit within the argument, because it 
is this that reveals people’s understanding of the issue under debate.
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5.1.3 The present study
Billig (1993) argues that in the context of controversy and public debate (a context he 
refers to as the ‘oratorical situation’) the ‘orators’ express different stances on issues, 
yet “call upon common traditions as they appeal to the common sense of a common 
audience” (1993; p.56). Amidst such controversy, people’s attitudes should be viewed 
as having both socially-shared elements, as well as non-shared aspects, being 
expressions of an “implicit, or explicit opposition to a counter viewpoint” (p.57). He 
therefore, advocates the study of attitudes in their “argumentative context”, as this 
enables the researcher to recognise their fluidity through the evolving context of 
controversy, for it is in this respect, that “the complexity of modem social 
representation might be revealed” (Billig, 1993; 59).
The present study draws on this idea by studying arguments relating to the single 
currency expressed in the print media within the fomm of a leading article or editorial. 
At times of high issue salience, different newspapers (in this case, The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph (and their Sunday equivalents, The Observer and The Sunday 
Telegraph), with publicly acknowledged opposing stances on the issue of European 
integration, articulate their different viewpoints in their leaders so that a ‘naturally 
occurring’ argumentative context is created. The study of arguments in their natural 
context provides further insight into the role of the media in informing and shaping 
public attitudes and public opinion social representations (Jodelet, 1984).
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Argumentation analysis: Toulmin’s (1958) model of argument
In order to analyse the arguments about the single currency employed in the leading 
articles of the two newspapers, a method of ‘argumentation analysis’ was employed. 
The method adopted here is based on Toulmin’s (1958) model of argument, a theory 
that has been applied by a number of different authors in a range of social scientific 
research contexts (e.g. Boiler, Swasy and Munch, 1990; Ball, 1994; Chambliss, 1995; 
Chambliss and Gamer, 1996; Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960; Liakopoulos, 2000a; 
2000b; van Bavel, 2001). The method involves reproducing the structure of the main
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argument in each of the leading articles, by identifying each of the argument features 
described in Toulmin’s model (see below), and coding the text accordingly. The precise 
analytical approach adopted here is derived from a number of different interpretations of 
Toulmin’s work, but draws mainly on Liakopoulos’s (2000b) description of a method 
for argumentation analysis, which is based on Toulmin’s model.
Toulmin’s (1958) analysis of argument is best understood in the context the history of 
the study of argumentation, which has a tradition of over 2000 years, dating to the 
writings of the ancient Greeks -  particularly those of Aristotle (van Eemeren et al. 1997; 
Leach, 2000). Argumentation refers to the use of language to “justify or refute a 
standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in views”, whether that be in 
interactions between two or more people, in legal proceedings or in the context of texts 
such as newspaper editorials where the writer formulates a formal line of reasoning (van 
Eemeren et al. 1997; 208). Historically, the aim of the study of argumentation was to 
discover the structural properties of arguments in order to evaluate their ‘soundness’ in 
terms of their internal logic and thereby, their persuasiveness. By uncovering the 
process of argumentation, it is possible to discover not only the way in which arguments 
are structured (typically, they comprise assertions or claims, inferred from data supplied 
as evidence for these), but also, to identify those argument forms that are more 
successful (or ‘valid’) than others. Thus, the concern of argumentation analysis has, 
typically, been with ‘logic’ and with the identification of different forms of argument, 
independent of the content of those arguments. By establishing where internal 
coherency is lost in argumentation, it is possible to identify invalid, or structurally 
weak, forms of arguments.
This kind of work is an ongoing concern of those still working within the tradition of
logic who maintain that argument is the primary means of discovering truth and
learning to think freely. For example, consider Shand’s (2000) opening statement in his
book on argument logic-
"... arguing is an indispensable way o f getting to the truth and avoiding the 
false. I f  we do not use argument well and when we should, the likelihood is 
that we will acquire large numbers o f false and quite probably dangerous 
beliefs on which we then base our actions. ” (Shand, 2000; p .l)
However, the logician’s approach has been criticised because it denies the reality of 
how argumentative discourse is used in the modem world. Arguments, as we know and
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recognise them, rarely take the form of the logical syllogisms that are the concern of
philosophers. On the contrary, everyday discourse is made up of informal arguments of
a wide range of forms, and comprises a complex interactive process between the
‘arguer’ (the person seeking to persuade) and the ‘audience’ (the target of the persuasive
attempt). This idea represents a shift in focus, away from the strictly linear linguistic
approach adopted by formal logicians, in which the communicative event is
conceptualised in the form of a message sent from a sender to a naive receiver (who
duly responds with an appropriate shift in attitude or behaviour). Instead,
“the central theoretical questions are how opposing views come to be 
reconciled through the use o f language and how actual audiences may be 
brought through rhetoric itself to more closely approximate the stance o f an 
ideally rational audience ” (van Eemeren et al., 1997; p. 215).
Thus, the activity of argument is dialectical in nature, and the relationship between 
arguer and audience is dialogic.
It was in this context that Toulmin (1958) made his contribution to argumentation 
theory. His approach broke away from that of formal logic by emphasising the 
importance of “persuasiveness and convincingness” (Liakopoulos, 2000b; 153) instead 
of formal validity, making the theory far better at accommodating contemporary 
examples of argumentative discourse. It is this that makes his approach a useful basis 
for contemporary research into argumentation.
According to Toulmin (1958) an argument is conceived as a structure comprising six 
key elements. Firstly, the core statement of an argument is referred to as its ‘claim’ or 
conclusion, and in order to support this claim, the arguer draws on the other structural 
elements of the argument. These include the ‘data’ or evidence offered in support of the 
claim and the ‘authority’ of the argument -  i.e. the underlying premises that endorse the 
leap from data to claim. In Toulmin’s terms, the authority comprises the ‘warrant’ and 
the warrant’s ‘backing’. In addition, the argument may also require ‘qualifiers’ and 
‘rebuttals’, in order to “register the degree of force the maker believes his claim to 
possess” (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960; 45). The aim of argument analysis, 
therefore, is to “make clear the functions of the different propositions invoked in the 
course of an argument” (Toulmin, 1958; p. 8-9).
This focus on structure makes argument analysis suitable for analysing the persuasive 
quality of information and its potential to effect changes in people’s attitudes. It also
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sets it apart from other forms of linguistic analysis, which might be viewed as 
incompatible with social cognitive accounts of persuasion. For example, discourse 
analysis takes a much broader approach, focusing on multiple dimensions of discursive 
interaction (making it particularly well-suited to analysing persuasion as it occurs in 
natural speech acts), in order to make explicit the social context in which persuasive 
communication takes place. Similarly, the analysis of rhetoric takes into consideration 
not only the logical features of argument structure (logos), but also how persuasion is 
achieved through appeals to the emotions (through the use of pathos) and the credibility 
of the source of a persuasive communication (ethos). The narrower focus of 
argumentation analysis makes it possible to focus purely on the characteristics of 
messages that mediate persuasion, independent of recipient responses to those 
characteristics and the relationship between message source and recipient.
Figure 5.1 Schematic depiction o f Toulmin’s (1958) model o f argument structure
Unless
Since...
On account of...
“A statement... presented as the 
outcome o f  the argument 
supported by facts.” 
(Liakopoulos, 2000b; 157)
Claim
Term or statement, which may 
be required to “register the 
degree o f  force the maker 
believes his claim to possess” 
(Brockriede and Ehninger, 
1960; 45)
Qualifier
“Facts or evidence that are at the 
disposal o f  the creator o f  the 
argument. Data might refer to 
past events or to the current 
situation, action or opinion, but 
in any case they refer to 
information that is related to the 
main claim o f  the argument.” 
(Liakopoulos, 2000b; 158)
Data
“A premise that authorises the 
refusal o f  the generality o f  the 
guarantee [warrant]. It shows 
the exception to the rule that is 
stated in the argument, or the 
conditions under which the 
argument does not have 
legitimation and therefore the 
claim does not hold true.” 
(Liakopoulos, 2000b; 159)
Rebuttal
W arrant
“A premise consisting o f  reasons, guarantees or rules to assert 
that the data are legitimately utilised to support the claim. It 
is the logical step that leads to the conclusion, not by means 
o f a formal rule, but by the rule o f  the logic o f  the particular 
argument.” (Liakopoulos, 2000b; 158)
“A premise that is used as a means o f  supporting the warrant in the argument. It is the source that guarantees the acceptability 
and truthfulness o f  the reason or rule that the warrant refers to. Similar in style to the data, it usually offers more explicit 
information.” (Liakopoulos, 2000b; 159)
Backing
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Most contributors to this field have followed the traditional approach of formal 
logicians by attempting to schematise arguments to represent their underlying structure. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the argument schema implied by Toulmin’s model. The diagram 
includes definitions of each argument element provided by Liakopolous’s (2000b) 
account of argumentation analysis as a method for the social sciences.
5.2.2 Sample of leading articles
A corpus of leading articles (editorials) published in The Daily/ Sunday Telegraph and 
The Guardian/ Observer was constructed using the online search engine Lexis-Nexis™. 
As in the previous study, the decision to focus on these broadsheet titles was based on 
their significant opinion-leading role amongst the public, policy makers and media 
producers alike (Bauer et al., 2001). It is assumed that arguments in favour and against 
British membership of EMU that appear in these publications ‘filter down’ to the 
popular level, as they are interpreted and communicated to the wider public by others in 
opinion-leading roles (e.g. Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). As in the previous study, 
articles were extracted using the search term ‘single currency’, and the search was 
restricted to the ten-year period from 1.1.1991 to 31.1.2001. For each newspaper, a 
sampling frame was created comprising the headlines of all articles containing the 
search term, which were designated as ‘leading articles’ or ‘leaders’ in the FT-Profile 
database, listed according to their date of publication. A sample of articles was selected 
from each list, on the basis of publication date, the criterion for sampling being that the 
article had appeared in the newspaper during a period of approximately two-weeks 
either side of an event deemed to be of particular relevance to the euro debate.
In total, eight events were selected for inclusion in the study, and all the leading articles 
from an approximate two-week period surrounding the event were included in the 
argumentation analysis9. The events selected are shown in table 5.1, together with the 
dates on which the first and last articles in each subset were published, and the total 
number of articles containing the search term for each newspaper per event. The 
rationale behind the choice of events was either that the event had stimulated a high 
level of press coverage (as established in the analysis of issue salience in study A), or
9 This sampling period was not adhered to strictly as it was considered important to retain the flexibility 
to include as many relevant texts as possible.
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that the event was important in terms of the history of the single currency, both in terms 
of European politics, as well as in terms of the British debate surrounding EMU 
(Usherwood, personal communication). The headlines of the leading articles contained 
in the sample are available in Appendix B.
There were two main reasons for the decision to sample in this way. Firstly, selecting 
articles published during periods of high intensity coverage means explicitly sampling 
periods when the issue was highly salient on the media agenda. Study A provided some 
evidence to suggest that during such periods, the salience of the issue is also raised on 
the public agenda (albeit perhaps only for a subset of the population). When issue 
salience is high on the public agenda, then people will be more likely to become 
involved in an issue, and be more motivated to process information about the issue. 
Secondly, periods of high issue salience provide examples of naturally occurring 
‘argumentative contexts’, which according to Billig (1987) provide insight into the 
processes by which public attitudes and representations are formed. Readers should 
refer to chapter 4 for information regarding the significance of the events in terms of 
their contribution to the historical development of EMU, and the British debate 
surrounding it.
Table 5.1 Events from which leading articles were sampled for argumentation 
analysis
Event Date(s) of 
event
Time
period
selected
Number of leading 
articles analysed
Telegraph Guardian/ 
Observer
Maastricht Summit 9-10.12.1991 03.12.91-
15.12.91
4 4
Madrid European Council 15-16.12.1995 02.12.95-
20.12.95
5 3
Dublin European Council 13-14.12.1996 02.12.96-
31.12.96
6 5
General Election (1997) 01.05.1997 17.04.97-
30.05.97
3 4
Amsterdam European 
Council
16-17.6.1997 03.06.97-
18.06.97
3 3
Decision on 11 euro-zone 
members
03.05.1998 24.04.98 -
28.05.98
5 4
Launch of stage 3 01.01.1999 29.12.98-
13.01.99
1 0
Danish Referendum on the 
euro
28.09.2000 04.09.00-
23.10.00
1 2
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The total number of articles analysed altogether was 53 (out of a total of 75 containing 
the search term that were initially sampled), of which 28 appeared in The Daily 
Telegraph/ Sunday Telegraph and 25 appeared in The Guardian/Observer. Only those 
leaders that were wholly or partly concerned with the issue of EMU or Britain’s 
relationship with the EU (and/or events related to these) were retained in the analysis. 
Articles merely making reference to the search term (‘single currency’), where the 
remaining content was not of direct relevance to the debate surrounding EMU were 
excluded from the analysis. For The Daily/Sunday Telegraph the number of articles 
from the sampling periods that were excluded on these grounds was 34, and the 
equivalent figure for The Guardian/ Observer was 16. It is noteworthy that there was a 
slight discrepancy in the sample sizes for each newspaper. However, this was not 
considered problematic, as the samples were not selected to be representative of all 
possible leading articles published in these papers. Rather, they were intended to 
capture the way in which the debate surrounding EMU had been framed by the two 
publications through their use of argumentation in their editorials. In this sense, any 
differences between the two newspapers in the quantity of articles referring to the single 
currency is of academic interest because it highlights the relative level of attention each 
of the titles gave to each of the events.
5.2.3 Procedure
The procedure for analysing arguments used here is based on the method described by 
Liakopoulos (2000b), which is based on identifying the constituent elements of 
argument structure identified by Toulmin’s model. The analysis involved two key 
stages. These were developed to ensure the coding of the articles was as systematic 
(and transparent) as possible. The purpose of the exercise, however, was primarily 
descriptive, the intention being to characterise the issue positioning of the two 
publications with respect to EMU, rather than to make inferences about arguments 
appearing outside the events recorded.
The first stage of the argumentation analysis involved coding the arguments in each of 
the leading articles. Each article developed what is termed here an ‘event-specific’ 
argument -  i.e. one which was specific to the events being reported on, and
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consequently, to the EMU debate at that time. This stage of the analysis involved 
reading through the articles and identifying the role played by each unit of text in the 
argumentative structure of the article. A ‘unit’ of text in most cases consisted of a 
single sentence or phrase. Each unit was identified and coded according to Toulmin’s 
model, using a method of ‘Framework’ analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994), which 
involves using spreadsheets to organise the data coding process in Microsoft Excel. An 
alternative method for managing the textual data might have been provided by 
qualitative analysis packages such as Atlas TI or QSR Nudist. Such computer-assisted 
analytic approaches, however, are particularly well suited to the analysis of large 
quantities of text data, especially where there is a large quantity of codes to manage. 
However, because the present analysis was restricted to just six ‘codes’ (corresponding 
to the six argument parts specified in Toulmin’s model), the Framework approach 
provided a more pragmatic solution.
As stated, the six codes were derived from Toulmin’s model of argument and the aim 
was, primarily, to identify the key claims made in each article and the data presented to 
support them. In addition, where appropriate, text units could be coded as ‘qualifier’, 
‘backing’ or a ‘rebuttal’, depending on the purpose they served in the argument as a 
whole. Because the focus of the analysis was on identifying arguments that were 
generic to the issue of EMU, rather than on the ‘event-specific’ arguments developed in 
each of the articles, the identification of these ‘supporting’ argument features was not of 
primary importance. Furthermore, the warrants underlying the event-specific arguments 
were rarely explicitly articulated, and so it was not usually appropriate to identify text 
units that served this purpose in the articles. Again, because the purpose of the analysis 
was to identify arguments generic to the euro debate, the analysis of warrants was not 
carried out at the initial stage of the argumentation analysis, but was conducted, instead, 
at the second stage, which focused on the ‘EMU-specific’ arguments developed in the 
four newspapers.
After the analysis of ‘event-specific’ arguments conducted at stage one, the coded 
argument parts were re-analysed and coded, in order to identify argument structures 
specifically relating to EMU and the single currency, so as to deconstruct the way in 
which newspapers communicated their positions on the issue. The aim was to identify 
argumentation that concerned the EMU issue -  what have been termed here as ‘EMU- 
specific’ arguments. These arguments were rarely developed explicitly within a single
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leading article. Rather, they emerged over the course of time as articulations of the 
newspapers’ stance on the issue.
The procedure for this stage of the analysis involved, firstly, identifying claims 
specifically related to EMU and the single currency. Secondly, ‘evidence’ was 
identified as text providing ‘reasons’ for adhering to the position on the euro advocated 
by the newspapers. Thus, unlike in stage 1 of the analysis, where the aim was to 
identify text acting as data in support of the event-specific claims in the articles, in stage 
2, the analysis involved identifying data which could be interpreted as support for either 
a pro- or anti-EMU position, independent of the role that information may have played 
in the event-specific arguments. Once the EMU-specific claims had been identified, 
these were then subjected to ‘thematic analysis’ aimed at categorising the different types 
of claims being made about EMU, and the different types of evidence used to support 
the newspapers’ positions on the issue. Claims and evidence were, therefore, coded and 
categorised according to their central theme.
Thirdly, the analysis sought to make explicit the implicit authority appealed to in the 
arguments -  i.e. to identify the warrants underlying the relationship between evidence 
and claims. To do this, the EMU-specific arguments were ‘reconstructed’ from the text 
units that were coded as ‘claims’ and ‘evidence’ and were presented schematically 
along with the inferred warrants assumed to underpin them. Additionally, where 
appropriate, ‘supportive’ argument parts were identified (i.e. where the argument made 
use of qualifiers, rebuttals, or backing). The schematic reconstruction of the EMU- 
specific arguments is intended to provide a depiction of the newspapers’ ‘prototypical’ 
positions on the euro.
5.2.4 Inter-coder reliability
In order to provide a means of evaluating the reliability of the method, two independent 
coders (including the author) conducted the analysis -  the second coder analysing a sub­
sample of the total number (about one quarter of the total). As described above, the 
analysis involved two main stages of coding. The first stage involved analysing -  
article-by-article -  the event-specific arguments developed in the leading articles. The 
second stage involved the analysis of argument claims and evidence specifically relating
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to EMU, from across the sample of leading articles. Analysis of inter-coder reliability 
was carried out only for the first stage of the process. Because it was not always 
possible to code all the text units (sentences) according to Toulmin’s schema, it was not 
straightforward to identify a finite number of units in each article and simply assess how 
each coder allocated the codes to each unit. In practice, the analysis was much more 
interpretive and so it did not lend itself easily to a formal test of reliability. A somewhat 
crude measure is provided by an analysis of the level of agreement between the two 
coders in the identification of claims and evidence in the event-specific arguments. Of 
the claims and evidence identified and coded by the author, the second coder identified 
and coded text units in the same way 72% of the time (further details are available in 
Appendix B). This provides some reassurance regarding the reliability of the analytic 
method, but the level of disagreement raises some cause for concern (discussed further 
below). The second stage of the analysis (identification of the EMU-specific claims and 
evidence) and the thematic analysis of EMU-specific claims and evidence were not 
subjected to reliability analysis and it should be emphasised that the summary of 
findings reported here represents the author’s interpretation.
5.2.5 Research questions
The main purpose of the argumentation analysis was to explore how the different 
publications communicated their positions on the EMU issue through argumentative 
discourse appearing in their leading articles. Specifically, the analysis addressed the 
following research questions:
1. What claims are made about EMU and the single currency over the course of the 
different events?
2. How have claims about EMU changed over the course of time?
3. What evidence is invoked in the articles to support the newspapers’ positions on the 
euro?
4. What warrants are appealed to, to justify the link between evidence and claims?
5. How can the newspapers’ issue-positioning be schematically represented?
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5.3 Results
Leading articles published in both the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph were structured 
similarly with the majority of articles consisting of a succession of explicit claims 
relating to the issue or event of interest, along with data in support of those claims. 
These ‘micro-arguments’ either worked in parallel or in series to support the overall 
argument presented in the leading article. Whilst the majority of articles were only 
partially concerned with the issue of the single currency and whether or not the UK 
should join EMU, the event-specific argument in each article acted as a vehicle for the 
editor to articulate the newspaper’s position on the euro issue. For this reason, the 
results reported here focus on the second stage of argumentation analysis that was 
conducted, aimed at identifying the arguments relating to EMU and the single currency.
5.3.1 EMU-speciflc claims in The Guardian and The Observer
The analysis of claims relating to EMU identified two ways in which the newspapers 
communicated their position on the issue. For the most part, issue-positioning revealed 
itself implicitly through the claims made about EMU; through the valence of those 
claims (i.e. whether they were positive or negative towards EMU), or through the 
warrant underpinning those claims. Additionally, however, the newspapers 
occasionally made explicit their issue positioning by either stating clearly what that 
positioning was, or by implying it through the use of the pronoun ‘we’.
In the case of The Guardian and The Observer, the clearest example of this in the
articles analysed here, appeared in a leader in the Guardian printed in the run-up to the
1997 General Election -
"There is hardly an institution in the country that is not split on the issue. The 
Observer favours the wait-and-see policy, with a predisposition towards 
joining -  but we are keenly aware o f the economic and political risks. ”
(27.4.97).
Thus, it would be inappropriate to describe the Guardian and Observer’s position on 
EMU during the period under investigation as being strongly in favour of the single 
currency. Indeed, whilst the publication claims to be broadly pro-European, its position 
on the euro issue remained somewhat ‘agnostic’ throughout the 1990s. It is also evident 
from this quotation that the editorial position of the Guardian was different from that of
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the Observer newspaper, although, for the remainder of the analysis, I have chosen to 
examine both publications together.
The nature of these positions is manifest in the EMU-related claims made by the two 
newspapers, none of which firmly commit the publications to a strongly pro-EMU 
stance and many of which could be described as ambiguous with respect to Britain’s 
relationship with Europe. Table 5.2 summarises the findings of the thematic coding of 
the EMU-specific claims identified in the argumentation analysis, in the order in which 
they appeared in the articles during the events analysed. All the claims that were coded 
(29 in total) are available in Appendix B.
Table 5,2 Euro-specific claims identified in The Guardian and The Observer 
Main Claim
1 Britain’s future must lie with Europe (Maastrict)
2 EMU has massive implications for Britain (Qualifier: whether we join or not)
(Maastrict)
3 Britain should work with Europe to create a different future for the EU (Madrid)
4 We must make the euro work (Dublin)
5 The single currency is one o f the most important issues facing the country (Election 
’97)
6 Britain’s policy must be to wait and see (Election ‘97)
1 Europe is political (Euro Launch)
Of the claims shown in table 5.2, the most frequently articulated argued that the single 
currency has significant implications for Britain, often with an appended qualifier such 
as “EMU may fail”, or “whether or not Britain joins”. The claim first appeared during 
the Maastricht coverage, and then, throughout the period of investigation. Some 
examples of this claim are given below. It is noteworthy, that ‘implications’ is used to 
refer to both the positive and negative impact of the single currency and in this sense, 
can be seen as being related to the ‘economic and political risks’ that form The 
Guardian’s central concern, although it often appeared to be supported by evidence 
relating to the benefits of the single currency.
Examples:
“The implications o f the agreement on EMU are huge. ” (Maastricht - 15.12.91)
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“A single currency will have immense implications for Britain, whatever the 
terms on which it is finally agreed and whether or not Britain joins it. ” (Dublin 
-9.12.96)
Even i f  Britain doesn’t join the single currency it won’t be able to avoid it. 
Sooner or later it will invade Britain. ” (Dublin —14.12.96)
“even though Britain is not joining European Monetary Union in the first wave, 
we will nevertheless be faced with the prospect o f the euro starting to circulate 
in Britain o f its own accord. ” (Euro-11 Decision -  29.4.98)
These claims appeared against the ‘background’ of the broadly pro-European position 
of the two publications, which urged readers that it was in Britain’s interests to be part 
of the European project and to work alongside European partners to achieve a future for 
Europe of mutual benefit to all. These claims were somewhat ambiguous vis-a-vis the 
single currency, often implying that Britain should be participating in closer union with 
its European partners but that Europe should not be making the single currency its 
priority. Once again, these were claims that appeared in the texts throughout the period 
of investigation.
Examples:
'Britain cannot afford to be left on its own i f  the rest o f Europe goes ahead 
with a common currency” (Maastricht —15.12.91)
“A modernised Britain needs to be part o f Europe not to stand apart from it.
That does not mean becoming a passive partner. But it does mean promoting 
the benefits o f engagement in Europe. ” (Dublin -  7.12.96)
“Europe’s blinkered dash for a single currency, instead o f co-ordinating 
economic policy, is putting the cart before the horse. (...) The era o f ‘ever 
closer ’ institutional union in Europe must close. The new priority must be to 
deliver popular and practical benefits to Europe’s people. ” (Election 97 -  
10.6.97)
By the time of the decision as to which EU Member States would join the single 
currency in the first wave (May 1998), such appeals had evolved into a concern that 
Britain should be working with its partners to ensure the success of the single currency.
e.g.
‘‘Although we have deep worries about the viability o f monetary union -  both 
as a project for the 11 founder members andfor Britain i f  she joins later — it is 
vital to mitigate the chances o f failure. ” (Euro-11 Decision -  2.5.98)
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It was apparent that The Guardian/ Observer’s consolidated position on the single 
currency, as articulated through all of the EMU-specific claims identified in the articles, 
was that, given the scale of project and the political and economic difficulties associated 
with it, the government’s decision to ‘wait and see’ was the right one. Interestingly, this 
position was mainly based on the conception that EMU was primarily an economic 
decision. However, by 1998, concerns about “political fixing” fuelled the newspapers’ 
caution about the single currency. During the Danish referendum, the prior claim that 
“no economic decision (...) is more important than the single currency” (appearing 
during the coverage of the summit in Amsterdam -  27.5.97), had evolved into the 
following claim:
”Forget Gordon Brown ’s mantra about five economic tests (...) the euro is not 
and can never be an ‘economic ’ issue. ” (Danish Referendum - 25.9.00)
Again, this claim clearly echoes the previous concern expressed in The Guardian about 
the economic and political risks carried by the EMU project, justifying the overall 
determination to put the decision on hold for the time being.
5.3.2 EMU-specific claims in The Daily and Sunday Telegraph
While The Guardian’s position was characterised by agnosticism towards the single 
currency project, The Daily/ Sunday Telegraph consistently revealed its opposition 
towards EMU throughout the period of investigation. As with The Guardian/ Observer, 
this issue-positioning is evident in a number of explicit claims made in the leading 
articles.
Examples:
“We do not want closer political or monetary union at present; we have 
enough to be going on with. ” (Maastricht-9.12.91)
“This newspaper has always warned that, under the pressures o f an election 
campaign, the Cabinet’s wait-and-see policy on the single currency was 
unlikely to hold. ” 17.4.97
“Conceived as a political fantasy, it seems destined to end as an economic 
failure. Britain must stay out o f it. ” (Euro-11 Decision -  4.5.98)
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This opposition was perhaps more a reflection of the strongly partisan support of the
newspaper for the Conservative Party, and the way it evolved over the course of the
decade reflected the position that the Tories took on the issue during this time. During
the early part of the decade, the newspapers’ claims about the euro strongly supported
John Major, applauding the opt-out of the single currency secured at Maastricht by the
then Prime Minister, and generally supporting the ‘wait-and-see’ policy on EMU
advocated by the Government at that time. Two examples from leaders published at the
time of the Maastricht summit illustrate this position:
“There is every reason to believe that the public will continue to see the sense 
o f what is essentially a ‘wait and see ’position by the Government on one o f 
the most far-reaching and hazardous decisions the Community has 
contemplated in decades. ” (Maastricht —3.12.91)
“A postponement o f such a critical decision would damage nothing. ”
(Maastricht -  9.12.91)
Table 5.3 Euro-specific claims identified in The Daily and Sunday Telegraph
Main Claim
1 We should ‘wait-and-see ’ (Maastricht)
2 EMU is a threat to independence (Maastricht)
3 EMU is dangerous/ damaging (Maastricht)
4 EMU is a political project (Madrid)
5 EMU carries implications for Britain (whether we join or not) (Madrid)
6 The Government must decide its position on EMU (Madrid)
7 No country will achieve the Maastricht convergence criteria (Dublin)
8 We must make EMU work (Dublin)
9 EMU means scrapping the pound (Election ’97)
10 The euro will be a weak currency (Election ’97) )
11 EMU is a French and German project (Amsterdam)
12 EMU carries economic risks (Euro-11 decision)
13 The euro is an intrusion on our national life (Euro Launch)
14 It is possible to be pro-EU but anti-EMU (Danish Referendum)
As divisions in the Conservative Party over Europe deepened, however, the Telegraph 
adopted a more firmly anti-EMU position, although like the Guardian, it was set against 
a broadly pro-European Union outlook, favouring co-operation with European partners, 
but rejecting economic and political union. However, by May 1998, political 
interference in the decision over which Member States qualified to join EMU at the first 
wave led the newspaper to a more determined rejection of the single currency project. 
Thus, unlike The Guardian’s position on EMU, which appeared to remain relatively 
stable over the course of the decade, The Telegraph’s stance on EMU evolved from a 
wait-and-see position into one which was firmly antagonistic towards a single currency.
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This opposition to the euro also found expression implicitly in the other EMU-specific 
claims identified in the argumentation analysis. The most common themes identified in 
the thematic coding of the claims are shown in table 5.3 (for each one, the event at 
which the claims first emerged is shown in parentheses). All text units coded as EMU- 
specific claims are shown in Appendix B.
Unlike in The Guardian, the EMU-specific arguments found in The Telegraph were 
considerably more varied and a greater number of them were recorded in the 
argumentation analysis (a total of 55 from the 27 articles analysed, compared with 28 
from The Guardian/Observer). Because of the evolution of the Telegraph’s position, the 
themes that summarise those claims (in table 5.3) are listed in the order in which they 
first appeared in the analysis, although it is noteworthy that many of these reappeared in 
articles published later (see below). Some of the claims made echoed those found in the 
Guardian leaders -  for example, support for the ‘wait-and-see’ position during the 
Maastricht negotiations and concerns about the implications of EMU for Britain, 
irrespective of whether or not the decision was made to join. Similarly, there was 
agreement that EMU represented one of the most important issues facing the country 
and support for the project in as much as “it is not in Britain’s interests for the euro to 
be a disaster” (Dublin -  15.12.96). However, in spite of these points of convergence 
between the two publications and the fact that there was greater variety in the arguments 
found in The Daily Telegraph, the majority of claims expressed the newspaper’s 
negative position on this issue. Four main themes recurred during the period of 
investigation communicating the newspaper’s position in this way. The first appeared 
at the time of Maastricht. Despite the support shown for the Conservative 
Government’s wait-and-see policy on EMU, the dominant theme at this time described 
the single currency project as ‘dangerous’ and ‘damaging’:
Examples:
“This newspaper believes that the lurch to a single currency is potentially 
damaging to the cause o f European co-operation. ” (Maastricht -3.12.91)
it is “one o f the most far-reaching and hazardous decisions the Community 
has contemplated in decades. ” (Maastricht — 3.12.91)
“It may be argued that the outcome o f this EC summit is more important for  
perils and disasters averted than for the positive benefits it confers ”
(Maastricht -15.12.91)
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By the time of the Euro-11 decision, this had evolved into a second theme, more
specifically concerned with the economic risks associated with the euro. This theme is
illustrated in the following examples:
“The euro system is one that can work properly only in good weather. As 
soon as the European economy hits turbulence, the engines are going to jam. ” 
(Euro-11 Decision -  30.4.98)
“There is no common interest rate that suits all Europe’s different 
economies. ” (Euro-11 Decision — 28.5.98)
“The danger o f EMU is that, i f  one nation in the currency zone finds itself 
suffering hardship that it could have avoided with the freedom to manage its 
own currency, there will be nothing that the politicians will be able to tell their 
angry electors. ” (Euro-11 Decision — 28.5.98)
Thirdly, at the time of the Madrid summit in 1995, concerns about political involvement
in and the political implications of the EMU project first emerged, and came to form a
central concern in the argumentative claims of the two newspapers, which, as the
examples shown below demonstrate, recurred throughout the decade:
To achieve EMU “the currency must be managed for political rather than 
economic ends ” (Madrid -  2.12.95)
“In the minds o f most, EMU is so clearly a political rather than an economic 
question that they believe the failure to converge is almost irrelevant. ”
(D ublin-2.12.96)
“The Commission’s evident readiness to elevate political over economic 
considerations has robbed the euro’s supporters in this country o f their last 
remaining argument. The EU is clearly less interested in monetary stability 
than in including as many states as possible in the next stage o f European 
construction. ” (Election 97 - 28.4.97)
“the launching o f the single currency is essentially a political undertaking. ”
(Euro-11 Decision — 24.4.98)
“The single currency has always been an explicitly political project. ” (Euro- 
11 Decision -  28.5.98)
“EMU has been consciously developed by Europe’s political elites as an 
instrument for achieving full economic and political union, and will therefore 
lead necessarily to the evisceration o f Parliament. ” (Euro Launch -  29.12.98)
The fourth main eurosceptic claim emerging during this period portrayed EMU as a 
threat to our independence and sovereignty. Again, this theme reappeared throughout 
the decade as illustrated in the following examples:
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“we are not merely engaged in protecting our independence, but limiting the 
injury that could be suffered by others i f  the Europe o f the philosophers runs 
so far ahead o f itself down the federalist road that it falls over its own 
peoples. ” (Maastricht -9.12.91)
“there may still come a day when Britain faces a straight choice between 
staying outside a single currency at serious cost to our economy, or opting in 
at the price o f our financial independence. ” (Maastricht —15.12.91)
“The abolition o f the pound means the end o f British national independence. ” 
(Election ’97-21.4.97)
“The single currency has serious implications for national sovereignty” (Euro 
Launch-29.12.98)
5.3.3 Descriptions of EMU
The arguments about EMU developed by the newspapers were articulated not only in 
the context of the event-specific arguments that were the central concern of the leading 
articles analysed, but also in the discursive context that typified the different 
publications. Both papers used a mixture of formal and informal styles, but The Daily 
Telegraph was far more likely than The Guardian to embellish their arguments with 
emotive rhetoric, which arguably lent additional weight to the force of the claims being 
made. Appendix B contains descriptions of the single currency and the EMU project 
that appeared in the articles subjected to argumentation analysis. Often, these 
descriptions arose ‘outside’ of the main argument claims and evidence, so they were not 
always included in the argumentation analysis. However, although they have not been 
coded here as explicitly contributing to the structure of the arguments presented, it can 
be argued that a description of an object can, nevertheless in itself, implicitly make 
claims about the nature of that object.
For example, the earliest descriptions of EMU recorded in the analysis of The Guardian
articles from Maastricht identified the move towards a single currency as “a German
thing because the Germany economy dominates”. Equally, a frequently occurring
theme in the Daily Telegraph articles was the description of EMU as part of a federalist
project. During the Madrid summit, EMU was variously described as:
“the cornerstone o f a federal Europe ”
“the headlong rush to federalism ”
“the federal menace ”
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“the ratchet o f federalism ”
Table 5.4 Descriptions o f EMU and the single currency
The Guardian/ Observer The Daily/ Sunday Telegraph
“a German thing” “damaging”
“a kind of monetary Esperanto” “politically precarious”
“an altogether more serious animal” “out of kilter”
“that fateful project” “federalist”
“in principle a desirable thing” “over-rigid”
“a complex and hugely important “unnatural”
question”
“the tortuous road to monetary union” “unhealthy”
“a question of unprecedented “rigid”
magnitude.. .with unpredictable, 
convulsive implications”
“irreversible” “mess”
“a matter of national destiny” “disaster”
“the cornerstone of federal Europe” 
“the headlong rush to federalism” 
“the federal menace”
“the ratchet of federalism”
“the Euro juggernaut”
“sinking ship”
“housewife’s headache”
“ill-starred plan”
“hideous”
“fimny money”
“constitutionally weak”
“inflationary ‘camembert’ currency” 
“inflationary disaster”
“risky”
Inevitably, there is considerable overlap between the EMU-specific claims that appear 
in the newspapers and the way in which EMU is talked about in the articles. It is not 
always possible to detach what is explicitly being claimed about the single currency 
from what is implicitly conveyed in this way. Clearly a detailed analysis of the content 
of arguments and the use of rhetoric is beyond the scope of the present study, which 
focuses on a comparatively large range of articles published over a long period of time. 
However, what is important here is to note the way in which claims and evidence are 
backed by the discursive and rhetorical tools used in the arguments (what Aristotle 
described as ‘artistic proofs’ -  see Leach, 2000). For The Daily Telegraph, these 
descriptions of the single currency and EMU were almost entirely negative, whilst those
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for The Guardian and Observer were both positive and negative, expressing the 
ambivalence of the publications’ positioning on the issue. Table 5.4 shows some of the 
adjectives and descriptions of the euro/ EMU identified in the analysis (note that 
considerably fewer rhetorical descriptions were present in the Guardian and the 
Observer).
5.3.4 EMU-relevant evidence
As with the analysis of euro-specific claims, units of text in the leading articles coded as 
euro-relevant ‘evidence’ in the argumentation analysis were also subjected to thematic 
coding. The purpose of this was to a) categorise the content of the evidence; and b) to 
identify the valence of the evidence - i.e. whether the data supported a generally pro- or 
anti-EMU stance. As with the descriptions of EMU discussed earlier, there was a clear 
distinction between evidence invoked in the Guardian/ Observer and that employed in 
The Telegraph arguments. Table 5.5 shows the themes identified in the evidence 
employed in the Guardian/Observer arguments. Immediately apparent is the finding 
that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the ambivalent position of these publications on EMU is 
supported by a range of multi-valenced evidence, which supported arguments both in 
favour and against the single currency project. Over 70 units of text were identified as 
‘EMU-specific’ evidence, of which over 40 were identified as reasons for adopting a 
pro-EMU stance.
Thematic coding of the evidence resulted in the list of themes shown in table 5.5 (listed 
in order of the frequency with which they recurred in the texts)10. The range of 
evidence presented is represented by a relatively small number of themes. It is 
noteworthy that of the pro-EMU evidence presented, the majority of data concerned the 
economic implications of the single currency, with just two main political arguments 
invoked in favour of joining EMU. These concerned the ideological goals of the EU, of 
deterring conflict by binding European states and providing a collective European 
identity, and the need for Britain to retain a central role in EU negotiations (which 
would be diminished by staying out of EMU). Of the economic data presented, the 
newspapers relied on the concept of ‘Eurocreep’, the idea that even if we stay out of
10 It should be noted that the frequency of occurrence of each theme is not provided here as it was felt that 
such information would not be appropriate in a qualitative analysis o f this kind. Tables containing the 
evidence extracts identified in the argumentation analysis are shown in Appendix B.
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EMU, the euro will enter ‘by the back door’ and be used by businesses and individual 
consumers regardless.
Table 5.5 Themes identified in evidence invoked in The Guardian/Observer
Reasons for being pro-EMU Reasons for being anti-EMU
1 ‘Eurocreep ’ -  Britain will start using 1 EMU carries economic costs
the euro anyway
2 Europe’s economy is strong/ like the 2 EMU implies loss o f control o f
US economy economy
3 There are economic risks if  we stay 3 EMU is imperfect/ needs
out modification
4 Businesses will want to use the euro 4 EMU could entail too much political
unification
5 EMU will remove transaction costs 5 There is too much political
interference in EMU
6 EMU ‘binds ’ European states 6 The millennium bug may make
changing to the euro problematic
7 Britain should have a central role in 7 There is little popular support for
EU negotiations the project
8 Lists o f economic reasons 8 EMU carries political risks
9 EMU can bring greater prosperity 9 Joining EMU may mean loss o f
sovereignty
10 EMU will attract overseas investors 10 The British economy is different
from the euro economy
11 EMU allows price transparency
A range of macro and micro economic advantages of participation in a single currency 
are presented in the articles in support of a pro-EMU position, however, these were 
juxtaposed against the reasons provided in support of an anti-EMU position. As with 
the pro-EMU arguments, the data used in the anti-EMU arguments were also more 
likely to be economic in nature, focusing on the economic costs associated with EMU 
and the economic disadvantages of EMU. However, the authors were more likely to 
invoke political reasons for opposing the single currency. In particular, concerns about 
excessive political unification, political interference in the project, and the implications 
for British sovereignty were the country to join. These themes were largely echoed in 
the leading articles published in the Daily/Sunday Telegraph, as is evident in table 5.6.
149
Table 5.6 Themes identified in evidence invoked in The Daily/Sunday Telegraph
Reasons for being anti-EMU
1 Problems associated with the Maastricht convergence criteria
2 EMU is a political project
3 EMU carries economic costs
4 EMU is a French and German project
5 There is little or no support for EMU
6 The euro will be ‘weak’ or inflationary
I  There are economic risks involved (especially due to ‘one-size-fits-all’
economic policy)
8 EMU could be ‘damaging’ or ‘dangerous’
9 Joining EMU would mean loss o f sovereignty/ independence
10 EMU is part o f a federalist project
II EMU will/ has cause(d) social unrest
12 The euro will be confusing
13 It is possible to be pro-Europe but anti-EMU
14 There is no such thing as a collective European identity
15 The euro is not yet a reality
16 The euro means ‘scrapping’the pound
17 EMU is associated with fudging
18 Labour is pro-EMU
19 There are more important issues to focus on
20 EMU may fail
As we have seen, unlike the arguments found in The Guardian/ Observer, those found in 
the Daily Telegraph were exclusively anti-EMU, and the evidence presented in support 
of this position was entirely negatively-valenced, stressing the negative aspects of the 
EMU project and of what British membership would entail. A total of 124 text units 
were coded as evidence in the Telegraph articles, and these are represented by just 20 
themes (shown in table 5.6). Units were coded as data if they provided support for the 
overall position of the newspaper (i.e. the implicit ‘claim’ that Britain should not join 
EMU), rather than simply where the text was specifically used to support an explicit 
claim in the article. For this reason, there was less of a clear distinction in the 
Telegraph articles between claims and evidence, and there was a tendency for the claims 
themselves to implicitly provide support for the overall stance of the publication 
towards the issue, acting as reasons why Britain should not join the euro.
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5.3.5 Prototypical Arguments and Warrants
Prototypical arguments about EMU were reconstructed for each newspaper from the 
claims and evidence identified in the argumentation analysis. These are shown in figure
5.2 and 5.3. Only the most frequently occurring claims and data that best-captured the 
stance of the publications on EMU over the course of the events analysed were 
included. It should be noted that the models represent the author’s interpretation of the 
data -  the schematic representation of the arguments shown in the figures are intended 
to illustrate that interpretation.
Because the warrants for the arguments were not articulated in the articles analysed -  
most warrants are usually implicit in an argument (Chambliss and Gamer, 1996) -  the 
warrants presented in the diagrams represent inferences on the basis of the claims and 
evidence analysed. As discussed previously, the study of warrants in argumentation 
analysis is rendered problematic by the fact that warrants are seldom explicit in the 
argument. For this reason, in order to identify the warrants that authorise a particular 
argument, it is necessary to infer it from our common sense understandings of the issues 
addressed in the argument. An additional complexity here, however, is that the different 
newspapers appeal to different sets of warrants inferred from the evidence and claims 
about EMU found in The Guardian/ Observer (following the method used by Chambliss 
and Gamer, 1996). To illustrate, the first warrants relate to the claim that EMU carries 
economic and political risks (which was a dominant theme in The Guardian), which is 
supported by evidence to suggest EMU might lead to political unification or have a 
negative impact on the British economy. The warrant enables the ‘leap’ from evidence 
to claim (Liakopoulos, 2000b), but in turn, depends upon shared assumptions between 
source and audience about how political unification might be undesirable. Thus, to 
understand fully the warrants underlying arguments, it is necessary to investigate the 
ideological component to news discourse whose comprehension relies upon taken-for- 
granted representations of how the world works. To facilitate the reader’s understanding 
of the warrants appealed to in the EMU-specific arguments of the newspapers analysed 
here, table 5.7 shows the “covert ideological positions” of the two newspapers identified 
by Anderson and Weymouth (1998) in their analysis of press reporting on EMU. It is 
this ideological position that is assumed by these authors to play a significant role in 
public opinion formation.
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Figure 5.2 Prototypical argument about EMU from The Guardian/ Observer
Evidence Warrants Claims
EMU carries economic and political 
costs e.g. loss o f control over economy; 
too much political unification.
EMU could have major economic 
advantages e.g. reduced transaction 
costs; price transparency; prosperity.
Europe’s economy is strong and could 
be like the US economy.
EMU could bind Europe together to 
achieve peace.
Britain could play a central role to 
.work towards the future o f the EU.
There are economic risks o f staying 
out
The euro will creep in the backdoor 
anyway.
Businesses will want to use the euro.
I f  EMU were to impact negatively on the economy,
I f  EMU meant political unification,
...then there would be economic and political risks in 
joining...
I f  EMU were to bring economic advantages,
I f  the European economy were strong like the US 
economy,
I f  EMU were successful in binding Europe together 
to achieve peace,
I f  Britain were to play a central role in creating the 
EU’s future,
...then it would be in Britain’s interest to be in 
Europe...
'— _ _
^7f  there are economic risks to staying out,
I f  the euro will creep in by the backdoor anyway,
I f  Businesses will want to use the euro,
...then there would be massive implications for 
Britain (whether we join or not)...
r  a
EMU carries 
economic and 
political risks
1
r  >
Britain’s future 
must lie with 
Europe
1
EMU has massive 
implications for 
Britain (whether we 
join or not)
We must ‘wait-and-see*
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Figure 5.3 Prototypical argument about EMU from The Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph
Evidence Warrants Claims
EMU is dangerous/ 
damaging
EMU carries economic risks and costs. Since EMU carries economic risks and costs,
The euro will/has cause(d) social 
unrest.
Since the euro has and will cause social unrest,
Since the Maastricht criteria are over-rigid,
The Maastricht criteria are over-rigid 
and none o f the countries can achieve 
them.
Since the euro will be weak/ inflationary,
EMU is a political 
project
Since EMU may fail,
The euro will be weak/inflationary.
EMU may fail. ...then EMU is dangerous/damaging...
Joining EMU would 
lead to a loss o f 
sovereignty
Since EMU is a French and German project,EMU is a French and German project
Since EMU will lead to federalism,EMU will lead to federalism.
Since Labour is pro-EMU,Labour is pro-EMU.
We must stay out
.. .then EMU is a political project...
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Table 5.7 Covert ideological positions on Europe o f The Daily Telegraph and The 
Guardian
The Guardian The Daily Telegraph
The European Union is an efficient The single currency is potentially a 
provider and facilitator working source o f social unrest, 
acceptably well in Britain’s interests.
The economic and social pressures on 
other member states in the run-up to 
qualifying for EMU signal caution as 
Britain negotiates on the single 
currency.
The single currency is (properly) being 
resisted by organised labour.
Britain should be prepared to 
investigate further unspecified acts o f 
political integration.
The single currency is an unnecessary 
diversion o f the EU from other more 
pressing issues such as the completion 
o f the single market.
Britain should not enter in the first 
round o f the single currency.
The single currency 
sovereignty.
is a threat to
The Social Chapter will hamper British 
manufacturing.
The EU is more disunited than united 
on matters o f foreign policy and 
security.
Britain needs the EU less than the EU 
needs Britain.
Germany is the driving force behind 
the single currency and this is linked to 
its historical attachment to its dreams 
o f expansion in Europe.
Britain should be prepared boldly to 
investigate further political integration, 
not ignoring certain federal options.
Europe is the most important geo­
political/ economic and social space in 
which Britain must become a 
permanent and major player.
Germany and France remain 
rather than partners in Europe.
rivals
The pro-Europeans [New Labour] are 
to be associated with ‘treason ’ and will 
abandon the veto, surrender the pound, 
sign away British rights.
Source: Anderson and Weymouth (1998; pp. 76 and 108)
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5.4 Discussion and Conclusion
5.4.1 Summary of findings
Over the course of the events from which the leading articles analysed here were 
sampled, it was possible to characterise the positions on EMU of the newspapers by 
examining the use of argumentative discourse relating to the issue. Whilst the articles 
were structured so as to present arguments specific to the event or debate being covered 
at that time, argumentation specifically concerned with EMU and the single currency 
recurred throughout the articles and represented one of the primary means through 
which the newspapers’ issue positioning was communicated. For The Daily/Sunday 
Telegraph, this positioning was a function of partisan support for the Conservatives and, 
therefore, showed evidence of having evolved over the course of the decade, from a 
position of support for John Major’s ‘wait-and-see’ position at the time of Maastricht, 
through appeals to the Tory Party to make its position clear on the issue of UK 
membership of EMU during the run up to the 1997 general election, to support for Tory 
opposition to the single currency project following the election. Overall, their stance 
was characterised by negativity towards closer European integration throughout the 
period, although downright opposition to EMU emerged only gradually as the debate 
evolved.
By contrast, the position of The Guardian and The Observer was essentially one of 
‘wait-and-see’ throughout the period under investigation (also a function of its pro- 
Labour partisanship). It was perhaps inappropriate to study the two ‘sister publications’ 
together, given the explicit statement in one of the articles that they held different 
stances on the issue of EMU (The Guardian being the more ambivalent of the two with 
its concern for the economic and political risks involved). Nevertheless, given that both 
publications shared a generally pro-European perspective, it seemed reasonable to 
interpret this statement about The Guardian’s position as implicitly communicating a 
‘wait-and-see’ strategy on EMU. Thus, it was possible to characterise the stance of the 
two papers as being essentially in favour of closer European integration, and of 
Britain’s direct involvement in that process, but with distinct reservations with respect 
to a single currency.
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The way in which the newspapers positioned themselves on the single currency issue 
manifested itself through what were termed here ‘micro-arguments’ -  EMU-relevant 
arguments that emerged over the course of events (independent of the issue-specific 
arguments developed in each of the articles), which communicated the overall stance of 
the publications. For the Telegraph, three key micro-arguments underpinned their 
overall view that “We must stay out” (of EMU). Firstly, claims repeatedly expressed 
the notion that EMU is somehow dangerous and/or damaging; secondly, they 
highlighted the idea that EMU is an essentially political project rather than an economic 
one; and thirdly, they highlighted the threat to British independence and sovereignty 
represented by EMU. These micro-arguments were additionally supported by the use of 
negative adjectives used to refer to the process of EMU and the single currency.
By contrast, for The Guardian/ Observer, the main three micro-arguments that 
underpinned the overall ‘wait-and-see’ position of the publications referred firstly, to 
the economic and political risks presented by the single currency; secondly, to the need 
for Britain’s future to be a part of Europe; and thirdly, to the idea that EMU carries 
serious implications for Britain, regardless of whether we join now or later. Unlike the 
Telegraph, these newspapers were considerably less likely to use rhetorical 
embellishment in their descriptions of EMU and the euro, negative or otherwise. 
Similarly, whereas the micro-arguments found in The Telegraph were either 
unsupported by explicit evidence, or were supported by only negatively-valenced 
evidence, those found in The Guardian/Observer were supported by both negative and 
positive reasons for and against joining the single currency.
Warrants were rarely, if ever, explicitly articulated in either newspaper and it was clear 
that the arguments appealed to socio-cultural information (Chambliss, 1995) assumed to 
be shared amongst the readers of the different publications. Our understanding of this 
ideological component of the newspapers’ argumentative discourse is informed by, and 
supports, Anderson and Weymouth’s (1998) analysis. There was evidence to show that 
arguments about the euro used to communicate and support the overall stance of the 
newspapers on the EMU issue recurred throughout the period of investigation. This 
meant that the arguments tended to build on each other cumulatively, such that once 
articulated, they formed part of a rhetorical resource, to which the author could appeal 
when building new arguments in later articles. Claims were repeated, but, in turn, these 
claims acted both as evidence for the implicit position of the publication, as well as
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acting as warrants for later arguments. The warrants appealed to in the arguments, 
therefore, not only drew on wider knowledge assumed to be shared by the readership of 
the different publications, but also on quite specific shared knowledge that came from 
past readings of the newspapers’ leaders. As such, the arguments entered into the 
shared knowledge of the writer and reader, and became available to be inserted into 
later arguments, facilitating the readers’ interpretation of the overall stance of the paper.
The analysis of arguments presented here had twin aims: firstly, to reveal the persuasive 
quality of arguments on either side of the EMU debate and secondly, to identify how 
information about the euro was framed by the media. In terms of the former, a clear 
conclusion to be drawn from the research findings is that the eurosceptic voice in the 
opinion-leading press during the course of the debate surrounding EMU was far 
‘stronger’ in communicating its position than the pro-European press. Arguments in 
The Telegraph were consistent in their opposition towards the euro, presenting a ‘united 
front’, with no attempt made to present readers with any of the arguments in favour of a 
single currency. By contrast, the more ‘balanced’ position of The Guardian/Observer, 
which presented evidence for and against EMU, arguably succeeded in communicating 
uncertainty and ambivalence about the single currency project. Whilst it was clearly the 
intention of these newspapers to provide support for the position that we should not rush 
into a single currency without seeing how it functions in reality (which was essentially, 
the Labour position on the issue at the time), the net result was that there was no clear 
articulation of the pro-EMU case as there was for the anti-EMU case and this ‘covert 
scepticism’ about EMU in the pro-European press may have been responsible in some 
way for public opposition to the euro. Of course, other publications may have been 
successful at this time in communicating unambiguously the arguments in favour of 
EMU (e.g. The Financial Times), so the conclusions drawn here must be made with this 
reservation in mind.
The use of argumentation analysis represented a relatively new approach to the study of 
argument quality, and the question of what makes an argument persuasive -  an issue 
that lies at the heart of research into persuasion. As was discussed in chapter 2, there 
has been considerable debate surrounding the question of whether the persuasiveness of 
an argument constitutes a characteristic of the argument itself or some characteristic of 
the receiver’s response to the argument. According to Boiler, Swasy and Munch (1990) 
analysing arguments according to Toulmin’s model can provide a means of determining
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their relative strength in terms of their ‘structural integrity’, without the need to refer to 
recipient cognitive responses. On this basis, one conclusion to be drawn from the 
present analysis is that the multi-valenced nature of The Guardian/Observer arguments 
rendered them structurally weaker and, consequently, less persuasive than the anti-EMU 
arguments circulated by The Telegraph newspapers. Further research would be 
necessary, however, to determine whether these appraisals of argument strength 
correspond with readers’ judgements about their persuasiveness.
In terms of the second aim of the research (to study media frames through the analysis 
of argumentation), the findings point towards the following conclusions. On the one 
hand, the event-specific arguments developed in each of the leading articles seemed to 
provide readers with ‘issue-specific news frames’ (de Vreese et al., 2001), highlighting 
particular attributes of the issue depending on the nature of the events being reported. 
But over time, the editorial writers came to rely on generic news frames (Gamson, 
1992: Neuman et al., 1992) to structure their representation of the debate surrounding 
EMU and these frames revealed themselves in the claims of the ‘micro-arguments’ 
described above. While The Telegraph’s arguments came to frame the issue in terms of 
conflict (e.g. between Britain and Europe), The Guardian / Observer tended to frame the 
issue in terms of the political and economic consequences of joining EMU. These 
findings differ slightly from those of de Vreese et al.’s (2001) study, which found that 
coverage of the single currency tended to be framed in terms of economic 
consequences, suggesting that the issue positioning of the journalist and publication is a 
crucial variable in determining the choice of news frame.
As well as building on previous studies of framing in news about European integration, 
the findings of the research provid further support for the conclusions of other 
researchers who have analysed the content of news reports about Europe. In particular, 
Hardt-Mautner’s (1995) research similarly revealed a reliance on negative stereotypes in 
the eurosceptic press and the absence of a clearly articulated pro-European voice in 
British newspapers. The analysis presented here also identified a set of ideological 
assumptions underlying the pro- and anti-EMU arguments in The Guardian/Observer 
and The Daily/Sunday Telegraph that were similar to those identified in Anderson and 
Weymouth’s (1998) study. The research extends the scope of these studies, however, 
by specifying some of the mechanisms by which these characteristics of anti-European 
press coverage might influence public attitudes. Notably, the findings suggest that the
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frames used in news reports are likely to reveal themselves in the way people think 
about the EMU issue, and that the more compelling anti-EMU arguments of the right- 
wing media are likely to have greater persuasive impact than those of the more 
ambivalent centre-left publications. More research is needed, however, to test these 
hypotheses empirically.
5.4.2 Limitations of the research
As a method for the social sciences, argumentation analysis provides a number of 
advantages to the researcher. As well as providing a tool for extending our 
understanding of theoretical approaches such as social representations theory (e.g. see 
Liakopoulos, 2000a; 2000b and van Bavel, 2001), on a practical level, it also provides a 
powerful tool for qualitative data reduction. In the present study, the Toulmin model 
provided a means of isolating what was being said about the euro in newspaper articles 
that were not only explicitly concerned with the EMU issue. As a result, the method 
made it possible to identify the evolution of the newspapers’ positions over the course 
of time and the way in which they framed the EMU issue, while remaining ‘true’ to the 
text, and with minimal loss of information, as is often a limitation of approaches based 
on classical content analysis (more commonly used in framing research). The approach 
adopted here also incorporated thematic coding, aimed at categorising the claims made 
about EMU and the evidence invoked in their support. These methods add value to 
classical approaches because they make it possible to examine the process by which 
framing is achieved in the first place, rather than focusing solely on frames as the end- 
product. As I argued in the introduction, the theoretical justification for this is drawn 
from the work of social psychologists who have explored the relationship between 
argumentation, human thought and social representation (e.g. Billig, 1987; 1993; 
Liakopoulos, 2000 and 2000b; van Bavel, 2001). If, as Billig (1987; 1993) argues, 
argumentative discourse mirrors thought processes, then studying the structure of that 
discourse in the context of an evolving social debate, can show us not only how media 
frames come to be constructed, but also how individuals and audiences frame issues 
themselves.
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Nevertheless, a number of limitations of the method of argumentation analysis adopted
here do raise concerns, regarding the validity of the findings, and more generally, about
the reliability of the method as a whole. One methodological limitation in particular
deserves special attention. The method of argumentation analysis based on Toulmin’s
model relies considerably on the interpretive skills of the researcher, a) to be able to
identify the argument parts in the first place (something many readers have been shown
to have difficulty with -  Chambliss, 1995); and b) to make inferences where argument
parts are missing or implicit. As van Bavel (2001) has argued,
“Toulmin’s framework needs to be understood as a model for a complete 
argument, including those elements which might be implied and not explicitly 
stated. The researcher must infer the missing elements, the pieces o f the 
puzzle which are missing. (...) In order to successfully analyse arguments and 
identify their hidden elements, therefore, the researcher has to take the wider 
context into account, which contains this taken-for-granted knowledge ” (p. 94- 
95)
The position of the newspaper on EMU was rarely explicitly articulated, yet it was 
implicit in the micro-claims made about the single currency. Because of this, 
identifying the argument parts was not always straightforward, because ‘micro-claims’ 
could equally have been coded as evidence for the implicit ‘macro-claim’ about EMU 
being made by the newspaper. In this sense, argument parts were interchangeable, 
depending on the level of argumentation (e.g. statements identified as evidence in the 
event-specific arguments coded at the first stage of analysis, may have served as claims 
later on in the analysis of EMU-specific arguments). As a consequence, it is possible 
that other researchers would reach different conclusions, a prospect that raises 
considerable concerns about reliability -  and the findings of the assessment of inter- 
coder reliability conducted here provides some evidence of this.
Perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of Toulmin’s model for social scientists
trying to analyse naturally occurring arguments, concerns the identification of
‘warrants’. A warrant is the ‘authority’ that justifies the relationship between evidence
and claim. It is the “underlying reason offered for accepting or rejecting evidence as
support for the claim” (Chambliss, 1995; p.781). However, the concept is problematic
because the warrant is usually implicit in the argument -  that is, it is seldom explicitly
articulated. Rather-
“the arguer presents the evidence and claim and assumes that the relationship 
between the two (warrant) is obvious (“Everybody knows that... ”) ”
(Chambliss and Gamer, 1996; p. 296)
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This means that the argumentation analyst must infer the warrant from the evidence and 
claims relying on an understanding of the assumptions shared between arguer and 
audience. This not only raises concerns about the reliability of such an analytic 
procedure, but also perhaps more importantly, presents a problem in terms of the 
universality of the argument. If an argument appeals to taken-for-granted assumptions 
about the world, then by its very nature it must be culturally specific. Arguments found 
in The Guardian and The Telegraph, therefore, may only ‘make sense’ to readers of 
those publications, and the validity of the argument will depend not on its structural 
integrity, but rather on the ideological component underpinning the relationship 
between claims and data and accessible only to those who share the relevant cultural 
understanding appealed to by the arguer. Both researcher and audience alike are, 
therefore, constrained by their access to the socio-cultural information required to 
comprehend argument warrants (Chambliss, 1995). If the way in which a reader 
interprets an argument depends up on their ability to access to socio-cultural 
information assumed on behalf of the arguer, then perceptions of the validity of the 
argument will also depend upon that access. Argument quality, therefore, can only be 
judged by readers familiar with the taken-for-granted assumptions upon which an 
argument is warranted. In other words, the validity of information depends not simply 
on the structural integrity of arguments, but on the message recipient’s acceptance that 
the message source is authoritative on the message-topic.
I return to the issue of argument quality and what makes an argument persuasive in 
Study D and discuss the findings of Study B further in chapter 9. In the next chapter, I 
present Study C, which tests predictions from the Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986) using data from a public opinion field 
experiment.
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6 IS SUE-INVOLVEMENT AND ATTITUDE CHANGE
6.1 Introduction
Studies A and B were concerned with the role of information circulated by the media in 
public opinion formation and change. The research focused on two different 
mechanisms by which media information influence public attitudes: a) its capacity to 
influence public perceptions of the importance of an issue through the communication 
of salience (agenda-setting) and b) its capacity to influence how people think about an 
issue by emphasising particular features of it (framing). In study A, it was shown that 
only a minority of British people considered matters relating to European integration to 
be important over the course of the debate surrounding the single currency, but that for 
this minority concerns about the issue were relatively sensitive to fluctuations in the 
salience of the issue in the print media. The analysis of argumentation in the pro- and 
anti-EMU press conducted for study B showed how arguments about the euro were 
restricted to a limited number of claims about the nature of the single currency and the 
EMU process, which typically emphasised the negative consequences of a single 
currency rather than highlighting the potential benefits. Whereas the anti-European 
press has consistently presented the arguments against Britain joining the euro, the pro- 
European press has failed to unambiguously present the arguments in favour. Rather, 
arguments about the euro developed over the course of the debate in the pro-European 
camp tended to present both positive and negative aspects of the issue, rendering 
arguments structurally weak and potentially unpersuasive.
In studies C and D, I switch focus away from the role of information in public attitudes 
to the question of how variation in public issue involvement determines how people 
respond to the information they are presented with. Both studies draw on the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986), which 
was described in detail in chapter 2. Whereas study D involved a purposely-designed 
study to test the predictions of the ELM with respect to the role of involvement and 
identity in persuasion, study C makes use of existing data from a public opinion field 
experiment -  a ‘Deliberative Poll’ -  designed to assess the effect of information and 
deliberation on attitudes. Analysing persuasion in the context of a deliberative poll is 
particularly illuminating because the research setting is said to simulate the conditions 
of high issue salience that might be expected to occur in a real-life referendum
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campaign. The data provide an opportunity to explore how public attitudes might be 
influenced in such a context, as well as a chance to test the applicability of the ELM for 
understanding persuasion outside of the social psychological research laboratory. The 
chapter begins with a brief review of the central tenets of the ELM and the significance 
of issue involvement in persuasion. I then describe the deliberative polling method and 
the unique opportunities for secondary analysis provided by the data used in this study. 
Next, I present the predictions derived from the ELM about variation in attitudes as a 
function of involvement, which guided the analysis of the deliberative poll data 
undertaken for this research. The remainder of the chapter presents the results of the 
analysis and discusses their implications for understanding persuasion processes under 
conditions of heightened issue salience, at varying levels of public issue involvement.
6.1.1 The role of involvement in how people respond to information
In chapter 2 ,1 introduced the key postulates of the ELM and highlighted the importance 
of ‘involvement’ as a predictor of elaboration likelihood. To recap, the model posits 
two ‘routes to persuasion’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981): a central route, involving 
systematic processing of arguments contained in the persuasive message; and a 
peripheral route, whereby the message recipient bases their attitudinal judgement on 
heuristics triggered by some element of the persuasive context (typically, extraneous to 
the arguments presented in the message). The route to persuasion taken depends upon a 
person’s motivation and ability to think about new information and to integrate that 
information into their existing structure of beliefs about a given issue. Both motivation 
and ability are assumed to be influenced by issue involvement.
People can be located at different points along a continuum of involvement, which 
correspond to different predictions regarding the likelihood of information or message 
elaboration. At high levels of involvement (e.g. where the target issue is of direct 
personal relevance, or where the issue is one they are particularly interested in or 
knowledgeable about), people will be more motivated and able to systematically process 
the different arguments contained in a message compared with those located at the 
lower end of the continuum. When information is systematically processed and 
integrated into an individual’s existing system of beliefs, any resultant attitude change is 
assumed to have taken place via the ‘central route’ to persuasion. By contrast, where
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involvement is low, the likelihood of elaboration is correspondingly low, so attitude 
change is more likely to be effected via the peripheral route. Thus, the two routes to 
persuasion anchor the two end-points of the involvement (or elaboration likelihood) 
continuum.
As we have seen, it is not uncommon to find that the public is relatively uninvolved in 
political issues. This has certainly been shown to be the case in relation to the issue of 
European integration and in particular, for the British people, who are among the least 
informed and most apathetic in the European Union, especially about Economic and 
Monetary Union. In chapter 1 ,1 introduced the literature relating to the public’s lack of 
issue-relevant knowledge and discussed the implications this has for measuring 
attitudes. In particular, people with low levels of knowledge about political issues tend 
to hold weaker and more labile attitudes or to respond seemingly at random to 
questionnaires designed to measure their attitudes (Converse, 1964). As a result, they 
tend to switch their views about issues over time and also tend to hold apparently 
inconsistent views about issues that might be seen to be related among the political elite 
Thus, the more politically sophisticated an individual is, the more likely it is that they 
will hold stronger and more ‘fully-formed’ attitudes about political issues and the more 
likely it is that their attitudes will exhibit ‘constraint’ (Converse, 1964) -  i.e. will be 
more consistent with sets of related beliefs (Fishkin, 1991). Similarly, the more 
important an issue or attitude is for an individual, the stronger the attitude is likely to be 
and the more resistant it is to persuasion (Krosnick, 1990). These ideas are consistent 
with the ELM, whereby those individuals that are highly involved in particular issues 
are more motivated and able to systematically integrate new information into their 
attitude and belief systems, leading to stronger, more coherent and more long-lasting 
attitudinal positions that are resistant to change.
6.1.2 Deliberative Polling -  rationale and method
The implications of a lack of political sophistication among the public gave rise to 
concerns among political scientists about the validity and reliability of attitude measures 
used in opinion polls and surveys. The willingness of respondents to express so-called 
‘non-attitudes’ (Converse, 1964) raised questions about how ‘true’ public opinion about 
political issues (that is, the opinions of an informed electorate) could ever be estimated.
164
One response to this challenge was the development of the ‘deliberative polling’ 
methodology by Fishkin (1991; 1995; Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 2002).
A deliberative poll typically involves three stages. The first stage involves a household 
survey of a random probability sample, in order to establish the views of the public on 
the polling issue. At the second stage, a sub-sample of respondents to the survey 
(representative both in terms of demographic characteristics, as well as in terms of the 
attitudes of the initial survey sample) are invited to attend a weekend event designed to 
immerse participants in the issue, providing opportunities for reading balanced material, 
small focus group discussion and question-and-answer sessions with politicians and 
experts from both sides of the debate. At the end of the weekend event, a third stage 
involves respondents completing the same questionnaire used at stage 1, so as to 
provide a measure of attitudes ‘post-deliberation’ (i.e. after the persuasion attempt). 
The findings of the second survey are assumed to represent the views of a better- 
informed public, because the participants have taken time to explore the different issues 
relating to the debate in detail. Unlike most polling procedures, therefore, the 
deliberative poll is said to measure not simply what the public thinks but also, "what the 
public would think, had it a better opportunity to consider the questions at issue" 
(Fishkin, 1995, p. 162). In this respect, deliberative polls are descriptive in nature, as 
well as predictive of how people’s attitudes might change during a period of high issue- 
salience, such as one might expect during a referendum campaign (Curtice and Jowell, 
1998).
In the present study, I make use of data from a deliberative poll on the subject of the 
future of Britain’s role in the European Union, conducted in June 1995 by the National 
Centre for Social Research (NatCen; then the Social and Community Planning Bureau), 
on behalf of Channel Four Television and The Independent newspaper. The European 
Union study was the second of five deliberative polls carried out in Britain between 
1994 and 1998 (indeed, only the second study ever to use the deliberative polling 
method) -  the others UK polls were about crime policy, the future of the monarchy, the 
May 1997 General Election and the future of the NHS (Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 
2002; p. 461). Each poll followed the same basic format -  face-to-face interviews with 
a random sample of British adults, followed by a two-day event held in Manchester to 
which a representative sub-sample was invited to participate (the Europe study took 
place at the University of Salford). Each of the events was filmed and televised as part
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of a Channel 4 series called ‘Power and the People’. All the British deliberative polls 
carried out by NatCen during this period were designed and conducted under the 
guidance of James Fishkin and Robert Luskin (both of whom were based at this time at 
the University of Texas) and Roger Jowell (then director of NatCen).
The main aim of the analysis conducted at the time of the poll by the principal 
investigators was to estimate the extent of attitude change among participants as a 
function of their participation in the weekend event. The results had to be analysed 
quickly in order to feed into the television programme broadcast at the end of the 
deliberative weekend and none of the researchers involved in the coordination of the 
poll ever subjected the data to more detailed analysis after the event of the kind 
undertaken here11 (this is not true for all of the British deliberative polls, however -  see 
for example, Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 2002; Luskin, Fishkin, Jowell and Park, 2004; 
Park, Jowell and McPherson, 2004; Sturgis, 2001; List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean, 
2007). The data have not so far been made freely available to be exploited by 
secondary analysts, so the opportunity for me to make use of them here was truly unique 
and a considerable privilege12. At the time the present analysis was conducted (Roberts, 
2001), the data from the European Union poll had not been subjected to secondary 
analysis by any other researchers. However, since then, the data have been included in 
a meta-analysis of all five British deliberative polls (see Sturgis, Roberts and Allum, 
2003), which looked at differences in attitude constraint before and after participation in 
the deliberative weekend, at different levels of political sophistication (measured by 
responses to knowledge quizzes in each survey -  described in more detail below). In 
study C, which had a broader focus on involvement as it is conceptualised in the social 
psychological literature on persuasion, I was interested in using the data to explore the 
applicability of the ELM as a theoretical account of the way in which people form 
attitudes in response to information.
6.1.3 Predictions
Because of the design of the deliberative poll, the data provide an unusual opportunity 
to examine the effects of information on attitudes. As stated previously, the aim of the
11 At least they had not done so prior to my undertaking the present study.
121 am indebted to Roger Jowell, James Fishkin, and Robert Luskin for permitting me to make use of the 
data for this research, as well as to the National Centre for Social Research for providing access.
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analysis undertaken here was to test a number of predictions about how people form and 
change their attitudes in response to the information they are presented with or 
encounter via the mass media, and in particular, about how different people will respond 
to information depending on their issue involvement. These assumptions are specified 
below:
1. Individuals vary according to their levels of interest in and knowledge about 
European integration and EMU, both of which can be regarded as indicators of 
issue involvement13. In ELM terms, this means they can be located on a 
continuum ranging from very low to very high involvement, with corresponding 
implications for the likelihood with which they will elaborate on information 
about Europe and the euro.
2. Individuals with higher levels of involvement will be more motivated and able to 
systematically process information about Europe and the euro and consequently, 
they will hold stronger attitudes about European integration, compared with 
individuals with lower levels of involvement, who may still be undecided in 
their views.
3. Individuals with lower issue involvement will be less motivated and able to 
systematically process information about Europe and the euro, and 
consequently, will tend to have weaker and more labile attitudes. They will be 
more likely to be persuaded by cues peripheral to the information they are 
presented with.
4. Thus, individuals will differ systematically in their responses to persuasive 
communications on the basis of their level of involvement in the issue. This will 
manifest itself:
a. in the extent to which individuals are open to persuasion in the first place 
-  i.e. relating to the strength of their prior attitudes;
b. in the extent to which their attitudes towards Europe and the euro are 
consistent with each other -  i.e. in terms of attitude constraint (Converse, 
1964; 2000);
c. in the nature and extent of attitude change resulting from exposure to 
persuasive information about the euro.
13 The concept of ‘issue involvement’ has been used in a number of different ways in the persuasion 
literature (see Johnson and Eagly, 1989); on pages 65-66 of this volume I describe the definition of the 
term that guided the research undertaken in this thesis.
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After describing the questionnaire used in the Europe poll, I present the results of the 
secondary analysis that tested these predictions.
6.1.4 Questionnaires
The deliberative poll makes use of two questionnaires: one administered at phase 1, in 
the initial household survey and the other administered at the end of the deliberation 
event. The second questionnaire only includes a subset of those questions asked at 
phase 1. The questionnaires used in the present study consisted of three main types of 
questions:
1) Items aimed at establishing respondents’ level of interest and involvement in 
politics and the topic of European integration. These included measures of 
attitudes towards Britain and being British and attitudes towards other countries 
(i.e. broadly, they provided a measure of patriotism and of openness towards 
other cultures).
2) A range of attitudinal measures relating to different aspects of UK membership 
of the European Union, including ‘agree-disagree’ statements concerning the 
advantages and disadvantages of European integration.
3) Socio-demographic measures (e.g. employment status and level of education) 
providing background variables for the analysis.
The analyses presented here focus on (2), the attitude measures, which formed the core 
of the questionnaires. These items were administered to respondents both at phase 1, as 
well as after the weekend event, thus providing a measure of attitudes before and after 
deliberation.
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6.1.5 Participants
The data analysed here were from those respondents who attended the deliberative poll 
weekend (n=224). Table 6.1 shows the sample composition, and compares it with that 
of the initial household survey (n=900). There were no significant differences between 
the weekend sample and the overall survey sample, either in terms of demographics, or 
in terms of their self-rated interest in politics and European issues, and knowledge about 
European integration. This highlights a key strength of the deliberative poll technique -  
the opportunity to draw inferences to the wider population through the use of random 
probability sampling.
6.1.6 Index of issue involvement
In order to test the predictions of the ELM (that attitudes and processes of attitude 
change vary as a function of prior involvement in the target issue), the weekend sample 
was divided into low, medium and high involvement groups. A ‘continuum of 
involvement’ was constructed based on people’s responses to three items administered 
in the phase 1 questionnaire (table 6.2), which taken together provide a measure of 
respondents’ interest in the polling issue, and their scores on a 5-item quiz in the core 
questionnaire (table 6.3), which provide an indication of their knowledge about the 
polling issue.
As I have argued, both interest in and knowledge about a polling issue are seen to be 
key components of issue involvement, because they relate to people’s motivation and 
ability to process issue-relevant information.
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Table 6.1 Socio-demographic composition o f deliberative poll samples
Weekend Sample Survey Sample Non-Weekend
(n=224) (n=900) Sample (n=676)
%  (unless % (unless %  (unless
otherwise otherwise otherwise
specified) specified) specified)
Sex
Male 100 (46%) 426 (47%) 323 (48%)
Female 121 (54%) 474 (53%) 353 (52%)
Age
Mean 45.9 years 47.5 years 48 years
Minimum 18 years 18 years 19 years
Maximum 81 years 93 years 93 years
18-30 22.0 20.0 20.0
31-40 22.0 18.0 17.0
41-50 18.0 21.0 22.0
51-64 23.0 20.0 19.0
65+ 17.0 21.0 22.0
Region
South 42.0 41.0 40.0
North 43.0 44.0 44.0
Scotland 9.0 9.0 9.0
Wales 6.0 6.0 7.0
Education
No qualifications 34.0 38.0 39.0
GCSE-level or equivalent 36.0 33.0 32.0
A-level or equivalent 12.0 11.0 11.0
Degree-level or equivalent 19.0 19.0 19.0
Party Allegiance
None/ DK/ Refused 19.0 20.0 20.0
Conservative 28.0 29.0 29.0
Labour 38.0 37.0 37.0
Liberal Democrat 11.0 11.0 11.0
Other 4.0 3.0 3.0
Interest in Politics
Very interested 12.0 10.0 10.0
Fairly interested 46.0 42.0 41.0
Not very interested 30.0 32.0 34.0
Not at all interested 13.0 15.0 16.0
Interest in future of Britain in 
Europe
Very interested 26.0 22.0 20.0
Fairly interested 49.0 50.0 50.0
Not very interested 18.0 20.0 21.0
Not at all interested 6.0 7.0 8.0
Can’t say 1.0 1.0 2.0
Self-rated knowledge about 
European integration
Very knowledgeable 5.0 3.0 3.0
Fairly knowledgeable 36.0 37.0 38.0
Not very knowledgeable 53.0 49.0 48.0
Not at all knowledgeable 6.0 9.0 10.0
Can’t say 1.0 1.0 1.0
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Table 6.2 Measures o f interest in polling issue
Item Wording Response Categories
(a6) How interested would you say you are in (Very interested, Fairly
politics? interested, Not very interested, 
Not at all interested, Can’t say)
(a7) And how interested would you say you are (Very interested, Fairly
in the future of Britain in Europe? interested, Not very interested, 
Not at all interested, Can’t say)
(a8b) How knowledgeable would you say you are (Very knowledgeable, Fairly
personally about creating stronger links with knowledgeable, Not very
Europe? knowledgeable, Not at all 
knowledgeable, Can’t Say)
Table 6.3 Measures of knowledge about polling issue
Item Wording Response
Categories
(a) The European Union has recently expanded to 15 members True, False, Don’t
(True) Know
(b) Switzerland is to join the European Union (False) True, False, Don’t
Know
(c) Britain’s income tax rates are decided in Brussels (False) True, False, Don’t
Know
(d) Elections to the European Parliament are held every 5 years True, False, Don’t
(True) Know
(e) Of the three major British parties, the Liberal Democrats are True, False, Don’t
the least in favour of the European Union (False) Know
The items in table 6.2 were coded so that a high score on each variable constituted a 
high level of interest or self-rated level of knowledge in the polling issue. Respondents 
scored one point for each correct response to the items in the knowledge quiz (table 
6.3). Mean scores across all the items in tables 6.2 and 6.3 were computed, in order to 
obtain an overall measure of issue involvement. Involvement scores were then used to 
categorise respondents into three equal-sized groups constituting those with low, 
medium and high scores on the involvement index (n=77 for low and high involvement 
groups and n=70 for the ‘medium-involvement’ group).
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Table 6.4 Inter-correlations between items in the involvement index
Score on Interest in Interest in Self-rated
Knowledge Politics Europe Knowledge
Quiz
Score on Knowledge Quiz .359 .277 .310
Interest in Politics .478 .424
Interest in Europe .360
Self-rated Knowledge
The inter-correlations between items included in the involvement index are shown in 
table 6.4. All were statistically significant at the 5% level. Reliability analysis of the 
items in the knowledge ‘quiz’ yielded an alpha of 0.56, which increased to 0.67 after the 
weekend event when quiz performance had significantly improved. In order to 
strengthen the justification for basing the involvement index on this set of items, a 
Principal Component Analysis was carried out, to ascertain whether the items appeared 
to be measuring the same underlying construct. The analysis yielded a model with a 
single principal component with an eigenvalue greater than 2, which explained over half 
(52%) of the variance in the data. On the basis of these considerations, therefore, the 
division of the sample on the basis of this involvement index was considered justifiable 
and satisfactory.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Predictors of low involvement in the polling issue
In order to explore socio-demographic variation in the sample as a function of issue 
involvement, binary logistic regression analysis was used to discover the most 
important predictors of involvement. Those with the lowest levels of involvement in 
Europe formed the focus of the analysis because of their significance in terms of their 
potential influence in a referendum on the euro (the proportion of undecided voters at 
this time could have influenced the outcome of the vote). Thus, the dependent variable 
in the model was membership of the low involvement group (i.e. the third of the sample 
with lowest scores on the involvement index) and the analysis predicted the likelihood 
of respondents being included in this low involvement category. The best-fitting model 
included the following covariates: sex of participant, political orientation (coded
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‘Conservative’ vs. other), strength of party allegiance (which can also be viewed as a 
proxy measure of how involved people are in politics), ethnicity (coded ‘white’ vs. 
other), education (a categorical variable based on the nature of qualifications gained) 
and two additional variables, which broadly measured people’s ‘openness’ to Europe. 
These were a) whether the respondent had travelled to other European countries in the 
past year and b) whether they could speak, either fluently or a little, another foreign 
language. All covariates were retained in the model as controls, despite the fact that not 
all were significantly associated with issue involvement. Model statistics are shown in 
table 6.5.
Table 6.5 Logistic regression statistics
B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Sex of participant -1.27 .35 13.24 1 .000 .28
Party affiliation -.45 .39 1.32 1 .25 .64
Strength of party 
affiliation
-.24 .25 .91 1 .34 .79
Employment status .15 .34 .20 1 .65 1.16
Ethnicity .25 .64 .16 1 .69 1.29
Recent travel experience 
Education level
-.94 .34 7.55
.52
1 .01
.92
.39
Level 1 -  Basic 
qualifications
-.13 .39 .11 1 .74 .88
Level 2 -  Advanced .07 .63 .01 1 .92 1.07
Level 3 -  Degree level -.31 .50 .38 1 .54 .73
Other language spoken -.69 .37 3.50 1 .06 .50
Constant 1.13 .62 3.33 1 .07 3.08
Table 6.5 indicates that participants’ sex, and their score on the two ‘openness to 
Europe’ variables are statistically significant (at or approaching the 5% level) predictors 
of the degree to which a person is involved in the polling issue. All three variables were 
associated with reduced odds of being in the low involvement group. In the case of the
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participant’s sex (which was coded 0 for women and 1 for men), being a male 
participant decreased the odds of being in the low invovlement group by nearly three- 
quarters, when all of the other variables were held constant. In other words, women 
were more likely than men to have low levels of issue involvement.
The two ‘openness’ variables -  which were both concerned with having had recent and 
direct experience of other European cultures -  were significant predictors of low 
involvement, even when holding education and political affiliation constant. In the case 
of recent travel abroad, participants who had travelled to European destinations during 
the past year were significantly more likely to be interested in and knowledgeable about 
European issues. The odds of these participants being in the low involvement group 
were 60% lower than for the others. Similarly, speaking at least one other language -  
even just a little -  was also associated with increased involvement in the polling issue. 
Speaking a foreign language reduced the odds of a participant being in the low 
involvement group by half. Thus, those who had recently travelled to other European 
countries and who spoke a second language were less likely to be in the low 
involvement group.
6.2.2 Issue involvement and opinions about European integration
Differences in attitudes towards European integration and Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) were explored on the basis of participants’ position on the ‘involvement 
continuum’ (i.e. their score on the ‘involvement index’). As described above, scores on 
this continuum were divided into three categories, so that comparisons could be made 
between those scoring highest on the index (i.e. those with high involvement) and those 
with the lowest scores on the index (i.e. those with low involvement). The core 
questionnaire contained a large number of different attitudinal items, with which 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed. 
Broadly, these were of three different types:
1. Statements asserting opinions about specific aspects of European integration,
expressing views about the future of Britain’s relationship with Europe;
e.g. “As a member state, would you say that Britain's relationship with 
the European Union should be ... much closer, a little closer, a little less 
close, much less close, or is it about right? ”
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2. Statements or questions asking respondents to evaluate the potential impact for
Britain of closer integration with Europe;
e.g. “How much more or less influence in the world do you think that 
closer links with the European Union would give Britain? ”
3. Attitudinal statements asserting the advantages and disadvantages of EU
membership and its implications for British national identity.
e.g. “All things considered, Britain is a lot better off in the EU than out 
o f it”
e.g. “Only the Germans have anything to gain from a single currency”
The analyses reported here focus predominantly on the opinion items (1) and the 
attitudinal statements (3) and the relationship between these sets of items.
Table 6.6 shows the key opinion measures relating to Britain’s role in Europe that were 
analysed, with a summary of responses for those deliberative poll participants in the low 
and high issue involvement groups. The first item asked respondents whether Britain’s 
relationship with the EU should be closer or less close -  in other words, the extent to 
which respondents supported further UK integration with Europe. Overall, low 
involvement participants were less likely than high involvement participants to endorse 
a closer relationship between Britain and the EU (48% of low involvement respondents 
compared with 61% in the high involvement group). Those in the low involvement 
group were also more likely to select the ‘Don’t Know’ response (22% of low 
involvement respondents compared with 4% of those in the high involvement group, 
making the former group seven times less likely to express an opinion than the latter 
group). The association between responses to this item on the basis of issue 
involvement yielded a significant chi-square measure of 11.26 (on 3 degrees of 
freedom, p<0.01).
A similar pattern of responses was found across the three other opinion items shown in 
table 6.6, which were concerned with the future of the Pound, voting intentions in a 
referendum on Britain’s links with the EU and whether or not Britain should unite fully 
with the EU. In each case, the odds of selecting the ‘Don’t Know’ response category 
were consistently around 8-9 times greater for low-involvement participants than for 
those in the high-involvement group. In the case of the question about the single 
currency, the difference in the proportion of low and high involvement participants 
selecting ‘Don’t Know’ was smaller, but low-involvement participants were more likely
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to hold the view that the pound should be retained as the only currency for Britain (59% 
compared with 33% of high involvement participants) and correspondingly, were less 
likely to believe that the pound should be replaced by a single currency (17% of the low 
involvement group selecting this option, compared with 28% of the high involvement 
group).
Table 6.6 Opinions about the future of the Britain fs relationship with Europe by 
involvement
Survey Item Low Involvement High Involvement
Participants Participants
% %
Ql. Britain’s relationship with the EU should be...
Closer 48 61
Less close 22 28
Is about right 8 7
Don’t know 22 4
Q5. Future o f the pound in the EU. The pound should be...
Replaced 17 28
Retained 59 33
Both £ and € 17 38
Don’t know 7 1
Q12. In a referendum about Britain’s links with EU how would you vote?
To strengthen 33 57
To weaken 14 18
Keep the same 21 20
Don’t know 33 5
Ql 5. ‘Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the EU’
Agree 34 61
Disagree 18 30
Not sure/ Don’t know 48 9
Notes: For Ql and Q5, figures have been rounded up and response categories have been collapsed such 
that the two end points of 5-point scales provided in the questionnaire constitute the positive and negative 
responses shown here.
These results support the findings of previous research that has found a positive 
relationship between attitudes to Europe and greater involvement in European issues 
(especially being more knowledgeable about European politics). Across each item, a 
higher proportion of high involvement participants than low involvement participants 
expressed pro-EU attitudes. Equally, high involvement participants were also more 
likely overall to express an opinion at all -  whether positive or negative -  than their low 
involvement counterparts, who were more likely to select the ‘don’t know’ option (on 3
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out of 4 of the items), rather than to give a substantive response. The large numbers of 
‘Don’t Know’ responses expressed by respondents in the low-involvement group lends 
some support to the proposition that respondents with higher issue-involvement will 
hold stronger attitudes about European integration than those with lower issue 
involvement. In this case, the propensity to opt for the ‘don’t know’ option is taken as 
indicative of the fact that those respondents with low involvement had unformed views 
about the polling issue.
Further support for the prediction that participants with higher involvement will hold 
stronger attitudes comes from the results of analyses of variance looking at variation in 
scores on the ‘involvement continuum’ (described above) as a function of responses to 
each of the four opinion items. Post-hoc Scheffe multiple range comparisons allow you 
to assess the size of differences in mean scores on the involvement index between 
multiple groups -  in this case, those selecting ‘Don’t know’ on the four opinion items 
shown in table 6.6 compared with those selecting other response categories (i.e. those 
expressing an opinion). Table 6.7 shows the results of the ANOVA and the Scheffe 
tests (the full output is available in appendix C). The results of the analysis show that 
the involvement scores for participants selecting ‘Don’t know’ were significantly lower 
than for those expressing an opinion, and especially those selecting the most pro- 
European response options. Thus, high issue involvement is not only associated with 
having more firmly held opinions about European integration, but it is also associated 
with holding more positive opinions about Europe.
Table 6.7 Scheffe post-hoc tests in ANOVA, comparing mean scores on involvement 
continuum (0-5) for respondents selecting the ‘Don’t Know* response category and 
those selecting the ‘Pro-Integration ’ response categories
Item
Mean
Involvement
Mean
Involvement Mean SE P F  (ANOVA) p
Ql.
Score for 
‘Don’t 
Know’ 
Respondents
1.99
Score for 
‘Pro- 
Integration’ 
Respondents
2.71
Differ
-ence
-0.72 0.15 .000 F3,218=  7.91 .001
Q5. 2.10 2.83 -0.73 0.25 .037 F3.217 = 8.46 .001
Q12. 2.12 2.80 -0.67 0.13 .000 F3.220 = 9.90 .001
Q.15 2.23 2.79 -0.56 0.10 .000 F?7?i = 17.57 .001
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6.2.3 Underlying attitudes towards European integration
In addition to the opinion measures shown in table 6.6, the core questionnaire contained 
23 ‘attitude statements’, with 5-point Likert response scales, ranging from ‘Strongly 
Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’ (the full questionnaire is available in Appendix C). The 
items were recoded such that a high score on each represented a positive attitude 
towards Europe. The data from these items were then analysed using exploratory factor 
analysis (using Maximum Likelihood as the extraction method), which allows the 
researcher to explore the latent structure of attitudes underlying responses to different 
scale items, such as those used here. As a data reduction technique, factor analysis also 
makes it possible to develop a more refined measure of attitudes, by identifying those 
items that are most strongly associated with the underlying attitude dimension. Both of 
these features of the method were important in the present exploratory analysis of the 
deliberative poll data.
In order to boost the sample size for the factor analysis, data from all 900 participants in 
the initial household survey were used (with missing data excluded ‘listwise’)14. The 
analysis yielded a two factor solution (both factors were chosen for having Eigenvalues 
greater than one). Together, the factors explained around 48% of the variance in 
responses to the statement batteries. The best-fitting model was obtained by applying 
an oblique rotation, which allows the two dimensions to be correlated with each other. 
The rotation achieved a very clear differentiation between the two dimensions, as is 
evident from the factor loadings shown in table 6.8. The factors were moderately 
correlated at .401 (see appendix C for full output).
The factor solution shown in table 6.8 represented the most parsimonious model of the 
data. However, it is less certain how best to interpret the model. The items found to 
load most highly on factor 1 were those concerned with the negative consequences of 
European integration, in terms of economic and cultural outcomes. By contrast, the 
items most highly correlated with the second factor were concerned more with the 
positive benefits of EU membership and reflect more positive views about integration.
14 The model was also fitted to the data from just the weekend participants, and there 
were only very minor differences in fit.
178
On the one hand, it is perhaps unsurprising that respondents are at once able to 
recognise both the advantages and disadvantages to Britain of closer integration with the 
EU. Their underlying attitudes appear to be comprised both of concerns about the 
possible negative consequences of closer integration, as well as of recognition of the 
positive benefits it could bring. On the other hand, however, an alternative explanation 
of the finding might be that it is, at least partly, an artefact of the methodological design 
of the questionnaire (comprising, as is typical, a balance of positively and negatively- 
valenced attitude statements). Obtaining such a clear split between the negative and 
positive statements in this way is often indicative of measurement error. Respondents 
sometimes adopt certain ‘response sets’ -  sometimes referred to as ‘satisficing’ 
strategies (Krosnick, 1991) -  such as always agreeing with attitude statements (an effect 
also known as acquiescence (Couch and Keniston, I960)), always disagreeing with 
them or always selecting the middle response category. In this case, it seems likely that 
respondents showed an increased propensity to agree with the attitude statements, 
regardless of whether the statements were positively or negatively valenced.
Table 6.8 Pattern matrix showing factor loadings for all attitude measures
Pattern Matrix
Factor
1 2
British traditions would have to be given up .762
Nations will lose their culture and individuality .712
Britain will lose control over decisions .697
Britain will lose control of economic policy .671
Only the Germans will gain from single currency .636
Britain does not get enough out of the EU .605
British seas should only be open to British fishing boats .601
Taxpayers in Europe are paying too much for EU .5 77
EU has too many petty rules and regulations .547
If we left the EU, Britain would lose its chance of real progress .734
Britain is a lot better off in the EU than out of it .357 .611
Peace is much more secure because Britain is a member of the EU .584
There would be serious unemployment in Britain if we left the EU .572
The cost of living in Britain would rise significantly if we left the EU .497
Competition from the EU is making Britain more modem and efficient .496
The EU should expand its membership to include Eastern European countries .340
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization, 
a- Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
Because the two factors appeared to be affected by measurement error in this way, it 
was decided that only those items concerned with the negative consequences of EU
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membership would be retained in the analysis. The rationale behind this decision was 
that the negative items constituted a more robust measure of underlying attitudes to 
integration, because it is likely that these items were more challenging to those inclined 
to satisfice by ‘acquiescence’ (i.e. by agreeing with every item). Therefore, mean 
scores (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 represents a more pro-European attitude) based on 
the six items with the highest factor loadings on factor 1 (shown in table 6.9) were 
computed for each respondent to provide an overall measure of their concerns about the 
negative consequences of closer integration with Europe.
Reliability analysis of the scale items yielded an alpha of .85. Differences in scores on 
this factor as a function of issue involvement were then examined using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA), in order to explore further the finding that individuals with higher 
issue-involvement are also more pro-European. Mean scores on the attitude factor for 
the low and high involvement groups revealed a non-significant difference between the 
two groups (mean scores = 2.66 and 2.84 for the low and high involvement groups 
respectively). However, the same comparison using the initial household survey 
sample found the difference to be statistically significant. Mean scores for low and high 
involvement participants in the phase 1 survey were 2.58 and 2.84 respectively (Fij58o = 
17.04, p<0.001). Thus, being more involved in and knowledgeable about the polling 
issue was found to be associated with being more pro-European.
Table 6,9 Items comprising the attitude scale (concerns about negative consequences 
of integration)
6e Lots o f good British traditions will have to be given up if  we strengthen our 
ties with the EU.
7b In a united Europe the various nations will lose their culture and their 
individuality.
7d I f  we stay in the EU, Britain will lose too much control over decisions that 
affect Britain.
6a Unless Britain keeps its own currency, it will lose control o f its own 
economic policy.
6h Only the Germans have anything to gain from a single European currency.
6c Britain does not get enough out o f the European Union, in comparison to 
what it puts in.
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6.2.4 The relationship between underlying attitudes, issue involvement and 
opinions about the euro
If it is assumed that underlying concerns about the negative consequences of integration 
are likely to impact on what people believe Britain’s role in Europe should be, then 
scores on the attitude factor will be predictive of responses to each of the opinion items 
shown in table 6.6. The analysis presented here focused on respondents’ views about 
the future of the pound. Respondents were asked:
“Here are three statements about the future o f the pound in the European Union. 
Which one comes closest to your view?
1. The pound should be replaced by a single European currency
2. Both the pound and a new European currency should be used in Britain
3. The pound should be kept as the only currency for Britain.
4. (Can V choose) ”
Logistic regression analysis was used to predict the likelihood of selecting option 1 
compared with option 3 (those respondents selecting options 2 and 4 were excluded 
from the analysis). The analysis showed that every unit increase on the mean attitude 
score (recall that higher scores were associated with positive attitudes towards 
integration) considerably increased the odds of being in favour of replacing die pound 
with a single European currency (Exp B = 26.65, pO.OOl). Introducing the 
involvement score into the logistic regression model illustrates clearly the differential 
effect of these two variables on people’s opinions about the future of the pound. Issue 
involvement was not found to have a significant predictive effect on the dependent 
variable, even when it was retained in the model to control for its effect on opinions 
about the single European currency. Underlying concerns about the negative 
consequences of integration were, however, found to be highly influential in 
determining views about the future of the pound (Exp B = 24.86, pO.OOl). Once again, 
however, it is noteworthy that fitting the same model on the phase 1 household survey 
sample (and thereby, boosting the sample size) yields a significant effect for issue 
involvement. By including an interaction term for the two variables in the same logistic 
regression model, it was possible to rule out the possibility that being more issue- 
involved reduces a person’s concerns about the negative consequences of closer
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integration with the EU. Indeed, it appears to be the case that being more involved 
serves to highlight the concerns one might have rather than to reduce them.
6.2.5 The role of issue involvement in persuasion: attitude strength, attitude 
constraint and attitude change
The deliberative poll methodology is specifically designed to examine the effects of 
prolonged exposure to persuasive communications on participants’ attitudes towards the 
polling issue. The next stage of the analysis, therefore, was to examine the nature and 
extent of attitude change between the initial household survey and the measures taken at 
the end of the deliberation event. Three related predictions formed the focus of this 
analysis. Overall, it was predicted that respondents would differ systematically in their 
responses to persuasion as a function of their level of prior issue-involvement and that 
this would manifest itself in three ways: a) in the extent to which respondents are open 
to persuasion (measured in terms of prior attitude strength); b) in the extent to which 
attitudes towards Europe and the euro are internally consistent (i.e. the degree of 
attitude constraint); and c) the nature and extent of attitude change at the end of the 
deliberation event. Once again, the key variables that were analysed were the four 
opinion measures (table 6.6) and the attitude score from the factor analysis -  a measure 
of respondents’ concerns about the possible negative consequences of closer integration 
with Europe.
The first prediction is based on the assumption that those respondents with lower levels 
of issue involvement will be more ‘open to persuasion’ because they will not have 
already formed fixed views about the polling issue. Recall from chapter 1 that this is 
the rationale behind the MORI opinion poll item that seeks to identify the ‘euro 
waverers’. It has been shown that low involvement participants were significantly more 
likely to give ‘Don’t Know’ responses to the four opinion items than were the high 
involvement participants. In addition, low involvement participants (92% compared 
with 75% of those in the high involvement group) were more likely to feel that they did 
not have sufficient information on which to vote in a referendum on whether or not 
Britain should strengthen its links with the EU, further indication that this group might 
be more open to persuasion, were they provided with further information.
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In order to establish whether high involvement participants also exhibited greater 
attitude ‘constraint’ (in terms of the correspondence between related sets of attitudes), 
two statistical measures were evaluated: 1) the inter-correlations between responses to 
the four opinion measures; and 2) the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient from reliability 
analyses of the items comprising the attitude scale. With respect to (1), we would 
expect high involvement participants to exhibit stronger associations between their 
opinions about European integration, and correspondingly, with respect to (2), we 
would expect higher values for alpha for high involvement participants. Table 6.10 
shows the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the four opinion questions (refer to table
6.6 for details of question wording).
Two findings are of interest simply eyeballing the statistics presented in table 6.10. 
Firstly, as predicted, there is a tendency for higher involvement respondents to show 
stronger associations between their responses to the four opinion items about the future 
of Britain’s relationship with Europe. The exceptions are the correlations between 
question 5 (about the future of the Pound) and questions 12 and 15 (concerned with 
forging closer links with Europe), which were slightly lower than those for the low 
involvement group. However, the data are generally consistent with the prediction that 
those who are more involved in the polling issue hold more ‘coherent’ or ‘constrained’ 
attitudes (Converse, 1964). Secondly, comparing the inter-item correlations before the 
deliberation event with those from the post-deliberation measures, it is noteworthy that 
many of the associations have become stronger. This suggests that attitudes have not 
only become stronger through the deliberation process, but have also become more 
internally consistent.
Table 6.10 Inter-correlations between opinion items by involvement
Pre-deliberation Post-■deliberation
Ql Q5 Q12 Q15 Ql Q5 Q12 Q15
All Ql
respondents Q5 .422 .592
Q12 .740 .481 .846 .652
Q15 .704 .441 .769 .747 .637 .783
Low Ql
involvement Q5 .408 .497
Q12 .530 .543 .876 .609
Q15 .538 .433 .730 .692 .617 .729
High Ql
Involvement Q5 .479 .728
Q12 .913 .470 .882 .729
Q15 .827 .410 .856 .798 .699 .851
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This finding is also reflected in the results of the reliability analyses of the attitude scale 
derived from the factor analysis. The scale broadly measured respondents’ concerns 
about the possible negative consequences of closer integration in Europe -  a factor that 
seems to form a key dimension of people’s attitudes towards the EU. As predicted, 
Cronbach’s alpha for high involvement participants was higher than that for low 
involvement participants, although not markedly so (.86 compared with .84). As with 
the correlations between the opinion items, however, there was a similar increase in the 
strength of association between responses to the six attitude statements that comprised 
the scale (post-deliberation a = .90 for the high involvement group and .86 for the low 
involvement group).
Table 6.11 Responses to opinion items after the weekend event (post-deliberation)
Survey Item Low Involvement High Involvement
Participants Participants
% %
Ql. Britain’s relationship with the EU should be...
Closer 69 (+21) 78 (+17)
Less close 13 (-9) 13 (-15)
Is about right 17 (+9) 7 (—)
Don’t know 1 (-21) 3 (-1)
Total change (TC) 30 17
Q5. Future o f the pound in the EU. The pound should be...
Replaced 28 (+11) 38(+10)
Retained 42 (-17) 23 (-10)
Both £ and € 21 (+4) 26 (-12)
Don’t know 9 (+2) 13 (+12)
Total change (TC) 17 22
Q12. In a referendum about Britain’s links with EU how would you vote?
To strengthen 52 (+19) 64 (+7)
To weaken 11 (-3) 13 (-5)
Keep the same 24 (+3) 18(-2)
Don’t know 13 (-20) 5 (—)
Total change (TC) 23 7
Ql 5. Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the EU’
Agree 58(+24) 63 (+2)
Disagree 26 (+8) 31 (+1)
Not sure/ Don’t know 16 (-32) 7 (-2)
Total change (TC) 32 3
Notes: Total change refers to the percentage of respondents switching response. Figures have been 
rounded up and response categories have been collapsed. Any discrepancies result from rounding and/or 
item non-response.
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Finally, the analysis focused on the nature and extent of attitude change among low- and 
high-involvement respondents, as a result of participation in the deliberation event. As 
expected, there was a considerable amount of variation in attitudes expressed at the time 
of the initial household survey and those recorded in the post-deliberation survey carried 
out at the end of the weekend event. That is, in keeping with previous deliberative polls 
(Fishkin, 1995; Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell, 2002), the deliberation process had a 
persuasive effect on the participants’ views about Europe. For the most part, the shift 
was in a positive direction, boosting support for European integration among the 
participants. Table 6.11 summarises responses to the four opinion questions at the post­
deliberation stage of the poll. The increased support for the pro-European position on 
each of the items is evident at the aggregate level, but some differences on the basis of 
issue-involvement are also apparent. The direction and extent of change is shown in 
parentheses (representing percent points), as well as in the ‘Total Change’ (T.C.) row.
In general, there was more attitude change evident among low involvement participants 
(as measured by the amount of ‘switching’ of response choices on these items). This 
finding is consistent with the fact that these participants also showed weaker attitude 
strength than those in the high involvement group (in terms of the proportion expressing 
‘Don’t knows’, as well as in terms of the internal consistency of their attitudes), 
suggesting that these respondents were, therefore, perhaps more ‘open to persuasion’ 
than those who were more involved. Furthermore, the general shift in respondents’ 
opinions from the anti-European response options to more positive positions was also 
matched by a reduction in the number of ‘Don’t knows’, lending further support to the 
conclusion that the deliberation process had served to strengthen people’s views on the 
polling issue. This was true for all the items with the exception of the question about 
the future of the pound. In the case of this item, the deliberation process appeared to 
have the effect of making respondents less certain of their views, especially those with 
higher issue-involvement. This was reflected in the reduction in the proportion 
selecting the ‘retain the Pound’ response and the greater number of respondents 
selecting the ‘Don’t know’ responses.
Overall, the increased propensity for low-involvement participants to switch response 
categories after the deliberation event was evident across all the items in the survey. 
The mean number of response switches for low-involvement participants was 
significantly higher than that for the highly-involved group (57.75 compared with
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40.31; F](i52 = 23.28, pO.OOl). This finding is illustrated for the four opinion items in 
table 6 .12, which shows the total proportion of low-involvement respondents who 
expressed an opinion15 and the direction of aggregate-level response switching. 
Question wording is shown in table 6 .6 .
Table 6,12 Percentage o f respondents switching response to items 1, 5 ,12 and 15 in 
either a positive or negative direction, or not at all, by issue involvement
Direction of Low Involvement Participants High Involvement Participants 
Response D/ 0/
Switch /o /o
Q l Q5 Q12 Q15 Q l Q5 Q12 Q15
Positive 48 26 20 44 38 22 17 29
Negative 16 7 10 26 14 12 9 14
No Change 35 51 31 30 43 52 64 55
As well as becoming more coherent (in terms of the strength of inter-item associations) 
scores on the attitude scale also became more positive as a result of participation in the 
deliberation event. Paired-samples t-tests for both the low- and high-involvement 
groups were used to examine the extent of this shift. The increase in mean scores on the 
attitude factor was greater for high-involvement participants than it was for low- 
involvement participants. The latter group continued to be more concerned about the 
negative consequences of integration than their more involved counterparts, even after 
the weekend event (t=-2.99, df=77, p<0.05 (low-involvement group) and t=-3.42, 
df=76, pO.OOl (high-involvement group).
6.2.6 Does deliberation increase issue involvement?
The positive shift in attitudes was accompanied by a significant improvement in 
participants’ knowledge about Europe (as measured by their performance on the five- 
item quiz). Mean score on the knowledge quiz (out of a total of 5) rose from 1.30 to 
2.96 for the low-involvement participants and from 3.88 to 4.42 for those who were 
highly-involved. The difference between the two test results was statistically significant 
for both groups (paired-samples t-tests yielded values for t of -9.06, df=76, pO.OOl for
15 Don’t know responses are not dealt with here.
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the low-involvement group and -4.27, df=76, p<0.001 for the high-involvement group). 
Similarly, the relative shift in scores between the two groups was also found to be 
significant (ANOVA was carried out on the total change in knowledge score: Fi, 152 = 
25.9; pO.OOl).
The improvement in scores on the quiz, however, was not reflected in responses to 
items asking whether a) the British public or b) the respondent had enough information 
on which to vote in a referendum on whether or not Britain should strengthen its links 
with the European Union. Before the weekend event, just 3% low-involvement 
respondents felt they personally had enough information, compared with just 5% of the 
high-involvement group. After the event, these figures increased to 25% and 51% 
respectively. With respect to the wider public, however, respondents were almost 
unanimous in their agreement, having participated in the deliberation event, that 
insufficient information was available.
6.3 Discussion
In accordance with the assumptions of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986), it was possible to create two groups of participants in the deliberative 
poll who were characterised by either very high or very low involvement in the polling 
issue. These groups of individuals were scaled on a so-called ‘involvement continuum’ 
on the basis of their responses to items asking how interested in and testing how 
knowledgeable they were about the issue of European integration. Demographically, 
the groups were not particularly distinct, except in terms of sex -  women in the sample 
were far more likely to be allocated to the low-involvement group than were men. 
Beyond this, however, the second most important predictors of whether a participant 
was highly-involved in the polling issue was their openness towards, and experience of 
other European cultures. This was measured by their ability to speak other languages 
and by whether or not they had travelled to Europe in the year prior to the survey.
The two groups were found to differ systematically both in terms of their existing 
attitudes to Europe and in terms of their responses to persuasive communications over 
the course of the deliberation event. Individuals with high involvement tended to give 
more pro-European responses while those individuals with low-involvement levels were
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not only less enthusiastic, but also significantly less sure of their views, which led them 
to choose the ‘Don’t Know’ response option more frequently. However, issue- 
involvement was not the only influence on the participants’ views about integration. 
Indeed, it seems that people’s underlying concerns about the possible negative 
consequences of UK membership of the EU were far more influential in determining 
opinion in this area, thus highlighting the importance of understanding peoples’ 
uncertainties about EMU and achieving the best means by which to clarify them.
In terms of the persuasive effect of the deliberation stage of the poll, there appeared to 
be at least three main outcomes: (1) amongst all participants there was a tendency for 
opinions to become more favourable towards European integration. High-involvement 
participants remained the more pro-European of the two groups, however. (2) The 
weekend also had the effect of strengthening attitudes -  demonstrated most markedly by 
the shift from ‘Don’t Know’ responses to alternative response choices by the low- 
involvement group. (3) Knowledge about the issues associated with integration was also 
clearly improved, although there were still concerns that what had been learnt was not 
enough information on which to decide how to vote in a referendum.
The deliberative poll provides some insight into how British attitudes to the euro might 
change in the context of a referendum campaign, highlighting the importance of 
information in influencing not only attitudes, but public involvement in the issue and 
openness to persuasion. The poll provides further evidence that expressed opposition in 
the polls does not always reflect the reality of public opinion on Europe. Indeed, it 
seems even more likely that, in conjunction with consistently high numbers of ‘Don’t 
Knows’, such poll findings simply disguise the large proportion of voters who are 
uninterested in the issues, uninformed about them and, as a result, uncertain of their 
views. Yet these are the people who are most likely to respond to persuasion, and 
providing them with information and the opportunity to raise their interest and 
understanding will help them to strengthen their views and to inform public opinion. 
This provides a clear indication for campaign leaders in the event of a referendum -  the 
arguments for and against the single currency must be publicly addressed by politicians 
and balanced information must be made available to the public.
This finding is further backed by the fact that those participants in the poll who were 
already highly involved in the issue, were considerably more favourable towards closer
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integration even before the deliberation weekend. Raising knowledge about Europe 
appears to improve people’s disposition towards European integration and the 
government will need to respond to the public’s demand for information. Yet simply 
making information publicly available may not be enough. In spite of the vast number 
of publications available and periods of high intensity press coverage afforded by 
European issues, the public continue to feel they have not been given enough 
information. In order to increase the public’s ‘elaboration likelihood’ of available 
material, therefore, it will also be important to increase public involvement in the issues. 
This means making the issues surrounding Britain joining the single currency personally 
relevant and interesting to people. From the present data, it is possible that one way of 
achieving this would be by fostering openness to other European cultures and relating 
the political issues surrounding EMU to people’s personal experiences of travel in other 
European countries.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the public carry with them a large amount of 
‘attitudinal baggage’ when it comes to European issues. This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the Government’s scepticism regarding European integration in the past. This 
relates particularly to people’s concerns about the possible negative consequences of 
closer integration with the EU, as these seem to be especially influential in determining 
people’s views about the future of European policy and perhaps even more so than 
people’s levels of interest and knowledge about Europe. The phenomenon discussed in 
the psychological literature on decision-making that ‘losses looming larger than gains’ 
when people are faced with a risky choice (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982), 
is consistent with this finding from the deliberative poll. It seems, therefore, that any 
attempt to change public attitudes to the euro will need to address two things: firstly, 
the problem of improving levels of interest and knowledge so that people will more 
readily engage with the arguments both for and against EMU; secondly, the need to 
clarify people’s concerns about the potential risks of a single currency.
Deliberative polls have been likened by some to referenda (e.g. Curtice and Jowell, 
1998), because similar to the campaign period prior to a popular vote, the weekend 
event of the poll is characterised by artificially-heightened issue salience. This means 
that not only is there a greater flow of information about the issue than there would 
otherwise normally be, but there are also greater opportunities for discussion and 
debate, both with experts as well as amongst the participants themselves. In the
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deliberative poll, this context provides participants with the ideal opportunity to become 
better informed and to achieve a greater degree of confidence in their opinions on an 
issue. The present findings demonstrate how effectively this can be achieved. This 
‘success’ is what has been termed the ‘prescriptive’ function of the deliberative poll 
(Fishkin, 1995). The results are intended to provide a demonstration of how the public 
might ideally vote on a given issue were they better informed.
A possible criticism of the deliberative polling technique, however, is that the unique 
environment the participants find themselves in (for example, being surrounded by 
fellow members of random sample of the population, being filmed for a television 
programme) is quite unlike the real world context in which political persuasion actually 
takes place. This raises concerns about the validity of the findings and questions the 
extent to which the heightened issue salience of a real referendum campaign could 
achieve the same effects as those observed here. In terms of the theoretical model, 
elaboration likelihood appeared to increase, making participants more likely to reflect 
on their own position and to weigh up the evidence they are presented with. However, 
we cannot assume that this kind of central processing is what actually took place (if it 
did, then it may have been as much a function of taking part in a televised event as it 
was a result of artificially-heightened issue salience per se), nor can we assume that it 
would occur in a real-life campaign.
Because the design of a deliberative poll essentially mimics an attitude change 
experiment, the data provide an opportunity to examine the extent to which social 
psychological theories of persuasion are able to account for attitude change in a ‘real- 
world’ context. However, as was described in chapter 2, formal ELM studies designed 
to test tenets of the theory rely on a strict methodological paradigm, which allows the 
researcher to experimentally control variables assumed to be responsible for, and to 
provide evidence of, variation in attitude change (namely, involvement and argument 
quality). Because the deliberative poll is designed for an altogether different purpose, it 
can in no way be considered a stringent test of the model. Nevertheless, the method 
does offer some important advantages over conventional attitude change experiments -  
in particular, its use of a general population, random probability sample (rarely used in 
public opinion surveys and social psychological experiments). A further advantage is 
that the deliberative event as an attempt at persuasion (comparing a mix of different 
‘messages’ and exposure to a range of arguments of different kinds) mirrors far more
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closely the way in which persuasive communications happen in the real world -  
compared with the persuasive messages typically used in ELM attitude change 
experiments.
Those taking part in a deliberative poll are exposed to a great variety of persuasive 
communications. Some of these are under the direct control of the experimenter (the 
deliberation event makes use of pre-prepared, balanced reading materials), and some of 
which are beyond this control, such as the responses of politicians who participate in 
debates and the vagaries of group dynamics which evolve among the participants. We 
cannot be certain, therefore, about the exact nature of the psychological processes 
underpinning persuasion during such an event -  i.e. whether or not attitude change is 
achieved via central or peripheral processing. Whilst it seems likely that the observed 
attitude change is a result of central route processing of the various arguments 
presented, the possibility that it is a function of the multitudinous peripheral cues 
inherent in such an event should not be overlooked. Indeed, this note of caution has 
been discussed elsewhere in relation to this particular poll, with the suggestion that the 
weekend event may have been unintentionally biased towards the pro-European 
standpoint (Curtice and Jowell, 1998)16. In addition to this, the effect of group 
discussion and the social influences inherent in such a context undoubtedly carry with 
them their own persuasive effects -  perhaps the most significant being that of 
convergence to group norms (Sherif, 1936) which could arguably be said to have 
occurred here.
In theoretical terms, it could be argued that the deliberative poll achieves high 
elaboration likelihood amongst its participants by increasing people’s motivation and 
ability to engage with persuasive communications of a wide variety. In reality, it is not 
very well-understood what psychological processes or causal mechanisms occur during 
the course of the polling event. For this reason, the method has been criticised because 
the deliberation stage represents something of a ‘black box’ (Price and Neijens, 1998), 
in terms of the explanations offered of why or how attitude change occurs. This not 
only has implications for the conclusions that can be drawn about how people might 
respond to the heightened salience of an issue during a referendum campaign, but it also 
means that these data provide only a limited test of the postulates of the ELM as
16 While this may appear to lend further weight to criticism concerning the ecological validity of the 
research, an alternative viewpoint is that biases of this kind are also inherent in real-world campaigns, 
thus providing some realism to the proceedings (Jowell -  personal communication).
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explanations for attitude change in the real world. This limitation of study C provided 
the motivation for study D, an experiment designed specifically to test predictions 
derived from the ELM using the method developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). The 
results of this experiment are presented in chapter 8 . Chapter 7 provides a detailed 
description of the methods used.
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7 DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In study D, I investigate further the roles of information and involvement in attitude 
change in an experiment designed especially to test the theoretical framework developed 
in chapter 2. Specifically, the research examines the relationship between people’s 
involvement in the euro issue, their attitudes towards the euro and their motivation to 
process issue-relevant information. In addition, the research looks at how national 
identity influences people’s attitudes towards EMU, the motivation to process 
information about the euro and the effect that information has on attitudes. Both 
involvement and national identity are, therefore, investigated as factors influencing how 
people respond to information about the euro. The study was also designed specifically 
to test the effect on persuasion of varying the salience of national identity in 
communications about the euro. Thus, the research addressed the following questions:
1. What are the psychological processes by which people’s attitudes are formed and 
changed in response to information?
2. What effect does issue involvement have on these processes?
3. What is the effect of manipulating the salience of national identity in information 
about the euro on the psychological processes involved in attitude change?
4. To what extent does national identity influence the elaboration likelihood of 
information about the euro?
In chapter 1, I reviewed existing research that has studied the relationship between 
national identity and attitudes towards European integration. This research has shown 
that attitudes vary with the strength of people’s attachment to their national identity 
(those with a stronger attachment tend to be more resistant to integration), as well as 
with the nature of that attachment -  e.g. whether their attachment is instrumental or 
sentimental (Rothi, Lyons and Chryssochoou, 1995; Cinnirella, 1996); or whether it 
consists of mainly patriotic sentiments or nationalistic ones (e.g. Dowds and Young, 
1996). In general, sentimental, or nationalistic forms of national identity tend to be 
correlated with negative attitudes towards Europe, while holding patriotic sentiments 
and an instmmental attachment to national identity facilitate more positive views about 
integration. Similarly, attitudes towards integration tend to vary as a function of the 
strength and nature of people’s attachment to a European identity (e.g. Cinnirella, 1996; 
Routh and Burgoyne, 1996). However, the influence exerted by social identities on 
attitudes also varies as a function of the salience of the identity at a given point in time.
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In this study, I focus on what happens when British national identity is made salient in 
communications about the euro, looking at its influence on expressed attitudes and the 
processes (central or peripheral) by which those attitudes are formed. As a result, the 
study does not examine variation in different forms of attachment to national and 
European identity and how they relate to attitudes, as an extensive exploration of these 
relationships was beyond the scope of the research. Instead, I concentrate on how the 
strength of people’s national identity and their issue involvement influence their 
responses to information under conditions of high and low category salience.
Once again the Elaboration Likelihood Model provides the conceptual framework for 
the study. In study C, I tested some of the key predictions derived from Petty and 
Cacioppo’s model using data from a deliberative poll. The analysis found evidence 
consistent with previous ELM research. In particular, there were differences in the 
strength of attitudes and the susceptibility of attitudes to change as a function of the 
participants’ level of issue involvement. But the ELM is concerned not only with the 
effect of information on attitudes, but with the cognitive processes by which attitudes 
are changed. It relies on a sophisticated experimental design, which allows the 
researcher to make inferences about the particular ‘route to persuasion’ (central vs. 
peripheral) that has led to persuasion. The research design used in study D is adapted 
from the ELM experimental method (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) with the aim of 
identifying how information about the euro is processed and how this, in turn, influences 
people’s attitudes towards EMU.
In this chapter I review the background to the research, briefly returning to the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. I then describe the classical ELM 
experimental design and the ways in which it was adapted to accommodate the specific 
requirements of the present study. I then present in detail the specific design and 
methodology used here, the key dependent and independent measures, the experimental 
manipulation and the procedures used. Due to the relative complexity of the method, I 
have chosen to present the findings of the experiment separately in chapter 8 .
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7.1 Involvement and identity: Two routes to central processing?
Chapter 2 reviewed the research literature relating to the role of identity in attitude 
change. It was noted that this topic has received research attention in both the fields of 
social influence and persuasion (Mackie and Skelly, 1994). However, in the field of 
persuasion, the majority of empirical evidence relates to the role played by the identity 
of the message source. Early ELM studies examined the effect of manipulating the 
source of a message and concluded that compared with the arguments contained in the 
message, source plays a relatively unimportant role in changing attitudes, acting as a 
peripheral cue for those with low elaboration likelihood. Because the peripheral route 
tends to have a less enduring impact on attitudes, source identity was concluded to be a 
relatively unimportant factor in persuasion.
In fact, as the studies reviewed in chapter 2 have demonstrated, information regarding 
the ingroup-outgroup status of a message source can be an important motivator for 
systematic processing of the message content. For example, Mackie and her colleagues’ 
(1990) first study indicated an increased propensity for participants to engage in 
argument-based processing of ingroup messages (strong messages being more 
persuasive than weak messages), but in a second study, this effect was only observed 
where group relevance was high (where group relevance was low, group membership 
was assumed to have served as a peripheral cue in the persuasion context). McGarty, 
Haslam, Hutchinson and Turner (1994) replicated and extended this research by 
integrating the findings into a social identity account of the cognitive mediation of 
attitude change. Their two studies found that group-membership information about a 
message source could induce thoughtful content-based processing, but only under 
conditions of high category salience (McGarty et al., 1994; Haslam, McGarty and 
Turner, 1996). Under conditions of low salience, the group information appeared to 
function in the manner specified by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), as a cue to a peripheral 
mode of processing.
The ELM’s treatment of the role of extra-message variables such as source identity in 
persuasion has been defended by Fleming and Petty (2000), who maintain that the 
apparently discrepant findings of these studies are indeed compatible with the postulates 
of the model. They argue that according to the ELM any variable in the persuasion 
context (including source identity, the group-relevance of a message, salience of in­
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group identity, and so on) can influence attitude change in any of four different ways: 1) 
as a cue to peripheral route processing; 2) as a motivator for central-route processing 
(i.e. influencing the quantity of elaboration); 3) as a bias on central-route processing (i.e. 
influencing the quality of message elaboration); and 4) as a message ‘argument’ in its 
own right (i.e. an additional persuasive factor that is elaborated on during central 
processing) (Fleming and Petty, 2000; Petty and Wegener, 1999). The way in which a 
variable influences persuasion will depend on an individual’s prior motivation and 
ability to process the persuasive message and the relevance the message holds for them 
personally or for their in-group. They argue that the task for future studies is to identify 
the conditions under which different roles are activated in different persuasion contexts.
In this study, I test predictions derived from the above about the effect of manipulating 
the salience of British national identity in information about the euro. The analysis has 
two main objectives: the first is to examine the influence of involvement and identity on 
the likelihood of message elaboration. As in study C, I test the basic hypothesis that 
central-route processing of information about the euro will be more likely at higher 
levels of issue involvement (because people who are more interested in and 
knowledgeable about the euro issue will be more motivated and able to process 
information about it). However, in study D, I extend this by testing the hypothesis that 
central-route processing will also be more likely among those with a stronger attachment 
to British national identity, because of the greater group relevance of the issue for this 
group. I then investigate which of the four roles identity salience assumes in the 
persuasion context for a) participants with high and low levels of issue involvement; and 
b) participants with strong and weak attachment to British national identity.
The assumption behind focusing on these four groups in particular is that the effects of 
salience on elaboration will depend upon involvement and the strength of a person’s 
attachment to their national identity and the effect these variables have on the 
motivation to elaborate. For example, at low levels of issue involvement, increasing the 
salience of national identity in information about the euro might be expected to serve as 
a peripheral cue to persuasion. For those with a strong attachment to national identity, 
however, increasing category salience might be expected to increase the motivation to 
process group-relevant information. The precise hypotheses tested in the analysis are 
presented in chapter 8 . In the next section, I review the classic ELM experimental 
method, before describing the specific design of the present study.
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7.2 Key features of the ELM experimental method
In chapter 2 ,1 introduced the main features of the ELM experimental method, described 
in detail by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) in one of their earliest accounts of the theory. In 
this section I review the most important elements and provide a short summary of their 
account.
The ELM method is aimed at measuring two key dependent variables. Most 
importantly, ELM studies aim to measure the amount of attitude change induced by a 
persuasive message. As described earlier, in the classic experimental design, this 
involves presenting participants with a persuasive communication (or ‘message’) about 
a target issue/proposal and then measuring their attitudes to that issue/proposal. 
Because the design involves random allocation of participants to the experimental 
conditions, it is assumed that any individual variations in attitudes prior to message 
exposure will be randomly distributed across experimental conditions. For this reason, 
it is not usually necessary to obtain pre-exposure attitude measures. Rather, it is inferred 
that differences in post-message attitudes across the different conditions are a function 
of exposure to the persuasive message. It is noteworthy that most ELM studies have 
focused on issues about which a participant is unlikely to have a pre-existing opinion. 
Participants are typically presented with information about a fictitious debate or 
proposal (manipulated to be of either high or low relevance to the participants). The aim 
of the experiment, therefore, is to examine the relative differences in attitudes between 
participants in each of the treatment groups and to identify the process by which the 
attitude about the proposal is formed.
The second dependent variable of interest in ELM research is ‘elaboration’. Measures 
of message elaboration are obtained so that conclusions can be drawn about the extent 
and nature of message processing. This is the method by which the researcher can 
determine whether the central or peripheral route has been followed and, where central 
processing has occurred, whether or not it has been relatively objective or relatively 
biased (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). In other words, by measuring the nature of message 
elaboration, the researcher has a means of determining what kind of influence an 
independent variable has had on persuasion (in terms of the four roles identified above). 
ELM research has used a variety of measures of elaboration - typically ones that involve 
recording recipients’ cognitive responses to the message (such as the number of
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favourable thoughts it elicits, the extent of counter-argumentation, etc.). The measures 
of elaboration used in the present study are described in greater detail below. See Petty, 
Ostrom and Brock (1981) for further information about the cognitive response approach 
to the study of persuasion.
7.2.1 Experimental manipulations: Argument quality and involvement
In addition to the two dependent measures in the ELM experimental design, the method 
relies on two key treatments or manipulations. The first of these is ‘argument quality’. 
As we have seen, argument quality refers to the strength of the arguments contained in 
the persuasive message. Because the model predicts that people with high involvement 
in the target issue will be more likely to take time to systematically process the 
arguments contained in the persuasive message, while people with low involvement will 
be unable or unmotivated to process the arguments carefully, the argument quality 
manipulation in ELM studies provides a means of inferring the nature and extent of 
message elaboration. People who are centrally processing the message will be able to 
distinguish between strong and weak arguments.
The second key experimental manipulation used in ELM studies is involvement in the 
target issue. Typically, the extent to which the topic of the persuasive message is 
personally relevant or ‘involving’ for the experimental participants is manipulated by 
varying the message content. For example, Petty and Cacioppo (1979b; 1984b) varied 
the personal relevance of the message in their study by having one condition in which 
undergraduate participants read a communication regarding plans to introduce a 
comprehensive exam in a year’s time (highly relevant to the current undergraduates) and 
another, which concerned plans to introduce the exam in five years time (which would 
not directly affect the present undergraduates). Thus, for the former group, the 
persuasive communication was highly involving, whereas for the latter group, 
involvement in the communication was relatively low.
The purpose of manipulating participants’ level of involvement in the target issue is to 
control the likelihood of message elaboration in the same way across all participants in 
the experiment (or a specific subset of them). By constraining the level of involvement 
to be either high or low (e.g. by varying the personal relevance of the message topic), it
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is possible to test the effect of a treatment variable on persuasion. Controlling for 
argument quality and involvement, therefore, allows the researcher to draw conclusions 
about the influence of an independent variable on the variables ‘attitude change’ and 
‘message elaboration’. In other words, manipulating involvement makes it possible to 
determine the influence of a third variable on the quantity of attitude change, as well as 
on the nature of the cognitive processes by which attitude change occurs (central vs. 
peripheral route).
7.3 Adapting the ELM method for the purposes of the present study
In order to test predictions derived from the ELM about how the public’s knowledge 
about and interest in EMU and their feelings about their national identity influence their 
attitudes towards Britain joining the euro, an experiment was designed based on the 
basic methodology developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). However, a number of 
adaptations were necessary to make it suitable for studying a) the particular population 
of interest (British adults who would be eligible to vote in a referendum on the euro); 
and b) attitudes towards a ‘real-world’ issue, about which participants might hold pre­
existing views. A further advantage of these adaptations was to enhance the ecological 
validity of the findings of the research. This section describes how the classical ELM 
method was modified for the purposes of the present study.
The principal change to the classic research design was to take the experiment ‘out of 
the laboratory’ and to administer it as an Internet-based self-completion survey with a 
‘built-in’ experimental design. As stated, a key priority for the study was to have access 
to a sample of British adults. ELM studies, like much experimental research in social 
psychology, have tended to rely on student samples. While the use of random allocation 
to experimental conditions overcomes many of difficulties associated with selection bias 
when non-random samples are used, a student sample was not appropriate in this context 
given the particular focus of this research. In particular, because the experiment focuses 
on a real political issue (which at the time the research was carried out (2003) was 
relatively salient in the media), it would not have been possible to control for the fact 
that many people would already hold attitudes towards it, nor to experimentally 
manipulate participants’ involvement in the issue. For this reason, it was necessary to 
be able to distinguish participants with low and high levels of issue involvement at the
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analysis stage, which meant accessing a sufficiently heterogeneous sample of the British 
population17. This precluded the use of a student sample, particularly at a university like 
the London School of Economics, where levels of involvement in European politics are 
likely to be higher than among the British public as a whole. Equally, the unusually 
high proportion of international students at the LSE meant that it would prove difficult 
to recruit participants who were British citizens. Using the Internet to collect the data 
offered a solution by not only providing this necessary access to British voters, but also 
making it possible to access participants from across the country. An added advantage 
of collecting data from respondents in their own homes or places of work was to avoid 
any detrimental impact on data quality associated with the artificiality of the 
experimental laboratory as a setting for research.
On a more practical level, the use of the Internet to field the questionnaire represented 
the most cost-effective method of collecting data, both in terms of time and money. To 
recruit a nation-wide sample of British voters (albeit a non-representative sample) to 
take part in an experiment at the LSE, or some other fixed location, would have been 
excessively costly. Equally, to use a postal method of distributing questionnaires to 
collect the data would also have been too expensive, both in terms of gaining access to a 
sample of postal addresses, as well as in terms of postage costs. Using an electronic 
method of data collection made it possible to automate the random allocation of 
participants to the different experimental conditions, whereas a postal method would 
have entailed a more complex method of randomisation, which may have reduced the 
degree of experimental control over the procedure. Furthermore, the administration of 
postal questionnaires is time-consuming and is often associated with low levels of
152response (Czaja and Blair, 2005 ). While the latter is a problem associated with web- 
based surveys also, the method used here meant that the sample could easily be boosted 
until sufficient numbers had participated in each of the experimental conditions.
Two of the main obstacles to the use of web-based data collection methods include the 
development of the questionnaires and gaining access to a sample of Internet users 
willing to participate in academic research. In the case of the present study, however,
17 Limited resources precluded the selection of a random probability sample for the survey, a method not 
easily applied in web-based surveys, except where the population is clearly defined and all members have 
access to the Internet. Details on sample selection and the demographic profile o f the achieved sample are 
provided in section 7.5.
8 Dillman’s (1978) ‘Total Design Method’ has proved highly successful as a means of enhancing 
response rates in postal surveys.
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these two obstacles were relatively easy to overcome. First of all, the questionnaire 
development and programming for the experiment (and two pilot studies that were 
conducted to pre-test the methodology) were both done by me, using Microsoft 
Frontpage. The web server at LSE on which the questionnaires were hosted was already 
equipped to handle data from Frontpage forms (using a custom cgi script), which meant 
that it was comparatively straightforward to manage the data collection procedure. 
Second of all, I was generously donated a sample of participants by Saros Research Ltd. 
-  a company offering a recruitment service for market researchers, that holds its own 
database of would-be participants willing to take part in research. These participants are 
described as members of the general public they have recruited especially, who have 
agreed to participate in studies (typically, for qualitative market research) and to be 
financially rewarded for doing so19.
The decision to carry out the experiment via the Internet entailed a number of further 
adaptations to the standard ELM method. Because the study was conducted entirely 
through self-completion questionnaires, it meant that no experimenter or confederate 
could be present to facilitate the running of the experiment. Experimental control was 
achieved entirely by manipulating the order in which different sets of questions were 
presented to participants, and the location of the ‘persuasive message’ in the 
questionnaire. Using a basic algorithm programmed in html, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the experimental treatment groups as soon as they accessed 
the questionnaire from the survey’s homepage (see below).
As with the standard design, the key dependent variable was attitude change. Unlike 
many ELM experiments, however, where attitudes are measured only after exposure to 
the persuasive message, half of the participants’ in the present study completed the 
attitude measures prior to message exposure. The reason for measuring attitudes before 
message exposure was partly to strengthen the overall experimental control in the 
design, as it provides a more robust measure of the effects of the arguments on attitudes. 
In addition, however, this feature of the design also provided a measure of the degree to 
which the participants’ attitudes towards Europe were representative of the electorate as 
a whole.
191 am very grateful to Maya Middlemiss of Saros Research for drawing the sample and sending 
participants the email invitation to participate in the study. I would also like to thank Fiona Jack and 
Teresa Edleston (then) at Green Light Research for arranging the connection with Saros.
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7.3.1 Issue involvement
Where the target issue in an ELM study is one about which participants are unlikely to 
have a pre-formed attitude, it is relatively straightforward experimentally to manipulate 
involvement in the message topic. However, where the target issue is a real-world 
political issue, it is impossible to control for participants’ pre-existing interest and 
knowledge about the issue and the personal relevance that issue will hold for them. 
Thus, the design of the present study deviated from the ELM in that no attempt was 
made to manipulate participants’ elaboration likelihood (except via the experimental 
manipulation of identity salience described below). Rather, those variables assumed to 
predict elaboration likelihood (including knowledge about and interest in the EMU 
issue; strength of attachment to British national identity; and others assumed to relate to 
the personal relevance of the issue) were measured as covariates and used in the analysis 
as independent variables, as well as to create an index of involvement with which to 
divide the sample into groups with high and low elaboration likelihood.
7.3.2 Argument Quality
A second major adaptation of the standard ELM methodology in the present study 
concerned the presentation of the persuasive arguments. Whereas participants in ELM 
experiments are presented with a single ‘message’ comprising a number of different 
arguments about the target issue, such a method was less well-suited to an Internet- 
administered questionnaire. Firstly, it would have been difficult to control the 
presentation of the message to participants. Secondly, it was possible that asking 
participants to read a long passage in the context of a web survey would lead many to 
‘switch off and result in high levels of non-response (either through break-offs or at the 
item level)20. For this reason, the presentation of the persuasive message was achieved 
by asking participants to read a set of three separate ‘arguments’ and then to evaluate 
each of them on a series of scales measuring different dimensions of argument quality 
and cognitive response.
20 This was confirmed in a pilot study in which the arguments were combined into a single message; 
participants found the exercise burdensome and off-putting.
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For the purposes of ELM studies, the persuasive message consists of either ‘strong’ or
‘weak’ arguments, defined empirically using the following method:
“In developing arguments for a topic we begin by generating a large number 
o f arguments, both intuitively compelling and specious ones, in favour o f some 
target issue (...). Then, members o f the appropriate subject population are 
given these arguments to rate for persuasiveness. Based on these scores, we 
select arguments with high and low ratings to comprise at least one “strong” 
and one “weak” message. Subsequently, other subjects are given one o f these 
messages and are told to think about it and evaluate it carefully. Following 
examination o f the message, subjects complete a “thought listing measure ”
(Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968) in which they are instructed to record the 
thoughts elicited by the message. These thoughts are then coded as to whether 
they are favourable, unfavourable, or neutral toward the position advocated 
(e.g. see Cacioppo and Petty, 1981; Cacioppo, Harkins and Petty, 1981). ”
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; 32)
The cognitive response approach rests on the principle that a ‘strong’ message contains 
arguments that generate predominantly favourable thoughts towards the advocacy, such 
that where the profile of issue-relevant thoughts is more favourable after message 
exposure than it was before, positive attitude change is expected to occur. The thought- 
listing measure is intended to ensure that the strong and weak messages elicit the 
appropriate profile of favourable and unfavourable thoughts. Once it has been 
established that the strong and weak messages elicit the appropriate profile of positive 
and negative cognitive responses, a panel of judges further check the messages for other 
characteristics including overall believability, comprehensibility, complexity and 
familiarity, the aim being to ensure that whilst the messages vary in terms of their 
argument quality, they are equivalent in terms of these other attributes.
In the present study, a different procedure was used, but which drew on Petty and 
Cacioppo’s (1986) method. A pilot study was devised to empirically establish the 
argument quality of a selection of arguments in favour of Britain joining the euro for use 
in the main experiment. A sample of pro-EMU arguments were selected to represent the 
prototypical arguments about the euro identified in the argumentation analysis in study 
B. The arguments, which according to Toulmin’s (1958) model, mainly consisted of a 
single claim (some with supporting evidence) were taken partly from the leading articles 
analysed in study B and partly from two pro-European campaign websites (Business for 
Sterling and Britain in Europe). Broadly, they were of three types, addressing different 
aspects of the debate surrounding EMU: economic arguments in favour of Britain 
joining the euro, political arguments and arguments about national identity.
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The pilot study involved a convenience sample of 120 British adults21 completing a 
short questionnaire (either on paper or via the Internet), in which they were asked to 
read the arguments presented and complete a thought-listing task to record their 
cognitive responses to what they had read. They were then asked to evaluate the 
cogency of the arguments on a series of scales (the paper questionnaire has been 
reproduced in Appendix D)22. The thought-listing measure was based on approaches 
developed by Brock (1967) and Greenwald (1968). Each argument was presented in 
turn, followed by a blank space in which participants were asked to write the first thing 
they thought about when they read the argument. The second task involved rating each 
argument on a set of six seven-point semantic differential scales (Osgood, Suci and 
Tannenbaum, 1971). These represented an attempt to operationalise the dimensions of 
argument quality used by the panel of judges in Petty and Cacioppo’s studies (1986; 
p.32). Four of the items measured the overall complexity of the arguments, their 
familiarity, comprehensibility and believability. The other two asked participants how 
much they agreed with the arguments and how persuasive they thought the arguments 
were.
To analyse the data, firstly, cognitive responses recorded in the thought-listing 
procedure were content analysed using a coding frame developed by Petty, Ostrom and 
Brock (1981). The coding involved evaluating responses along three different 
dimensions (each with three categories): (1) the ''polarity'’ of the thoughts, referring to 
their valence in relation to the advocacy of the argument (favourable, neutral or 
unfavourable); (2 ) the ‘origin’ of the thoughts (direct recall of the message, reactions to
21 Participants were recruited mainly through friends and relatives working in a variety of different 
settings, including a range of educational (FE and HE) institutions and research organisations, as well as 
from undergraduate and postgraduate courses in the Social Psychology department at the LSE. I am 
grateful to Russell Luyt, Leilani Mitchell, Rebecca Newton and Christine Roberts for their assistance in 
recruiting the participants.
22 In the paper version of the questionnaire, participants were asked to evaluate 5 arguments. In order to 
boost response, a web-based version of the questionnaire was developed. To reduce the response burden 
in the web mode, the online version only required participants to evaluate a single argument. In both 
modes, participants were randomly allocated to a different version of the questionnaire, containing 
different argument(s). There were 2 versions of the paper questionnaire (each containing 5 arguments) 
and 10 versions of the single-argument web questionnaire.
204
Table 7A Profile o f cognitive responses to pro-EMU arguments and mean argument quality ratings
Pro-EMU arguments
Britain cannot afford to be left on its own while the rest o f Europe 
goes ahead with a common currency. A modernised Britain needs 
to be part o f Europe, not to stand apart from it.
A single currency is in principle a desirable thing for Britain in 
Europe because o f its effect on exchange rate instability, 
transaction costs, interest rates and because o f its disciplinary 
effects on the public finances o f other European nations.
Money has a powerful symbolic value. Yet the essence o f being 
British has nothing to do with the pound or the euro. Our national 
identity would be very thin indeed if  the best thing about our 
culture was the Queen's head on the coin. An overarching civic 
sense o f Europeanness based on a set o f shared democratic values 
is surely something to strive after as a way to eliminate the root 
cause o f the violent ethnic conflicts that have occurred as a result 
o f ethnic nationalism.
Foreign investors choose Britain because we are a gateway to the 
European Union and remaining isolated from the euro would make 
us less attractive to them. This investment makes our country more 
prosperous. As the gateway to Europe and a bridge to the rest o f 
the world, Britain plays a unique and pivotal role in global affairs.
Favourable Neutral Unfavourable Mean
Thoughts % Thoughts % Thoughts % argument
quality rating
65 9 27 2.78
54 15 31 3.16
39 -  62 3.92
38 13 50 4.07
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Joining the euro means pooling sovereignty, not losing it. When it 
comes to interest rates, joining the euro would in some ways give 
us more sovereignty. Being represented in the European Central 
Bank would give us more influence, because we would be there as 
part o f the decision-making process, not just having to accept 
decisions made by others that have a profound effect on us.
We are rightly proud o f Britain and confident in our national 
identity. Britain would still be Britain if  we voted to join the euro, 
and the Queen's head would still be on our coins.
Even if Britain doesn ’t join the single currency now, it won 7 be 
able to avoid it. Sooner or later it will invade Britain. It is 
inevitable.
In the modem world, Britain can 7 afford to go it alone — we ’re 
better off in Europe. In the euro, we could be even more 
prosperous and powerful. Britain’s place in Europe is central to 
our prosperity and standing. Joining the euro could guarantee our 
economic stability by strengthening our relations with our biggest 
trading partners.
There are huge potential advantages o f joining the single 
European currency in terms o f living standards, fiscal stability and 
economic growth. British exclusion from the project could entail 
many risks.
Joining the euro would be better for shoppers because prices 
would be lower. Everybody knows that everyday consumer goods 
are much cheaper in the rest o f Europe than in Britain.__________
37 7 56 3.93
37 13 50 4.23
31 8 62 4.11
28 6 66 3.28
26 3 71 3.47
22 13 65 4.07
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the message, or the recipient’s own message-topic thoughts); and (3) the ‘target’ of the 
thoughts (related either to the topic of the communication, to the style of the 
communication or to the audience of the communication). (The coding frame is shown 
in appendix D).
Central to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) determination of argument quality is the polarity 
dimension -  that is, the valence of the cognitive responses elicited with respect to the 
advocacy of the argument. For these authors, the strength of arguments was established 
according to a strict formula whereby a ‘strong’ message was one which elicited on 
average a profile of thoughts of which 75% were favourable. Because the persuasive 
‘messages’ in the present study were short arguments (often consisting only one or two 
sentences), it was not appropriate to adopt such a strict criterion. Instead, arguments 
were selected for the main study on the basis of the proportion of favourable thoughts 
each generated among participants in the pilot study and on the basis of the ratings they 
received on each of the dimensions of argument quality identified. A mean score on 
each of the 5 dimensions was computed for each argument (the semantic differential 
scales were all coded so that a high score (from 1-7) indicated weaker argument 
quality). Table 7.1 shows the percentage of thoughts coded in each category on the 
polarity dimension for each of the 10 pro-EMU arguments in the pilot, together with the 
mean argument quality ratings. Those arguments generating the highest proportion of 
favourable thoughts were selected as the strong arguments for the study. The weak 
arguments selected were those receiving the highest argument quality ratings . An 
additional criterion for selecting the arguments was that they were balanced by topic - 
each set was made up of an economic argument, a political argument and a national 
identity argument -  and by length. The arguments selected for the experiment are 
shown in table 7.2.
23 NB -  To control for the possible confounding effect o f the participants’ prior attitudes towards EMU on 
their argument quality ratings, the data in table 1 are taken only from those participants who were pro- 
EMU.
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Table 7.2 Strong and weak arguments selected for the experiment
Strong arguments Weak Arguments
1. Some people argue that we shouldn’t Some people argue that we shouldn’t 
join the euro because money has a join the euro because the pound is a 
powerful symbolic value. Yet, the major national symbol for Britain. We 
essence o f being British has nothing to are rightly proud o f Britain and 
do with the pound or the euro. Our confident in our national identity. But 
national identity would be very think Britain would still be Britain i f  we voted 
indeed if  the best thing about our to join the euro, and the Queen’s head 
culture was the Queen’s head on the would still be on our coins.
coin.
2. A single currency is, in principle, a Joining the euro would be better for  
desirable thing for Britain because o f shoppers because prices would be 
its effect on exchange rate instability, lower. Everybody knows that everyday 
transaction costs, interest rates and consumer goods are much cheaper in 
because o f its disciplinary effects on the the rest o f Europe than in Britain, 
public finances o f other European
nations.
3. Britain cannot afford to be left on its Even i f  Britain doesn’t join the single 
own while the rest o f Europe goes currency now, it won ’t be able to avoid 
ahead with a common currency. A it. Sooner or later it will invade 
modernised Britain needs to be part o f Britain. It is inevitable.
Europe, not to stand apart from it.
7.4 Experimental design
The experiment was based on a multi-factorial, between-subjects design, involving three 
treatments. These are shown in table 7.3. The first of these concerned the presentation 
of the arguments; whether before or after participants were asked about their attitudes. 
Because of the difficulties of studying attitude change in within-subjects designs 
(especially in the context of a self-completion survey, where the use of repeated 
measures would be particularly problematic), the measurement of attitude change was 
achieved by asking half the participants about their attitudes at the start of the 
questionnaire, before asking them to read and evaluate the arguments, and half part-way 
through the questionnaire, immediately after they had read and evaluated the arguments. 
Random allocation of participants to these two basic conditions meant that any resultant 
difference in attitudes between the two groups was assumed to be a function of exposure 
to the persuasive communication.
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The second treatment in the study was the manipulation of argument quality. As 
described, half the participants were presented with three ‘strong’ arguments in favour 
of joining the euro to read and evaluate, and half were presented with three ‘weak’ 
arguments (shown in table 7.2).
The third treatment involved the manipulation of national identity salience. The 
concept of ‘salience’ is derived from self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et 
al., 1987). The manipulation involved a priming procedure based on that used by 
Brown, Vivian and Hewstone (1999) and Memmendey, Klink and Brown (2001), aimed 
at maximising the likelihood of self-categorisation as ‘British’, encouraging inter-group 
comparisons, highlighting inter-group bias and inducing in-group favouritism. The 
priming procedure involved responding to 6 additional items, and as with the other 
treatments, was applied to just one half of the sample.
Table 7.3 Experimental treatments
Factor Description of treatment Levels
Attitude Measurement Question ordering of the Pre-message measure
attitude measures Post-message measure
Argument Quality Strength of persuasive Strong
messages Weak
Salience Salience of national High
identity Low
The design of the experiment was fully-crossed, such that the three factors yielded 8 
different conditions, each with its own version of the questionnaire. The questionnaires 
varied in terms of the order in which the different questions (and the arguments) were 
presented (attitude measurement before or after message exposure), the quality of the 
arguments presented (strong or weak) and the presence or absence of the salience 
manipulation {high versus low salience). The full design is illustrated in table 7.4.
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Table 7.4 Full experimental design
FACTOR 1 
Attitude Measure
Pre-Message Attitude Post-Message Attitude
FACTOR 2
Argument Quality Strong Weak Strong Weak
FACTOR 3
Identity Salience High Low High Low High Low High Low
Group A B C D E F G H
7.5 Participants
Participants in the experiment were recruited and contacted through the qualitative 
research recruitment service, Saros Research Ltd -  a company specialising in managing 
a database of over 25,000 members of the general public who have expressed an interest 
in occasionally participating in market research. The company claims that its database 
is broadly representative of the British online community24. However, because of the 
experimental design of the study, no systematic sampling method was necessary. 
Random allocation ensures that the distribution of responses across different conditions 
will differ systematically only as a result of the manipulations. The profile of the 
sample contacted was not, therefore, designed to be representative of the population (the 
use of the Internet as a data collection instrument further restricted this). Rather, it was 
decided that people who had most recently joined the database should be contacted, to 
ensure that email address details were up-to-date, in order to maximise the contact and 
response rates (by targeting those who had only relatively recently expressed their 
interest in participating in research).
Nevertheless, because of the nature of the topic under investigation, was desirable that 
the achieved sample provided some point of comparison with the population it is 
intended to represent (British citizens aged 18 and over, eligible to vote in a referendum 
on the euro). For this reason, a number of demographic measures were included in the 
questionnaire that could be compared with population estimates. Similarly, some of the 
measures of attitudes and involvement used in this study were taken from recent large-
24 Characteristics of the achieved sample are compared with the British online community in chapter 8.
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scale surveys using nationally-representative samples (a survey conducted by MORI on 
behalf of the Foreign Policy Centre in 2002 and the Autumn 2002 Eurobarometer) to 
provide further possibilities for comparison.
In total, 1092 participants returned complete questionnaires from an initial sample of 
5500, who were invited to participate in the study25 (a rate of 19%; though there is no 
record of the number of ineligible email addresses in the starting sample). The method 
of randomly allocating participants to the experimental conditions employed in the 
experiment (a html script) worked in the following way: Rather than ensuring that equal 
numbers of each version of the questionnaire were completed in series, it allowed the 
researcher to manipulate the relative likelihood of a respondent being presented with a 
particular version of the questionnaire over another. Thus, the total number of returned 
questionnaires in each condition was monitored throughout the fielding of the survey, so 
that, if necessary, the likelihood of receiving a particular version could be manipulated 
to try to ensure as far as possible equal numbers in each of the 8 experimental groups .
25The research methodology was pre-tested in an extensive pilot study, to ensure that all aspects of the 
design worked as intended. Email invitations were sent to 1500 people registered on the SAROS 
database. Because of uncertainty regarding the likely response rate for the survey, the rationale behind 
the comparatively large sample for the pilot study was to ensure sufficient numbers in each of the 8 cells 
of the design to permit an initial examination of potential effect sizes. Pre-testing the method in this way, 
therefore, not only provided an indication of the achievable response rate, but also a basis for power 
calculations to decide the total number o f SAROS members to contact for the main survey. In total, 367 
people returned responses to the pilot study, a response rate of about 25%.
Following the pilot study and initial analysis o f the pilot data, it was possible to make a more informed 
decision regarding the requisite sample size for the main survey. The pilot study achieved a mean per- 
condition sample size of 45. Analysis o f Variance for the full-factorial model (including a measure of 
issue involvement as a blocking factor), using a 7-point scale attitude measure as the dependent variable, 
yielded a within-subjects mean square estimate of variance of 2.65. On the basis o f this measure of 
variance, it was possible to use an approximate formula for calculating sample size, which has been 
demonstrated to yield a power over 0.70 (using the 0.05 significance level for the test). The formula is 
taken from Boniface (1995) and is shown below:
n = (2)2(1.96) 2 (variance)/spd2 
(where spd = the “smallest practical difference” of importance between the pair of mean scores on the 
dependent variable (Boniface, 1995; p.90). It was decided that a conservative estimate for the spd on the 
7-point euro attitude scale (which ranged from ‘Very negative’ to ‘Very positive’) should be 0.5. Thus, 
the resultant formula used for the power determination was as follows: 
n = (15.3664) (2.649)/0.52 
= (15.3664) (2.649)/0.25 
= 40.71/0.25 
= 163
Given the relative efficiency of the online survey and that access to the SAROS database did not constrain 
the use of a large sample, it was decided to aim for a sample of around 165 in each of the 8 conditions -  
that is, a total sample size of 1320. Given the relatively low response rate achieved for the pilot survey, in 
order to ensure sufficient numbers in each of the 8 experimental conditions, a total of sample 5500 people 
were selected from the database to be invited to participate in the main survey.
26 This turned out to be necessary. The most likely reason for uneven response rates across the conditions 
was that some versions of the questionnaire elicited more ‘break-offs’ or non-response than others. In 
particular, the questionnaires in the high salience conditions were much longer than in the low salience
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In practice, because of the fast rate of incoming responses to the Internet survey 
(particularly during the first 24 hours of the survey going live), it was not possible to 
achieve this perfectly and as a result, the numbers participating in each treatment group 
were not equal. Table 7.5 shows the total number of participants achieved in each cell 
of the research design.
Table 7.5 Achieved sample sizes in each treatment group
Pre-Message Attitude Post-Message Attitude
Strong Weak Strong Weak
High Low High Low High Low High Low
Target n 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
Achieved n 145 156 151 148 139 154 132 150
7.6 Measures
The questionnaire contained items designed to measure each of the following:
a. attitudes towards the euro
b. issue involvement
c. national identification
d. argument elaboration
e. political orientation and engagement
f. socio-demographic background of the participant
In this section, I describe the key dependent and independent measures used to test the 
central hypotheses of study D (presented in chapter 8). The full list of questions is 
available in Appendix D.
7.6.1 Dependent variables
Attitude change - The main dependent variable under investigation was attitude change, 
measured as the difference in attitudes towards the euro between groups A-D (asked
conditions. Also the presence of national symbols in these conditions may have been off-putting to some 
potential participants.
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about their attitude before message exposure) and groups E-H (asked about their 
attitudes after message exposure). The following measures of attitudes were included:
(1) a seven-point semantic-differential scale, ranging from ‘Very negative’ to ‘Very 
positive’, on which participants were asked to rate their views on the single currency;
(2) a categorical measure of attitudes developed and used by MORI to differentiate 
those who are decided in their opinion on the euro (‘strongly in favour’ or ‘strongly 
opposed’), and those who are undecided and but might be persuaded if they thought it 
would be good or bad for the British economy (the euro waverers question described in 
chapter 1). Question (1) was deliberately intended to be quite vague, to allow the 
detection of relatively small difference in means. By contrast, question (2) was 
included primarily to enable direct comparison of the pre-message sample (groups A-D) 
with the British population as a whole. However, the waverers question was also used as 
an additional, albeit crude ordinal measure of attitudes, coded from 1 to 4 (where 1 
indicates strong opposition to the euro and 4 indicates strong support). For the overall 
sample (i.e. across all the conditions), question (2) was correlated with the question (1) 
at 0.72 (p<0.001; n=1092)27.
Following message exposure, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with the three arguments (taken together). This item was intended 
as a measure of the favourability of participants’ cognitive responses to the arguments. 
However, it was also used in the analysis as a proxy for participants’ attitudes towards 
the euro, in order to explore within-sample differences in groups A-D in the amount of 
attitude change following message exposure. The correlation between the attitude index 
and agreement with the message was only moderate however, at 0.51 (p<0.001; n=546) 
in the pre-message condition and 0.56 (p<0.001; n=546) in the post-message condition.
Message elaboration -  In keeping with the classic ELM studies, the second dependent 
variable of interest was the extent of message elaboration. This was measured using 
two procedures based on those developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986): (1) a self- 
report of elaboration effort; and (2) the manipulation of argument quality described 
above (which included two measures of participants’ own evaluations of message 
quality). While the former provides a direct measure of elaboration effort, the latter 
provides an indirect measure, resting on the assumption that the quantity of attitude 
change will depend on the strength of the arguments, only where participants are
27 ‘Don’t Know’ responses to the MORI “Waverers” item were coded zero for this purpose.
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engaging in deep, systematic processing. The implications of this assumption, and the 
predictions derived from it are discussed in the next chapter.
Participants in the study were asked to read three arguments and then to evaluate them 
on a set of four measures. Participants were asked to identify which of the three 
arguments they ‘liked the best’ and which one they ‘disagreed with the most’ (aimed at 
tapping favourable and unfavourable cognitive responses); then they were asked to 
report the extent to which they felt the arguments taken together (a) made their point 
effectively and (b) were convincing (aimed at evaluating the persuasive quality of the 
items) using 7-point semantic differential scales as used in the pilot study to establish 
argument quality. The argument evaluation measures were primarily intended to 
reinforce the cover story for the experiment and were only used in the analysis as a 
check of the success of the argument quality manipulation.
7.6.2 Independent variables
Issue involvement -  Multiple indicators of participants’ knowledge about EMU and 
their level of interest in the issue were used to create a single index of involvement. As 
in study C, this index was intended to provide a measure of an individual’s motivation 
and ability to systematically process information about the euro, and thereby, of their 
elaboration likelihood. Participants located at the high end of the involvement 
continuum were hypothesised to have high elaboration likelihood, whilst those at the 
lower end of the continuum were hypothesised to have low elaboration likelihood. The 
index was also used in the analysis as a predictor of attitude change and elaboration 
likelihood.
The measures of issue involvement included in the experiment were based on those 
used in the deliberative poll (study C). The index was created using the mean of scores 
on two sets of variables. The first set of questions included four items asking 
participants to use 7-point semantic differential scales to subjectively rate a) how 
interested they are in politics generally as well as, b) how interested they are in the 
future of Britain’s relationship with the European Union; c) how knowledgeable they 
are about Britain’s relationship with the EU, and d) how well-informed they are about 
the pros and cons of joining the single currency. The second set of questions provided
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an objective rating of knowledge about the EU and EMU, based on responses to a 5- 
item quiz. Scores on all items in the quiz were positively and highly correlated with 
each other. The decision to create the index based on responses to both sets of 
questions was supported by a principal component analysis, which yielded a main 
principal component, accounting for over 63% of the variance, with an eigenvalue of 
3.17. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was 0.85.
National identity -  As noted earlier, the measures of national identity used in this study 
were intended to capture variation in the strength of participants’ attachment to Britain. 
The decision to focus on this aspect of national identity -  as opposed to the nature of 
participants’ attachment to nation (Cinnirella, 1996) -  was mainly pragmatic. For 
reasons of limited questionnaire space, it was not possible to include a large number of 
items measuring the various dimensions of national identity that have been identified in 
previous research (e.g. Rothi et al., 1995; Dowds and Young, 1996). To have included 
all the items from the 1995 British Social Attitudes Survey module that were analysed 
by Dowds and Young, for example, would have made the questionnaire overly long and 
off-putting for respondents. Furthermore, because the priming procedure designed to 
manipulate the salience of national identity consisted of additional questions asking 
participants’ their views about Britain (focused mainly on sentimental aspects of 
national identity), it was important not to confound it by including multiple independent 
measures of attachment to nation in all conditions. Simply asking participants about 
their national identity may have inadvertently made that identity salient for them, so it 
was decided to keep these items to a minimum.
Three measures of national identification were included in the questionnaires for all the 
experimental conditions. The first item measured the extent of positive ingroup 
evaluation by asking participants the extent to which they felt ‘proud to be British’. The 
other two items measured the strength of in-group identification by asking participants 
the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements (a) ‘It is important to 
me to be British’ and (b) ‘I identify with British people’(using a standard 5-point Likert 
scale, from ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’). The purpose of the items was two­
fold: items 1 and 2 were used to form an index of the strength of participants’ 
attachment to their national identity; item 3 served as a check of the effectiveness of the 
salience manipulation (see below).
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Personal relevance -  In addition to the questions relating to levels of interest in and 
knowledge about the euro issue, a further component of involvement measured in the 
survey was that of personal relevance. The personal relevance EMU holds for different 
people depends on a range of different variables, the measurement of which was beyond 
the present study. However, given the significance of recent European travel experience 
and the ability to speak European languages in predicting involvement in the 
deliberative poll study, I decided to include two measures of these in the questionnaire 
for this study. Recent European travel was measured by asking participants whether 
they had travelled to any European countries since the launch of the euro (and if so, 
which countries), and the ability to speak other European languages was measured by 
asking if the participant could speak any European language(s) either fluently, a little or 
not at all.
Political orientation and engagement -  The questionnaire also asked participants about 
their political orientation by asking which political party they are most inclined to 
support and which daily newspaper they most regularly read. Finally, participants were 
asked how likely it is that they would get along to vote, if there were a referendum 
tomorrow on whether Britain should be part of a single European currency. Neither the 
personal relevance nor political orientation variables were included in the present 
analysis, however.
7.6.3 Salience manipulation
The manipulation of national identity salience involved a priming procedure consisting 
of six items, broadly based on a procedure used by Brown, Vivian and Hewstone (1999) 
and Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001). As stated, the aim of the procedure -  
derived from self-categorisation theory -  was to maximise the likelihood of self­
categorisation as ‘British’, to encourage inter-group comparisons, in-group favouritism 
and inter-group bias. First of all, in two open-ended questions, participants were asked 
to write down (a) ‘the best things about living in Britain compared with other European 
countries’, to elicit a positive evaluation of the national category; and (b) ‘the 
characteristics they like most about British people compared with other Europeans’, to 
prompt inter-group comparison (Mummendey et al., 2001). Secondly, participants were 
asked how ‘typical’ of British people they considered themselves to be, the aim being to
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decrease ingroup and outgroup heterogeneity. Thirdly, participants were asked the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with two attitude statements, aimed at further 
drawing attention to inter-group differences (‘Of all the nations in the world, Britain 
stands out’) and encouraging inter-group comparison (‘I would rather be a citizen of 
Britain than of any other country in the world’). Lastly, two items reflecting 
instrumental and cultural aspects of patriotism asked how proud participants were of (a) 
Britain’s economic achievements and (b) history, with the aim of reinforcing 
participants’ positive in-group evaluations28. To reinforce the intended effects of the 
priming procedure, the label ‘British’ was repeated frequently to try to raise category 
accessibility, and national symbols (the Union Jack flag, the Queen’s head and a Pound 
coin) were pictured on the homepage and background of the questionnaire to try to 
evoke specific category cues.
7.6.4 Question order
As described, the experimental design included eight conditions, each with its own 
questionnaire. All eight versions of the questionnaire used the same questions, differing 
only in terms of the order in which they were presented, by the ‘strength’ of the 
message arguments, and by the presence or absence of the salience manipulation. Table
7.6 shows the order in which the questions were presented in each of the experimental 
groups (note that the question ordering was identical in both the strong and weak 
argument quality conditions, so it is illustrated for just 4 of the 8 groups here).
An extensive pilot survey provided a test of the argument quality and national identity 
salience manipulations, question wording and the overall design of the questionnaire 
from the point of view of layout and led to a number of modifications for the main 
survey. Further details about the pilot study are available in Appendix D.
28 Future analysis of the data could examine differences in attitudes as a function of the nature of 
attachment to nation by deriving instrumental and sentimental attachment to nation from these measures.
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Table 7.6 Order o f question presentation
Pre-message/ Pre-message/ Post-message/ Post-message/
High salience Low salience High salience Low salience
Conditions Conditions Conditions Conditions
1 Salience Attitudes Salience National
manipulation manipulation identification
2 Attitudes Involvement National MESSAGE
identification PRESENTATION
3 Involvement National MESSAGE Argument
identification PRESENTATION elaboration
4 National MESSAGE Argument Attitudes
identification PRESENTATION elaboration
5 MESSAGE Argument Attitudes Involvement
PRESENTATION elaboration
6 Argument Demographics Involvement Demographics
elaboration
7 Demographics Political Demographics Political
engagement engagement
8 Political Political
engagement engagement
7.7 Procedure
The questionnaire was designed and programmed by the author as a form in Microsoft 
Frontpage 2000 (using a custom-script for returning the data to the author’s email 
address). The questionnaire was presented on a single page and the respondent was 
required to navigate the page by scrolling down as they answered each question. While 
the ‘form-based’ design of web surveys is generally considered to be less sophisticated 
than interactive or page-by-page designs (e.g. Moon, 1998; Couper, 2000), it has the 
advantage that it is more similar to a paper self-completion questionnaire, making it a 
more familiar response mode for participants (Dillman, 2000). The form-style 
questionnaires also has the advantage of enabling participants to look ahead at what is 
coming up, as well as to review and modify their responses to earlier questions 
(although this can also be considered a disadvantage if the questionnaire is very long, or 
appears too demanding).
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Sample members were sent a personalised email from Saros, inviting them to participate 
in the study if they were aged 18 or over and were UK citizens29. The email contained a 
hyperlink to the survey, which when clicked activated a script, which randomly 
allocated the respondent to the ‘homepage ’ of one of the 8 treatment conditions. The 
homepage contained the cover story for the experiment and instructions for how to take 
part. From the homepage, participants had to follow a further link to access the 
associated questionnaire for that condition.
The cover story was intended to prepare people for the fact that they would be presented 
with different arguments in favour of joining the euro and read as follows:
“This research is being carried out in the Department o f Social Psychology at the 
London School o f Economics. It is part o f an ongoing project evaluating the different 
arguments people use for and against joining the single currency, the ’euro'. This 
particular study looks at arguments in favour o f the UK joining the euro - arguments 
from newspapers, websites and euro campaign material. We are asking people to 
assist in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses o f different arguments in favour o f the 
introduction o f the euro in the UK. Because your personal views about Britain and 
Europe (for example, whether you think we should join the euro or not) might influence 
what you think o f the arguments, it is necessary to gather some additional information 
about you. For this reason, we have included lots o f different questions that ask your 
opinions about Britain creating stronger links with Europe, how interested you are in 
European politics and some questions about how you feel about living in Britain and 
being British.
Fieldwork took place during March 2003 and lasted a fortnight. It is the policy of Saros 
not to contact their members more than once about any given opportunity to participate 
in research31. So the sample was contacted just once only and was asked to complete 
the survey within the specified period of two weeks. The opportunity to participate in a 
prize draw to win £100 was offered as an incentive to participate.
29 The email invitation is available in Appendix D.
30 http ://personal. 1 se.ac.uk/robertsc/europesurvevO 1 X.htm (Group A). For groups B-H, change suffix to 
02X, 03X, 04X, etc. Last accessed April 2007.
31 Note that Saros’s data protection policy also meant that it was not possible to seek information 
regarding non-respondents.
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After completing all the questions32, participants were asked to submit their answers 
(the ‘Submit’ button activated a custom script to email the responses to the author). On 
submission, a ‘thank you’ page appeared, containing a link to further information 
debriefing participants as to the actual purposes of the study. This page additionally 
contained an email address, with which participants could contact the researcher with 
any additional queries they might have about the research.
7.8 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter I described the design and methodology of Study D, an ELM experiment 
investigating the role of involvement and identity in persuasion. Specifically, the aim of 
the study was to examine the effect of raising the salience of national identity in 
persuasive communications about the single currency on people’s attitudes and the 
psychological processes by which their attitudes are formed and changed. In order to 
access a sample of British adults, the experiment was administered as an Internet-based 
self-completion survey. However, the experimental design was based on the original 
methodology developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) to test the predictions of the 
ELM. Participants were asked to evaluate a set of (either strong or weak) arguments in 
favour of joining the euro. Half the participants were allocated to the ‘high salience’ 
condition, in which a priming procedure was used to raise the salience of British 
national identity. The questionnaire additionally contained measures of issue 
involvement and strength of attachment to British national identity. The aim of the 
analysis was to examine the effect of the salience manipulation on attitude change and 
elaboration likelihood at different levels of issue involvement and attachment to 
national identity. In chapter 8 ,1 describe in detail the specific predictions derived from 
the ELM that were tested and present the results of the data analysis.
32 Participants were required to respond to all items in the questionnaire. When they came to submit their 
responses, if  any item was left unanswered, an error message appeared asking them to return to that 
question and provide an answer. The questionnaire could not be submitted if it was incomplete. The 
practice of forcing responses to all items in a web-based questionnaire is not recommended (e.g. 
DeRouvray and Couper, 2002). However, at the time of developing the instrument, there was only 
limited literature on the conduct of Internet surveys to guide such design considerations and a pragmatic 
decision was taken to force participants to answer all the questions in order to ensure that the data were as 
complete as possible.
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8 THE EFFECT OF INVOLVEMENT AND NATIONAL IDENTITY ON 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EURO
In the previous chapter I presented the design and methodology of study D, an internet 
experiment designed to test the theoretical framework developed in this thesis. In this 
chapter I present the results of the statistical analysis of the data from the experiment. 
Before turning to the results, I shall briefly review the aims of the study and describe the 
focus of the analysis presented here.
The study was designed to investigate further the roles of information, involvement and 
identity in attitude change, in the context of the theoretical framework provided by the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986). The research had two 
main aims. The first was to test the predictions of the ELM regarding attitude change 
and cognitive processing in relation to a real-world issue: Britain’s membership of the 
euro. The model predicts that, as a result of variation in elaboration likelihood, people 
will respond differently to information about an issue in terms of the psychological 
processes used to form and change their attitudes. Groups of participants in this study 
are compared on the basis of two variables: 1) their level of issue involvement and 2) 
the strength of their attachment to British national identity. The second aim was to 
examine the effect of raising the salience of national identity in information about the 
euro, a) on persuasion, and b) on the psychological processes by which persuasion is 
achieved.
In order to identify the psychological processes by which attitudes are formed and 
changed (i.e. whether cognitive processing of information is via the ‘peripheral’ or 
‘central’ route), a range of evidence is taken into consideration. Firstly, I look at the 
effect of the persuasive message on attitudes and look for evidence of differences in 
attitudes on the basis of argument quality. I then look at the effect of raising the 
salience of national identity on attitude change and processing, to decide which of the 
four roles identified by the authors of the ELM the manipulation played in effecting 
attitude change across each comparison group. Finally, I look at a range of indicators of 
increased message processing (based on Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; van Knippenberg, 
1999), on which to compare high versus low involvement participants and participants 
with strong versus weak attachment to British national identity. The hypotheses and 
predictions are specified in detail below.
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8.1 Hypotheses
The data analysis tested a number of hypotheses derived from the postulates of the ELM 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999). One postulate of particular 
interest is that any variable can influence persuasion in one of four ways:
1. As an influence on the extent of central-route processing - i.e. by influencing 
the quantity of elaboration. A variable can either enhance or reduce how much 
(relatively objective) processing a participant engages in.
2. As an influence on the direction of central-route processing -  i.e. by biasing 
the quality of central-route processing either positively or negatively.
3. As a cue for peripheral processing -  i.e. by activating a mode of processing 
that is qualitatively different from the systematic processing associated with the 
central route.
4. As an issue-relevant argument. Where an individual is engaging in high levels 
of relatively-objective message processing (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), it is 
likely that so-called ‘peripheral’ information will be processed alongside 
arguments contained in the message. Under such circumstances, it is said that 
the variable has acted as an issue-relevant argument in the persuasion context.
Variables are predicted to take on different roles depending on the likelihood of
elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). As Petty and Wegener (1999; p.51) explain:
“In brief, variables serve as cues (or work via peripheral mechanisms) at the 
low end o f the elaboration continuum. Variables serve as arguments or bias 
information processing at the high end o f the elaboration continuum. Variables 
are most likely to affect the amount o f thinking when the elaboration likelihood 
is not constrained by other variables to be high or low (e.g., at about the middle 
o f the continuum). ”
In this study, elaboration likelihood was not constrained to be high or low. The first 
aim of the analysis, therefore, was to investigate how ‘naturally-occurring’ variations in 
issue involvement and attachment to British national identity influenced the extent of 
message processing.
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8.1.1 The effect of involvement and identity on persuasion
The following hypotheses about the extent of message processing among participants 
with high and low issue involvement and participants with strong and weak attachment 
to British national identity are tested:
H I: According to the ELM, the more involved a person is in the target issue, the higher 
their elaboration likelihood. High involvement participants tend to be more able and 
more motivated to engage in central-route processing. We would expect, therefore, to 
see evidence of increased message processing among high involvement participants. By 
contrast, participants with low issue involvement are expected to have low elaboration 
likelihood because they are likely to be less able and motivated to engage in central- 
route processing. We would expect, therefore, to see evidence of less message 
processing among low involvement participants.
H2: On the basis of research into the group proto-typicality of message topics in 
persuasion (see Haslam et al., 1996; van Knippenberg, 1999), it is hypothesised that for 
respondents with strong attachment to British national identity, the topic of the euro will 
have high group relevance and will be expected to influence persuasion in a similar way 
to issue involvement -  increasing the likelihood of message elaboration, but with a 
particular focus on determining the validity of messages (van Knippenberg, 1999; Crano 
and Chen, 1998). We would expect, therefore, to see evidence of increased message 
processing among participants with strong attachment to British national identity. By 
contrast, participants with weak attachment to British national identity are predicted to 
be less motivated to engage in central processing on the grounds of group relevance. 
We would expect, therefore, to see evidence of less message processing among 
participants with weak national identity attachment.
According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), individuals engaging in increased message 
processing should show evidence of the following:
a. High self-reported elaboration effort
H la: High involvement participants will rate their elaboration effort higher than low 
involvement participants.
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H2a: Participants with strong national identity attachment will rate their elaboration 
effort higher than participants with weak national identity attachment.
b. Post-message evaluations o f argument quality that differentiate between strong 
and weak arguments.
An individual engaged in central-route processing will be able to distinguish arguments 
that are compelling from arguments that are specious; he/she will evaluate those 
arguments more positively than weak arguments. On the basis of HI and H2, it follows 
that:
H lb: High involvement participants will rate strong arguments more positively than 
weak arguments, whereas the argument evaluations of low involvement participants will 
be unlikely to differentiate between strong and weak arguments.
H2b: Participants with strong national identity will rate strong arguments more 
positively than weak arguments; whereas the argument evaluations of participants with 
weak national identity will be unlikely to differentiate between strong and weak 
arguments.
c. Post-message attitudes that differentiate on the basis o f argument quality.
For individuals engaging in central-route processing, the extent of attitude change will 
be influenced by the quality of the arguments presented. Strong arguments will have a 
stronger influence on attitudes than weak arguments. On the basis of HI and H2, it 
follows that:
Hlc: The post-message attitudes of high involvement participants will differentiate 
between strong and weak arguments, such that the attitudes of high involvement 
participants presented with strong arguments will be more favourable to the euro than 
the attitudes of high involvement participants presented with weak arguments. By 
contrast, the post-message attitudes of low involvement participants will either 
differentiate on the basis of argument quality to a lesser degree, or not differentiate on 
the basis of argument quality at all.
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H2c: The post-message attitudes of participants with strong national identity will 
differentiate between strong and weak arguments, such that the attitudes of strong 
identity participants presented with strong arguments will be more favourable to the 
euro than the attitudes of strong identity participants presented with weak arguments. 
By contrast, the post-message attitudes of weak national identity participants will either 
differentiate on the basis of argument quality to a lesser degree, or not differentiate on 
the basis of argument quality at all.
d. Strong correlations between post-message attitudes and message evaluations.
The ELM predicts that if message processing is increased, post-message attitudes are 
more likely to reflect the thoughts and ideas evoked by the persuasive communication 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; p.47). As such, there will be a higher degree of correlation 
between message evaluations and post-message attitudes. Correlations are also 
expected to vary according to the quality of the arguments presented, with strong 
arguments associated with higher correlations. From this, it follows that:
H id: Correlations between argument evaluations and post-message attitudes will be 
higher for high involvement participants than for low involvement participants. The 
magnitude of correlation coefficients will vary with argument quality, such that 
evaluations of strong arguments will be more highly correlated with post-message 
attitudes than evaluations of weak arguments are among high involvement participants.
H2d: Correlations between argument evaluations and post-message attitudes will be 
higher for participants with strong national identity attachment than for participants with 
weak national identity. For strong identity participants, the magnitude of correlation 
coefficients will vary with argument quality, such that evaluations of strong arguments 
will be more highly correlated with post-message attitudes than are evaluations of weak 
arguments.
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e. Favourability o f cognitive responses predictive ofpost-exposure attitudes.
Finally, according to the ELM, if message processing is increased, the favourability of 
participants’ cognitive responses to the arguments should be predictive of post-message 
attitudes. Thus,
Hie: Cognitive responses to the arguments of high involvement participants will be 
more predictive of post-message attitudes than those of low involvement participants.
H2e: Cognitive responses to the arguments of participants with strong national identity 
will be more predictive of post-message attitudes than those of participants with weak 
national identity.
8.1.2 The effect of identity salience on persuasion
The second aim of the analysis was to compare participants in the high salience 
condition with participants in the low salience condition in order to identify the effect of 
raising the salience of British national identity on persuasion. Since the way in which a 
variable influences persuasion depends on elaboration likelihood, and elaboration 
likelihood, in turn, is hypothesised to depend on issue involvement and attachment to 
British national identity, the aim of the analysis was to identify in which of the four 
roles the treatment variable acted for a) the sample as a whole; b) for high and low 
involvement participants; and c) for participants with strong and weak national identity 
attachment.
H3: Across the sample as a whole, because elaboration likelihood was not 
experimentally manipulated to be high or low, the treatment variable (salience) is 
expected to influence the amount of elaboration, either by enhancing or reducing the 
quantity of message processing. Thus, high salience participants will show evidence of 
processing that is quantitatively different (across the five indicators identified above) 
from that of low salience participants.
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H4: The effect of the treatment variable (salience) at different levels of involvement and 
attachment to British national identity will depend on the effect of involvement and 
attachment to British national identity on elaboration likelihood (H1/H2). Thus, if 
involvement and attachment increase processing, the treatment variable (salience) will 
act either as an argument or as a bias on central-route processing. High involvement and 
strong attachment participants in the high salience condition will show evidence of 
processing that is qualitatively different from their counterparts in the low salience 
condition (this effect is illustrated in figure 8.1 below).
H5: On the other hand, if involvement and attachment decrease processing, the 
treatment variable (salience) will act either as a peripheral cue or as an influence on the 
quantity of elaboration. Low involvement and weak attachment participants in the high 
salience condition will show evidence of processing that is either quantitatively 
different from their counterparts in the low salience condition, or of peripheral route 
processing as opposed to central route processing (as evidenced by the absence of an 
argument quality effect -  again, this is illustrated in figure 8.1).
To identify what role the treatment variable played in persuasion for each group, post­
message attitudes are compared on the basis of argument quality and salience. As 
stated, for participants engaging in central-route processing strong arguments are 
predicted to be more persuasive than weak arguments and post-message attitudes are 
expected to differentiate on the basis of argument quality. Therefore, if a treatment 
variable increases the quantity of elaboration, then the post-message attitudes of 
participants in the treatment group will vary by the strength of the message arguments 
presented (figure 8.1, left-hand image). If a treatment variable decreases the quantity of 
elaboration, post-message attitudes of participants in the treatment group will be more 
similar (figure 8.1; right-hand image).
A treatment variable that influences the direction of processing (i.e. biases processing) 
can do so either positively or negatively and the post-message attitudes of participants 
in the treatment group will be either more or less favourable towards the object, but will 
still be expected to show differentiation on the basis of argument quality (figure 8.2).
By contrast, participants engaged in peripheral route processing will not differentiate 
between arguments on the basis of their argument quality, because persuasion is driven
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not by the arguments but by the variable acting as the peripheral cue. Thus, there will 
be no difference between post-message attitudes of participants in the treatment group. 
The effect of the peripheral cue on attitudes will be either positive (figure 8.3, left-hand 
image) or negative (figure 8.3; right-hand image).
Figure 8.1 Evidence o f enhanced or reduced objective processing
I. Objective Processing
a) Enhancing treatment b) Reducing treatment
Strong
Symmetric 
Argument Quality
X
Treatment
Interaction Weak
Weak
Low elaboration 
control
High elaboration 
treatment
High elaboration 
control
Low elaboration 
treatment
Source: All figures adapted from Petty and Cacioppo, 1986
Figure 8.2 Evidence o f biased processing
II. Biased Processing
a) Positive bias b) Negative bias
Strong
Asymmetric 
\rgument Quality 
X
Treatment
Interaction
Weak
Strong
Weak
Low elaboration 
control
High elaboration 
treatment
High elaboration 
control
Low elaboration 
treatment
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Figure 8.3 Evidence o f a peripheral cue effect
III. Peripheral Cue Effect
Treatment 
[Peripheral Cue) 
Main Effect
J L
Weak
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Figure 8.4 Evidence o f a treatment variable acting as an argument in persuasion
IV. No Peripheral Cue Effect
Argument Quality 
Main Effect
Strong
- ♦
Weak 
- •
J 1 I I I 1 I__
Control Treatment
Finally, if there is evidence of central-route processing (i.e. an argument quality effect is 
present) but there is no difference between the control and treatment groups (i.e. the low 
and high salience groups) in either the extent or direction of message processing, then 
the treatment variable is assumed to have acted as an issue-relevant argument. Such an 
effect is illustrated in figure 8.4.
a) Positive b) Negative
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8.2 Sample composition
Table 8.1 shows the socio-demographic makeup of the sample. It is noteworthy that 
both women and young people were over-represented in the overall sample. However, 
the distribution of all the observed socio-demographic variables did not differ 
significantly across the experimental conditions, so the randomisation procedure 
appeared to have worked successfully (this was confirmed using Chi-square tests of 
independence).
Table 8.1 Socio-demographic composition o f the sample
Variable
Sex
Male
n (Total n= 
1092)
322
%
30
Age
Min
Max
Mean
18-30
31-40
41-50
51-64
65+
18
70
35
486
362
212
110
5
41
31
18
9
.5
Level of education
Secondary 
Secondary -  A-level 
First degree 
Certificate/ Diploma 
Vocational qualification 
Masters/ Doctorate
209
187
320
174
112
90
19
17
29
16
10
8
Occupation
Professional/ Higher technical work 
Manager/ Senior administrator 
Clerical
Sales or services
Foreman or Supervisor
Skilled manual work
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual work
Full-time student
Voluntary/ Unpaid work
Other
Have never worked
222
162
187
98
20
26
36
96
62
179
4
20
15 
17 
9 
2 
2 
3 
9 
6
16 
.5
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Ethnicity
White 990 91
National identity
UK citizen 90 8
British 613 56
English 307 28
Northern Irish 8 1
Scottish 36 3
Welsh 17 2
Other 21 2
Region
South 600 55
North 434 40
Scotland 35 3
Wales 11 1
Northern Ireland 11 1
Overseas 1 -
Newspaper readership
The Express 42 4
The Daily Mail 169 16
The Mirror 68 6
The Daily Star 14 1
The Sun 111 10
The Daily Telegraph 48 4
The Financial Times 11 1
The Guardian 102 9
The Independent 17 2
The Times 92 8
Local/Regional Daily 57 5
Other 60 6
None of these - 1 don’t read a daily paper 301 28
Political party affiliation
Conservative 271 25
Green 72 7
Labour 325 30
Liberal Democrats 269 25
Plaid Cymru 7 .5
Scottish National Party 15 1
UKIP 19 2
Other party 5 .5
None 67 6
Don’t vote 5 .5
Floating voter/ undecided 12 1
No answer/ don’t know 10 1
BNP 8 1
Socialist Alliance 7 .5
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The decision to use the Internet as the mode of data collection meant that necessarily 
certain subsections of the population without access could not be included in the study. 
In February 2002, around 45% of British adults used the Internet for their personal use 
(only 39% of women did so). Table 8.2 compares the age and sex of the sample with the 
estimated age and sex of the UK ‘online community’ at the time the experiment was 
conducted. It is clear that the sample still over-represents women (though it is not 
known the extent to which they are over-represented on the Saros database), and that it 
slightly over-represents those in the 25-34 age group, while slightly under-representing 
those aged 55 and over.
Table 8.2 Comparisons with opinion data using representative samples
Variable MORI data (%) Study sample (%)
All internet users1:
Sex
Male 55 30
Age
15-24 20 (18-24) 17
25-34 23 35
35-44 24 23
45-54 18 15
55-64 10 5
65+ 5 1
Data weighted to GB population2:
Views of British participation in EMU
Strongly support British participation 18 12
Generally in favour of British participation, 24 30
but could be persuaded against it if I 
thought it would be bad for the British 
economy
Generally in favour of British participation, 24 32
but could be persuaded against it if I 
thought it would be bad for the British 
economy
Strongly oppose British participation 29 24
Don’t know__________________________________ 5_______________ 3________
‘Base: All GB Public aged 15+ who use the internet (1,630); Source: e-MORI Technology Tracker, 
December 2002
2Base: 1,991 British adults aged 16+; Source: MORI Financial Services and Schroder Salomon Smith 
Barney, February 2002
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Also shown in table 8.2 are participants’ views of British participation in the euro, as 
measured by MORI’s ‘Waverers’ item, alongside data from a poll conducted by MORI 
in February 2002. MORI data are weighted to the known profile of the population of 
Great Britain. The proportion of ‘waverers’ -  those who are generally in favour or 
against British participation in the euro, but could be persuaded to change their minds -  
was slightly higher among participants in the experiment than among the public at large.
8.3 Statistical methods
In order to make comparisons between groups on the basis of a) their level of issue 
involvement and b) the strength of their attachment to British national identity, two 
indices were created with which to divide the sample. These are described in the 
following section. The hypotheses were tested using independent samples t-tests, to 
compare differences in mean scores between the groups across a range of indicators. To 
test H ie and H2e, OLS regression models were fitted to the data, in order to identify the 
effect of cognitive responses on post-message attitudes, while controlling for the effect 
of other variables. The data were analysed using SPSS.
8.3.1 Involvement index
Multiple indicators of respondents’ knowledge about the euro issue and their level of 
interest in the issue were used to create an index of involvement. The index was 
computed using the sum of scores on the four items asking participants how interested 
they are in politics and in the future of Britain and Europe, and about how 
knowledgeable they feel about the EU and the euro (each measured on 7-point scales). 
Also included were scores on the five-item quiz, yielding a measure of involvement 
with a maximum total of 33 points. Mean scores on these items are shown in table 8.3. 
Scores on all items in the index were positively and highly correlated with each other 
(table 8.4). The decision to create the index in this way was supported by a principal 
component analysis, which yielded a main principal component, accounting for over 
63% variance, with an eigenvalue of 3.17. All items loaded highly and positively on the 
principal component (between .6 and .9), so the decision was taken to use the summed 
scale as the involvement index rather than the principal component scores (which would
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have weighted the items according to their factor loadings). Cronbach’s alpha for the 
scale was 0.85.
To create high and low involvement groups, a median split of the sample was taken 
using the involvement index.
Table 8.3 Descriptive statistics for measures o f involvement
Measures Mean Std.
Error
S.d. Variance n
How knowledgeable about Europe 
(1-7)
3.71 .05 1.49 2.22 1092
How informed about the euro (1-7) 3.88 .05 1.62 2.63 1092
Score on knowledge quiz (0-5) 2.60 .03 1.40 1.97 1092
Interest in politics (1-7) 4.04 .05 1.76 3.12 1092
Interest in Europe (1 -7) 4.63 .05 1.55 2.42 1092
Involvement index (4-33) 18.85 .19 6.33 6.22 1092
Table 8.4 Correlations between measures o f involvement
Europe Euro Quiz Political Europe
knowledge informed score interest interest
Europe knowledge
Euro informed .67
Quiz score .50 .40
Political interest .69 .50 .39
Europe interest .67 .49 .34 .71
8.3.2 Attachment to British national identity
The three items measuring participants’ attachment to British national identity were 
combined to form a scale (descriptive statistics are shown in table 8.5). The first asked 
participants to what extent they felt ‘proud to be British’ (on a 7-point scale), the second 
and third asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with two statements: ‘It is 
important to me to be British’ and ‘I identify strongly with British people’ (on fully- 
labelled 5-point scales). Item 3 was also used to check the effectiveness of the salience 
manipulation (see below), while the three items together were combined to form an 
overall index of attachment to national identity with which to divide the sample. The 
three items were correlated highly and positively with each other. A principal
component analysis yielded a single component on which all three items loaded highly 
and positively (over .8). To further support combining the items in a scale, reliability 
analysis yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .78. Again, a median split was used to create 
two equal groups with high and low scores on the index. A further variable was created 
to distinguish those with very high and very low scores on the index, by dividing the 
sample into four equal groups.
Table 8.5 Descriptive statistics for identity variables
Measures Mean Std.
Error
S.d. Variance n
Proud to be British (1-7) 4.96 .05 1.63 1.63 1092
It is important to me to be British (1-7) 3.64 .38 1.21 1.21 1092
I identify strongly with British people 
(1-5)
3.70 .34 1.13 1.13 1092
8.4 Results
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in the following order. Firstly, before 
turning to the hypotheses, I check the effectiveness of the argument quality and salience 
manipulations and then look at the extent of attitude change as a result of message 
exposure to evaluate whether reading the arguments resulted in persuasion. Secondly, I 
examine evidence of increased message processing among high involvement 
participants and participants with strong attachment to national identity in order to test 
hypotheses la-e and 2a-e. Thirdly, differences in post-message attitudes are compared 
on the basis of argument quality and salience, in order to test hypotheses 3, 4 and 5.
8.4.1 Manipulation checks
Argument quality manipulation: After reading the arguments, participants were asked 
to evaluate them on two 7-point scales in response to the following questions: a) ‘To 
what extent did you feel the arguments made their point effectively?’ and b) ‘To what 
extent do you feel the arguments were convincing?’ Respondents mean response to the 
two items provided a measure of the effectiveness of the argument quality manipulation
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(the two items were correlated at .78). An independent samples t-test was used to test 
the difference in means on this composite measure between those participants presented 
with ‘strong’ arguments and those presented with ‘weak’ arguments. The differences 
was statistically significant, with strong arguments rated as more effective and 
convincing (M= 4.07) than weak arguments (M = 3.87; t = -2.39; d.f.= 1090; p<0.05).
Salience manipulation: To test the effectiveness of the priming procedure at inducing 
self-identification with the category ‘British’, I examined responses to an item asking 
participants to report the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement: ‘I 
identify with British people’. Overall, participants in the high salience condition were 
more likely to agree with the statement (mean score = 3.79, where 5 = ‘strongly agree’). 
The mean for participants in the low salience group was 3.62. The difference in means 
was statistically significant (t = -2.52, df = 1090, p<0.05).
For participants in the high salience conditions, the priming procedure was administered 
at the very start of the questionnaire. However, the design of the questionnaire was 
such that the position of the identification measure used to check the success of the 
salience manipulation varied across half of the experimental groups. In the ‘pre­
message’ conditions, in which the attitude and involvement measures were located 
before the argument evaluation task, the identification measure was the last question 
participants were asked after all the other items, before reading the arguments. In the 
‘post-message’ condition, the identification measure was also located immediately 
before the arguments, but was preceded only by the other national identity measures 
(and the priming procedure in the high salience groups). To check for the possibility of
- j o
an order effect on responses to the measure used to check the effectiveness of the 
priming procedure, mean scores were compared between the low and high salience 
groups, controlling for the order of message exposure. Table 8.6 shows the mean scores 
on the salience check measure. Only the difference between high and low salience 
groups in the pre-message condition was found to be statistically significant (t =-2.1;
33 The location of the identification measures was changed following the pilot study, in which the priming 
procedure was unsuccessful. One explanation was that because the identification measures were 
positioned after the arguments for participants in the low salience group and before the arguments in the 
high salience groups (immediately after the priming procedure), the measure of the effectiveness of the 
priming procedure was confounded by message exposure. Reading the arguments may have influenced 
identity salience, thereby diluting the effect of the salience manipulation. This led to the decision to 
relocate the items so that they were presented before the arguments in all the treatment groups, despite the 
possibility that they also may have affected identity salience. By keeping the location consistent across 
all groups, it was assumed that such an effect would be equal for all participants. However, it may have 
also have had the undesired effect of weakening the overall impact o f the priming procedure.
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df= 544; p<0.05), however, suggesting that on its own, the priming procedure was less 
effective at manipulating the salience of national identity than it was when it was 
presented along with questions relating to Europe and the single currency.
Table 8.6 Mean scores on the measure 41 identify with British people * by salience and 
order o f attitude measures
Pre-message Post-message
Low salience 3.64 3.60
High salience____________ 3.84*____________________ 3.75__________________
*p<0.05
8.4.2 Attitude change as a result of message exposure
Table 8.7 shows mean scores on the main measure of attitudes towards the euro for 
participants in both the pre- and post-message conditions. Differences in attitudes 
between these two groups are attributed to reading and evaluating the three pro-EMU 
arguments. Pre- and post-message attitudes are compared for the sample as a whole, 
and on the basis of issue involvement and participants’ level of attachment to British 
national identity.
Table 8.7 Pre- and post-message attitudes (mean scores)
Pre-message n Post-message n
attitudes attitudes
Involvement
High 3.98 246 4.20 275
Low 3.30 300 3.66* 271
Attachment
Strong 3.00 223 3.59** 216
Weak 4.03~~ 323 4.15 330
All 3.61 546 3.93* 546
Notes: Question: ‘How positive or negative do you think your views about the single European currency 
-  the euro - are?’(l -  ‘Very negative’, 7 = ‘Very positive’)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (*= post-message attitudes significantly different from pre-message 
attitudes; "= pre-message attitudes differ significantly between comparison groups).
Reading the pro-EMU arguments had a significant positive effect on attitudes across the 
experimental groups. However, breaking the sample down by their level of 
involvement in the issue and their attachment to British national identity reveals that the 
effect of the arguments was not equal across all participants in the study. In particular,
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low involvement participants were more likely to be influenced by reading the 
arguments than high involvement participants. Their post-message attitudes were 
significantly more favourable towards the euro than their pre-message attitudes, 
whereas the difference in attitudes for the highly involved -  who held more positive 
attitudes to start with -  was not statistically significant.
Participants with a strong attachment to British national identity held more negative 
attitudes towards the euro than participants with a weak attachment to their national 
identity. The differences in means were statistically significant both before and after 
message exposure (t=6.53, df=544, pO.OOl; t=3.36, df=544, p<0.01). However, 
reading the arguments had the effect of reducing the magnitude of the difference 
between these groups. Those with a strong attachment to their national identity were 
more persuaded by the arguments than those with weak national identity; the difference 
in the pre- and post-message attitudes of the former group was highly significant. This 
pattern of results was particularly marked among those with the highest scores on the 
national identity measures (participants with scores in the upper quartile on the 
‘attachment’ variable). Overall, those with ‘very strong’ national identity held more 
negative pre-message attitudes and were positively influenced by reading the arguments 
to adjust their attitudes in favour of the euro (not shown in table).
A further test of the effectiveness of the salience manipulation was to see whether 
attitudes to the euro were influenced by the priming procedure. The attitudes of 
participants in the high salience/ pre-message group were slightly more negative than 
those in the low salience/ pre-message group; however, the effect of the salience 
manipulation on pre-message attitudes was not statistically significant. Post-message 
attitudes also did not vary as a function of the salience manipulation.
Table 8.8  shows the distribution of responses to the MORI ‘Waverers’ measure 
(Mortimore and Atkinson, 2003) for participants in the high and low salience conditions 
and respondents in the pre- and post-message conditions. There was no difference in 
the distribution of responses to the items as a function of reading the arguments. 
However, the priming procedure appeared to have the effect of making participants 
more likely to report ‘fixed’ views on British participation in EMU -  either strong 
support or strong opposition.
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Table 8.8 Views o f British participation in EMU by experimental group
Strongly support British participation
Attitude 
Measurement 
Pre Post
12 12
Salience
Low High
10 15
Generally in favour of British 
participation, but could be persuaded 
against it if I thought it would be bad 
for the British economy
29 30 31 30
Generally in favour of British 
participation, but could be persuaded 
against it if I thought it would be bad 
for the British economy
31 32 36 27
Strongly oppose British participation 25 23 21 27
Don't know 2 4 3 3
Note: X2 = 17.25, d.f.= 4, p<0.01
A further test of this is provided by looking at the overall proportion of participants 
classified as ‘waverers’ (those saying they were either generally in favour, generally 
against or don’t know) in each of the experimental conditions. In the high salience 
condition, 58% of participants were classified as waverers, compared with 70% in the 
low salience condition (X2= 15.23, d.f.=l, p<0.001).
8.4.3 Evidence of increased message processing as a function of issue involvement 
and attachment to national identity
This section assesses the evidence for increased message processing a) among 
participants with high levels of issue involvement and b) among participants with strong 
attachment to British national identity.
To recap, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), evidence of increased message 
processing can be found in the following:
-  High self-reported elaboration effort
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-  Post-message evaluations of message quality that differentiate between strong and 
weak arguments
-  Post-message attitudes that differentiate between strong and weak arguments
-  High correlations between post-message attitudes and argument evaluations
-  Correlations between post-message attitudes and argument evaluations that 
differentiate between strong and weak arguments
-  Cognitive responses to arguments that are positively predictive of post-message 
attitudes (i.e. favourable cognitive responses predict favourable post-message 
attitudes)
I consider the evidence for each in turn comparing high involvement participants with 
participants with low involvement (Hla-e), and participants with strong attachment to 
British national identity with participants with weak attachment (H2a-e). I also assess 
the effect of raising the salience of national identity on cognitive processing for each 
group of participants.
Hl/2a: Self-reported elaboration effort
To measure elaboration effort, participants were asked to what extent they were trying 
hard to evaluate the arguments (1 ‘not very hard’, 7 ‘very hard’). Table 8.9 shows mean 
scores on this item by argument quality and order of message presentation, comparing 
1) high and low involvement participants and 2 ) participants with strong and weak 
attachment.
Table 8.9 Self-reported elaboration effort by order o f presentation and argument 
quality
Pre-message Post-message
All Strong Weak All Strong Weak
arguments arguments arguments arguments
Involvement
High 4  91*** 4.76 5.04*** 5.09*** 5.17*** 5.01*
Low 4.50 4.53 4.47 4.60 4.50 4.69
Attachment
Strong 4.81 4.73 4.90 5.02* 5.02 5.01
Weak 4.59 4.55 4.62 4.74 4.72 4.75
All 4.68 4.63 4.73 4.85 4.85 4.85
***p<0.001 *p<0.05 (high involvement vs. low involvement)
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High involvement participants reported greater elaboration effort than low involvement 
participants in both the pre- and post-message conditions and irrespective of argument 
quality. The difference in scores was statistically significant across all groups (except 
those presented with strong arguments in the pre-message group). The same pattern of 
results was found across the high and low salience groups (table 8.10). The priming 
procedure did not influence self-reports of elaboration effort, but high involvement 
participants reported greater elaboration effort than low involvement participants.
Participants with strong attachment to their national identity also reported greater 
elaboration effort across all conditions than those with weak national identity. 
However, the difference in ratings was only statistically significant in the post-message 
group and did not vary as a function of argument quality. Table 8.10 indicates that the 
effect was confined to those in the high salience condition. Salience had no effect on 
elaboration effort for participants in the pre-message group.
Table 8.10 Self-reported elaboration effort by order o f presentation and salience
Pre-message Post-message
High salience Low salience High salience Low salience
Involvement
High 4.94** 4.87* 5.05** 5.14**
Low 4.49 4.51 4.50 4.68
Attachment
Strong 4.88 4.75 5.01* 5.03
Weak 4.57 4.61 4.63 4.83
All 4.70 4.67 4.78 4.91
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
Hl/2b: Evaluations of argument quality
The two argument evaluation measures used to check the success of the argument 
quality manipulation provided a further measure of the extent of message processing. 
Participants engaging in careful message processing are expected to be able to 
differentiate between strong and weak arguments. To test this, mean scores on the 
argument evaluation measures were compared across experimental groups using t-tests 
(table 8 .11) to see a) whether participants rated strong arguments as more convincing
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and effective than weak arguments and b) whether there were differences in ratings as a 
function of involvement and identity attachment.
As noted, participants in the strong argument quality conditions rated the arguments 
they were presented with more highly than did the participants in the weak argument 
quality conditions. This pattern was observed across both the high and low involvement 
groups (see table 8.11). However, the difference in ratings between participants in the 
strong and weak argument conditions was not statistically significant once the groups 
were broken down by issue involvement. There were also no differences between high 
and low involvement groups in terms of their ratings of argument quality. By contrast, 
more marked differences are evident in the comparisons between participants with 
strong and weak national identity. There was no difference in the evaluations of strong 
and weak arguments for those with strong national identity, but participants with weak 
national identity rated strong arguments as significantly more convincing and effective 
than weak arguments. Participants with weak national identity also rated the strong 
arguments as significantly more convincing and effective than did participants with 
strong national identity.
Table 8.11 Evaluations o f argument quality by order ofpresentation
All Pre-message Post-message
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
Involvement
High 4.11 3.87 4.17 3.84 4.06 3.91
Low 4.04 3.86 3.93* 3.54 4.17 4.20
Attachment
Strong 3.85tf 3.89 3.76ft 3.67 3.94 4.12
Weak 4 23*** 3.85 4.23*** 3.68 4.23 4.02
All 4.07* 3.87 4.04** 3.68 4.11 4.06
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 (strong v weak) 
np<0.01 (strong v weak identity)
Table 8.12 shows the effect of the salience manipulation on participants’ evaluations of 
argument quality. In the pre-message condition, strong arguments were generally rated 
as more convincing/effective than weak arguments. However the difference in 
argument quality ratings was only statistically significant in the low salience condition 
for the sample as a whole, for high involvement participants and participants with weak 
national identity. In the post-message group, evaluations of the strong arguments were 
not significantly different from those of the weak arguments (except among participants
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with weak national identity in the high salience condition) and argument quality ratings 
were almost identical in the low salience condition.
Table 8.12 Evaluations of argument quality by order ofpresentation and salience
High salience Low salience
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Pre­ Involvement
message High 3.97 3.97 4.38* 3.71
group Low 3.88 3.49 3.96 3.58
Attachment
Strong 3.68 3.69 3.83 3.65
Weak 4.10 3.74 4 3 4 *** 3.63
All 3.92 3.72 4.13** 3.64
Post­ Involvement
message High 4.03 3.78 4.08 4.04
group Low 4.09 4.12 4.25 4.27
Attachment
Strong 3.80 4.20 4.08 4.05
Weak 4.26* 3.79 4.22 4.23
All 4.06 3.94 4.16 4.16
*p<0.05 *<>p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Hl/2c: The effect of argument quality on attitudes
Table 8.13 Post-message attitudes by involvement and argument quality
Post -message group
All High salience Low salience
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
Involvement
High 4.22 4.17 4.27 4.25 4.17 4.09
Low 3.68 3.64 3.61 3.61 3.66 3.75
Attachment
Strong 3.74 3.43 3.73 3.65 3.75 3.23
Weak 4.18 4.12 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.23
All 3.96 3.90 3.95 3.95 3.97 3.86
Table 8.13 shows post-message attitudes broken down by argument quality and 
salience. Overall, though it is evident that post-message attitudes differentiate on the 
basis of argument quality, the main effect of argument quality on attitudes was not
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significant. Looking at the effect of raising national identity salience, no clear pattern of 
effects is evident. The post-message attitudes of high involvement participants were no 
more likely to differentiate on the basis of argument quality than those of the low 
involvement participants. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the attitudes 
of participants with strong attachment to British national identity were more sensitive to 
the persuasiveness of the arguments presented than those of participants with weak 
national identity attachment.
Hl/2d: Correlations between argument evaluations and post-message attitudes
Table 8.14 Correlations between post-message attitudes and argument evaluations
All participants (n = 1092)
Overall Strong arguments Weak arguments
Involvement
High .421 .433 .410
Low .392 .434 .356
Attachment
Strong .334 .267 .423
Weak .443 .548 .350
All .395 .423 .367
High Salience (n = 517)
Involvement
High .388 .431 .347
Low .377 .394 .363
Attachment
Strong .277 .150 .408
Weak .433 .583 .310
All .365 .407 .328
Low Salience (n= 575)
Involvement
High .458 .436 .485
Low .404 .465 .350
Attachment
Strong .387 .355 .433
Weak .453 .514 .395
All .424 .437 .412
Table 8.14 shows correlations between argument evaluations and post-message attitudes 
by argument quality. Overall, high involvement participants have higher correlation 
coefficients (Pearson’s r) than low-involvement participants and there is evidence of
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differentiation on the basis of argument quality; correlations are weaker among the 
participants shown the weak arguments. The differentiation between strong and weak 
messages is also evident for the low-involvement participants, however.
Correlations were higher among participants with weak national identity compared with 
those with strong national identity. There is a clear difference in the strength of 
correlations for participants in the strong and weak argument quality conditions; the 
post-message attitudes of those with strong national identity were correlated more 
highly with argument evaluations in the weak argument quality condition, while those 
of participants with weak national identity were correlated more highly with argument 
evaluations in the strong argument condition.
The same pattern of relationships is evident across the high and low salience conditions. 
Across all participants, correlations were slightly lower in the high salience condition 
(.365 compared with .395 overall) and slightly higher in the low salience condition 
(.424), however, this reducing and enhancing effect did not apply equally across all 
groups.
Hl/2e: The relationship between cognitive responses and post-message attitudes
Finally, according to the ELM, if a treatment variable increases message processing, the 
favourability of participants’ cognitive responses to the arguments should be predictive 
of post-message attitudes. In order to test this hypothesis in the present study, OLS 
regression models were fitted to the data, to predict the attitudes of participants in the 
post-message group. This provided a further test of the hypotheses already addressed, 
by making it possible to observe at a glance the relative impact of involvement and 
identity on post-message attitudes, as well as control for the effect of the experimental 
manipulations34.
Four models were fitted to the data to compare the predictors of post-message attitudes 
for the high and low involvement groups and strong and weak attachment groups. The 
models included the following independent variables: two measures of cognitive
34 Note, however, that the experimental variables will already be uncorrelated with the other predictors.
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response to the arguments, including (a) agreement with the message (measured on a 
scale of 1-7, where 7 = ‘Agree completely’) and b) evaluations of argument quality 
(mean of two 7-point scales, where 7 = ‘Very effective(ly)’ and ‘Very compelling’); the 
experimental manipulations: argument quality (0 = weak / 1 = strong) and salience (0 = 
low salience/ 1 = high salience); issue involvement (a summed scale ranging from 1-33, 
with higher scores indicating higher involvement) or (depending on the subsample) 
attachment to national identity (a summed scale ranging from 1-17, with higher scores 
indicating stronger attachment to British national identity); and finally, sex (0=female/ 
l=male) and age -  to control for the bias in the sample and because both variables are 
known to be correlated with attitudes towards the euro. None of the interactions 
between the experimental manipulations (argument quality x salience) and the variables 
of interest (involvement x attachment) had a significant relationship with the dependent 
variable in any of the four models.
Model 1 - Low involvement participants
Table 8.15 Regression coefficients for model 1: Low involvement participants
Unstandardised Standardised
Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std.
Error
Beta t Sig.
Constant .885 .450 1.965 .050
Argument quality .123 .181 .036 .674 .501
Salience -.005 .181 -.002 -.029 .977
Attachment -.355 .185 -.105 -1.921 .056
Sex -.318 .254 -.067 -1.252 .212
Age .013 .010 .073 1.354 .177
Evaluation of arguments .222 .088 .172 2.513 .013
Agreement with arguments .406 .080 .349 5.059 .000
Note: Dependent variable: ‘How positive or negative do you think your views about the European single 
currency, the euro, are?’ (1= ‘Very negative’/ 7= ‘Very positive’)
The model fitted to the data for the low involvement group had an R2 of .26 and overall 
the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable was 
statistically significant (F7)263 = 12.98; pO.OOl). Table 8.15 shows the model 
coefficients. Of the independent variables, just two were significantly associated with 
post-message attitudes: holding the effect of all other variables constant, both measures 
of cognitive response were positively associated with post-message attitude scores. Both
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age and argument quality was also positively associated with post-message attitudes, 
while salience, sex and attachment were negatively associated with attitudes. Of these, 
only the coefficient for attachment approached significance, indicating that for 
participants with low issue involvement, the stronger a participant’s attachment to 
national identity, the less favourable their post-message attitude was towards the euro. 
The biggest predictor of post-message attitudes for the low involvement group, 
therefore, was the favourability of cognitive responses to the message arguments.
Model 2 - High involvement participants
Table 8.16 Regression coefficients for model 2: High involvement participants
Unstandardised Standardised
Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std.
Error
Beta t Sig.
Constant .700 .501 1.397 .164
Argument quality -.025 .201 -.006 -.119 .905
Salience .233 .205 .056 1.137 .257
Attachment -.657 .213 -.157 -3.076 .002
Sex .643 .211 .153 3.043 .003
Age .018 .009 .098 1.972 .050
Evaluation of arguments .190 .086 .147 2.224 .027
Agreement with arguments .514 .078 .439 6.545 .000
Note: Dependent variable: ‘How positive or negative do you think your views about the European single 
currency, the euro, are?’ (1= ‘Very negative’/ 7= ‘Very positive’)
For the high involvement group, the regression model was a better fit of the data, 
accounting for 36% of the variance in post-message attitudes (F7,267=2 1 .14; p<0.001). 
Holding the effect of all other independent variables constant, neither of the two 
manipulation variables (argument quality and salience) was significantly associated 
with post-message attitudes. The remainder of the independent variables were however 
(coefficients for the model are shown in table 8.16). Of these, only attachment to 
British identity was negatively associated with the model: for every step increase in 
scores on the attachment variable, attitude scores were reduced by .6 6 . In other words, 
participants with stronger national identity hold more negative attitudes towards the 
euro after message presentation (holding the effect of involvement constant). The other 
independent variables were all positive and significant predictors of post-message 
attitudes: men’s attitudes were more positive than women’s, as were those of older 
participants. Holding the effect of these, constant, however, the favourability of
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cognitive responses to the arguments remained an important predictor o f post-message
attitudes.
Model 3 -  Participants with weak attachment to British national identity
The same model was fitted to the data from participants with weak attachment to British 
national identity (the only difference being that ‘attachment’ was replaced by 
‘involvement’ in the list of independent variables). The R2 for the model was .36, and 
overall the independent variables were significantly associated with the dependent 
variable ^ 7,322=2 6 .12; pO.OOl). Once again, neither of the experimental manipulations 
was significantly associated with post-message attitudes (while holding the effects of 
the other predictors constant). Neither was sex nor age. The remainder of the 
independent variables -  involvement and the two cognitive response variables -  were 
positively and significantly associated with post-message attitudes for participants with 
weak national identity (see table 8.17). Holding the effect of national identity constant, 
step increases along the involvement continuum were associated with more positive 
attitudes towards the euro. Once again, favourability of cognitive responses to the 
arguments was an important predictor of post-message, attitudes. The more effective 
and compelling participants with weak national identity rated the arguments, and the 
more they agreed with them, the stronger their post-message attitudes.
Table 8.17 Regression coefficients for model 3: Weak attachment participants
Unstandardised Standardised
Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std.
Error
Beta t Sig.
Constant -.126 .469 -.270 .788
Argument quality -.107 .168 -.029 -.640 .523
Salience -.021 .168 -.006 -.126 .900
Involvement .045 .014 .156 3.203 .001
Sex .065 .211 .015 .310 .757
Age .012 .008 .066 1.445 .150
Evaluation of arguments .205 .084 .150 2.450 .015
Agreement with arguments .545 .074 .448 7.315 .000
Note: Dependent variable: ‘How positive or negative do you think your views about the European single 
currency, the euro, are?’ (1= ‘Very negative’/ 7= ‘Very positive’)
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Model 4 -  Participants with strong attachment to British national identity
Finally, the model was fitted to the data from participants with strong attachment to 
British national identity. Overall, the model explained just 25% of the variance in post­
message attitudes for participants with strong national identity and although overall, the 
independent variables were significantly associated with the dependent variable 
(F7; 208=10.00; p<0.001), the model fitted the data poorly (see table 8.18). Just two of 
the independent variables were significantly associated with post-message attitudes: age 
and the extent to which participants agreed with the arguments (both positively related 
to attitudes). The second of the two cognitive response variables was also positively 
related to attitudes (the coefficient approached significance at 0.06). Neither of the two 
experimental manipulations was significantly associated with post-message attitudes. 
Similarly, for participants with strong national identity, issue involvement had no effect 
on the favourability of post-message attitudes.
Table 8.18 Regression coefficients for model 4: Strong attachment participants
Unstandardised Standardised
Coefficients Coefficients
Model B Std.
Error
Beta t Sig.
Constant -.350 .642 -.546 .586
Argument quality .263 .236 .068 1.114 .267
Salience .295 .233 .076 1.265 .207
Involvement .022 .020 .070 1.071 .286
Sex .437 .256 .109 1.706 .089
Age .024 .011 .143 2.304 .022
Evaluation of arguments .173 .093 .143 1.862 .064
Agreement with arguments .401 .085 .357 4.729 .000
Note: Dependent variable: ‘How positive or negative do you think your views about the European single 
currency, the euro, are?’ (1= ‘Very negative’/ 7= ‘Very positive’)
8.4.4 Identifying the role played by identity salience in persuasion
The final stage of the analysis was to assess the evidence relating to hypotheses 3, 4 and 
5, concerning the role played by salience in persuasion. To test these hypotheses, the 
post-message attitudes of participants in the low and high salience conditions are 
compared on the basis of argument quality. Table 8.13 shows mean scores on the 
attitude variable by argument quality and salience for all groups. To recap, although
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there is evidence that post-message attitudes differentiate on the basis of argument 
quality, the main effect of argument quality was not significant. No clear pattern of 
effects is evident for the salience manipulation either.
Figure 8.5 charts these data to illustrate the direction of differences in post-message 
attitudes as a function of argument quality and salience and provides -  albeit limited -  
evidence concerning the role played by salience for each group of participants. To 
assess the pattern of effects, the reader should refer back to figures 8 .1-8.4, which 
illustrate the pattern of findings associated with each of the four roles for persuasion 
variables.
The first graph at the top of figure 8.5 provides suggests that overall, the salience 
manipulation reduced elaboration among participants; attitudes in the high salience 
group did not differentiate on the basis of argument quality, whereas those in the low 
salience condition did. For the low involvement group, this reducing effect appears 
more marked, and there is some indication of a slight negative bias in processing. 
However, for the high involvement group, the direction of the difference in attitudes 
between the low and high salience conditions is in the opposite direction, suggesting a 
possible positive bias in processing. For the strong and weak identity groups, the 
treatment variable again appears to have reduced processing, with a possible negative 
bias in the weak attachment group.
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Figure 8.5 Post-message attitudes by salience and argument quality
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8.5 Discussion and conclusion
One of the challenges of applying the ELM to the issue of whether Britain should join 
the euro was that, unlike in typical ELM experiments, it was not possible to control for 
participants’ elaboration likelihood. Some people would be motivated to read and 
evaluate the arguments more carefully than others would be. For this reason, the design 
of this study had to be adapted from the typical ELM experimental design, to allow for 
natural variations in elaboration likelihood. In this study, I chose to focus on two: (a) 
variations in what I have referred to throughout as ‘issue involvement’, which includes 
how interested people are in EMU, as well as how much they know, or feel they know 
about it; and (b) variations in the strength of people’s attachment to British national 
identity; to specifically examine how each would influence the extent of message 
processing and attitudes change. It was predicted that each of the two covariates would 
have an effect on the quantity of elaboration participants engaged in. According to HI, 
greater issue involvement will increase elaboration likelihood, because high 
involvement participants will be more able and motivated to process issue-relevant 
information (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). According to H2, stronger attachment to 
British national identity will be associated with higher elaboration likelihood because of 
the increased group relevance of the target issue (whether Britain should join the euro) 
(Mackie et al., 1990). The results are summarised in the following.
Overall, the evidence relating to HI was mixed. High involvement participants held 
more favourable attitudes towards the euro and their attitudes were unaffected by 
reading the message arguments. By contrast, the attitudes of low involvement 
participants were less favourable towards the euro and more susceptible to change as a 
result of reading the arguments. There were no significant differences between the 
groups in terms of their evaluations of argument quality; strong arguments tended to be 
rated as stronger than weak arguments, but high involvement participants were no more 
likely to rate them differently than low involvement participants. Similarly, there were 
no differences between the groups in terms of how their post-message attitudes 
differentiated between strong and weak arguments. Thus, Hlb and c cannot be 
supported. However, high involvement participants did report higher elaboration effort 
than low involvement participants and the correlation between their argument 
evaluations and post-message attitudes were higher than those for the low involvement
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group, so HI a and d are both supported. For the low involvement group, the strongest 
predictor of post-message attitudes was the favourability of participants’ cognitive 
responses to the message arguments. For the high involvement group, however, while 
cognitive responses were also predictive of attitudes, in addition, sex, age and identity 
attachment were significant predictors, presumably because attitudes were already 
fixed, and less sensitive to the effects of message exposure. Thus, both groups engaged 
in systematic message processing, but high involvement participants were left un­
persuaded by the arguments because their existing attitudes towards the euro were 
already positive and relatively stable.
Once again, the evidence relating to H2 was mixed, but overall, there was evidence to 
suggest that participants with weak attachment to national identity engaged in more 
message-processing than those with strong attachment (H2 rejected). Participants with 
a strong attachment to British national identity held more negative attitudes towards the 
euro than those with weak attachment to British national identity, but were more 
persuaded by reading the message arguments than their counterparts were. Post­
message attitudes for the weak national identity group were not significantly different 
from pre-message attitudes. No clear pattern emerges from the results relating to H2a-e. 
There were no significant differences in self-reported elaboration effort, though self- 
reports were higher among the strong national identity group than the weak national 
identity group. Participants with weak national identity rated strong arguments as 
significantly stronger than weak arguments and they also rated their persuasiveness 
higher than did the strong national identity group (who did not differentiate arguments 
on the basis of argument quality at all) (H2b rejected). Yet the post-message attitudes 
of the weak national identity group were not differentially affected by strong and weak 
arguments (perhaps because like the high involvement group, their attitudes were 
relatively fixed and were left un-persuaded by the arguments overall). By contrast, 
there was some indication that the post-message attitudes of the strong national identity 
group were sensitive to argument quality though the difference between groups was not 
statistically significant (H2c only partially supported).
Contrary to hypothesis 2d, correlations between argument evaluations and post-message 
attitudes were actually higher among the weak attachment group than among the strong 
attachment group and the correlations varied with argument quality. The post-message 
attitudes of those in the weak attachment group were more highly correlated with
253
evaluations of strong arguments; while those of participants in the strong attachment 
group were more highly correlated with evaluations of weak arguments. Again, this 
perhaps reflects the fact that the attitudes of participants with weak national identity 
were more positive to begin with, making this group more likely to respond favourably 
to the arguments; their cognitive responses to the message arguments were also the 
main predictors of their post-message attitudes in the regression model fitted to the data 
(H2e). In addition, issue involvement was a significant and positive predictor for this 
group; the higher their involvement, the more positive their attitudes. For the strong 
attachment group, however, only agreement with the arguments and age were 
significantly associated with post-message attitudes, suggesting that attitude change for 
this group was not simply a function of message exposure. Overall, therefore, the 
evidence suggests that being strongly attached to British national identity had the effect 
of reducing message processing rather than increasing it.
The second set of hypotheses tested in this chapter related to the role played by national 
identity salience in persuasion. Predictions varied as a function of the elaboration 
likelihood of the groups of interest. Overall, salience was predicted to either enhance or 
reduce the quantity of message processing for the sample as a whole (H3). Some 
limited evidence confirmed a reducing effect for salience (post-message attitudes were 
less likely to differentiate on the basis of argument quality in the high salience 
condition) though the main effects of salience and argument quality on post-message 
attitudes were not significant for any of the groups concerned. Salience appeared to 
have a differential effect on attitudes in the high and low involvement groups, reducing 
processing overall for both groups, but biasing processing in opposite directions for 
each. Post-message attitudes for high involvement participants were slightly more 
positive in the high salience condition, while those for low involvement participants 
were slightly more negative in the treatment group. The nature and direction of effects 
for the strong and weak attachment groups were similar -  overall, salience appeared to 
reduce processing, closing the gap between attitudes associated with argument quality, 
but processing appeared to be biased in opposite directions for each group. Because the 
premises underlying H4 and H5 did not hold, however (there were only small 
differences in the quantity of elaboration between low and high involvement groups and 
greater message processing observed in the weak attachment group rather than in the 
strong attachment group), neither hypothesis is supported.
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In the same way as it was not possible to control for elaboration likelihood, it was also 
not possible to control for people’s prior attitudes towards the issue under investigation. 
ELM studies have tended to focus on fictitious issues/ attitude objects, about which it is 
unlikely that participants will have existing views, making it possible to observe the 
‘pure’ effects of strong and weak arguments on attitudes at high and low levels of 
elaboration likelihood. In the present study, the effect of the arguments (and argument 
quality manipulation) on attitudes was confounded with the effect of prior attitudes. 
The results of this are noticeable in at least three observations in the data.
Firstly, the impact of the persuasive message on attitudes varied as a function of both 
attitude valence and attitude strength. If participants’ attitudes had only been measured 
after message exposure, the standard approach would have been to attribute variation in 
attitudes to the persuasive effects of the message. However, the present study included 
a control group who were presented with the message arguments after they reported 
their attitudes, which provides a measure of prior attitudes against which to compare 
post-message attitudes. Those with more favourable attitudes towards the euro to begin 
with (the high involvement group and the weak attachment group) did not change their 
attitudes as a result of reading the arguments; neither did those with more fixed attitudes 
(the ‘Decideds’ compared with the ‘Waverers’).
Secondly, there was some evidence to suggest that those with more positive and more 
stable attitudes towards the euro were more likely to distinguish strong arguments from 
weak arguments, though this did not mean that the arguments had a differentially 
persuasive impact on post-message attitudes. For example, participants in the weak 
identity group were more likely to distinguish arguments on the basis of their argument 
quality, rating strong arguments as stronger and weak arguments as weaker than their 
counterparts did, yet their post-message attitudes did not vary with argument quality. 
One explanation for this is that their main motivation for centrally processing the 
arguments was to establish the validity of the arguments rather than to evaluate the 
‘correctness’ of their attitudes (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
Thirdly, the valence of participants’ prior attitudes influenced their evaluation of the 
persuasive quality of the arguments. Although not reported in the results section, I 
found that among participants whose attitudes were measured before message exposure
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(the ‘pre-message’ group), those with more positive attitudes towards the euro rated the 
arguments as more effective and compelling than those with more negative attitudes.
At first glance, these observations appear to present a serious challenge to the 
applicability of the ELM to studying real-word issues, as well as to the experimental 
design on which the model is based (the implications of this are discussed in detail in 
the concluding chapter of the thesis). Yet the finding that prior attitudes influence 
elaboration likelihood is to some extent consistent with the findings of previous studies 
that have investigated the role played by group identity in persuasion (e.g. Mackie et al., 
1990; Haslam et al., 1996).
Hypothesis 2 in the present study was based on the assumption (derived from Mackie et 
al., 1990) that in the absence of information about the messages source, the group 
relevance of the message topic would influence elaboration likelihood. Thus, people 
with a strong attachment to British national identity were predicted to be more 
motivated to read a message about the euro because the topic (introducing a single 
currency) is highly relevant to that group. This prediction was not bome out in the data. 
Instead, those with strong attachment were less motivated to process the message -  
particularly under conditions of high identity salience. While these findings disconfirm 
H2, they also highlight a difficulty with the premise on which the hypothesis was based: 
the group identity of the message source was not absent in this experiment, rather, it 
was defined by the valence of the arguments themselves (pro-EMU). Prior attitudes 
influenced participants’ responses to information precisely because those attitudes 
defined the salient group memberships in the persuasion context. Because those with a 
strong attachment to their national identity were more likely to hold negative attitudes 
towards the euro to begin with, being presented with an anti-attitudinal message had the 
same effect as being presented with an out-group message: central processing was 
reduced (particularly under conditions of high category salience). Equally, because 
those with weak attachment tended to hold more positive attitudes towards the euro to 
begin with, being presented with a pro-attitudinal message had the same effect as being 
presented with an ingroup message: central processing was enhanced. The findings of 
study D, therefore, lend further support to the conclusions drawn by social identity 
theorists regarding the processing-motivating effect of ingroup messages over outgroup 
messages (van Knippenberg, 1999).
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A number of limitations to the methodology used in this study further restricts the 
extent to which generalisations from these data are possible. Firstly, both the salience 
and argument quality manipulations were relatively weak, which is one of the most 
likely explanations for the mixed pattern of results (particularly in relation to H3-5). 
Although overall, there was a significant difference in how strongly participants 
identified themselves as British between the high and low salience groups, as well as 
argument quality ratings, the effect of the manipulations was not apparent when you 
broke the sample down further by involvement and attachment to British identity. As 
noted, the effect of argument quality was also confounded with prior attitudes, which 
may have further diluted the impact of the arguments during persuasion. The priming 
procedure may also have had mixed effects on participants, perhaps arousing suspicion
I f
and was possibly off-putting to the less ‘patriotic’ participants .
Additionally, the fact that there was little evidence of peripheral processing in the data 
(e.g. among the low-involvement participants) may be a function of the design of the 
experiment. For example, by presenting the persuasive message as an ‘argument 
evaluation exercise’, with the three arguments presented one-at-a-time may have had the 
effect of increasing elaboration likelihood; the participants were aware they would have 
to answer questions about the arguments, which may have encouraged them to make the 
effort to read them carefully. Furthermore, the scrolling design of the questionnaire 
meant that participants could go back to re-read the arguments while they were 
completing the questions. In light of these observations, the finding that both high and 
low involvement participants were engaged in central-route processing is 
understandable.
One other feature of the design of this study is potentially problematic. Experimental 
control was achieved by manipulating the order in which participants responded to 
different measures in the survey questionnaire. As a result of variation in the order of 
presentation, it is possible that some of the observed effects were artefacts of the design 
of the questionnaire. One example provides an illustration of this. Overall, evaluations 
of strong arguments were not significantly different from evaluations of weak 
arguments. However, breaking the sample down into the ‘pre-message’ and ‘post­
message’ groups (tables 8.11 and 8.12) revealed a significant difference in argument
35 It is also noteworthy that the measures o f attachment to nation may have been inadequate to the extent 
that they could not capture variation in the nature o f participants’ attachment, only in the strength of 
attachment.
257
quality ratings from participants in the pre-message group. According to the postulates 
of the ELM, this would suggest that participants in the pre-message group were engaged 
in more intensive processing than those in the post-message group. The design of the 
questionnaires was such that the ‘pre-message’ group had to complete most of the other 
items before reading and evaluating the arguments; those in the post-message groups 
were asked to read and evaluate the arguments at the start of the questionnaire before 
completing the other items. Thus, it appears that the act of answering the other 
questions may have increased elaboration likelihood over the course of participation, 
such that differences in the extent of processing can be attributed in part to the order in 
which the questions were presented. Further analysis would help to illuminate this, as 
well as the other observations discussed in this section.
Despite these limitations, the study was not wholly unsuccessful in meeting the aims for 
which it was intended. The first was to test the predictions of the ELM regarding 
attitude change and cognitive processing in relation to a real-world issue. Though the 
evidence in support of the hypotheses was inconclusive, discemable differences 
between the groups of interest were apparent, both in terms of the effect of the 
arguments on attitudes and in terms of the extent of cognitive processing. However, the 
challenges involved in applying the model to an issue like EMU are all too apparent. A 
regrettable conclusion is that the methodological foundations on which the ELM stands 
are not sufficiently sophisticated to handle the complexities of studying attitude 
formation and change in the real world.
The second aim was to examine the effect of raising the salience of national identity in 
information about the euro, both on persuasion and on the psychological processes by 
which persuasion is achieved. The tentative finding of this study is that, consistent with 
the model developed in the introduction to this thesis, raising the salience of British 
identity in information about the euro serves to decrease effortful processing, as well as 
possibly to bias it. However, the conclusions we can draw from this are restricted not 
only by the methodological difficulties encountered in the present study, but also by the 
fact that the experimental paradigm provided by the ELM may not be the most 
appropriate vehicle for measuring the phenomena of interest. Future research should be 
directed towards developing more robust methods of measuring how identity processes 
influence attitude formation and change among different sub-groups of the population.
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9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter is to draw the thesis to a close by pulling together the 
different themes and ideas that have been developed, and reaching some conclusions 
about what we can learn from the empirical findings and where the research might be 
taken in future. I begin the chapter with a summary of the thesis, revisiting the main 
aims and research questions and the theoretical basis for the empirical studies 
undertaken. I then review the key findings of each of the four studies, for each one 
considering what has been learned, what has been achieved and what was not achieved, 
and draw conclusions about the contribution they make to our understanding of British 
attitudes towards the euro and of public opinion processes more generally. This 
discussion of the relative strengths of the different approaches adopted in the thesis is 
then followed by a review of the main conclusions from the research, some reflections 
on the theories and methods used and their suitability to the study of public attitudes 
towards European integration and an epilogue, in which I consider how the debate 
surrounding EMU evolved after the empirical research was complete.
9.1 Summary of thesis
The overall aim of the thesis was to investigate the psychological processes underlying 
British public attitudes towards Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) over 
the course of the debate surrounding the preparations for and in the immediate aftermath 
of the launch of the euro. The main motivation for this focus was to examine the 
possible reasons for widespread public opposition in Britain at this time to closer 
integration in Europe and to extend existing work in this area, by adopting a social 
psychological perspective. Previous studies tended to focus on the correlates of anti- 
EMU attitudes, on the assumption that these views were fixed and stable. In fact, there 
are strong grounds for assuming that for a large proportion of the British population, 
attitudes towards the euro are far from fixed. Poll findings show high levels of ‘don’t 
knows’ reported by British samples in response to opinion measures about European 
integration and there is significant variation in the favourability of attitudes between 
those who are highly knowledgeable about integration and those with little factual 
knowledge about integration. Moreover, according to polls conducted by MORI during 
the period of interest, when asked, a majority of the population will admit that they
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‘could be persuaded to change their mind’ about the euro. The approach adopted here 
took this as its premise and sought to examine not simply the correlates and predictors 
of attitudes, but the factors that influence the processes by which people’s attitudes 
towards the euro are formed and changed.
A further motivation for choosing to focus on public attitudes towards the euro was 
because the issue provided an opportunity to apply a range of theoretical approaches to 
the study of public opinion and to explore their validity in the context of a real-world 
issue. As others working in this field have argued (e.g. Cinnirella, 1996), the topic of 
European integration provides a “vehicle” for testing psychological theory. At the time 
when the proposal for the research was written (in 1999), the issue of British 
membership of EMU was highly salient on both the political and media agenda and it 
was widely accepted that a referendum would be held at some point during the life of 
the programme of research. Such an event would have provided an ideal ‘natural 
experiment’ for studying real-life changes in attitudes in response to a political 
campaign. In the end, this opportunity did not present itself, but nonetheless the chosen 
substantive focus of the thesis proved to be an effective basis for exploring public 
opinion processes generic to a range of political issues.
Three existing areas of inquiry into the factors underlying high levels of public 
opposition towards European integration influenced the chosen focus of the thesis. The 
first was concerned with the impact on public opinion of the media. In particular, a 
number of contributors (e.g. Hardt-Mautner, 1995; Anderson and Weymouth, 1998) had 
studied the way in which events relating to integration had been reported in newspapers 
and the possible influence this had on public attitudes. Their findings suggested that 
‘Euroscepticism’ in the British press had at least two effects. First of all, it served to 
reduce the informational content of news about integration, and where factual 
information did appear it was often dumbed-down and/or factually inaccurate (Hardt- 
Mautner, 1995). Second of all, eurosceptic discourse in newspapers -  which made use 
of a range of anti-European stereotypes -  served to highlight the distance between 
British readers and their European counterparts by raising the salience of British 
national identity. Few studies, however, had specified the social and psychological 
mechanisms by which such effects might impact on public attitudes.
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The second area of inquiry underpinning the thesis was concerned with the way in 
which people’s experience of their national identity and the strength of their attachment 
to Britain influences their beliefs about European integration. Analyses of 
Eurobarometer data (e.g. Hewstone, 1986; Breakwell, 1996) for example, showed how 
support for closer integration was moderated by people’s concerns about losing their 
national identity. Also found to be important was the nature of the attachment -  
whether sentimental or instrumental -  both to national and European identities 
(Cinnirella, 1993; 1996; Routh and Burgoyne, 1998; Mueller-Peters et al. 1998a). 
Dowds and Young (1996) distinguished between four distinct versions of national 
identity based on where people were located on the two dimensions of ‘inclusive’ and 
‘exclusive’ nationalism (the former encompassing national pride, the latter, xenophobic 
sentiments). Each type of national identity was associated with different views on 
European integration and the single currency. Using social identity theory as the 
theoretical framework for understanding different forms of national identity, these 
studies focused on the relationship between identity and attitudes. However, few 
studies have taken into consideration the strength of attitudes towards integration (and 
their susceptibility to change), or the implication of fluctuations in identity salience for 
the relationships specified (one exception is Cinnirella, 1996).
The third area of inquiry concerned the extent to which people’s knowledge about and 
interest in issues relating to European integration (what I have referred to throughout as 
‘issue involvement’) influences their attitudes. A number of studies have shown that 
public opposition towards integration appears to be underpinned by low levels of issue 
involvement. For example, as well as exhibiting low levels of support for European 
integration, British respondents were also frequently found to be among the least 
informed in the EU of matters relating to integration (e.g. Pepermans and Mueller- 
Peters, 1999; Sinnott, 2000). They were also relatively unconcerned about European 
integration compared with other issues on the political agenda (Worcester, 2000). 
Similarly, those socio-demographic groups holding more negative attitudes towards 
Europe (e.g. women, those with lower levels of education and those employed in 
manual occupations), were also more likely to show low levels of awareness of EU 
politics (Ahrendt, 1999; Evans, 2003).
One conclusion to be drawn from this is that increasing public involvement in issues 
relating to European integration will lead to more favourable attitudes towards
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integrative policy. However, an alternative conclusion is that these findings call into 
question the validity of attitudinal measures in surveys about European integration. A 
considerable body of literature suggests that when asked to give their opinion in 
surveys, people with only a patchy understanding of the question topic are unlikely to 
be motivated or able to give a carefully considered response (e.g. Converse, 1964; 
Krosnick, 1991). At best, attitudes underpinned by low levels of political sophistication 
are likely to be weakly formed and susceptible to persuasion (Krosnick, 1988). Few 
studies of public attitudes towards European integration have acknowledged the 
implications of these findings for understanding the nature of attitudes reported in 
opinion polls (some exceptions include Sinnott, 2000 and Evans, 2003), fewer still have 
examined the implications of involvement for how attitudes towards European 
integration are formed and changed.
This thesis represented an attempt to bring together these three branches of research into 
attitudes towards European integration, through an investigation into the way in which 
information, identity and involvement influence processes of attitude formation and 
change in relation to EMU. The three elements were integrated through social 
psychological theory in the form of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; 1986) and Self-categorisation Theory (Turner, 1985; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell, 1987), which together provide a 
framework for understanding how attitudes are influenced by information and identity, 
at varying levels of issue involvement. However, the empirical chapters drew on 
theoretical insights from a range of disciplines including political science, media and 
communication and public opinion research, as well as social psychology. The different 
studies brought together a range of evidence from the media and from survey research 
to enhance our understanding of the way in which the debate surrounding the single 
currency progressed in Britain during the 1990s and how public attitudes towards the 
issue were influenced and expressed. The following sections review the aims and 
summarise the key findings of my research. For each study, I consider what the 
findings tell us about the nature of public attitudes towards the euro and discuss the 
main achievements of the research, its shortcomings and ideas for future studies.
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9.2 Summary and discussion of empirical findings
9.2.1 Study A
In study A, the aim was to build up a picture of the ‘landscape’ (Bauer et al., 2001) of 
the debate surrounding British membership of the euro since the Maastricht summit in 
1991. I examined the amount of coverage devoted to the single currency in newspaper 
articles over a ten-year period, in order to identify the key events that took place during 
the course of the debate and the periods in which the issue was highly salient on the 
media agenda. The study had two objectives: the first to describe the political and 
media context in which public attitudes towards EMU were formed; the second to 
explore the relationship between variations in issue salience on the media agenda with 
variations in issue salience on the public agenda. The theoretical basis for the study was 
provided by the media agenda setting hypothesis (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), which 
proposes that fluctuations in the salience of issues in the media have the capacity to 
direct public attention onto specific issues at certain times, particularly for so-called 
‘obtrusive’ issues (Zucker, 1978) that are highly relevant in many people’s lives (e.g. 
unemployment, education, health services, etc.), or where people have relatively low 
levels of political involvement.
Studies of agenda setting in relation to European integration have found limited support 
for an agenda setting effect however (Norris et al., 1999; de Vreese, 2001). Even when 
the issue of the single currency dominated media coverage of the 1997 general election 
campaign, people remained relatively unconcerned about it, being more concerned with 
other campaign issues instead (Norris et al., 1999). The results of the present study 
broadly supported these findings.
The analysis was aimed at answering a number of questions concerning the amount of 
coverage the euro issue attracted during the period of investigation, the events relating 
to the issue that attracted the most attention and public concerns about the issue during 
the same period. In the first part of the analysis, I looked at the amount of coverage the 
euro issue attracted in the press by looking at the number of articles containing the 
search term ‘single currency’ published monthly in a range of broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers. This revealed the way in which the issue fluctuated in salience over the 
course of the debate. The analysis identified the events that generated the most
263
coverage. Comparing the level of coverage across different types of newspaper 
revealed that broadsheet newspapers shared broadly similar news agendas throughout 
the period of analysis, while the tabloids analysed varied more in terms of the amount of 
coverage given to the single currency. In the second part of the analysis, I looked at the 
relative salience of the issue on the public agenda. The results revealed a close 
correspondence between public concerns about European issues and coverage of the 
single currency, but only for a small proportion of the population (no more than 43% at 
any one time). There was also some limited evidence of a negative relationship 
between the salience of the single currency debate in the media and the favourability of 
public support for the EU and EMU.
As with Norris and her colleagues’ study, this study showed that the majority of the 
public remained relatively unconcerned about European issues, despite the extensive 
press attention given to the debate surrounding the introduction of the single currency at 
various stages during the 1990s. However, for a limited group of people, the analysis 
showed that attention to the issue was closely aligned with the level of coverage devoted 
to the issue in the press. As the amount of coverage increased, so did the proportion of 
British adults reporting that European integration ‘is one of the most important issues 
facing Britain today’. In this way, the findings of the study illustrate an important 
characteristic of public opinion, namely that people vary in the importance they attach 
to particular policy issues - and to their attitudes towards those issues (Krosnick, 1990). 
As a result, only a subset of people is likely to be concerned about a given issue at any 
point in time. Thus, the findings of the study are consistent with the so-called ‘issue 
public’ hypothesis (Converse, 1964), which argues that the cognitive demands of being 
well-informed about policy issues are too high for every person to be concerned about 
every issue. Instead, subgroups of the population can be differentiated according to the 
importance they attach to particular policy issues over others.
The research undertaken had some limitations. In particular, the relatively crude design 
of the study provides a somewhat weak basis for drawing firm conclusions about the 
capacity for the media to set the public agenda of issue concerns (or vice versa). The 
findings also underline the importance in agenda-setting research of disaggregating the 
population when looking for possible media effects. Further research would be 
necessary, for example, to identify the characteristics of the group who consider Europe 
to be the most important issue facing Britain today, both in terms of their socio­
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demographic make-up and their issue involvement, but also in terms of their existing 
attitudes towards integration, and specifically, the single currency. In order to draw 
more robust conclusions about the possibility of a media agenda setting effect, it would 
also be necessary to examine patterns of media consumption among different groups of 
the population.
Nevertheless, the research was successful in achieving its modest aims and has some 
noteworthy contributions to make besides. Prior to this research, relatively few 
previous studies of British media reporting on European integration had specified the 
mechanisms by which information in the press might influence public opinion, focusing 
instead on the style and content of news reports about Europe. Although primarily 
descriptive, this study helps to advance the literature in this respect, by making 
reference to the agenda-setting approach to describe one way in which people’s attitudes 
might be influenced, albeit indirectly, by the media. As noted, the findings were 
consistent with those of the few other studies (Norris et al, 1999; de Vreese, 2001) that 
have similarly applied this approach to the study of media communications about 
Europe.
The research also lends further empirical support to the thesis developed in chapters 1 
and 2, which questions the basis of the high levels of public opposition to the euro 
around which the British debate about joining EMU often centred. Public opinion on 
the single currency during the 1990s was far from fixed; for the majority of people in 
Britain it was simply not an issue (see also Worcester, 1999; 2000), despite the 
extensive media attention it attracted at various points during this period. Finally, the 
findings of study A are also consistent with the ELM account of persuasion. As the 
euro issue became more prominent in newspaper reporting, a consistent minority 
responded by reporting European integration to be one of the most important issues 
facing the country. The people for whom the issue was considered to be important were 
those for whom involvement was likely to be greater; their attentiveness to the salience 
of the euro issue on the media agenda reflecting their increased likelihood of engaging 
with issue-relevant information. In this way, the study demonstrates the potential value 
for the discipline of incorporating media analyses into social psychological research. 
Exploring the social context in which individual psychological processes function 
provides a method for testing and strengthening social cognitive theory.
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9.2.2 Study B
In study B, the focus was on the content of media information. The aim was to explore 
how opinion-leading newspapers portrayed the debate surrounding EMU and how this 
may have shaped the way people came to think about it. The research was informed by 
the literature on framing, which provides an alternative theoretical framework to the 
agenda-setting approach for understanding the mechanism by which media content can 
influence public opinion (e.g. Tuchman, 1978; Entman, 1993). Framing refers to the 
process by which the media make certain attributes of issues or events more salient than 
others, which according to Entman, influences the “probability that receivers will 
perceive this information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory” 
(1993; p.53). This study investigated how the opinion-leading press have framed the 
single currency issue through an analysis of argumentation in newspaper editorials.
There were two main factors motivating the decision to focus on arguments. Firstly, 
arguments form the basic building block of persuasive communication; they provide the 
vehicle through which information changes attitudes. By analysing the structure and 
content of arguments, I hoped to gain insight into the persuasive quality of information 
about the euro being circulated by the media, in order to better understand the basis of 
public attitudes towards the issue. This focus was partly influenced by the debate 
surrounding the question of what makes an argument persuasive, which has never fully 
been resolved in the social psychological literature on persuasion and which, as we saw 
in chapter 2, represents one of the most controversial elements of the ELM paradigm. 
While Petty and Cacioppo (1986) advocated the use of a recipient-based cognitive 
definition of ‘argument quality’, critics have argued in favour of structural message- 
based definitions of strong and weak arguments, that can be shown to be more objective 
(e.g. Areni and Lutz, 1989; Boiler et al., 1990). The analysis of argument structure 
proposed by Toulmin (1958), which was the methodological approach I adopted in 
study B, represents one possible means of determining the relative persuasive quality of 
arguments (and indeed was the approach used by Boiler and his colleagues, 1990).
Secondly, the decision to focus on arguments was influenced by the work of social 
psychologists who have advocated the study of argumentation as a means to 
understanding the formation of social representations (Moscovici, 1981; 1984).
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Notably, Billig (1987) maintains that arguments provide a model of human thinking. 
The processes of argumentation and counter-argumentation match the cognitive 
processes of categorisation and particularisation by which objects are either grouped 
together with other similar objects or set apart from other objects as different from 
them. These processes also relate to the twin processes of social representation: 
anchoring and objectification, by which new and unfamiliar objects are made familiar 
(Billig, 1993; Liakopoulos, 2000a; 2000b). In this study, the method of analysis was 
based on that described by Liakopoulos (2000b), which uses Toulmin’s (1958) model to 
identify structural features of arguments -  notably, argument claims, evidence for 
claims (or reasons for accepting a claim) and warrants (the justification for accepting 
the link between evidence and claims). Argument claims serve to categorise objects or 
anchor them in the familiar (Billig, 1993). In this study, I proposed that argument 
claims made in newspapers’ leading articles also serve to make certain issue attributes 
salient over others. In this way, the focus on editorial arguments was intended to inform 
our understanding of how the print media frame issues for their readers.
The purpose of the analysis, therefore, was twofold: firstly, to be able to draw 
conclusions about the relative persuasiveness of media information about the euro on 
both sides of the debate; and secondly, to identify how the media framed the euro issue 
by analysing issue-relevant arguments developed in the opinion-leading press over the 
course of the debate during the 1990s. Leading articles from pro- and anti-EMU 
broadsheet newspapers (The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph) published at the time 
of eight key events (identified in study A) were selected for analysis. The analysis 
involved two stages. The first stage was to code the text according to Toulmin’s model, 
in order to identify the structural components of arguments developed in each leading 
article (the particular focus was on argument claims, evidence and warrants). The 
second was to identify the claims made in articles specifically relating to EMU, their 
supporting evidence and underlying warrants. This allowed the reconstruction of the 
‘prototypical’ arguments about the single currency developed by the pro- and anti-EMU 
camps over the course of the debate.
Overall, both The Guardian and The Observer, had broadly pro-European outlooks 
during the period of interest, but their position on EMU was more ambivalent, 
supporting instead the ‘wait and see’ strategy that came to characterise Labour’s policy 
on British membership in the late 1990s. This ambivalence manifested itself in a set of
267
argument claims that stressed the importance of the decision to join EMU and the need 
to make the single currency work, but at the same time urged caution on account of the 
politics surrounding the project. The claims were backed by a set of reasons 
emphasising both the potential benefits of a single currency as well as the political and 
economic risks involved. Throughout the events analysed, the newspapers described 
the single currency in both favourable and unfavourable terms. In other words, the pro- 
EMU arguments can be described in attitudinal terms as being ‘multi-valenced’, 
because they endorsed both positive and negative evaluations of the single currency. By 
comparison, the anti-EMU position of The Daily and Sunday Telegraph was 
unequivocal. The argument claims in relation to the single currency -  all of which 
expressed opposition to EMU - revolved around four main ideas: that the euro was 
‘dangerous’, that it carried economic risks, that EMU was a political project and that 
EMU was a threat to national independence. The reasons given for accepting these 
claims were exclusively negative and typically political in nature rather than being 
based on the economics involved in monetary union. A range of rhetorical 
embellishments served to strengthen the anti-EMU arguments and the newspapers 
described the single currency only in unfavourable terms throughout the course of the 
debate. Thus, from these publications at least, there was no clear communication over 
the course of the debate emphasising the potential benefits of joining EMU for Britain, 
whereas in the eurosceptic press, the lead for public opinion was unambiguous. In this 
respect, the anti-EMU arguments had greater structural integrity than the pro-EMU 
arguments, making them appear more compelling and persuasive than the more 
ambivalent, multi-valenced position advocated in The Guardian and Observer.
The claims made about EMU in all the newspapers show which attributes of the issue 
were made most salient over the course of the debate. Both the pro- and anti-European 
press emphasised the idea that the decision about joining the single currency was not 
simply economic, but predominantly political. Similarly, all the newspapers highlighted 
the potential economic and political risks of joining. But while The Daily and Sunday 
Telegraph claimed that EMU was ‘dangerous’, ‘damaging’ and a ‘threat’, the claims 
made by The Guardian and Observer emphasised only that the issue was ‘important’ 
and that ‘Britain’s future must be as part of Europe’. In this sense, the newspapers came 
to frame the EMU issue in different ways. The event-specific arguments developed in 
each of the leading articles tended to provide ‘issue-specific news frames’ (de Vreese et 
al., 2001) for the events being covered. But over time, the positions advocated by the
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newspapers tended to be portrayed to their respective audiences in terms of generic 
news frames (Gamson, 1992: Neuman et al., 1992). While The Telegraph came to 
frame the issue in terms of conflict (between British interests and the objectives of 
integration), The Guardian / Observer tended to frame the issue in terms of the political 
and economic consequences of joining EMU.
The method of argumentation analysis adopted here had some limitations. In particular, 
the coding of event-specific arguments proved to be labour intensive and gave rise to 
reliability problems, due to disagreement among the coders as to how to code different 
argument parts. Nevertheless, the approach proved an effective means of reducing the 
quantity of data in a relatively large sample of newspaper articles, while at the same 
time remaining close to its structure and content, without the loss of information 
sometimes considered to be problematic in quantitative approaches to content analysis. 
The study has some limitations, however, both as an analysis of argument quality, as 
well as of media framing, in that its focus on media content and corresponding neglect 
of audience responses to information presents us with only one side of the story. To 
draw conclusions, for example, about the impact of media information on how people 
think about issues, it would of course be necessary to supplement the analysis with a 
study of audience frames, to explore the extent to which they correspond to those found 
in the media they are exposed to. This also raises the question of whether, in the 
absence of exposure to the relevant publication, it is possible to infer the presence of 
media effects at all. Future studies of how argumentation in the opinion-leading press 
(or indeed, broadcast media) frames political issues should ideally be twinned with a 
corresponding investigation into how issues are represented among different subgroups 
of the population (for example, by conducting focus groups and analysing arguments 
used by participants), along with an analysis of media consumption patterns to assess 
the extent of exposure to media frames among different groups.
To a certain extent, a similar criticism can be applied to the analysis of argument 
persuasiveness. Message-based definitions of argument quality may provide a means of 
objectively assessing the relative strength of arguments according to their structural 
integrity or the presence or absence of different argument features, yet the persuasive 
power of arguments depends ultimately on recipient responses and subjective 
evaluations of how convincing they are. This highlights the fundamental challenge of 
defining argument quality: the persuasiveness of information lies not only in its content,
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nor in the cognitive responses of message recipients. Rather, it is located in the 
interaction between source, message and recipient, and as such, any analysis of 
argument quality must take all three elements into consideration.
Not discounting these limitations, study B makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of people’s attitudes towards the euro, as well as of public opinion 
processes more generally. In particular the sheer preponderance of negative arguments 
about EMU (and reasons not to support British membership) circulated by the press 
during the period of investigation provides some explanation for the opposition to the 
euro reported in polls during this time, even if we cannot draw robust conclusions about 
the relative persuasiveness of information on either side of the debate and its likely 
impact on underlying attitudes. Some support for this conclusion is provided by Zaller 
and Feldman’s (1992) theory of how respondents formulate responses to attitude 
measures in surveys, which I briefly introduced in chapter 1. According to their 
approach, few people hold fully-formed attitudes on political issues; rather, they hold 
stores of different considerations relevant to the issue that they draw upon when 
formulating a judgement in the context of a survey interview or self-completion 
questionnaire. When presented with a request for an opinion, the respondent tends to 
average across a sample of considerations (p.586) that are most salient at the time to 
formulate their response to the survey question; if the sample of considerations brought 
to mind is mainly negative (or positive), then the expressed attitude is also likely to be 
negative (positive). By contrast, if the sample of considerations is a mix of positive and 
negative considerations, then the attitude expressed from one request to the next is 
likely to vary, resulting in response instability. This is especially likely to occur where 
only one or two considerations are brought to mind, for example among those with low 
issue-involvement.
The ‘considerations’ in Zaller and Feldman’s model correspond with the pieces of 
evidence (or reasons) that support an argument claim in Toulmin’s (1952) model of 
argumentation (similarly, they equate with the concept of ‘support beliefs’ in Fishbein 
and Ajzen’s (1975) model of reasoned action). The salience of a given set of 
considerations at the moment of the survey request is determined by the accessibility of 
the information in memory (Zaller and Feldman, 1992; p.586). For example, 
information that has recently been thought about is more likely to be brought to mind 
when the respondent is presented with the attitude measure (which, according to the
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authors, accounts for the occurrence of context effects in surveys). Similarly, 
accessibility is likely to be influenced by the salience of issues or issue attributes in the 
media (either directly, or indirectly). Thus, one conclusion we might draw from study B 
is that the media debate surrounding British membership of the euro succeeded in 
making salient a number of clearly articulated, negative ‘considerations’ (or reasons for 
not joining EMU), which in turn were more accessible to survey respondents when they 
were asked about their attitudes in opinion polls. Future research into the relationship 
between arguments in the media and public opinion on political issues might usefully 
build upon this framework, by combining an analysis of media arguments with research 
into the salient considerations that influence responses to attitude measures in surveys.
9.2.3 Study C
In studies A and B, the focus was on the circulation of information about EMU by the 
media. In study C, I looked at the impact of information on public attitudes towards the 
EU and EMU. Using data from a deliberative poll about Europe (that had not 
previously been analysed in depth elsewhere), I was able to investigate differences in 
the favourability and strength of attitudes before and after exposure to issue-relevant 
information (in the form of a range of specially-provided written material and a 
weekend event involving small group discussions and question-and-answer sessions 
with experts on both sides of the debate). The twin aims were to examine the effect of 
information exposure on attitudes towards Europe and the role of issue involvement in 
attitude change. In particular the study looked at the differences in attitudes between 
people for whom European integration was an important issue (those who were highly 
interested and knowledgeable about Europe), and people for whom the issue was 
unimportant -  in other words, people with high and low levels of issue involvement.
Based on the review of the literature presented in chapters 1 and 2, and the findings of 
study A, there was reason to suppose that people with high involvement in the single 
currency issue might vary in their attitudes and respond differently to issue-relevant 
information than people with low involvement. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) provided a theoretical framework for 
understanding these differences. Compared with people who are low in issue 
involvement, those with high involvement are assumed to be more motivated and better
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able to systematically process information and to integrate it into their existing 
framework of attitudes and beliefs. They are better able to generate counter-arguments 
to information that is unconvincing or inconsistent with their existing attitudes. Their 
attitudes are, therefore, likely to be stronger and more resistant to change. The analysis 
of data in study C tested these predictions. The sample was divided into participants 
with low and high levels of involvement, making it possible to examine socio­
demographic differences between the two groups (the main predictors of involvement in 
the issue of European integration) and to look at differences in the strength and valence 
of attitudes between the two groups, before and after exposure to information.
As predicted, the analysis of the data found significant differences between participants 
as a function of issue involvement. Firstly, in terms of their attitudes, those with low 
involvement were less likely to support closer integration in Europe and a single 
currency and showed greater concern for the possible negative consequences of closer 
integration. However, a range of evidence attested to the fact that their attitudes were 
weaker and more labile than those of the highly involved. The low involvement 
participants were more likely to select the ‘Don’t Know’ response across a range of 
opinion measures and to claim they felt insufficiently informed to vote in a referendum 
on Europe. The inter-item correlations for their responses to the attitudinal measures 
were lower than for the high involvement group (suggesting weaker attitude ‘constraint’ 
-  Converse, 1964). They were also more likely to change their attitudes after having 
participated in the weekend deliberation event -  their attitudes became more positive, 
more coherent and the participants were less likely to select the ‘Don’t know’ option 
after information exposure. Levels of factual knowledge also improved.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the findings of study C about attitudes 
towards the euro and public opinion generally. Firstly, they demonstrate the extent to 
which public opinion about European integration is susceptible to change. The most 
compelling explanation for this is that for a large proportion of the population 
(according to this study, especially women and those with little personal experience of 
other European countries), attitudes are underpinned by low levels of interest in and 
knowledge about the issues involved. Providing people with the opportunity to really 
engage with the issues appears not only to make them more certain of their attitudes, but 
in relation to this topic, also more favourable to the idea of closer integration in Europe. 
In this sense, the findings provide support for the predictions derived from the ELM
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about the influence of involvement on attitude strength and an individual’s 
susceptibility to persuasion. Secondly, if the deliberative poll is intended to reflect the 
heightened issue salience of a referendum or other political campaign, then the findings 
would suggest that the increased availability of information in the run-up to a 
referendum would be sufficient to effect a change in public attitudes. However, as 
study A showed, simply increasing the quantity of information available does not 
guarantee that people will become more concerned about an issue and motivated to 
process information about it. The likelihood of a person engaging with that information 
will depend on their prior involvement in that issue.
The findings of study C highlight the need to understand better the psychological 
processes by which information exerts an influence on attitudes at varying levels of 
involvement, yet the deliberative poll data are limited in the opportunities they provide 
for studying them. As we saw in chapter 6, one criticism that has been directed at the 
deliberative poll methodology (Price and Neijens, 1998; Sturgis, Roberts and Allum, 
2005) is that insufficient data are collected over the course of the weekend to draw 
conclusions about how attitudes are formed and changed. The ELM postulates that 
differences in attitudes between low and high involvement participants are due to 
variation in elaboration likelihood and the cognitive routes by which information effects 
persuasion. However, the ‘black box’ of the deliberative poll weekend provides no data 
with which to test explicit predictions derived from the model about the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying attitude change during the weekend event and about why some 
people change their attitudes as a result of taking part in the poll and others do not. 
Future deliberative polls would benefit from gathering a range of paradata during the 
weekend event to supplement the interview data and provide greater insight into these 
kinds of questions.
Despite the limitations of the deliberative polling method (as a means to studying 
psychological processes involved in attitude change), the dataset analysed in study C 
provided a unique opportunity to examine the applicability of the ELM’s central 
postulates outside of the conventional setting for a persuasion experiment. Of course, 
the study was not intended as a direct test of the model, given the data were gathered for 
an altogether different purpose, but it took a first step towards investigating the extent to 
which the key premises of the model hold in a ‘real-world’ setting (notwithstanding any 
criticism of the ecological validity of the weekend event). The results provide some
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support for the model. The data also provided me with a rare chance to examine the 
factors underlying attitudes towards European integration in a random probability 
sample of the population36 and, therefore, a stronger basis for my conclusions than 
would have been possible with other sources of data: the fact that they had not been 
previously exploited by other researchers made these opportunities - and the findings of 
my analysis -  all the more noteworthy.
9.2.4 Study D
A criticism that can be directed at previous research on public attitudes towards 
European integration is that it has tended to focus on the correlates of attitudes reported 
in polls (e.g. sex, age, education, knowledge, national identity) as a means to 
understanding patterns of variation. Yet as the findings of study C confirm, for a large 
proportion of the population, attitudes about European issues during the period of 
investigation were far from fixed; people felt uninformed about the issue and were open 
to persuasion. This question mark surrounding the validity of responses to attitudinal 
measures in surveys about Europe was the starting point for study D. The aim of the 
research was to examine the effect of a persuasive message (comprised of arguments 
identified in the argumentation analysis in study C) on reported attitudes. Two 
covariates of attitudes identified in previous research formed the focus of the analysis, 
to see what effect they had on the processes (whether peripheral or central) by which 
people formed and changed their attitudes in response to information: issue involvement 
and strength of attachment to British national identity.
A second motivation for study D came from research into the role of identity in 
persuasion, which has challenged aspects of the ELM. Previous studies have shown 
that the strength and nature of a person’s national identity appears to be an important 
predictor of their attitudes towards the euro. According to social identity theory, 
however, the importance attached to a given social identity depends on the salience of 
that identity at any given moment. In this study I explored the effect of identity salience
36 As we saw in chapter 1, a large proportion of previous research in this field has relied on 
Eurobarometer survey data, which are not collected from strict probability samples. Relatively few UK 
surveys of attitudes towards European integration satisfy these criteria -  the British Social Attitudes 
survey being one exception. More recently, the European Social Survey has provided researchers 
interested in comparing attitudes across Europe with a new source of high quality data, but regrettably 
carries relatively few questions relating to integration processes.
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on persuasion. Early studies of identity and persuasion wrongly concluded that identity 
(e.g. of a message source) acts as a peripheral cue in persuasion, but a number of more 
recent studies (reviewed in chapter 2) have demonstrated that it can, in fact, act as an 
important motivator for central processing. According to the authors of the ELM, 
however, any variable in persuasion can act in any of four different ways to bring about 
changes in attitudes: as an influence on the amount of information elaboration, as a bias 
on elaboration, as an issue-relevant argument or as a peripheral cue. The role adopted 
by the persuasion variable depends on the individual’s prior involvement in the target 
issue. Study D examined the role in persuasion played by raising the salience of 
national identity in communications about the euro.
Study D also provided a further opportunity to test the extent to which the ELM could 
explain attitude change in relation to a real-world issue. In order to achieve this, 
however, it was necessary to make several innovative adaptations to the classical ELM 
method. To gain access to a general population sample (although admittedly, one 
accessed via a volunteer panel) the experiment was fielded as an Internet survey, using 
an automatic randomisation tool to assign participants to the different treatment groups. 
Each treatment varied according to the order in which the questions (including the 
message arguments) were presented. The study employed two key manipulations: 
argument quality (based on Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) method) and a procedure 
designed to prime self-categorisation as ‘British’ in order to raise the salience of 
national identity among half the respondents. The questionnaire included sets of 
questions designed to tap different predictors of attitudes towards the euro -  notably, 
items to measure issue involvement (knowledge about the euro, interest in politics, etc.), 
strength of national identity and message elaboration (e.g. favourability of cognitive 
responses to the message; elaboration effort, and so on). These items were then 
analysed as covariates of attitudes to test hypotheses derived from the ELM about the 
relationship between information, involvement and identity and public attitudes towards 
the euro. Because of these adaptations, study D cannot be viewed as a formal test of the 
ELM. Nevertheless, the unique approach adopted proved to be effective in terms of 
revealing the strengths and weaknesses of the model as the following discussion shows.
The results of the experiment lent further support to the findings of study C. High 
involvement participants in the study not only held more favourable attitudes towards 
the euro, but their attitudes were unaffected by reading the arguments in favour of EMU
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they were presented with. The attitudes of the low involvement participants on the 
other hand were less favourable and more susceptible to change as a result of reading 
the arguments. However, there was only mixed evidence that low involvement 
participants had engaged in less central-route processing than the highly-involved, and 
there was no evidence of peripheral processing in either group. Consistent with 
previous research, the attitudes of participants with strong national identity were more 
negative than those of participants with weak national identity, but they were also more 
susceptible to change as a result of reading the message arguments. However, there was 
some evidence to suggest that being strongly attached to British national identity had 
the effect of reducing message processing. Manipulating the salience of national 
identity appeared to reduce the amount of processing across all groups, though the effect 
observed in this study was not statistically significant.
The finding that those who were less knowledgeable and interested in the single 
currency issue and those who were more concerned about national identity were more 
susceptible to persuasion provides further support for the conclusion drawn at the start 
of the thesis that the responses to attitude measures of survey participants with low 
involvement are unstable. Weak attitudes appear to be especially sensitive to exposure 
to persuasive communications, leading to a greater likelihood of response switching and 
susceptibility to measurement error, such as the context effects observed in study D. 
The effects observed are also consistent with Zaller and Feldman’s (1992) account of 
the survey response process: making salient a number of positive considerations about 
the euro made low-involvement participants more likely to express positive attitudes. In 
this sense, the study is perhaps less informative about processes of persuasion per se 
than it is more generally about the nature of measured attitudes and the effect of 
information, involvement and identity on the survey response process.
By contrast, the attitudes of those who were more knowledgeable and interested in the 
issue and of those who were less concerned about their national identity did not change 
after reading the arguments (though these participants were more likely to distinguish 
strong arguments from weak arguments). This finding lends further support to the 
conclusion that in relation to EMU there existed in Britain what Converse (1964) 
referred to as an ‘issue public’ (discussed earlier) -  in other words, a group for whom 
the issue was especially important. According to this approach, as issue/attitude
276
importance increases for an individual, the likelihood of persuasion decreases, which 
was indeed observed in study D. According to Krosnick (1990), persuasion
“is unlikely to occur with important policy attitudes, because important 
attitudes are likely to be highly resistant to change. Extensive linkage to other 
attitudes, beliefs, values, and psychological elements through a network o f 
associations in memory exerts stabilizing forces (Ostrom and Brock, 1969). 
Important attitudes are presumably accompanied by large stores o f relevant 
knowledge in memory, which equip individuals to counterargue against attitude- 
challenging information (Wood, Kallgren, and Priester, 1985). ” (Krosnick, 
1990; p.63)
The fact that high involvement participants in the study were more resistant to 
persuasion is consistent with the predictions of the ELM and suggests that there may be 
some value in using the model to enhance our understanding of public opinion 
processes. However, the unanticipated finding that participants’ prior attitudes towards 
the euro moderated the persuasive impact of the arguments presented by influencing 
elaboration likelihood (message processing was motivated where the arguments 
presented were pro-attitudinal) and perceptions of argument quality (pro-attitudinal 
arguments were judged to be stronger than counter-attitudinal arguments) raises 
concerns about the suitability of the ELM method for the study of persuasion in relation 
to real political issues. In particular, if the valence of existing attitudes vis-a-vis the 
attitude object affects the likelihood of information elaboration, then it is not possible to 
experimentally manipulate participants’ involvement in the target issue. Similarly, if 
participants’ existing attitudes and beliefs about the target object determine in part their 
cognitive responses to the persuasive message, then it is not possible to control for the 
persuasiveness of the arguments presented. Without the experimental manipulation of 
argument quality, inferences regarding the depth of the message recipient’s cognitive 
processing are limited. The remainder of this section discusses the implications of these 
findings in relation to the concept of argument quality.
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) recipient- or audience-based definition of argument quality 
has proved adequate for the purposes of most ELM lab studies, in which the target issue 
is one about which participants hold no prior attitudes, and as long as the two 
dimensions of argument quality - strength and valence -  are unconfounded (Areni and 
Lutz, 1988). This is because under these conditions, subjective responses to the
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advocacy can be described as being relatively ‘pure’: individual x with no prior attitude 
to target y can be expected to respond favourably to strong messages about y and 
negatively to weak messages about y. Assuming these conditions are met, it should be 
possible to make predictions about any resultant attitude change in accordance with the 
tenets of the ELM. Yet where argument strength and valence are confounded, messages 
emphasising the positive attributes of target objects may elicit favourable cognitive 
responses, irrespective of the number and nature of ‘support beliefs’ they contain 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1981) or evidence provided in support of the argument claim. In 
other words, if strong messages about y are actually just messages that highlight the 
positive attributes of y, then individual x will respond favourably to message y not 
because it contains more persuasive arguments but because the positive features of the 
advocacy elicit favourable cognitive responses (Areni and Lutz, 1988). Argument 
persuasiveness is determined by the valence of the target attributes and not by argument 
strength.
Areni and Lutz’s (1988) critique of how persuasive messages had been constructed in 
ELM studies led others (notably, Boiler, Swasy and Munch, 1990) to advocate a 
definition of argument quality based purely on message-based attributes. Boiler et al’s 
approach involved identifying the features of arguments according to Toulmin’s model 
(described in chapter 5) and constructing strong and weak messages on the basis of the 
structural integrity of the arguments contained in them. Such an approach eliminated 
the possibility of the valence attributes of messages being confounded with argument 
strength and of recipients’ responses to messages being determined by those valence 
attributes instead of the actual quality of the arguments in terms of their strength. But as 
the research presented in this thesis shows, definitions of argument quality based on 
structural features of arguments do not necessarily predict recipient responses to the 
arguments. In other words, it seems that argument persuasiveness cannot be evaluated 
independently from the subjective cognitive responses generated by message recipients.
This problem was identified in challenges to the ELM by social psychologists 
investigating the role of identity in persuasion and the findings of my own research lend 
further support to their conclusions. Studies by Mackie, Worth and Asuncion (1990) 
and McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson and Turner (1994), for example, found that 
messages attributed to in-group sources were rated as more persuasive by ingroup 
members than messages attributed to out-group sources (see also Van Knippenberg,
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1999 and Haslam et al, 1998). These authors argue that the perceived validity of a 
message cannot be viewed independently from the source of the message, because the 
way in which information is processed is “profoundly mediated by our group 
memberships and associated perceptions of reality” (Haslam et al., 1996; p.34). Rather 
than functioning as a pre-given property of message arguments, persuasiveness is co­
determined by the ingroup-outgroup status of the message source (van Knippenberg, 
1999). Even when no information about the message source is available, the persuasive 
impact of the message will depend on the social context in which the message is 
presented (Crano and Chen, 1998; McGarty et al., 1994; Haslam et al., 1996).
In study D, the identity of the message source was not revealed to participants in the 
questionnaire itself. The arguments presented were structured in the same way (each 
consisting of 3 support beliefs or reasons for accepting the claim that Britain should join 
the single currency. They were also balanced for content, each addressing either 
economic, political or identity concerns related to joining the euro. The arguments 
varied only in terms of the profile of favourable, neutral and unfavourable thoughts each 
elicited among participants in the pilot study and on the basis of different aspects of 
their persuasive quality, including familiarity, believability, convincingness and 
persuasiveness. Yet despite controlling -  as far as possible -  for message-based 
characteristics that might influence the favourability of participants’ cognitive responses 
to the persuasive message; evaluations of argument quality were influenced by the 
valence of participants’ prior attitudes. This finding no doubt reflects in part identity 
processes inherent within the persuasion context. Though not made explicit, the in- 
group-out-group status of the message source was implicit; the arguments could be 
attributed to the pro-EMU campaign and its proponents. It also suggests that the 
valence attributes of the advocacy -  or how desirable the object of the advocacy is -  
depends on the message recipient’s existing structure of beliefs and attitudes about the 
target issue. In other words, for real world attitude objects/ issues, it is not possible to 
separate either argument valence or argument strength from audience characteristics and 
the social context in which persuasion takes place.
So what makes an argument persuasive? And where does this leave research into 
persuasion? Based on the findings of this study it seems that for the purposes of 
studying attitude change in the real world, neither audience/recipient-based definitions 
of argument quality, nor message-based definitions are wholly adequate. The
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persuasiveness of an argument lies in the nexus between audience, message and source- 
based characteristics of the persuasive communication. This equates to the idea of the 
‘warrant’ in Toulmin’s (1958) model of argument, which though seldom explicitly 
articulated in the argument itself, provides the essential justification for the link between 
argument claims and the reasons for accepting those claims (i.e. determines the 
persuasiveness of the argument). Warrants are typically inferred by message recipients 
from the claims and evidence they are presented with and from a set of assumptions the 
recipient has about the source or likely source of the communication. Based on the 
work of others who have applied Toulmin’s model to the study of argumentative 
discourse (e.g. Liakopoulos, 2000a; 2000b; van Bavel, 2001), it seems likely that where 
the identity of the message source is known, the warrant is derived from the 
understanding between source and recipient about the nature of the world and socially- 
shared representations about the message topic. A possible avenue for future research, 
therefore, would be to investigate further the relationship between prior attitudes and the 
assumptions people hold about the likely source of political information.
In the ELM, the definition of argument quality is a necessary element of the 
experimental method, for it is by manipulating argument strength that inferences can be 
drawn about the depth of the message recipient’s processing. If argument quality 
cannot be defined empirically, then the focus of persuasion research must shift away 
from how information mediates attitude formation and change. One alternative avenue 
for the future is to divert attention towards thinking about how issue involvement (as it 
occurs ‘naturally’ in the real world) and how identity processes influence whether and 
how people integrate new information into their existing framework of beliefs and 
attitudes. The present research has gone some way towards demonstrating the potential 
fruitfulness of such an approach for the study of public attitudes towards political and 
economic policy. More research is needed, however, to refine the methodological tools 
needed to meet this challenge.
9.3 Conclusions
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from the empirical research 
reported in this thesis about public attitudes towards the euro. First of all, despite the 
apparent widespread opposition to EMU reported in the results of opinion polls, only a 
minority of British people attached any importance to the issue over the course of the
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debate, expressing concern that matters relating to European integration were among the 
most important issues facing Britain at that time. This finding is consistent with the 
idea that there exist so-called ‘issue publics’ (Converse, 1964; Krosnick, 1990); 
subgroups of the population that can be differentiated according to how much 
importance they attach to particular policy concerns. Most people in Britain remained 
relatively unconcerned about EMU throughout the course of the debate and attached 
relatively little importance to the issue. Their attitudes were underpinned by limited 
factual knowledge of the issues concerned and a lack of interest in them. As a result, 
the attitudes reported in surveys were only weakly-formed, making them especially 
susceptible to the persuasive effects of unbalanced issue-relevant information. This was 
clearly demonstrated in the results of studies C and D, where low-involvement 
participants were more likely to adjust their attitudes in response to pro-European/ pro- 
EMU information37. It seems reasonable to conclude that the circulation of negatively- 
framed information by the media had a similarly persuasive impact on the attitudes 
reported in opinion polls during this period, which might help to explain the high levels 
of opposition towards the euro that were recorded.
Study C showed that providing participants with information about European 
integration helped to strengthen their attitudes and make them more coherent. It also 
made people’s attitudes more favourable towards closer integration in Europe. 
However, these findings were slightly at odds with those of study A which appeared to 
show that most people were unaffected by fluctuations in the availability of information. 
This supports the conclusion that it is not how much information is available that is 
important for attitudes, but people’s motivation and ability to process the available 
information; to think about it and integrate it within their existing framework of 
attitudes and beliefs (in other words, their ‘elaboration likelihood). Motivation and 
ability to process information is linked to involvement, as was shown in study C. 
Participants’ involvement actually increased over the course of the deliberative poll 
weekend. Motivation among participants to centrally process information was no doubt 
enhanced by the special context of the organised event, and ability to centrally process 
information improved over the course of the event, as reflected in participants’
37 The extent of attitude lability in study D was such that attitudes were not only sensitive to the 
arguments presented but also to the order in which the questions were presented in the questionnaires. 
So-called ‘context’ or ‘question order’ effects have been widely documented in the survey methodology 
literature (e.g. Strack and Martin, 1987; Schwarz and Strack, 1991) and are especially likely to occur 
where levels o f involvement in the survey topic are low and where respondents do not have strongly- 
formed pre-existing views on the topic (Krosnick, 1991).
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improved quiz scores at the end of the weekend. In this context, it seems likely that 
attitudes were not only temporarily shifted in a particular direction by the valence of the 
arguments presented, but that they also became more coherent, or ‘constrained’ 
(Converse, 1964; Sturgis et al., 2005). This would suggest that the effects of persuasion 
would have been more enduring compared with the perhaps more temporal shifts in 
attitudes observed in study D. These findings are especially pertinent to those involved 
in political campaigning, in particular if there were ever a referendum on the euro, or 
about any other European policy concern.
The effect of information on attitudes is not only moderated by issue involvement -  or 
people’s ability and motivation to process it -  but also by people’s existing attitudes and 
beliefs. This effect was observed in study D where those participants with stable (pro- 
EMU) attitudes to begin with did not change their attitudes as a result of information 
exposure. This finding is consistent with the results of other studies that have shown 
that as attitude importance increases, the likelihood of persuasion decreases (e.g. 
Krosnick, 1990). However, highly-involved participants with stable attitudes were still 
motivated to centrally process issue-relevant information and to appraise the quality of 
the arguments they were presented with. Yet their appraisals of argument quality were 
dependent on the valence of their prior attitudes. In other words, people with pro-EMU 
attitudes evaluated pro-EMU arguments as more persuasive than anti-EMU ones and 
people with anti-EMU attitudes evaluated anti-EMU arguments as more persuasive than 
pro-EMU ones. This finding calls into question one of the central elements of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model -  that by manipulating the strength of argument quality 
(e.g. based on the favourability of cognitive responses among a panel of judges) it is 
possible to assess the extent of participants’ message elaboration.
Finally, the results of the empirical studies shed some light on the role played by 
national identity in attitudes towards the euro. Contrary to the hypotheses tested, 
participants in study D with stronger attachment to British national identity were less 
motivated to engage in central-route processing and they were more susceptible to 
persuasion. Although the effects of raising the salience of national identity in the 
persuasive communication were not statistically significant, the pattern of effects all 
pointed towards the same conclusion: raising the salience of national identity appears 
to reduce the amount of processing of group-relevant information. Further research is 
necessary however to test this hypothesis empirically.
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One important contribution made by this thesis to the study of attitudes towards 
European integration is that it highlights the fluidity of uninformed attitudes and 
therefore the need to study the dynamics of attitude change rather than just the 
correlates and predictors of attitudes reported in polls. To understand public opinion it 
is necessary to identify those people for whom attitudes about a particular policy 
concern are fixed and stable -  i.e. the people for whom those attitudes are important 
(Krosnick, 1988; 1990) -  and the people who attach relatively little importance to those 
attitudes. Establishing attitude importance and the strength of people’s attitudes 
provides the basis for understanding the susceptibility of attitudes to change and 
therefore the confidence with which theories about variation in attitudes among 
different subgroups of the population can be developed.
9.4 Reflections on the theoretical approaches and methods adopted in this thesis
In this thesis I adopted a mixed method approach to the study of public attitudes 
towards the euro. The motivation for this was mainly pragmatic: based on the literature 
review, I identified a number of pertinent questions about the role played by 
information, involvement and identity in public opposition to EMU and the choices of 
approaches and methods available to me, to a large extent, stemmed automatically from 
these. To study informational influences on public attitudes, I turned to theories of 
media communication (agenda-setting, framing); to study the role of involvement in 
processes of attitude formation and change, I looked to social psychological theories of 
persuasion (the ELM); whereas to study the role of identity in persuasion, I looked to 
theories of group processes (social identity theory). Having identified the theoretical 
approaches that appeared to offer the most insight into my research questions, the 
decision about which research methods to adopt was -  by and large -  settled by the 
traditions associated with each.
The resulting eclecticism largely reflects the multi-disciplinary nature of the field of 
public opinion research, which over the years has been built up by contributors from 
political science, sociology and media research, as well as from social and political 
psychology, resulting in a number of hybrid theories and methods. But it also reflects, 
in part, a philosophical decision on my behalf not to pursue a programme of research 
directed from the outset by a single ontological outlook, but one which drew on existing
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knowledge from a variety of sources and which was guided by practical considerations 
about which theoretical and methodological ‘tools’ would be best suited to tackling the 
particular research questions I wanted to address. My motivation was to use a 
collection of complementary approaches to enhance our understanding of the 
psychological processes underlying public attitudes towards the euro, rather than to 
tackle the problem under the constraints of a single paradigm. Within this, I was also 
keen to innovate and to attempt new ways of working with existing approaches -  a 
motivation that is reflected in the decision to use argumentation analysis to study media 
frames and argument quality in study B, and to use a web survey experiment to test 
predictions from the ELM with a general population sample in study D. The extent to 
which my approach was successful is borne out in the preceding discussion of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each of the empirical studies. To be sure, there are other 
methods I could have used, which with hindsight, would have improved my research or 
strengthened my conclusions (for example, conducting focus groups to learn more about 
the arguments about EMU being used by the public would have bridged the gap 
between the studies of media content and the studies of attitudes). But I believe the 
research presented here provides a richer insight into public opinion processes than 
would have been possible had I decided to only analyse survey data, to only conduct a 
series of laboratory experiments, or to only analyse media content.
Despite the conscious decision to draw upon the theoretical and methodological 
approaches of other disciplines that have contributed to the study of public opinion, the 
overall aim of the thesis was to explore the utility of social psychological theory in 
understanding processes underlying people’s attitudes. Taking as its premise the idea 
that attitudes towards the euro are (or were) only weakly formed and the declared 
openness of the public to persuasion, I wanted to establish what could be learned from 
theories of attitude change about how public opinion responds to informational 
influences communicated by the media. Of the theoretical approaches developed within 
the field of persuasion research, I was attracted to the ELM because of its focus on 
‘involvement’ as a mediator of informational influence (which has been shown 
elsewhere to be relevant to understanding political attitudes (e.g. Krosnick, 1988) and 
which, based on the literature review, was clearly an important variable influencing 
British attitudes towards the euro). I was also attracted by its clearly-specified 
methodology and by its overall popularity in and dominance of the field of attitude 
change research. A vast number of studies have utilised and tested Petty and
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Cacioppo’s model of persuasion in classical laboratory experiments, finding 
considerable support for its dual-process account of attitude change, yet relatively few 
have attempted to examine its applicability to the study of attitudes towards real 
political issues. In the empirical work I undertook, I wanted to see how well the ELM 
could explain processes underlying attitudes towards the euro, by testing predictions 
derived from the model about the role of information and involvement in attitude 
formation and change. As we have seen, the results of this endeavour were mixed.
By contrast, my interest in Social Identity Theory and Self-categorisation Theory (e.g. 
Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) stemmed from a desire to understand the 
role played by national identity in attitudes towards European integration. Building on 
the work of other social psychologists that have adopted these approaches in their 
studies of social change in Europe (e.g. Breakwell and Lyons, 1996; Cinnirella, 1993; 
1996; Hopkins and Reicher, 1996), I chose to focus specifically on the effect of raising 
national identity salience in information about the euro. The assumption underlying this 
focus was that in the same way that people’s attitudes are not fixed or stable, neither is 
the influence of group identity on people’s attitudes and behaviour, because it depends 
on the salience of a given category at any given moment. Thus, to understand the 
relationship between national identity and attitudes towards the euro, it is necessary to 
understand the role identity salience plays in attitude formation and change. While the 
social identity approach provides its own account of the relationship between identity 
and group beliefs (e.g. Chryssochoou, 1996; Bar-Tal, 1998), in the present research, my 
purpose was to use it in combination with the ELM and I saw the two approaches as 
offering complementary accounts of processes of influence. Though to many, these two 
approaches are likely to be seen as being far from compatible, deriving as they do from 
very different traditions within the discipline of social psychology, my motivation for 
working with both stemmed from seeing each as offering insight into different aspects 
of the problem I was researching.
Social psychology has a significant role to play in understanding what the public think 
about different issues and how they form and change their attitudes on the basis of 
information -  either from the media or from members of ingroups and outgroups alike. 
In many ways, it can be said to offer a unique vantage point, because it enables theorists 
to address the interface between the psychological and the social (Smith and Mackie, 
1997), or as Giddens (1984) has described it, the nexus between the individual, the
285
group and society (cited in Breakwell, 1996). According to Lyons and Breakwell 
(1996), the discipline can only successfully fulfil this role if its theoretical models are 
tested and refined in complex real-world settings to ensure they are able to cope with 
the “interactions between societal, interpersonal and individual processes” (p.4).
These observations presuppose a fully-integrated discipline which aims to give equal 
attention to individual, group and society in its accounts of human cognition and 
behaviour. Yet historically, this has not been the case, and social psychology has 
mostly been characterised by divisions resulting from overemphasis on the importance 
of one part of this triad over the other two (e.g. see Farr, 1996; McGarty and Haslam, 
1997; Smith and Mackie, 1997). This is perhaps most pronounced in the chasm 
between North American social psychological theories (of which the ELM is one) and 
the approach consolidated in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s (largely dominated by 
the social identity paradigm). Developed partly in opposition to the dominance of the 
US tradition with its focus on the individual, social psychologists in Europe developed 
an approach which sought to address the social context in which human psychological 
functioning takes place (Tajfel et al., 1984; Hogg and Abrams, 1999). However, 
division is manifest throughout the discipline, reflected in the contemporary 
fragmentary nature of theory (Aronson, 1997) and in the rift between advocates of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to social psychological research.
According to some (e.g. see Aronson, 1997; Smith and Mackie, 1997), these 
developments in the discipline have contributed to a kind of impasse for social 
psychologists. As Aronson has argued, “when artificial barriers are erected and related 
theories get insulated from each other (...) we decrease our ability to forge vital 
syntheses -  and, consequently, our discipline becomes unnecessarily fragmented and 
disjointed” (1997; 29). He proposes that the solution lies in placing more emphasis on 
synthesis as opposed to analysis and in forging links between old and new theoretical 
approaches -  an outlook which has firmly influenced the approach I chose to adopt in 
this thesis. Similarly, contemporary methodological approaches recognise the benefits 
of triangulating (Denzin, 1970; Flick, 1992; Olsen, 2004) different ways of conducting 
research and of adopting a kind of ‘toolbox’ approach to choosing methods (Bauer, 
Gaskell and Allum, 2000), in an effort to bridge the long-standing dichotomy in social 
scientific research methodology. As I have already stated, I was consciously guided by 
this principle when selecting the different approaches adopted in this thesis. In my own
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view, applying social psychological theory to the study of cognition and behaviour in its 
‘natural’ setting demands this kind of synthesis, and coping with the complexity of 
studying social change requires a sophisticated understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of adopting different theoretical approaches and of using different 
methods in different contexts. This means that as social psychologists, we share a 
responsibility not only to become skilled in a range of approaches but to develop 
sensitivity to the relative strengths of each, and to the heritage within which each has 
been developed.
As we saw in chapter 1, social scientists from across a range of disciplines have 
approached the study of public responses to European integration in different ways, 
tending to focus their analysis at a single level of explanation (individual, group or 
society). In this thesis, I attempted to integrate a range of approaches incorporating all 
three levels of explanation in order to take full advantage of the unique vantage point 
offered by social psychology to address the inter-connectedness of individual 
psychological and social processes. The benefits of adopting such an approach in the 
study of European integration are not restricted to those interested primarily in the 
substantive topic, however. As Cinnirella (1996) has argued, using social change in 
Europe as an empirical vehicle for examining social psychological theory offers 
reciprocal benefits for the discipline as well (see also Lyons and Breakwell, 1996; 
Hopkins and Reicher, 1996). The research undertaken for this thesis provides some 
evidence in support of this, in its application of social psychological theories of attitude 
formation and change to the debate surrounding UK membership of EMU. The 
challenge for the future is to continue this process of refining the theoretical tools of the 
discipline by testing them outside of the research laboratory.
9.5 Epilogue
One notable limitation of the research findings presented is that they are focused on a 
very specific substantive issue and one which no longer carries the same political import 
as it did when the research was carried out. To a certain extent, the same limitation 
applies to any study focused on a single policy issue, but the debate surrounding British 
membership of the single currency followed a particularly peculiar trajectory. Issues 
surrounding EMU dominated the political and media agenda throughout the 1990s (as
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was shown in study A), defining party politics in the run up to both the 1997 and 2001 
general elections. The promise of a referendum on the decision of whether or not 
Britain should join the euro -  what would have been the first vote of its kind in over 
thirty years -  exemplified the seriousness with which the issue was taken by the 
Government and the urgency of the need to understand the workings of public opinion. 
The cultural climate at the time was characterised by concerns with the concept of 
national identity and the meaning of ‘Britishness’ in the context of closer integration in 
Europe and the disintegration of the former Soviet bloc, and this Zeitgeist provided a 
powerful impetus for the research undertaken.
The September l l tb 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City had a 
profound impact on this political and cultural climate, and though the influence of these 
events arguably took time to dismantle the debate surrounding British membership of 
EMU, this was ultimately the effect they had. With the Government’s decision in 2003 
to support the US invasion of Iraq and the shift in media attention onto the so-called 
‘war on terror’, concerns about the single currency eventually subsided. The euro was 
now the working currency in 12 countries, and Britain -  along with the other EU 
countries that had elected to stay out of the euro -  had survived the transition that had 
taken place, without the negative repercussions on the economy that many had feared. 
In June 2003, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the ‘five economic tests’ 
had not yet been met, and so the Government could not recommend Britain joining the 
single currency and the issue was effectively ‘swept under the carpet’ as the salient 
issue in the debate surrounding European integration (Evans, 2003).
More recently, EMU has been usurped as the central issue in the debate surrounding 
Britain’s relationship with Europe by concerns about EU enlargement and the 
ratification of the EU Constitution. The latter refreshed familiar divisions in the press, 
but following ‘no votes’ in referenda held in both France and The Netherlands during 
2005, the matter was set aside in much the same way as the debate surrounding British 
membership of the euro. While the expansion of the European Union in May 2004 from 
15 to 25 member states -  and most recently, the addition of Romania and Bulgaria on 
the 1 st January 2007 -  sparked some media interest, it was generally short-lived and in 
any case, the focus of attention appears to have shifted. Whereas previously one of the 
central concerns of the debate was how closer integration between Britain and Europe 
might impact on British national sovereignty and cultural identity, today the tone of the
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debate resonates with concerns about the likely impact of enlargement on British society 
from increased immigration, as well as about the implications of multiculturalism for 
national security.
So what relevance have the empirical findings presented in this thesis now that the 
debate surrounding British membership of the euro has effectively run its course (for the 
time-being at least) and now that political, media and public attention has been diverted 
to other issues? Despite the fact that the substantive focus of the thesis was in many 
respects its raison d ’etre, it played a far more significant role as a vehicle through which 
to examine the utility of different theoretical accounts of the dynamics of public 
opinion. In this respect, the conclusions drawn here are equally relevant to the study of 
public attitudes in other domains -  notably in relation to political issues, where the 
concept of ‘involvement’ holds considerable scope as an explanatory variable for 
understanding variation in public opinion. Equally, or perhaps even more so in relation 
to contemporary political debates in Britain, exploring the role played by identity 
processes in attitude formation and change has a particularly valuable contribution to 
make to the study of public views on a range of different issues (including, for example, 
immigration, terrorism and religion).
The empirical research conducted here took an innovative approach to the study of 
public attitudes, drawing on a range of theories and using a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies. The findings of the research not only enhanced our 
understanding of the substantive topic, but also provided a number of interesting 
insights into public opinion processes generally and the nature of people’s responses to 
attitude measures in surveys. Most importantly, the research demonstrated the unique 
value of a social psychological approach to the study of public attitudes and the benefits 
for the discipline of testing social psychological theories in real-world contexts. Future 
studies would similarly benefit from adopting a mix of approaches, but so too would the 
discipline stand to gain from continuous efforts to bridge the gaps between different 
fields of research and different theoretical paradigms. Only by moving the discipline 
forwards in this way can it hope to fulfil its potential to illuminate the complex 
interactions between psychological and social processes.
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APPENDIX A
Table 1 Most important issue facing Britain today: % selecting Europe, Crime,
Education, Health and Unemployment by month (1991-2001)
Date Europe Crime Education Health Unemployment
Jan-91 4 5 17 27 34
Feb-91 3 7 17 23 37
Mar-91 5 7 18 24 38
Apr-91 4 15 20 29 48
May-91 5 14 25 51 45
Jun-91 18 9 20 40 52
Jul-91 8 13 17 33 53
Aug-91 6 13 19 34 54
Sep-91 8 23 26 45 54
Oct-91 9 15 21 51 54
Nov-91 32 12 24 42 48
Dec-91 24 15 17 34 41
Jan-92 12 11 24 43 54
Feb-92 9 13 27 49 56
Mar-92 10 12 27 45 55
Apr-92 10 11 27 41 53
May-92 14 15 23 32 57
Jun-92 17 16 21 30 57
Jul-92 10 17 20 28 61
Aug-92 10 14 18 26 64
Sep-92 22 11 17 21 61
Oct-92 19 9 14 27 74
Nov-92 19 12 16 27 71
Dec-92 24 12 15 24 72
Jan-93 8 17 16 28 79
Feb-93 10 33 20 30 81
Mar-93 10 34 18 24 78
Apr-93 9 26 19 24 73
May-93 13 24 19 41 68
Jun-93 9 20 21 37 69
Jul-93 19 24 18 32 66
Aug-93 10 25 21 36 63
Sep-93 7 29 19 32 61
Oct-93 6 33 17 32 61
Nov-93 6 28 23 35 61
Dec-93 6 23 19 34 66
Jan-94 5 31 22 32 61
Feb-94 4 26 22 40 61
Mar-94 12 34 25 35 59
Apr-94 7 33 24 38 60
May-94 12 32 21 35 60
Jun-94 13 30 21 29 66
Jul-94 12 23 20 35 65
Aug-94 9 33 23 36 62
Sep-94 7 33 21 34 59
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Oct-94 11 37 22 34
Nov-94 14 25 20 40
Dec-94 17 22 18 34
Jan-95 22 23 22 38
Feb-95 25 26 26 36
Mar-95 16 24 25 43
Apr-95 12 25 33 41
May-95 15 25 29 44
Jun-95 26 22 29 38
Jul-95 12 23 28 39
Aug-95 12 24 29 39
Sep-95 13 24 30 44
Oct-95 17 22 29 45
Nov-95 11 25 31 39
Dec-95 10 23 32 40
Jan-96 14 27 29 41
Feb-96 11 24 30 39
Mar-96 16 24 31 36
Apr-96 20 24 33 34
May-96 29 29 30 39
Jun-96 28 22 28 33
Jul-96 25 29 31 35
Aug-96 20 30 27 33
Sep-96 23 27 32 35
Oct-96 20 41 39 36
Nov-96 23 37 42 43
Dec-96 38 37 38 42
Jan-97 29 22 43 49
Feb-97 35 27 45 48
Mar-97 33 28 43 49
Apr-97 43 27 54 63
May-97 30 26 50 57
Jun-97 23 24 45 51
Jul-97 16 23 49 46
Aug-97 21 27 39 47
Sep-97 21 28 45 45
Oct-97 35 26 36 47
Nov-97 31 22 36 47
Dec-97 28 16 31 42
Jan-98 23 19 37 42
Feb-98 16 14 37 50
Mar-98 22 13 42 47
Apr-98 23 21 39 35
May-98 22 20 39 49
Jun-98 33 21 33 44
Jul-98 22 19 40 45
Aug-98 13 21 33 41
Sep-98 20 17 31 40
Oct-98 23 20 33 38
Nov-98 26 17 32 37
Dec-98 32 17 26 34
Jan-99 27 17 32 49
Feb-99 30 19 29 39
62
58
55
52
52
51
51
53
47
51
52
48
51
52
51
49
48
44
46
42
44
43
44
43
37
41
35
36
38
39
28
34
39
34
35
35
32
34
31
32
31
34
31
30
33
28
36
44
43
35
30
26
26
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Mar-99 32 16 29 37
Apr-99 15 20 31 34
May-99 26 18 27 33
Jun-99 37 18 29 35
Jul-99 30 16 30 39
Aug-99 25 19 30 41
Sep-99 23 21 31 39
Oct-99 34 16 31 41
Nov-99 23 24 29 40
Dec-99 32 15 33 41
Jan-00 22 24 32 70
Feb-00 25 18 32 54
Mar-00 20 20 37 57
Apr-00 17 16 35 53
May-00 19 34 30 45
Jun-00 24 23 32 55
Jul-00 19 34 34 51
Aug-00 24 26 32 49
Sep-00 21 13 30 46
Oct-OO 24 19 25 44
Nov-00 27 13 27 46
Dec-00 26 26 29 45
Jan-01 21 30 32 50
25
27
23
19
21
24
22
17
21
18
20
19
18
21
23
17
17
16
10
10
10
7
12
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Table 1 Dates and headlines o f leading articles included in the argumentation analysis
Event The Daily/ Sunday Telegraph The Guardian/ Observer
Date Headline Date Headline
Maastricht Treaty 02.12.91 Off with her head
December 1991 03.12.91 A sombre prelude
07.12.91 Now the words must form a pattern
09.12.91 Maastricht: the time of reckoning 09.12.91 Messages behind Maastricht
12.12.91 Out of the summit and into the light 12.12.91 An ecu for prosperity?
15.12.91 Out of tune in Europe
Madrid European 02.12.95 Painful deja vu
Council
December 1995 08.12.95 Say what we want
09.12.95 Decus et Tutamen
10.12.95 More means better in a wider Europe
16.12.95 Clarke takes charge 16.12.95 The real Europe debate
18.12.95 Speak up, Prime Minister 18.12.95 Getting the Euro habit
Dublin European 02.12.96 The choice for Major: cop-out or opt-out? 02.12.96 A featureless note
Council
December 1996 04.12.96 Government by the day 04.12.96 United again (for now)
05.12.96 Sir James's question
06.12.96 Blair's continental drift
07.12.96 Gorst, Dykes and Clarke 07.12.96 Time to go to the polls
08.12.96 Lessons in the conservatory highlight
09.12.96 To what end? 09.12.96 Lessons in the conservatory highlight
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Election 1997 
April/ May 1997
Amsterdam 
European Council 
June 1997
09.12.96 Try leading, Mr Major
10.12.96 Blair’s federalist agenda
13.12.96 Major's task at Dublin
15.12.96 Housewives know best
18.12.96 Poos to the euro
31.12.96 Kinkel's interference
17.04.97 The Tories'moment of truth
18.04.97 Names and addresses
21.04.97 Fighting pound for pound
22.04.97 Santer backs Blair
28.04.97 Kohl's Italian Job
01.05.97 Seven into Three doesn't go
05.05.97 Mr Clarke and Europe
06.05.97 Labour in Brussels
14.05.97 Clarke off-centre
03.06.97 EMU’s French farce
04.06.97 Labour's Troy
08.06.97 Not our favourite
10.06.97 How they see EMU
12.12.96
14.12.96
17.12.96
17.04.97
27.04.97
06.05.97
24.05.97
27.05.97
30.05.97
10.06.97
12.06.97
Clarke's fine but futile line 
Enter the euro 
When posturing rules
Major's hard currency
Where to spend effort on the single currency
Once more into Europe
Blair takes a lead in Europe 
Jospin's pole position 
Germany jumps the gun
Sweetening the euro pill 
Sound money and jobs
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Euro-11 Decision 24.04.98 Dutchman or Frenchman 
April/May 1998
30.04.98 Strange meeting
Euro Launch 
January 1999
Danish Referendum 
September 2000
04.05.98 The currency of failure
22.05.98 Michael Heseltine, extremist
26.05.98 Jusy say nej
28.05.98 Sir Leon's Britain
29.12.98 The truth about EMU
01.01.99 Europe's dream, not ours
13.01.99 A federal Europe - it's official
04.09.00 Common currency
23.10.00 Why Tony Blair really won't scrap the 
pound
16.06.97 Rethinking the route to Europe
18.06.97 The real lesson of Amsterdam
29.04.98 Living with the euro
02.05.98 EMU arrives on time; we must make it work
05.05.98 Birth pangs of the euro; Chirac's deal is tacky
21.05.98 Hague's euro dilemma
10.09.00 A false unity that shackles Blair
25.09.00 Yes or no; the Danes have done Europe a favour
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Table 2 EMU-specific claims
The Guardian The Daily Telegraph
“Britain’s future must lie in Europe” 9.12.91 “This newspaper believes that the lurch to a single 
currency is potentially damaging to the cause of 
European co-operation.” 3.12.91
“By opting out o f a single European currency (...), 
Britain will forgo the benefits -  while being 
lumbered with the costs of keeping sterling 
permanently aligned to a dominant ecu and of 
convincing he markets that a devaluation is not 
around the comer.” 12.12.91
‘There is every reason to believe that the public 
will continue to see the sense of what is essentially 
a "wait and see" position by the Government on 
one of the most far-reaching and hazardous 
decisions the Community has contemplated in 
decades.” 3.12.91
“If the EC becomes locked into an ecu zone in 
which the dominating Deutschmark sets the 
competitive pace, then most of Europe, and not just 
Britain, will be locked into a slow spiral o f decline” 
12.12.91
“A POSTPONEMENT of such a critical decision 
would damage nothing'”.9.12.91
“Britain cannot afford to be left on its own if the 
rest o f Europe goes ahead with a common 
currency” 15.12.91
‘The uncertainties are legion” 9.12.91
“The implications o f the agreement on EMU are 
huge.” 15.12.91
‘The path forward is still far from evident.” 
9.12.91
“As for monetary union, if John Major assumes 
that all Britain has to do is wait on the sidelines 
while the venture fails, he is mistaken.” 10.12.95
“We do not want closer political or monetary union 
at present; we have enough to be going on with.” 
9.12.91
“if  Britain were to put its shoulder to the slipping 
wheel of the EU alongside both countries, then it 
might be possible to delay the timetable for 
monetary union” 10.12.95
“we are not merely engaged in protecting our 
independence, but limiting the injury that could be 
suffered by others if  the Europe of the philosophers 
runs so far ahead o f itself down the federalist road 
that it falls over its own peoples.” 9.12.91
Qualifier: “Of course, the whole idea of a single 
currency may yet come a cropper.
But if  it does happen and Britain stays out it is 
worth remembering that the world won't stand 
still.” 18.12.95
“Given our exposed position on the fringe, the only 
honest and sensible policy is to continue patiently 
and forcefully arguing our case, declining to sign 
up for things we cannot accept at Maastricht - 
including a single currency and the Social Charter” 
9.12.91
“A modernised Britain needs to be part of Europe 
not to stand apart from it. That does not mean 
becoming a passive partner. But it does mean 
promoting the benefits of engagement in Europe.” 
7.12.96
“Mr Major has achieved a notable diplomatic 
success at Maastricht... It may be argued that the 
outcome of this EC summit is more important for 
perils and disasters averted than for the positive 
benefits it confers.” 15.12.91
“a single currency will have immense implications 
for Britain, whatever the terms on which it is 
finally agreed and whether or not Britain joins it.” 
9.12.96
“What we have avoided - immediate bondage in an 
unhealthy centralisation o f monetary, social, 
defence and foreign policy - is more important than 
what we have gained.” 15.12.91
“.. .there can be no hiding from the consequences 
of the single currency, whatever stance Britain 
takes.” 9.12.96
“there may still come a day when Britain faces a 
straight choice between staying outside a single 
currency at serious cost to our economy, or opting 
in at the price of our financial independence.” 
15.12.91
“It is unquestionably in Britain's interests for the 
single currency to be the best possible single 
currency, whether or not we join it.” 9.12.96
“the currency must be managed for political rather 
than economic ends” (for EMU) 2.12.95
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“Even if  Britain doesn't join the single currency it 
won't be able to avoid it. Sooner or later it will 
invade Britain.” 14.12.96
“no amount of psychological or economic 
convergence will make British people happy to 
accept ecus for their pounds.” 9.12.95
“the single currency is a question o f unprecedented, 
magnitude in recent peacetime Europe, as well as 
one with unpredictable, convulsive implications.” 
17.4.97
“Monetary union may yet fail. The European 
Community, it cannot be stressed too often, has 
more important questions in hand, notably 
enlargement and the reform of agricultural subsidy. 
But for Britain, and for the Cabinet, a decision 
about the single currency cannot be postponed for 
much longer.” 16.12.95
“A single currency to which the big three countries 
could all belong would be a gain for both Britain 
and Europe.” 27.4.97
“the strains between those who go ahead and those 
who stay out could tear the single market apart and 
imperil the whole future of the European 
Community.” 18.12.95
“No economic decision in this parliament is more 
important than the single currency. It must be 
thought through long and hard.” 27.5.97
“Mr Major's diagnosis o f the ills of EMU is correct 
and the stage has now been reached where he does 
no one, not even his own quarrelling party, any 
kindness by trying to disguise it.” 18.12.95
“Britain can afford to wait until the single currency 
has established a bit o f a tract record before 
consigning its economic destiny to it.” 10.6.97
“Whether we join a single currency or not, we 
will, on Mr Major's own analysis, be deeply 
affected by its consequences.” 18.12.95
“Europe’s blinkered dash for a single currency, 
instead of co-ordinating economic policy, is putting 
the cart before the horse.” 10.6.97
“If Mr Major thinks that the timetable for a single 
currency is not just unrealistic but dangerous, and 
he clearly does, he must come off the fence and say 
so” 18.12.95
“Britain may be advised that it can’t be at the heart 
of Europe if it detached from the arteries." 10.6.97
“It is clear, on any proper reading of the Maastricht 
Treaty, that virtually none of the countries 
preparing for Economic and Monetary Union will 
meet the treaty's "convergence criteria" within the 
timetable.” 2.12.96
“The era of “ever closer” institutional union in 
Europe must close. The new priority must be to 
deliver popular and practical benefits to Europe’s 
people.” 10.6.97
“In the minds of most, EMU is so clearly a political 
rather than an economic question that they believe 
the failure to converge is almost irrelevant” 2.12.96
“IT IS surprising how long it has taken for people 
to realise that even though Britain is not joining 
European Monetary Union in the first wave, we 
will nevertheless be faced with the prospect o f the 
euro starting to circulate in Britain o f its own 
accord.” 29.4.98
“A single currency built on weak foundations 
would defeat its own purposes” 2.12.96
“Since the potential risks are so high and because 
(unlike the rest of the EU) there is no big political 
momentum in the UK for early entry, Britain's 
decision to watch and wait is the right one. Let 
companies and individuals decide to accept the 
euro or not. The nation can make a collective 
decision later.” 29.4.98
“the release of the Euro design was a moment of 
the greatest psychological importance.” 15.12.96
“The US economy, a single market with a single 
currency, is Europe's role model. On the evidence 
o f this week's statistics, it seems to have discovered 
perpetual motion. If emulated in Europe, it could 
usher in a new golden age.” 2.5.98
“it is not in Britain's interests for the Euro to be a 
disaster.” 15.12.96
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“Although we have deep worries about the viability 
o f monetary union - both as a project for the 11 
founder members and for Britain if  she joins later - 
it is vital to mitigate the chances o f failure” 2.5.98
‘This newspaper has always warned that, under the 
pressures of an election campaign, the Cabinet's 
wait-and-see policy on the single currency was 
unlikely to hold.” 17.4.97
“even though we won't know whether EMU will 
succeed for at least five years because until then 
Europe's economy will be enjoying a cyclical 
recovery. But this shouldn't stop us from taking 
measures now to try to make monetary union work 
in the long-term.” 2.5.98
“the overwhelming majority o f Conservatives are 
now agreed that Britain should not enter a single 
currency.”
17.4.97
“Europe has a lot going for it.” 2.5.98 “such an important issue transcends party” 17.4.97
“The euro was supposed to take politics out of 
monetary policy yet its launch has been marred by 
political fixing of the crudest kind.“ 2.5.98
“John Major described the single currency as the 
most important peace-time issue this country has 
faced in living political memory. So it is (or rather 
it is a part o f the most important issue - Britain's 
relationship with the European Union).” 21.4.97
“If the single currency proves a success, even in the 
short term, sterling will be forced by the markets to 
join it.” 21.5.98
“the jargon about economic and monetary union, 
convergence criteria, exchange rate mechanisms 
and so on concerns the abolition of the pound.” 
21.4.97
“Forget Gordon Brown's mantra about five tests 
(...) the euro is not and can never be an 'economic' 
issue.” 25.9.00
‘The abolition of the pound means the end of 
British national independence.” 21.4.97
“It now looks very likely that the euro will be soft 
rather than hard.... the euro will be constitutionally 
weak “ 28.4.97
“the Commission's evident readiness to elevate 
political over economic considerations has robbed 
the euro's supporters in this country of their last 
remaining argument. The EU is clearly less 
interested in monetary stability than in including as 
many states as possible in the next stage of 
European construction” 28.4.97
“other European countries will not meet the 
Maastricht criteria for monetary union by January 
1, 1999 ” 3.6.97
“It might be, as EMU nears its critical moment, 
that the project will be pulled apart by the conflict 
that always lay at its heart: between the French 
desire to wrest control of German monetary policy, 
and the German desire to maintain Teutonic 
rigour.“ 3.6.97
“the launching of the single currency is essentially 
a political undertaking” 24.4.98
“It is a “myth that the euro is nothing more than a 
technical instrument for settling accounts. In fact, 
the single currency involves a huge change in the 
ways in which European states manage their 
economies.”” 24.4.98
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“the single currency compels Europe towards full 
economic and political union.” 24.4.98
“the single currency, as now conceived, is both a 
violation of the Treaty of Maastricht and a hostage 
to fortune” 30.4.98
‘The euro system is one that can work properly 
only in good weather. As soon as the European 
economy hits turbulence, the engines are going to 
jam.” 30.4.98
“the single currency must be bom free of political 
interference” 4.5.98
“everything touched by Brussels becomes 
political” 4.5.98
“Conceived as a political fantasy, it seems destined 
to end as an economic failure. Britain must stay out 
of it.” 4.5.98
“there are political, as well as economic, dangers in 
economic and monetary union - indeed (...) the 
two are inextricably intertwined” 22.5.98
‘There is no common interest rate that suits all 
Europe's different economies”.22.5.98
“the single currency has always been an explicitly 
political project.” 28.5.98
“Monetary union is an attempt by the French to 
create a central European bank by which they can 
influence German interest rates.” 28.5.98
“It is the economic uncertainty that makes the 
cession of political authority so risky” 28.5.98
“The danger of EMU is that, if one nation in the 
currency zone finds itself suffering economic 
hardship that it could have avoided with the 
freedom to manage its own currency, there will be 
nothing that the politicians will be able to tell their 
angry electors.” 28.5.98
“Most o f us, apparently, assume that our country 
will be forced by events to join Economic and 
Monetary Union in the end, but we do not care for 
it.” 29.12.98
“The euro is an intrusion on our national life that 
we would rather not have to confront.” 29.12.98
“the single currency has serious implications for 
national sovereignty” 29.12.98
“EMU has been consciously developed by Europe's 
political elites as an instrument for achieving full 
economic and political union, and will therefore 
lead necessarily to the evisceration of Parliament”
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29.12.98
“there is nothing inconsistent about opposing the 
single currency, while remaining within the EU” 
4.09.00
“As Lord Owen points out: "Britain has the 
constitutional right and the economic and political 
clout to stay in the EU but say 'no' to the euro."” 
4.09.00
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Table 3 Descriptions o f EMU
The Guardian The Daily Telegraph
“one, a German thing because the Germany 
economy dominates, is the move towards a single 
currency” (Maastricht)
“the lurch to a single currency is potentially 
damaging to the cause of European co-operation” 
(Maastricht)
“the EMU model preoccupied by the control of 
inflation (...) has delivered great prosperity and 
great social responsibility” (Maastricht)
“the uncertainties are legion” (Maastricht)
“the implications of the agreement on EMU are 
huge” (Maastricht)
“a remarkably ambitious and politically precarious 
currency reform” (Maastricht)
“the Maastricht agreement is full o f ambiguity and 
uncertainty” (Maastricht)
“it is like extending the spire of a church whose 
buttresses are in danger of sinking” (Maastricht)
“the Government dislikes monetary union arguing 
that it is the slippery slide to federalism” 
(Maastricht)
“the entire process is out of kilter” (Maastricht)
“the Maastricht timetable is now crushingly tight” 
(Madrid)
“(running) down the federalist road” (Maastricht)
“Britain would have a second currency -  a kind of 
monetary Esperanto” (Madrid)
“heaping the Ossa of over-rigid monetary policy on 
the Pelion of an unnatural degree of political 
integration” (Maastricht)
“the euro, adopted by leading countries would be 
an altogether more serious animal” (Madrid)
“bondage in an unhealthy centralisation of 
monetary, social, defence and foreign policy” 
(Maastricht)
“a decision will be taken which, it can truthfully be 
claimed, will change the face of Europe” (Dublin)
Timetable for monetary union is “rigid” 
(Maastricht)
“that fateful project” (Dublin) A “mess” (Maastricht)
“the decision goes to the heart of the European 
identity” (Dublin)
A “disaster” (Maastricht)
“a single currency will have immense implications 
for Britain, whatever the terms on which it is 
finally agreed and whether or not Britain joins it” 
(Dublin)
‘The currency must be managed for political rather 
than economic ends” (Madrid)
“there can be no hiding from the consequences of 
the single currency, whatever stance Britain takes” 
(Dublin)
“the cornerstone o f a federal Europe” (Madrid)
“a single currency is in principle a desirable thing 
for Britain in Europe”
“the headlong rush to federalism” (Madrid)
The “complex and hugely important question of the 
single currency” (Dublin)
“the federal menace” (Madrid)
“the tortuous road to monetary union for Europe” 
(Dublin)
“the ratchet of federalism” (Madrid)
“the euro is no longer a figment of the imagination: 
now, for the first time, there is something to see” 
(Dublin)
“scrapping the national currencies” (Madrid)
“the member states of a united Europe will never 
again go to war with each other and will instead 
bind themselves together in peace by sharing the 
most powerful of all social cements -  a common 
currency”. (Dublin)
“the Euro juggernaut” (Madrid)
“the single currency is a question o f unprecedented 
magnitude in recent peacetime Europe, as well as 
one with unpredictable, convulsive implications” 
(Election 97)
EMU is “clearly a political rather than an economic 
question” (Dublin)
“No economic decision in this parliament is more 
important than the single currency. It must be 
thought through long and hard.” (Election 97)
A “European dream” (Dublin)
“the potential risks are high” (Euro-11 decision) A “sinking ship” (Dublin)
“EMU candidates had to don fiscal straitjackets to A “housewife’s headache” (Dublin)
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qualify for the single currency” (Euro-11 decision)
“The single currency (...) is irreversible” (Euro-11 
decision)
“all the quaintness of a rain dance and about the 
same potency” (citing John Major) (Dublin)
“it is a matter of national destiny” (Danish) “ill-starred plan” (Dublin)
“hideous new banknote” (Dublin)
“Europe’s new funny money” (Dublin)
“EMU is the most important issue to face this 
country since the war” (Election 97)
The issue “transcends party” (Election 97)
“John Major described the single currency as the 
most important peace-time issue this country has 
faced in living political memory” (Election 97)
“the jargon about economic and monetary union, 
convergence criteria, exchange rate mechanisms 
and so on concerns the abolition of the pound” 
(Election 97)
‘The abolition of the pound means the end of 
British national independence.” (Election 97)
“it now looks very likely that the euro will be soft 
rather than hard” (Election 97)
“the euro will be constitutionally weak” (Election 
97)
“we now have the likelihood of an inflationary 
“camembert” currency” (Amsterdam)
“an inflationary disaster” (Amsterdam)
“the single currency is essentially a political 
undertaking” (Euro-11 Decision)
It is a “myth that the euro is nothing more than a 
technical instrument for settling accounts. In fact 
the single currency involves huge change in the 
ways in which European states managed their 
economies.” (Euro-11 Decision)
“the single currency compels Europe towards full 
economic and political union”
“the single currency, as now conceived, is both a 
violation of the Treaty of Maastricht and a hostage 
to fortune” (Euro-11 Decision)
It means that “some states will be trapped in a 
fiscal straitjacket” (Euro-11 Decision)
“conceived as a political fantasy, it seems destined 
to end as an economic failure” (Euro-11 Decision)
“there are political, as well as economic, dangers in 
economic and monetary union” (Euro-11 Decision)
“the single currency has always been an explicitly 
political project.” (Euro-11 Decision)
“Monetary union is an attempt by the French to 
create a central European bank by which they can 
influence German interest rates” (Euro-11 
Decision)
“risky” (Euro-11 Decision)
“the euro is an intrusion on our national life that we 
would rather not have to confront” (Euro Launch)
“the single currency has serious implications for 
national sovereignty” (Euro Launch)
“EMU has been consciously developed by 
Europe’s political elites as an instrument for 
achieving full economic and political union” (Euro 
Launch)
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Table 4 Text coded as EMU-relevant evidence from the leading articles (The
Guardian/  Observer)
No. Positive (pro-EMU) Negative (anti-EMU)
1 The EMU model preoccupied by the control o f  inflation - 
because that is Germany's black hole o f  history - has 
delivered great prosperity and great social responsibility 
(otherwise known as self-discipline). (Maastricht)
Whether it can do that for either the Community w e have, 
or the wider Community that beckons, is beyond firm 
prediction. Reactions within nations that are not, and 
cannot be, Germany may tear it apart: with a cost that can 
be reckoned. (Maastricht)
2 The benefits forgone include not just the savings from not 
having to buy currencies, but also the prospect o f  having 
the new European Central Bank located in Britain, o f  
which there is now no chance. (Maastricht)
At present countries with poor productivity and high 
inflation may, under the existing Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM), devalue their currency to regain 
competitiveness. This will no longer be possible once there 
is a single currency. (Maastricht)
3 To the extent that opting out o f  a single currency 
agreement reflects doubts about our commitment to full 
integration, it may also act as a deterrent for the 
considerable overseas investment which has been attracted 
to the UK on the assumption that here was a secure 
manufacturing base for Europe. (Maastricht)
Countries will either have to improve their economic 
performance or become relatively poor regions within the 
large single market. (Maastricht)
4 Yet the real argument against hesitation, as everyone 
knows, stems from the perceived need for a European 
political order which binds and is built around Germany 
and (less certainly) France. (Madrid)
In theory, they can compensated by transfers from central 
Community funds, but the Brussels budget would have to 
be several times bigger than it is for the assistance to make 
much impact. Enlarging the budget is on no one's political 
agenda and, given the urgent cries for help from East 
Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, is not likely to be. 
(Maastricht)
5 How pleasant not to have to change pounds into francs into 
lira and back again! (Madrid)
He has been right to resist provocative and potentially 
destabilising moves towards an unrealistic level o f  political 
unification. And to stand tough in negotiations over some 
o f  these matters. (Dublin)
6 Or, less self-interestedly, they see a single currency as 
likely to end speculation and ease the task o f  business. 
(Madrid)
If it is fudged, then the European Union will be forced to 
bail out any nations which cannot stand the deflationary 
pace. (Dublin)
7 If that happens then UK savings institutions, keen to 
expand in the single market opened up by currency union, 
are bound to promote savings accounts denominated in the 
euro to anyone in Europe or Britain who wants them. Lots 
o f  people in Britain may want to put their savings into a 
"strong" euro account rather than a devaluation-prone 
pound. (Madrid)
There have to be some penalties but i f  the original German 
plan o f  automatic fines running into billions o f  pounds on 
recalcitrant countries had been accepted, it would have 
risked a massive social backlash in the guilty countries. 
(Dublin)
8 But i f  the Abbey National or Halifax were to offer savings 
accounts they would almost certainly have a plastic card 
attached to them. This would make it easier - and cheaper - 
to make payments when going to Europe on business or for 
a holiday. (Madrid)
The problem is that i f  one or more countries decide to let 
their deficits rise to 4  or 5 per cent o f  GDP then the burden 
o f  coping with it would fall on other countries who would  
either have to transfer resources (cash) or suffer higher 
interest rates. (Dublin)
9 Then, observing the emergence o f  a secondary currency in 
Britain, Sainsburys or Marks & Spencer may introduce 
credit or bank cards denominated in euros to be used at 
check-out points. Other retailers would then want to get in 
on the act. (Madrid)
To impose fixed fines on countries with heavy deficits by 
forcing them to hand over more m oney is a bit like treating 
haemophilia with bloodletting. (Dublin)
10 It would coincide with interesting new developments in 
digital technology (like electronic purses able to carry a 
stock o f  digital money convertible into other currencies) 
which by themselves could enable a common European 
currency to be introduced to Britain by market forces rather 
than the politicians. (Madrid)
the single currency is a question o f  unprecedented, 
magnitude in recent peacetime Europe, as w ell as one with 
unpredictable, convulsive implications. (Election 97)
11 ...corporations will almost certainly adopt the new Euro­
currency in a full-blooded way from the start. Most o f  their 
new loans are expected to be denominated in euros (just as 
they adopted the ecu a few years ago until it became 
obvious it wasn't going to be the common currency). 
(Madrid)
even a sound single currency must not be allowed to imply 
further centralisations, especially o f  taxation and public 
expenditure policy, massive issues which must not be 
allowed to creep on to the European agenda and against 
which a line must be drawn. (Election 97)
12 They will pay for their European imports in euros and may 
eventually warm to the idea o f  paying salaries in euros if
this step, i f  ever taken, would have diminishing 
implications for the sovereignty o f  any British parliament
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there is a demand for it. (Madrid) and any British government. (Election 97)
13 If farmers receive their subsidies in euros they may well try 
to pay some o f  their bills that way as well.
(Madrid)
With a hugely volatile pound and an economy which in 
terms o f  the business cycle, is several years ahead o f  the 
rest o f  the EU -  Tony Blair should be grateful he is 
watching all this from the sidelines. (Election 97)
14 Seventeen years o f  British negativism have not merely 
exhausted Britain's credit in the councils o f  Europe. They 
have also helped to create the current vogue in Germany 
and elsewhere for the more majoritarian, centralist 
Europeanism which is embodied in the intergovernmental 
conference proposals which will be discussed at Dublin 
next week. British abstentionism has promoted what it was 
intended to prevent. (Dublin)
Not to mention the millennium bug which may scupper the 
w hole operation anyway -  (Election 97)
15 If it is a strong currency and Britain stays out, then sterling 
will be sucked into its orbit. (Dublin)
(There’s a danger of) Europe being entrapped by 
unbendable fiscal constraints bearing little relation to the 
real world: it may even make monetary union ( . . .)  a 
project that ordinary people could relate to. (Election 97)
16 If it is weak and Britain stays out, then sterling will 
become overvalued and exports will be hit hard. (Dublin)
One o f  the serious potential obstacles hasn’t yet been 
seriously considered by governments. It is the twin 
pressures o f  changing computer systems to cope with 
monetary union while simultaneously removing the causes 
o f  the “millennium bomb” (arising from the inability o f  
computers with two-digit configurations to know what the 
date will be at the start o f  the new century). (Amsterdam)
17 a single currency is in principle a desirable thing for 
Britain in Europe because o f  its effect on exchange rate 
instability, transaction costs, interest rates and - this is a 
more recent discovery - because o f  its disciplinary effect 
on the public finances o f  other European nations. (Dublin)
One practical factor which will slow  the march o f  the euro 
is that scarce computer staff will be so tied up with trying 
to solve the millennium bug that they may not have the 
resources to convert other systems to the euro. (Euro-11 
Decision)
18 that a single currency must work as w ell as possible, 
whether or not Britain decides to join it, because a 
European single currency will profoundly affect our 
economic and monetary circumstances, whatever our 
relationship to it. (Dublin)
there is a potentially lethal cost i f  Britain joined a monetary 
union which went wrong because (say) European interest 
rates had to be kept high to stop inflation in France and 
Germany while the UK economy needed low interest rates 
to pull it out o f  recession and high unemployment. (Euro- 
11 Decision)
19 Britain must take an active and positive part in the 
negotiations which lead up to any decision because to do 
otherwise is to renounce control over our own affairs. 
(Dublin)
The head o f  the Federal Reserve has a statutory duty not 
only to keep inflation down but to maintain the highest 
level o f  growth consistent with that inflation target. It is 
this second objective (which EMU doesn't have despite 
French pressure for it) that has persuaded Alan Greenspan, 
the revered head o f  the Fed, to resist market pressures to 
raise interest rates at the first sign o f  monetary overbeating. 
So far that has proved very successful. (Euro-11 Decision)
20 to Europhiles the images are on a different plane: they are 
windows o f  opportunity, bridges o f  reconciliation and 
gateways to a new age in which the member states o f  a 
united Europe will never again go to war with each other 
and will instead bind themselves together in peace by 
sharing that most powerful o f  all social cements - a 
common currency. (Dublin)
Second, Europe must realise that one o f  the reasons why 
the United States works as a single currency area (apart 
from having a single language) is that it has very flexible 
labour markets. (Euro-11 Decision)
21 People will start to take out euro-denominated plastic cards 
when they visit Europe: some will want euro-savings 
accounts: others will want their mortgages backed by the 
"strong" euro - which may lead to some salaries being paid 
in euros in order to avoid having to repay a mortgage in a 
strong currency (the euro) out o f  wages paid in what might 
be a depreciating one (sterling). (Dublin)
When Boeing sheds thousands o f  workers, they jump into 
their cars to work elsewhere. That is not possible in Europe 
where technical and cultural barriers prevent people from 
finding jobs readily in other countries. (Euro-11 Decision)
22 Companies like BMW which by then w ill be paying all 
their Continental subsidiaries in euros will probably be 
only too happy to offer similar facilities to its Rover 
employees in Britain. (Dublin)
America is also able to allocate extra money to distressed 
parts o f  the country suffering disproportionate 
unemployment on a scale that a united Europe is unlikely 
to match. (Euro-11 Decision)
23 By that time shops like Tesco and Sainsbury - thanks to 
advances in electronic money - will be able to accept 
payments in either currency. (Dublin)
The euro was supposed to take politics out o f  monetary 
policy yet its launch has been marred by political fixing o f  
the crudest kind. If this is what a European Central Bank
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freed from political interference is, then goodness knows 
what an interventionist model would look like.
24 (There are) huge potential advantages o f  a single 
European currency in terms o f  living standards, fiscal 
stability and economic growth. (Election 97)
The City was expecting investors to sell euro-currencies 
yesterday and move into the pound or the dollar on the 
grounds that political interference in ECB's affairs was 
bound to make Europe's new currency weaker than the 
Deutschmark on which it has been modelled. But these 
fears were offset by the prospect that German interest rates 
may rise to prove that the concept o f  sound money isn't 
being swept aside. (Euro-11 Decision)
25 (John Major) was right to compel those who oppose him to 
face up to the risks which British exclusion from the 
project may entail. (Election 97)
(some of) the central problems o f  the ECB: like giving it a 
remit compelling it to take account o f  unemployment as 
w ell as inflation, and making it politically accountable to 
European electors. The fact that ECB tenure has been fixed  
for the next 12 years only underlines the scale o f  the 
problem. (Euro-11 Decision)
26 You wouldn’t think from all the talk o f  Euro-sclerosis that 
the EU as an economic unit has a trade surplus with the 
rest o f  the world that improved every year from 1993 to 
1996 when it was equivalent to 1.8 per cent o f  the entire 
GDP o f  the EU. (Amsterdam)
The single currency w ill happen on January 1 and is 
irreversible. William Hague believes it will rapidly lead to 
supranational control over taxation and spending, en route 
to the political union which is the true driving force behind 
the rush to EMU.
27 Nor would you think from all the talk o f  globalisation and 
losing out to Asian markets that Europe is around 90 per 
cent self-sufficient in what it produces. By and large EU  
countries export to, and import from, each other. 
(Amsterdam)
Hague’s fierce rhetoric is undercut by his caution. That 
does not give his critics the right to dismiss his critique o f  
Europe’s ponderous economic and political characteristics, 
nor the deflationary impact euro and its “one size fits all” 
interest-rate policy could have on jobs in many parts o f  the 
union. (Euro-11 Decision)
28 Put these two facts together and you get a strong argument 
for an EU-wide expansion -  perhaps through co-ordinated 
tax changes as well as jointly lowering interest rates -  to 
boost employment without risking running into a major 
balance o f  payments crisis. (Amsterdam)
The foundations o f  the European house were neglected by 
the architects. It has to have people's adherence, heart and 
mind. And people live still inside nation states with all 
their dense (and sometimes oppressive) allegiances, 
histories and predilections. (Danish)
29 B ig companies and financial institutions are already 
swinging over to the euro in a big way out o f  self-interest. 
(Euro-11 Decision)
But in what member state are people not now confused, if  
not downright hostile? (Danish)
30 Pilkington, the glass company, told MPs it was converting 
all its systems to using the euro because it would eliminate 
differences in production costs in different European 
plants. (Euro-11 Decision)
31 ICI said that euro cash would spread throughout the 
economy and Siemens added that even i f  Britain did not 
join the single currency, "the euro w ill come through the 
back door" because companies and people who are paid in 
euros will want to spend them in the UK. (Euro-11 
Decision)
32 Sainsbury's says that just as it accepts Irish Punts in its 
stores in Northern Ireland, so it will accept all types o f  
European payments from 2002 (when euro notes and coins 
start to circulate). (Euro-11 Decision)
33 Suddenly, there's no need to cash surplus foreign currency 
when you return from that European holiday. (Euro-11 
Decision)
34 Members o f  the public w ill find it in their self-interest to 
think in terms o f  the euro because it will enable them to 
locate places in Europe where prices (henceforth 
denominated in the same currency) are cheaper. (Euro-11 
Decision)
35 MPs were right to point out that there could be a cost to not 
joining the euro i f  things go wrong for us (as much as 1 per 
cent o f  GDP by 2005) and that a true evaluation o f  the 
"success" o f  monetary union will take at least five years 
because o f  the need to study the effects over a full business 
cycle. (Euro-11 Decision)
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36 The US economy, a single market with a single currency, 
is Europe's role model. On the evidence o f  this week's 
statistics, it seems to have discovered perpetual motion. If 
emulated in Europe, it could usher in a new golden age. 
(Euro-11 Decision)
37 The American economy, fuelled by its commanding lead in 
the information technology revolution, is now in its 
seventh successive year o f  inflationless growth. (Euro-11 
Decision)
38 Even i f  Britain doesn't join EMU, she will have to track the 
Maastricht criteria under pain o f  being punished by the 
money markets for deviation. If Britain eventually does 
join then the whole economic strategy will have to shift 
from monetary policy (solely the job o f  the central bank) to 
fiscal policy. That means that the UK will have to maintain 
a borrowing requirement much less than the Maastricht 
ceiling (3 per cent o f  GDP) in order to have the flexibility 
to cut taxes or increase spending when the UK economy 
gets out o f  sync with the rest o f  Europe. (Euro-11 
Decision)
40 The 11 candidates for EMU have a combined GDP o f  
almost 80 per cent o f  the US and a balance o f  payments 
surplus where America has a deficit. At the moment it 
looks like a second division competitor to the US. Maybe 
the biggest thing going for EMU is the unexpected. (Euro- 
11 Decision)
41 A  little over five years ago people were despairing o f  
America which seemed to be falling seriously behind Japan 
in the technology race. But the US fought back and now  
looks unreachable. (Euro-11 Decision)
42 For some, for example Italians and Germans, Europe has 
been a kind o f  better self; national leaders have advanced 
the European cause with, often, popular acclaim. (Danish)
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Table 5 Text coded as EMU-relevant evidence from the leading articles (The
Daily/Sunday Telegraph)
No. Positive (pro-EMU) Negative (anti-EMU)
1 there is room for a degree o f  confusion besides which the 
transaction costs, which at present burden the conversions 
between different European currencies, will seem footling. 
(Maastricht)
2 The Continental passenger arriving at Heathrow will be 
able to pay for his London taxi with pictures o f  11 
foreigners including, let us imagine, Aristotle, Herge, 
Rembrandt, Eamon de Valera, Caruso, Colette, and 
whoever may be Luxembourg's most famous son or 
daughter. (Maastricht)
3 The matter may even be complicated further by the fact 
that regions o f  countries, claiming for themselves 
Scotland's ancient right to print its own notes, will 
celebrate the heroes o f  Catalonia, Languedoc or Schleswig- 
Holstein. This cultural diversity, one must suspect, will 
prove too much for the traditionally uncertain temper o f  the 
London cabby. (Maastricht)
4 Dr Klaus is right: premature decisions are worse than 
decisions postponed; in the latter case at least, there is 
more evidence to go  on. (Maastricht)
5 The uncertainties are legion - the possibility o f  a coup in 
the Soviet Union being only one. (Maastricht)
6 An even greater irony is that an economic Community 
which has proved itself only too adept at shuffling o ff  
necessary action should be stampeding into structural 
reforms whose wisdom is dubious and over which there is 
no substantial urgency. (Maastricht)
7 A  Community which cannot agree on subsidies for suckler 
cows or sheep wants to superimpose on the chaos o f  its 
farming policies a remarkably ambitious and politically 
precarious currency reform. (Maastricht)
8 the entire process is out o f  kilter. N o one in their right mind 
would have chosen to start from here. (Maastricht)
9 w e are not merely engaged in protecting our independence, 
but limiting the injury that could be suffered by others i f  
the Europe o f  the philosophers runs so far ahead o f  itself 
down the federalist road that it falls over its own peoples. 
(Maastricht)
10 What we have avoided - immediate bondage in an 
unhealthy centralisation o f  monetary, social, defence and 
foreign policy - is more important than what we have 
gained. (Maastricht)
11 the country's political elite sticks doggedly to policies 
which have little to do with dom estic economic 
requirements and everything to do with their determination 
to dump the franc and join a single European currency in 
1999. (Madrid)
12 the currency must be managed for political rather than 
economic ends. (Madrid)
13 This policy means cutting borrowing to meet criteria laid 
down by the Maastricht Treaty, and maintaining an 
overvalued currency (which does much to keep 
unemployment at 11.5 per cent compared with Britain's 8.1 
per cent). (Madrid)
14 The franc is vulnerable, but will doubtless be given
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sufficient support, i f  necessary, by the Bundesbank, for 
Germany knows that without France, the single currency is 
a dead letter. (Madrid)
15 In the coming months and years, British taxpayers' money  
w ill be spent on a campaign o f  proselytisation to win round 
the unconvinced and the apathetic. (Madrid)
16 The Brussels commission will proceed as i f  the social and 
econom ic problems caused by Maastricht's convergence 
criteria did not exist. (Madrid)
17 The European Community, it cannot be stressed too often, 
has more important questions in hand, notably enlargement 
and the reform o f  agricultural subsidy. But for Britain, and 
for the Cabinet, a decision about the single currency cannot 
be postponed for much longer. (Madrid)
18 The strains o f  a single currency would stretch the 
community's already taut budget to breaking point. 
(Madrid)
19 Its introduction could sabotage the prospects o f  those 
Eastern European countries waiting to join the EC. 
(Madrid)
20 Above all, and o f  most interest to ourselves, how would  
those who stay outside a single currency protect their 
interests vis-a-vis those who sign up? (Madrid)
21 It is clear, on any proper reading o f  the Maastricht Treaty, 
that virtually none o f  the countries preparing for Economic 
and Monetary Union will m eet the treaty's "convergence 
criteria" within the timetable. (Dublin)
22 In some cases - that o f  Italy, for example - there is not the 
faintest hope o f  getting anywhere near the targets. 
(Dublin)
23 In the minds o f  most, EMU is so clearly a political rather 
than an economic question that they believe the failure to 
converge is almost irrelevant: the project must go forward. 
(Dublin)
24 The famous "opt-out" from EMU which Mr Major secured 
at Maastricht was designed for just such an eventuality as 
this, to ensure that this country was not irretrievably 
committed to a project whose success was uncertain. 
(Dublin)
25 Kenneth Clarke, the Chancellor, has said all along that 
convergence must really take place. (Dublin)
26 A  single currency built on weak foundations would defeat 
its own purposes (Dublin)
27 It is not Conservative Party opinion: the number o f  
constituency associations which would vote for EMU  
tomorrow could be counted on the fingers o f  one hand. 
(Dublin)
28 It is not business or industry, although some o f  the larger 
and more corporatist firms like the idea o f  a single 
currency. (Dublin)
29 It is not even backbench Tory opinion in the Commons: the 
number o f  irreconcilable Euro-enthusiasts hardly reaches 
double figures. (Dublin)
30 The small band o f  persistent sceptics such as Peter Lilley 
and Michael Howard has been joined by the broader, 
unideological mass - people like the President o f  the Board 
o f  Trade, Ian Lang, and the Welsh Secretary, William  
Hague. (Dublin)
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31 Nor is it reasonable to keep businessmen guessing about 
whether or not they will have to face the costs o f  transition. 
(Dublin)
32 for instance, that the opt-out remains alive, but that the 
fudging o f  the convergence criteria makes it unlikely that a 
Tory government could recommend the project (Dublin)
33 Mr Major emphasised yesterday that there was no question 
o f  Britain joining stage three o f  Economic and Monetary 
Union i f  the criteria were fudged (Dublin)
34 They can see the banknote which has all but destroyed the 
Conservative Party, and may soon replace the pound. 
(Dublin)
35 As Peter Shore said in the Commons debate on Europe last 
week, our freedom to borrow and tax will be severely 
constrained by involvement in EMU. (Dublin)
36 "Are w e really saying," the veteran Labour sceptic asked, 
"that we are no better than a rate-capped local authority? 
D o we really think that w e do not have the good sense to 
make the correct economic judgment for our people and 
our nation year by year?" (Dublin)
37 Rebuttal: la the same debate Kenneth Clarke defended the 
Maastricht criteria on the grounds that "they take as their 
underlying principles our own guiding principles on 
macro-economic policy". (Dublin)
But why, then, do we need the help o f  supranational 
institutions to enact our own home-grown principles? 
(Dublin)
38 The economies, interests and prejudices - admirable and 
not - o f  the EU's 370 million people in 15 countries, defy  
circumscription by the architects o f  Europe's new funny 
money. (Dublin)
40 There is such a thing as a European culture, but its political 
expression is not robust enough to subsume distinctive 
national characteristics (Dublin)
41 If Europe were genuinely united, it should be possible for 
the various denominations o f  banknote to feature, say, 
Charlemagne, Pope Innocent III or Martin Luther. 
(Dublin)
42 For years, the issue o f  "Europe" has been rendered almost 
unintelligible by the mumbo-jumbo used by its architects, 
but it has gradually become clear to people that the jargon 
about economic and monetary union, convergence criteria, 
exchange rate mechanisms and so on concerns the 
abolition o f  the pound. (Election 97)
43 If it turns out that our true government is located elsewhere 
- in Brussels or Frankfurt - what is a British general 
election for? (Election 97)
44 Although it suits the Labour Party to express a certain 
scepticism, the N ew  Labour heart (if  there is such a thing) 
is with Brussels, and Brussels is with N ew  Labour. There 
is no Euro-sceptic reason for voting Labour. (Election 97)
45 If Paul Sykes, the millionaire philanthropist, is right, there 
are fewer than 30 Tory candidates in winnable seats who  
will not declare their opposition to a single currency and 
take Mr Sykes's money for their campaigns. (Election 97)
46 It is now clear that the French have won the argument: the 
continuing slide o f  the mark against both sterling and the 
dollar is evidence that the markets, at least, are in no doubt 
that the euro will be constitutionally weak. (Election 97)
47 The Commission's interim ruling is, in these terms, 
remarkably convenient: five countries were judged likely 
to have deficits o f  exactly three per cent o f  GDP - the
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figure needed to qualify for EMU.
48 The Italian government, whose deficit was forecast at 3.2 
per cent, is understandably outraged: it has come from 
much further behind than other members, and independent 
studies predict that Spain, France and Germany itself will 
also have excessive deficits in 1997. (Election 97)
49 the Commission's evident readiness to elevate political 
over economic considerations has robbed the euro's 
supporters in this country o f  their last remaining argument. 
The EU is clearly less interested in monetary stability than 
in including as many states as possible in the next stage o f  
European construction. (Election 97)
50 other European countries will not meet the Maastricht 
criteria for monetary union by January 1, 1999. 
(Amsterdam)
51 M ost forecasters believe France and Germany will be 
between half and one percentage point adrift on the key 
three per cent budget deficit criterion; and the French 
deficit could be as much as 4.5 per cent o f  GDP, according 
to a leaked French government memo. (Amsterdam)
52 It is also true that the French have just elected a 
government which seems likely to make matters worse. 
Lionel Jospin's entire appeal to the electorate was that he 
w ould scrap the austerity o f  "Maastricht" without 
scrapping the treaty itself. (Amsterdam)
53 Helmut Kohl and Theo W aigel, his finance minister, know 
that the euro must be shown to be as solid, as non- 
infiationary, as bomb-proof, as the Deutschemark: 
otherwise they could face a revolt from a German public 
whose suspicions have already been rightly excited by the 
attempt to revalue the Bundesbank's bullion. (Amsterdam)
54 It might be, as EMU nears its critical moment, that the 
project will be pulled apart by the conflict that always lay 
at its heart: between the French desire to wrest control o f  
German monetary policy, and the German desire to 
maintain Teutonic rigour. (Amsterdam)
55 w e now have the likelihood o f  an inflationary "camembert" 
currency, as France and Germany ignore the other's 
blemishes, turn o ff  the light, and leap into bed. Many 
Labour MPs will be strongly tempted by the "euro for 
growth". And yet it is the Government's official policy, 
correctly, that EMU cannot be fudged. Will Mr Blair use 
Britain's voice and veto to insist that the treaty's criteria be 
observed? Or w ill he allow Europe to drift to an 
inflationary disaster? That may be the first big test o f  his 
statesmanship. (Amsterdam)
56 France's socialist government was elected only two weeks 
ago on a specific promise not to proceed with monetary 
union i f  doing so would mean spending cuts and job losses. 
(Amsterdam)
57 A  government which runs an excessive deficit will be 
faced with a fine o f  between 0.2 per cent and 0.5 per cent 
o f  its GDP for each year that it fails to take remedial 
action. (Amsterdam)
58 All that the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, has won 
is a banal statement to the effect that the EU recognises the 
importance o f  jobs. (Amsterdam)
59 The skirmish over the stability pact is the latest 
engagement in a quiet but fierce conflict between France 
and Germany over Europe's money. (Amsterdam)
60 For decades the French have sought to loosen the 
Bundesbank's tight monetary policy, primarily by binding 
Germany into a monetary union with relatively inflation- 
prone Latin countries. (Amsterdam)
61 The Germans, on the other hand, have been reluctant to
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dilute the strength o f  the mark - as have the other members 
o f  the D-mark bloc. (Amsterdam)
62 So does the deal on the stability pact mean that the euro 
w ill be a hard currency after all? No. Yesterday's decision  
must be set against a series o f  signals from the EU and 
national governments that the Maastricht criteria w ill not 
be rigidly interpreted. (Amsterdam)
63 Despite a slight rise in the value o f  the mark yesterday, the 
money markets seem to have no doubt that the euro will be 
inflationary. (Amsterdam)
64 the launching o f  the single currency is essentially a 
political undertaking (Euro-11 Decision)
65 the myth that the euro is nothing more than a technical 
instrument for settling accounts. In fact, the single  
currency involves a huge change in the ways in which 
European states manage their economies. (Euro-11 
D ecision)
66 Last year's Stability Pact, which imposed spending 
restraints on profligate governments, has already set the 
precedent for centralised EU control o f  budgetary and tax 
policy. (Euro-11 Decision)
67 there will be intrusions into the ways in which member 
states can run their pension systems. (Euro-11 D ecision)
68 the single currency compels Europe towards full 
econom ic and political union. (Euro-11 Decision)
69 The French know that the ECB is going to be a work in 
progress, shaped by events, and they are determined to 
ensure that it conducts its affairs in their interest. (Euro-11 
D ecision)
70 Few member states have met the "convergence criteria" 
laid down in the treaty as necessary conditions for 
sustainable monetary union. (Euro-11 Decision)
71 the single currency, as now conceived, is both a violation 
o f  the Treaty o f  Maastricht and a hostage to fortune. (Euro- 
11 Decision)
72 Far from reducing their national debts to 60 per cent o f  
GDP, the majority have allowed them to rise over the past 
seven years by an average o f  15 per cent. (Euro-11 
Decision)
73 The debts o f  Italy and Belgium are over twice the limit. 
(Euro-11 Decision)
74 Several countries have engaged in flagrant trickery to keep 
their annual budget deficits below the ceiling o f  three per 
cent o f  GDP, but they have been allowed to get away with 
it. (Euro-11 Decision)
75 After ceding control over interest rates to the ECB, they 
w ill find they cannot offset the effects o f  recession by  
cutting taxes or increasing expenditure. (Euro-11 Decision)
76 This does not mean that the euro will collapse under a 
mountain o f  debt, o f  course, but it does mean that some 
states will be trapped in a fiscal straitjacket. (Euro-11 
D ecision)
77 The euro system is one that can work properly only in good  
weather. As soon as the European economy hits 
turbulence, the engines are going to jam. (Euro-11 
D ecision)
78 Even its most fervent supporters agree the single currency  
must be bom free o f  political interference. (Euro-11 
D ecision)
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79 The politicians who conceived it promised to allow their 
fledgling currency to be adopted by independent foster 
parents at the European Central Bank. (Euro-11 Decision)
80 Only by making such a commitment were they able to 
convince the markets the euro would not be undermined by 
inflation. (Euro-11 Decision)
81 events at this weekend's summit in Brussels have 
demonstrated that Europe's leaders are unwilling and 
unable to keep their word. (Euro-11 Decision)
82 everything touched by Brussels becomes political. (Euro- 
11 Decision)
83 It was clearly spelt out that the governor o f  the central bank 
would serve for an eight-year term; a period that, it was 
felt, would insulate the incumbent from political pressures. 
(Euro-11 Decision)
84 Many o f  the 11 countries which agreed this weekend to 
merge their currencies have met the convergence criteria 
for national debt and government borrowing only by dint 
o f  the most flagrant fiscal fiddles. (Euro-11 Decision)
85 The most likely outcome is that this further evidence o f  
political interference w ill undermine confidence in the 
euro. (Euro-11 Decision)
86 Today, 10,000 City workers wait at their desks on a Bank 
Holiday, preparing to deal with the fallout from this latest 
fudge. (Euro-11 Decision)
87 The markets will sell marks and francs, and buy pounds 
and dollars. (Euro-11 D ecision)
88 A stronger pound will make life even more difficult for our 
beleaguered exporters. (Euro-11 Decision)
89 Conceived as a political fantasy, it seems destined to end as 
an economic failure. (Euro-11 Decision)
90 There is no common interest rate that suits all Europe's 
different economies. (Euro-11 Decision)
91 there are political, as well as economic, dangers in 
economic and monetary union - indeed, that the two are 
inextricably intertwined. (Euro-11 Decision)
92 Therefore a country that joins the single currency could 
find, i f  its employment was high, that rates rose. (Euro-11 
Decision)
93 Under these circumstances, Mr Hague warned, there could 
be civil unrest. (Euro-11 Decision)
94 Mr Hague's, Lord Hurd said that "a European monetary 
policy which produced . . .  barricades in the streets o f  
Paris, Naples, or Leipzig would not be able to shelter 
behind the text o f  a treaty or a stability pact". (Euro-11 
Decision)
95 THE forces o f  federalism are fighting back. As soon as 
William Hague ended the eight-year fudge o f  the Tory line 
on EMU, retaliation was inevitable. (Euro-11 Decision)
96 He pretends that the plan is a mechanical "completion o f  
the single market", whereas the single currency has 
always been an explicitly political project. (Euro-11 
Decision)
97 Monetary union is an attempt by the French to create a 
central European bank by which they can influence 
German interest rates. (Euro-11 Decision)
98 British membership would remove the ability o f  a British 
government to manage the econom y in the national 
interest. (Euro-11 Decision)
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99 As Sir Leon says him self, in words that might have been 
lifted from Mr Hague's speech, "there is no doubt in my 
mind that EMU will not be sustainable without significant 
further structural reforms in Europe's labour and product 
markets". (Euro-11 Decision)
100 During his time in the Brussels Commission, his colleagues 
have promulgated a spate o f  measures making EU labour 
markets less flexible, less capable o f  absorbing the shock 
o f  a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. (Euro-11 Decision)
101 The danger o f  EMU is that, i f  one nation in the currency 
zone finds itself suffering econom ic hardship that it could 
have avoided with the freedom to manage its own 
currency, there will be nothing that the politicians w ill be 
able to tell their angry electors. (Euro-11 Decision)
102 To say that Britain must join, because otherwise she will be 
"left out", is not to show any particular confidence in 
EMU, but a lack o f  confidence in Britain. Sir Leon should 
admit it: he is a Brito-sceptic. (Euro-11 Decision)
103 there is nothing inconsistent about opposing the single  
currency, while remaining within the EU. (Euro Launch)
104 THE Government faces an uphill task persuading the 
public to vote for abolition o f  the pound in a future 
referendum. (Euro Launch)
105 M ost o f  us, apparently, assume that our country w ill be 
forced by events to join Economic and Monetary Union in 
the end, but we do not care for it. (Euro Launch)
106 But his Government faces the likelihood that this 
ambivalence will remain unchanged, at best, for months or 
years to come. (Euro Launch)
107 Britons will not be able to see, feel or spend the new  
currency on trips to the Continent. (Euro Launch)
108 The euro will merely be an invisible accounting unit for 
bonds, stocks and bank accounts until 2002. (Euro Launch)
109 The European Central Bank has set itself an ambitious 
target o f  4.5 per cent annual growth in the broad money 
supply, a target that it can scarcely ignore after telling the 
international markets that this would be the guiding light o f  
monetary policy. (Euro Launch)
110 Further interest rate cuts in the first half o f  next year are 
out o f  the question. (Euro Launch)
111 Indeed, the ECB may be compelled to raise rates to restrain 
monetary expansion that is already pushing through the 
limits. (Euro Launch)
112 The risk is that the euro w ill appreciate rapidly, becoming  
seriously overvalued during the course o f  1999. (Euro 
Launch)
113 The effect will be compounded by huge portfolio shifts 
from US dollars into euros by Asian central banks and 
international investors. (Euro Launch)
114 Economic growth has already stalled in Germany and Italy. 
(Euro Launch)
115 While there is little risk o f  outright recession, the core 
EMU states face a period o f  protracted stagnation. (Euro 
Launch)
116 Unemployment will not com e down significantly from its 
double-digit levels in Germany, France and Italy. (Euro 
Launch)
117 It could start creeping back up again. (Euro Launch)
331
118 The current ceasefire between Europe's socialist 
governments - which were not in power when the 
Maastricht rules were written - and the unelected, 
unaccountable and ultra-orthodox bankers in Frankfurt is 
certain to give way to a raging battle for control o f  
econom ic policy. (Euro Launch)
119 Only a third o f  voters are aware that the single currency  
has serious implications for national sovereignty. In other 
words, they do not yet realise that EMU has been 
consciously developed by Europe's political elites as an 
instrument for achieving full economic and political union, 
and will therefore lead necessarily to the evisceration o f  
Parliament. (Euro Launch)
120 They do not know this because the debate has been 
conducted in such a dishonest manner in this country, as i f  
the purpose o f  the euro were lower "transaction costs" or 
exchange rate stability. (Euro Launch)
121 In Britain, unlike in Europe, the anti-EMU case will be 
made by influential businessmen and the dominant wing o f  
a major political party. (Euro Launch)
122 The public clearly believes that the Government has 
already made its decision to join EMU, and there is 
perceptible irritation that ministers are not coming clean on 
the issue. (Danish)
123 In fact, many - probably the majority - o f  those opposed to 
monetary union do not necessarily wish to withdraw from 
the EU. (Danish)
124 As Lord Owen points out: "Britain has the constitutional 
right and the economic and political clout to stay in the EU 
but say 'no' to the euro." (Danish)
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BRITAIN IN EUROPE
SELF-COMPLETION QUESTIONNAIRE
S«r. No. 301-04 
Cort 03 305-06
INTERVIEWER: ENTER SERIAL NUMBER:
To selected respondent:
The questions inside are about your views on Britain's place in Europe.
We would like you to answer each question simply by placing a tick (✓) in one box for 
each question. The questionnaire should not take very long to complete, and we hope 
that you will find it interesting and enjoyable. The answers you give will be treated as 
confidential and anonymous.
•
Please return the questionnaire to the interviewer when you have finished.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.
Social and Community Planning Research is an independent social research institute 
registered as a charitable trust. Its projects are funded by government departments, 
local authorities, universities and foundations to provide information on social issues 
in Britain.
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OMI.Y
Q.1 Firstly, a few questions about Britain’s relationship with
the European Union (sometimes referred to as the European 
Community).
As a member state, would you say that Britain's relationship 
with the European Union should be ...
P LEASE TICK ONE BOX
... much closer. 
a little closer, 
a little less close, 
much less close, 
or is it about right? 
(Can’t choose)
<✓ )□□□□□
Q.2 How much more or less influence in the world do you 
think that closer links with the European Union would 
give Britain?
PLEASE TICK ONE BO X
Much more influence
(✓)
i_ i J
A little more influence □
A little less influence L a i
Much less influence □
It would make no difference □
(Can't choose) l_aj
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Q.3 And how much stronger or weaker economically do you 
feel that closer links with the European Union would 
make Britain?
P L E A SE  TICK ONE BOX
Much stronger economically, 
A little stronger economically 
A little weaker economically 
Much weaker economically 
It would make no difference 
(Can’t choose)
(✓>□□□
□
OTTKt
U SI
ONLY
Q.4 Which of the following do you think Britain’s long-term 
policy should be?
P LEA SE TICK O NE BOX ONLY
Britain should leave the European Union (EU),
Britain should stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s powers,
Things should be left as they are
Britain should stay in the EU and try to increase the EU's powers
Britain should stay in the EU and work towards the 
formation of a single European government
(Can't choose)
j/)
Ld□□□
Q.5 And here are three statements about the future of the 
pound in the European Union. Which one comes 
closest to your view?
PLEA SE TICK ONE BO X ONLY
The pound should be replaced by a single European currency
Both the pound and a new European currency should
be used in Britain
The pound should be kept as the only currency for Britain
(Can't choose)
< ✓ )□
□
n
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Q.6 How much do you agree or disagree with each of 
following statem ents?
he
P LEA SE TICK ONE BO X  
ON EACH U N E Strongly
agree Agree
Neither 
agree nor 
d isagree Disagree
Strongly (Can’t 
disagree ch o o se)
a. Unless Britain keeps its own 
currency, it will lose control 
of its own econom ic policy
□ □ □ □ □ □ 312
b. The EU countries should be more 
than just a trading bloc - their 
governments should make joint 
decisions on other things too
□ □ □ □ □ □ 313
c. Britain does not get enough 
out of the European Union, in 
comparison to what it puts in
□ □ □ □ □ □ 314
d. All things considered, Britain 
is a lot better off in the EU 
than out of it
□ □ □ □ □ □ 313
e. Lots of good British traditions 
will have to be given up if we 
strengthen our ties with the EU
□ □ □ □ □ □ 31A
f. The cost of living in Britain 
would rise significantly if we 
left the European Union
□ □ □ □ □ □ 317
g- Peace is much more secure 
because Britain is a member 
of the European Union
□ □ □ □ □ □ 319
h. Only the Germans have anything 
to gain from a single European 
currency
□ □ □ □ □ □ 319
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Q.7 How much do you agree or disagree with 
each of the following?
PL E A SE  TICK ONE BO X  
ON EACH LINE Strongly
agree Agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree Disagree
Strongly (Can’t 
disagree choose)
a. If we left the European Union, 
Britain would lose its best 
chance of real progress
□ □ □ □ □ □ 320
b. In a united Europe the various 
nations will lose their culture 
and their individuality
□ □ □ □ □ □ 321
c. Competition from other countries 
in the European Union is making 
Britain more modem and efficient
□ □ □ □ □ □ 322
d. If we stay in the EU, Britain 
will lose too much control over 
decisions that affect Britain
□ □ □ □ □ □ 323
e. There would be serious unem­
ployment in Britain if we 
left the European Union
□ □ □ □ □ □ 324
Q.8 Do you think that the British public has enough information 
on which to vote in a referendum on whether or not Britain 
should strengthen its links with the European Union?
P LEA SE TICK ONE BO X O NLY
Yes. enough information 
No, not enough 
(Can't choose)
( / )□
G
□
Q.9 And how about you? Do you feel that you have enough 
information on which to vote in a referendum on 
whether or not Britain should strengthen its links?
PLEA SE TICK ONE BO X ONLY
Yes, enough information 
No, not enough
(-0□□
(Can't choose)
Q.10 Hew much are you in favour or against having a referendum 
where the British public would vote on whether or not 
Britain should strengthen its links with the European Union?
PLEA SE TICK ONE B O X ONLY
Strongly in favour L d
In favour L _ i l
Neither in favour nor against
Against
Strongly against
(Can’t choose)
Q.11 If there were a referendum about Britain's ties with 
Europe, how likely is it that you would vote in it?
PLEA SE TICK ONE BO X ONLY
Definitely would ngi vote
Unlikely to vote
Quite likely to vote
'g'« i0
Definitely would vote
(Can’t say)
If you were to vote in a referendum about Europe,
(✓ )PLEASE TICK ONE BO X  ONL Y
To strengthen links with the European Union 
To weaken links with the European Union
I o keep things just as they are
(Can't choose)
■
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Q 13 Som e sav  that m ore decisions should be m ade bv the Eurooean 
Union. O thers say that more decisions should be m ade by 
individual aovem m ents. Do vou think decisions about each  
of the following should mostly be m ade by the European Union 
or mostly by individual governm ents?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX  
ON EACH LINE
S hould  be 
m ostly  
m ade  by 
th e  EU
S h ou ld  be 
m ostly  m ade  
by individual 
g o v e rn m e n ts
S hould  be 
m ade  by 
both 
equally
(C an’t
c h o o se )
a. Decisions about taxes? □ □ □ □ 330
b. Decisions about 
controllina Doiiution? □ □ □ □ 331
c. Decisions about defence? □ □ □ □ 332
d. Decisions about the  riahts of 
DeoDle at work? . □ □ □ □ 333
s- Decisions about immlon*twm? ni__u □ □ □ 334
Q.14 How much do you agree  or disagree with each  of 
following statem ents?
he
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX  
ON EACH LINE Strongly 
ag ree  A gree
rieiiiivi
ag re e  no r S trongly  (C an’t 
d isag ree  D isagree d isag ree  ch o o se )
a. British s e a s  should only 
be open to British fishing 
boats
□ □ □ □ □ □ 335
b. Britain should sign up to the 
EU rules for protecting 
people's rights a t work 
(the Social Chapter)
□  □ □ LJ □ □ 336
c. The European Union should 
expand its mem bership to inc­
lude som e of the ex-Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe
□□
□ □ □ □ 337
d. The European Union h as  too 
many petty rules and regulations 
which affect the way we live
□□
□ □ □ □ 336
e. If we signed up to the  EU 
rules for protecting people's 
ngnts ai work (the Su^ioi 
Chapter), this would cost 
Britain jobs
□  □ □ □ □ □ 336
Q.15 Please tick one box to show which comes closest 
to your view about the following statement?
Britain should do a ll it can to unite fully  
with the European Union
o m a
U K
ONLY
PLEA SE TICK ONE BO X  O NLY ( /)
Definitely □
Probably □
Not sure □
Probably not n
Definitely not □i— i
(Can’t choose) i »
Q.16 And please tick one box to show which comes closest 
to your view about the following statement?
The European Union should  be no more than 
ju s t  a trading bloc
PLEA SE TICK ONE B O X  O NLY (✓)
Definitely □
P r n h a h k / □
Not sure □
Probably not □
Definitely not □
(Can't choose) □
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Q.17 How much do you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?
OFFICE
USE
ONLY
P LEASE TICK ONE BOX  
ON EACH LINE
a. Taxpayers all over Europe 
are paying too much towards 
the costs of running the 
European Union
b. Only businessmen are bene- 
fitting from Britain being
a member of the EU
c. If we had a single European 
currency, British mortgage 
rates would be more likely 
to rise
d. EU rules are fairer to British 
farmers than to fanners in
e. Passport controls within 
the EU should be removed 
altogether
Strongly 
agree Agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Strongly (Can’t 
Disagree disagree choose)
□ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ 
□ □ □
! «
Q.18 Who do you think is benefiting most at the moment from Britain's 
membership of the European Union? Please tick one box to show 
which comes closest to your view?
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY
Britain is benefiting most 
Other European countries are benefiting most 
Both are benefiting equally
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n united or divided do you fee! each of the three ;V 
jor parties are on their policy towards Europe? 'M s -  v
•?; ■ 
' 'T': •;
EASE TICK ONE B O X  ' " - S om e- -N e ith
; ^ p H i « V £  . ; . / :
r.
' c. The Liberal Democrats?
Q.20 Finally, a quick quiz about Europe. For each 
of the following, please tick one box to show 
whether you think it is true or false, or 
whether you don't know?
..... True False
Don’t
know
a. The European Union has recently expanded 
to 15 members □ □ □  , 351
h Swir7Priand is tn join thp Furnnean llninn 1—1 
1_U
n
L_2J □ 353
' c.
<r ;
Britain’s income tax rates are decided in 
Brussels □ □ □ 353
" d. Elections to the European Parliament are 
held every 5 years □ □ □ 364
e. Of the three major British parties, the 
Liberal Democrats are the least in favour 
of the European Union □ □ □ - 355
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YCUR HELP 
Please hand this completed questionnaire back to the interviewer
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SPSS output from Analysis of Variance, including post-hoc Scheffe tests (ql, qS, q!2 and q!5)
Qi
Oneway
Descriptives
involved involvement continuum
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean
Minimum MaximumLower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 closer 127 2.7080 .65346 .05799 2.5933 2.8228 1.25 4.00
2.00 less close 54 2.6821 .69629 .09475 2.4920 2.8721 1.00 4.00
3.00 about right 17 2.5735 .71679 .17385 2.2050 2.9421 1.25 3.75
4.00 dont know 24 1.9861 .72301 .14758 1.6808 2.2914 .67 3.25
Total 222 2.6134 .70744 .04748 2.5198 2.7069 .67 4.00
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
involved involvement continuum
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
.251 3 218 .860
ANOVA
involved involvement continuum
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Siq.
Between Groups 10.862 3 3.621 7.914 .000
Within Groups 99.743 218 .458
Total 110.605 221
343
Post Hoc Tests
Multiple C om parisons
Dependent Variable: involved involvement continuum
Scheffe______________________________________
(I)q1_2007 recoded 
for table 6.6
(J)q1_2007 recoded 
for table 6.6
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 closer 2.00 less close .02591 .10989 .997 -.2837 .3355
3.00 about right .13448 .17469 .898 -.3577 .6267
4.00 dont know .72189* .15055 .000 .2977 1.1461
2.00 less close 1.00 closer -.02591 .10989 .997 -.3355 .2837
3.00 about right .10857 .18811 .954 -.4214 .6386
4.00 dont know .69599* .16594 .001 .2285 1.1635
3.00 about right 1.00 closer -.13448 .17469 .898 -.6267 .3577
2.00 less close -.10857 .18811 .954 -.6386 .4214
4.00 dont know .58742 .21442 .060 -.0167 1.1915
4.00 dont know 1.00 closer -.72189* .15055 .000 -1.1461 -.2977
2.00 less close -.69599* .16594 .001 -1.1635 -.2285
3.00 about right -.58742 .21442 .060 -1.1915 .0167
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Homogeneous Subsets
involved involvement continuum
Scheffea,b
q1_2007 recoded 
for table 6.6
Subset for alpha = .05
N 1 2
4.00 dont know 24 1.9861
3.00 about right 17 2.5735
2.00 less close 54 2.6821
1.00 closer 127 2.7080
Sig. 1.000 .891
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed, 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 31.525. 
t>. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean 
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are 
not guaranteed.
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Q5
Oneway
Descriptives
involved involvement continuum
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
1.00 The pound should 
be replaced by a single 43 2.8295 .79348 .12100 2.5853 3.0737 1.25 4.00
European currency 
2.00 Both the pound and 
a new European currency 64 2.8555 .54701 .06838 2.7188 2.9921 1.75 4.00
should be used in 
3.00 The pound should 
be kept as the only 105 2.4317 .68639 .06698 2.2989 2.5646 .75 4.00
currency for Britain 
8.00 (Cant choose) 9 2.1019 .76009 .25336 1.5176 2.6861 .67 3.25
Total 221 2.6184 .70866 .04767 2.5245 2.7123 .67 4.00
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
involved involvement continuum
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
2.694 3 217 .047
ANOVA
involved involvement continuum
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Siq.
Between Groups 11.572 3 3.857 8.462 .000
Within Groups 98.913 217 .456
Total 110.485 220
345
Post Hoc Tests
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: involved involvement continuum
Scheffe ___
(1) q5 Future of the pound (J) q5 Future of the pound
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 The pound should 2.00 Both the pound and
be replaced by a single a new European currency -.02601 .13313 .998 -.4011 .3491
European currency should be used in
3.00 The pound should
be kept as the only .39771* .12224 .016 .0533 .7421
currency for Britain
8.00 (Cant choose) .72761* .24748 .037 .0303 1.4249
2.00 Both the pound and 1.00 The pound should
a new European currency be replaced by a single .02601 .13313 .998 -.3491 .4011
should be used in European currency
3.00 The pound should
be kept as the only .42372* .10707 .002 .1221 .7254
currency for Britain
8.00 (Cant choose) .75362* .24035 .022 .0764 1.4308
3.00 The pound should 1.00 The pound should
be kept as the only be replaced by a single -.39771* .12224 .016 -.7421 -.0533
currency for Britain European currency
2.00 Both the pound and
a new European currency -.42372* .10707 .002 -.7254 -.1221
should be used in
8.00 (Cant choose)
.32989 .23450 .578 -.3308 .9906
8.00 (Cant choose) 1.00 The pound should
be replaced by a single -.72761* .24748 .037 -1.4249 -.0303
European currency
2.00 Both the pound and
a new European currency -.75362* .24035 .022 -1.4308 -.0764
should be used in
3.00 The pound should
be kept as the only -.32989 .23450 .578 -.9906 .3308
currency for Britain
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Homogeneous Subsets
involved involvement continuum
Scheffea,b
q5 Future of the pound N
Subset for alpha = .05
1 2
8.00 (Cant choose) 9 2.1019
3.00 The pound should
be kept as the only 105 2.4317 2.4317
currency for Britain
1.00 The pound should
be replaced by a single 43 2.8295
European currency
2.00 Both the pound and
a new European currency 64 2.8555
should be used in
Sig. .395 .180
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 25.076.
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the 
group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not 
guaranteed.
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Q12
Oneway
Descriptives
involved involvement continuum
95% Confidence Interval for
Mean
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum
4.00 To strengthen 
links with EU 98 2.7976 .68906 .06961 2.6595 2.9358 1.25 4.00
5.00 To weaken 
links with EU 42 2.6925 .63424 .09787 2.4948 2.8901 1.25 4.00
6.00 To keep things 
just as they are 44 2.5966 .64071 .09659 2.4018 2.7914 1.25 3.75
7.00 (Cant choose) 40 2.1229 .67436 .10663 1.9072 2.3386 .67 3.75
Total 224 2.6179 .70601 .04717 2.5250 2.7109 .67 4.00
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
involved involvement continuum
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
.195 3 220 .900
ANOVA
involved involvement continuum
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 13.219 3 4.406 9.898 .000
Within Groups 97.936 220 .445
Total 111.155 223
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Post Hoc Tests
Multiple Com parisons
Dependent Variable: involved involvement continuum
Scheffe_____________________________________________________________
(I)q12 How would 
vote in referendum
(J)q12 How would 
vote in referendum
Mean
Difference 95% Confidence Interval
d-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
4.00 To strengthen 
links with EU
5.00 To weaken 
links with EU .10516 .12305 .866 -.2415 .4518
6.00 To keep things 
just as they are .20103 .12108 .433 -.1401 .5421
7.00 (Cant choose) .67470* .12519 .000 .3220 1.0274
5.00 To weaken 
links with EU
4.00 To strengthen 
links with EU -.10516 .12305 .866 -.4518 .2415
6.00 To keep things 
just as they are .09587 .14393 .931 -.3096 .5014
7.00 (Cant choose) .56954* .14741 .002 .1543 .9848
6.00 To keep things 
just as they are
4.00 To strengthen 
links with EU -.20103 .12108 .433 -.5421 .1401
5.00 To weaken 
links with EU -.09587 .14393 .931 -.5014 .3096
7.00 (Cant choose) .47367* .14576 .016 .0630 .8843
7.00 (Cant choose) 4.00 To strengthen 
links with EU -.67470* .12519 .000 -1.0274 -.3220
5.00 To weaken 
links with EU -.56954* .14741 .002 -.9848 -.1543
6.00 To keep things 
just as they are -.47367* .14576 .016 -.8843 -.0630
*■ The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Homogeneous Subsets
involved involvement continuum
Scheffe3,b
q12 How would 
vote in referendum
Subset for alpha = .05
N 1 2
7.00 (Cant choose) 40 2.1229
6.00 To keep things 
just as they are 44 2.5966
5.00 To weaken 
links with EU 42 2.6925
4.00 To strengthen 
links with EU 98 2.7976
Sig. 1.000 .529
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed, 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 48.935.
b- The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean 
of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not 
guaranteed.
348
Q15
Oneway
Descriptives
involved involvement continuum
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean
Minimum MaximumLower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 agree 104 2.7909 .67200 .06590 2.6602 2.9216 1.25 4.00
2.00 disagree 50 2.8000 .66624 .09422 2.6107 2.9893 1.00 4.00
3.00 dont know/not sure 70 2.2310 .63293 .07565 2.0800 2.3819 .67 3.67
Total 224 2.6179 .70601 .04717 2.5250 2.7109 .67 4.00
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
involved involvement continuum
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
.165 2 221 .848
ANOVA
involved involvement continuum
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 15.250 2 7.625 17.571 .000
Within Groups 95.905 221 .434
Total 111.155 223
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Post Hoc Tests
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: involved involvement continuum
Scheffe__________________________________________
(I)q15_2007 recoded 
for table 6.6
(J)q15_2007 recoded 
for table 6.6
Mean
Difference
(l-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1.00 agree 2.00 disagree -.00913 .11337 .997 -.2885 .2702
3.00 dont know/not sure .55991* .10184 .000 .3089 .8109
2.00 disagree 1.00 agree .00913 .11337 .997 -.2702 .2885
3.00 dont know/not sure .56905* .12198 .000 .2684 .8697
3.00 dont know/not sure 1.00 agree -.55991* .10184 .000 -.8109 -.3089
2.00 disagree -.56905* .12198 .000 -.8697 -.2684
*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
Homogeneous Subsets
involved involvement continuum
Scheffe3,b
q15_2007 recoded for 
table 6.6
Subset for alpha = .05
N 1 2
3.00 dont know/not sure 70 2.2310
1.00 agree 104 2.7909
2.00 disagree 50 2.8000
Sig. 1.000 .997
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed, 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 68.335. 
b- The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the 
group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not 
guaranteed.
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SPSS output from factor analysis of attitude statements
Communalities
Initial Extraction
Q6A Britain will lose .399 .443control of economic policy
Q6C Britain does not get .385 .400enough out of the EU
Q6E British traditions .501 .564would have to be given up
Q6H Only the Germans
will gain from single .343 .385
currency
Q7B Nations will lose
their culture and .455 .497
individuality
Q7D Britain will lose .501 .558control over decisions
Q14A British seas should
only be open to British .310 .343
fishing boats
Q14D EU has too many
petty rules and .309 .294
regulations
Q17A Taxpayers in
Europe are paying too .369 .366
much for EU
Q6DD Britain is a lot
better off in the EU than .584 .676
out of it
Q6FF The cost of living in
Britain would rise .188 .217significantly if we left the
EU
Q6GG Peace is much
more secure because .263 .319Britain is a member of the
EU
Q7AA If we left the EU,
Britain would lose its .452 .570
chance of real progress
Q7CC Competition from
the EU is making Britain .280 .325more modern and
efficient
Q7EE There would be
serious unemployment in .269 .311
Britain if we left the EU
Q14CC The EU should
expand its membership to .203 .202include Eastern European
countries
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation
Factor Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 5.561 34.758 34.758 5.008 31.301 31.301 4.613
2 2.065 12.905 47.663 1.460 9.128 40.429 3.122
3 .930 5.809 53.473
4 .785 4.906 58.379
5 .755 4.722 63.101
6 .715 4.470 67.570
7 .686 4.289 71.859
8 .645 4.030 75.889
9 .597 3.734 79.623
10 .568 3.551 83.175
11 .549 3.433 86.608
12 .500 3.127 89.734
13 .480 2.999 92.733
14 .450 2.814 95.547
15 .390 2.436 97.982
16 .323 2.018 100.000
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
a- When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
Scree Plot
61--------------------------
o  Oj__ ,_,___ ,__,__,__,__,__,_,__ ,_,__,___,_
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Factor Number
Goodness-of-fit Test
Chi-Square df Sig.
193.114 89 .000
352
Factor Matrix Pattern Matrix*
Factor
1 2
Q6DD Britain is a lot
better off in the EU than .762 .307
out of it
Q7D Britain will lose .727control over decisions
Q6E British traditions .692 -.292would have to be given up
Q7B Nations will lose
their culture and .653 -.266
individuality
Q6A Britain will lose .617 -.249control of economic policy
Q6C Britain does not get .609enough out of the EU
Q17A Taxpayers in
Europe are paying too .583
much for EU
Q6H Only the Germans
will gain from single .564 -.258
currency
Q7AA If we left the EU,
Britain would lose its .562 .505
chance of real progress
Q14A British seas should
only be open to British .532 -.244
fishing boats
Q14D EU has too many
petty rules and .502 -.204
regulations
Q7CC Competition from
the EU is making Britain .484 .301more modem and
efficient
Q14CC The EU should
expand its membership to .414include Eastern European
countries
Q6GG Peace is much
more secure because .362 .434Britain is a member of the
EU
Q7EE There would be
serious unemployment in .366 .421
Britain if we left the EU
Q6FF The cost of living in
Britain would rise .253 .391significantly if we left the
EU
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
a- 2 factors extracted. 5 iterations required.
Factor
1 2
Q6E British traditions .762would have to be given up
Q7B Nations will lose
their culture and .712
individuality
Q7D Britain will lose .697control over decisions
Q6A Britain will lose .671control of economic policy
Q6H Only the Germans
will gain from single .636
currency
Q6C Britain does not get .605enough out of the EU
Q14A British seas should
only be open to British .601
fishing boats
Q17A Taxpayers in
Europe are paying too .577
much for EU
Q14D EU has too many
petty rules and .547
regulations
Q7AA If we left the EU,
Britain would lose its .734
chance of real progress
Q6DD Britain is a lot
better off in the EU than .357 .611
out of it
Q6GG Peace is much
more secure because .584Britain is a  member of the
EU
Q7EE There would be
serious unemployment in .572
Britain if we left the EU
Q6FF The cost of living in
Britain would rise .497significantly if we left the
EU
Q7CC Competition from
the EU is making Britain .496more modern and
efficient
Q14CC The EU should
expand its membership to .340include Eastern European
countries
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
a- Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
353
Structure Matrix Factor Correlation Matrix
Factor
1 2
Q6E British traditions
.750 .277would have to be given up
Q7D Britain will lose .741 .387control over decisions
Q7B Nations will lose
their culture and .705 .268
individuality
Q6A Britain will lose
.665 .255control of economic policy
Q6C Britain does not get
.630 .305enough out of the EU
Q6H Only the Germans
will gain from single .619 .212
currency
Q17A Taxpayers in
Europe are paying too .602 .294
much for EU
Q14A British seas should
only be open to British .584
fishing boats
Q14D EU has too many
petty rules and .542 .207
regulations
Q6DD Britain is a lot
better off in the EU than .602 .754
out of it
Q7AA If we left the EU,
Britain would lose its .344 .754
chance of real progress
Q6GG Peace is much
more secure because
.563Britain is a member of the
EU
Q7EE There would be
serious unemployment in .557
Britain if we left the EU
Q7CC Competition from
the EU is making Britain
.345 .554more modem and
efficient
Q6FF The cost of living in
Britain would rise .456significantly if we left the
EU
Q14CC The EU should
expand its membership to
.324 .415include Eastern European
countries
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor 1 2
1
2
1.000
.401
.401
1.000
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
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Factor Plot in Rotated Factor Space
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Factor 1
Factor Score Coefficient Matrix Factor Score Covariance Matrix
Factor
1 2
Q6A Britain will lose
.139 -.016control of economic policy
Q6C Britain does not get
.115 .010enough out of the EU
Q6E British traditions .202 -.028would have to be given up
Q6H Only the Germans
will gain from single .120 -.022
currency
Q7B Nations will lose
their culture and .164 -.019
individuality
Q7D Britain will lose .180 .030control over decisions
Q14A British seas should
only be open to British .106 -.020
fishing boats
Q14D EU has too many
petty rules and .089 -.010
regulations
Q17A Taxpayers in
Europe are paying too .104 .010
much for EU
Q6DD Britain is a lot
better off in the EU than .110 .337
out of it
Q6FF The cost of living in
Britain would rise -.021 .118significantly if we left the
EU
Q6GG Peace is much
more secure because -.017 .159Britain is a member of the
EU
Q7AA If we left the EU,
Britain would lose its -.002 .314
chance of real progress
Q7CC Competition from
the EU is making Britain .018 .134more modem and
efficient
Q7EE There would be
serious unemployment in -.014 .154
Britain if we left the EU
Q14CC The EU should
expand its membership to
.023 .076include Eastern European
countries
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor Scores Method: Regression.
Factor 1 2
1 1.345 1.158
2 1.158 1.276
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor Scores Method: Regression.
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APPENDIX D
A r g u m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  e u r o
On the following p ages are 5 exam ples of arguments in favour of the UK 
joining the single European currency, the ‘euro’.
For my PhD research, I am  looking at what p eop le think about the 
different kinds of arguments in favour of joining the euro.
Please help m e by answering the questions about ea c h  of the 
arguments to show what you think about them. Try to answer the 
questions, regardless of what your own views about the euro are. Your 
answers are com pletely anonym ous and will b e treated confidentially.
Instructions are given throughout the booklet, to help you respond. Do 
not spend too long working through the questions. I am  interested in 
your im mediate responses. The questionnaire should not take more than 
10 minutes to com plete.
Thank you very much for participating in this research.
If you have any questions about my research, 
please con tact m e -
Caroline Roberts 
Room S384, Department of Social Psychology,
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
C.E.Roberts@lse.ac.uk Tel: 020 7955 7703
WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED, PLEASE DROP THE BOOKLET 
INTO THE POST BOX OUTSIDE THE SOCIAL PSCYHOLOGY 
OFFICE (S302V OR POST IT TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME.
Initial Reactions to arguments about the euro
Below are five arguments in favour of the UK joining the euro.
For each one...
1. Read the argument carefully.
2. Write in the box what you first thought about the argument when you 
read it, NO MATTER WHAT you thought. E.g. some words, phrases or 
sentences.
I am interested in your initial reactions. Don't worry about what you write about 
or how much you write, but please write something in the box provided to 
show what your first thoughts about the argument were. Your responses will be 
treated entirely confidentially, and they are completely anonymous.
There are no correct answers. This is about what you think.
Britain cannot afford to be left on its own while the rest of Europe goes 
ah ead  with a  com m on currency. A modernised Britain needs to be  
part of Europe, not to stand apart from it.
What did you think when you first read this argument? Please write in the 
space provided the first thought (e.g. a word, a phrase or a sentence) that 
came into your head:
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2. There are huge potential advantages of joining the single European 
currency in terms of living standards, fiscal stability and economic  
growth. British exclusion from the project could entail m any risks.
3. In the modern world. Britain can 't afford to go it alone -  we're better off 
in Europe. In the euro, we could be even more prosperous and  
powerful. Britain’s p lace  in Europe is central to our prosperity and  
standing. Joining the euro could guarantee our econom ic stability by 
strengthening our relations with our biggest trading partners.
4. Foreign investors choose Britain because we are a  g atew ay to the 
European Union and  remaining isolated from the euro would m ake us 
less attractive to them. This investment m akes our country more 
prosperous. As the g atew ay to Europe and  a  bridge to the rest of the 
world. Britain plays a  unique and  pivotal role in g lobal affairs.
5. We are rightly proud of Britain and  confident in our national identity. 
Britain would still be Britain if we voted to join the euro, and the 
Q ueen ’s h ead  would still be on our coins.
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Evaluating arguments about the euro
On the following pages are the five arguments you have just read. Please 
answer each of the questions about them. First of all, you are asked to use the 
scales provided to show what you think about each of the arguments.
Each scale consists of a set of two opposing adjectives or descriptions that could 
apply to the arguments. Put a circle around one of the numbers (between 1 and 
7) on each scale to show how closely you think the description fits the argument.
Example:
The UK should join the euro because the w eather is better on the 
continent.
Weak 1 3 4 5 6 7 Strong
Extremely Q uite Slightly Neutral Slightly Q uite Extremely
If you thought that the argument in the example was quite a weak argument in 
favour of the UK joining the euro, you would show this by putting a circle around 
the number ‘2’ on the scale.
I am interested in what you think about each of the arguments. You should give 
your first impressions only and not try to work out if there is a ‘correct’ answer or 
an answer that makes most sense.
Please turn over the page to the first argument..
I. Britain cannot afford to be left on its own while the rest of Europe goes 
ah ead  with a  com m on currency. A modernised Britain needs to b e part 
of Europe, not to stand apart from it.
a) Put a circle around a number on each of the scales below to show 
how well you think the words at either end ‘describe’ the argument.
The numbers mean the following:
1 2  3 4
Extremely Q uite Slightly N eutral
Simple 2 3 4 5
Believable 2 3 4 5
Heard it before 2 3 4 5
Makes sense to m e 2 3 4 5
Convincing 2 3 4 5
Relevant to m e 2 3 4 5
5 6 7
Slightly Q uite Extremely
6 7 Com plicated
6 7 Unbelievable
6 7 Never heard it before
6 7 D oesn’t m ake sense to me
6 7 Unconvincing
6 7 Irrelevant to me
b) How persuasive do you personally think this argument is in favour of 
the UK joining the euro? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Extremely Quite Slightly Neither Slightly Quite Extremely
Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive nor Unpersuasive Unpersuasive Unpersuasive
Unpersuasive
c) How much do you agree or disagree with the view expressed in this 
argument? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Agree Agree a  Agree a Neither Disagree Disagree a Disagree
Completely lot littte Agree nor a little lot Completely
Disagree
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2. There are huge potential advantages of joining the single European 
currency in terms of living standards, fiscal stability and economic  
growth. British exclusion from the project could entail m any risks.
a) Put a circle around a number on each of the scales below to show 
how well you think the words at either end ‘describe’ the argument. 
The numbers mean the following:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Q uite Slightly Neutral Slightly Q uite Extremely
Simple 2 3 4 5 6 7 Com plicated
Believable 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unbelievable
Heard it before 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never heard it before
Makes sense to m e 2 3 4 5 6 7 D oesn’t m ake sense to me
Convincing 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unconvincing
Relevant to m e 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irrelevant to me
b) How persuasive do you personally think this argument is in favour of 
the UK joining the euro? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Extremely Quite Slightly Neither Slightly Quite Extremely
Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive nor Unpersuasive Unpersuasive Unpersuasive
Unpersuasive
c) How much do you agree or disagree with the view expressed in this 
argument? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Agree Agree a Agree a Neither Disagree Disagree a Disagree
Completely lot little Agree nor a little lot Completely
Disagree
3. In the modern world, Britain can 't afford to go it alone -  we're better 
off in Europe. In the euro, we could be even more prosperous and  
powerful. Britain’s p la ce  in Europe is central to our prosperity and  
standing. Joining the euro could guarantee our econom ic stability by 
strengthening our relations with our biggest trading partners.
a) Put a circle around a number on each of the scales below to show 
how well you think the words at either end ‘describe’ the argument. 
The numbers mean the following:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Quite Slightly N eutral Slightly Q uite Extremely
Simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Com plicated
Believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unbelievable
Heard it before 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never heard it before
Makes sense to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 D oesn’t m ake sense to m e
Convincing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unconvincing
Relevant to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irrelevant to me
b) How persuasive do you personally think this argument is in favour of 
the UK joining the euro? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Extremely Quite Slightly Neither Slightly Quite Extremely
Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive nor Unpersuasive Unpersuasive Unpersuasive
Unpersuasive
c) How much do you agree or disagree with the view expressed in this 
argument? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Agree Agree a  Agree a  Neither Disagree Disagree a  Disagree 
Completely lot little Agree nor a  little lot Completely
Disagree
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4. Foreign investors choose Britain because we are a  gatew ay to the 
European Union and  remaining isolated from the euro would m ake us 
less attractive to them. This investment m akes our country more 
prosperous. As the g atew ay to Europe and  a  bridge to the rest of the 
world, Britain plays a  unique and  pivotal role in global affairs.
a) Put a circle around a number on each of the scales below to show 
how well you think the words at either end ‘describe’ the argument. 
The numbers mean the following:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Q uite Slightly Neutral Slightly Q uite Extremely
Simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Com plicated
Believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unbelievable
Heard it before 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never heard it before
Makes sense to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 D oesn’t m ake sense to me
Convincing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unconvincing
Relevant to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irrelevant to me
b) How persuasive do you personally think this argument is in favour of 
the UK joining the euro? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Extremely Quite Slightly Neither Slightly Quite Extremely
Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive nor Unpersuasive Unpersuasive Unpersuasive
Unpersuasive
c) How much do you agree or disagree with the view expressed in this 
argument? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Agree Agree a Agree a Neither Disagree Disagree a Disagree
Completely lot little Agree nor a  little lot Completely
Disagree
5. We are rightly proud of Britain and  confident in our national 
identity. Britain would still be Britain if w e voted to join the euro, 
and  the Queen's head  would still b e  on our coins.
a) Put a circle around a number on each of the scales below to show 
how well you think the words at either end ‘describe’ the argument. 
The numbers mean the following:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Q uite Slightly N eutral Slightly Q uite Extremely
Simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Com plicated
Believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unbelievable
Heard it before 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Never heard it before
Makes sense to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Doesn't m ake sense to m e
Convincing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unconvincing
Relevant to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irrelevant to m e
b) How persuasive do you personally think this argument is in favour of 
the UK joining the euro? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Extremely Quite Slightly Neither Slightly Quite Extremely
Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive nor unpersuasive Unpersuasive Unpersuasive
Unpersuasive
c) How much do you agree or disagree with the view expressed in this 
argument? Please tick one box only.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
Agree Agree a  Agree a  Neither Disagree Disagree a  Disagree
Completely lot little Agree nor a  little lot Completely
Disagree
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Finally, please could you respond to the last few questions by simply ticking 
the box that best describes your own view or by putting a circle around one 
of the numbers like you did before:
1. Which of the following best describes your view of UK participation in 
the single currency, the ‘euro’?
□  Strongly support
□ Generally in favour, but could b e  persuaded against it if I thought it would b e bad for the British econom y
□  Generally opposed , but could b e persuaded in favour if I thought 
it would b e good  for the British econom y□□Strongly op pose  Don’t know
2. The issue of whether or not the UK joins the euro....
Means nothing to m e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Means a lot to me
Is significant
Is boring
Matters to m e
Is something I am  
interested in
Is irrelevant
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
Is insignificant
Is interesting
Doesn't matter to me
Is something I am not 
interested in
Is relevant
You have reached the end of the booklet. Thank you very much for taking the 
time to participate in this research.
T h a n k  y o u  f or  t a k i n g  p a r t  in t h i s  r e s e a r c h
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Cognitive Responses to Arguments about the Euro -  Coding Frame
Rate cognitive responses to the arguments along the following dimensions:
Polarity Dimension
1 = Favourable thoughts
2 = Neutral thoughts
3 = Unfavourable thoughts (i.e. counter-argumentation)
Origin Dimension
1 = Message-oriented thoughts (statements that are direct restatements of the 
communication -  i.e. message recall)
2 = Modified message-oriented thoughts (statements that are reactions to, qualifications 
of, or illustrations of the material in the communication -  i.e. elaborations of, or replies 
to, message arguments)
3 = Recipient-generated thoughts (statements expressing ideas or reactions not traceable 
directly to the communication -  e.g. responses pertinent to the issue but not to a specific 
argument in the message)
Target Dimension
(Provides information about the effect of the persuasive appeal on the recipient’s focus 
of attention.)
1 = Message-topic thoughts (statements pertaining to the topic of the appeal or to 
arguments either stated or implied in the message)
2 = Source-thoughts (statements pertaining to the topic of the communicator and his or 
her style of communication)
3 = Audience thoughts (statements pertaining to the recipients or potential recipients of 
the persuasive appeal, including oneself and significant others).
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Table 1 Questionnaire Items used in Study D
Measures
Salience manipulation
Item Variable Name 
No.
1 manipul
manipu2
manipu3
4a manipu4
4b manipu5
5 a manipu6
Question Wording
What would you say are the best things about 
living in Britain compared with other European 
countries?
What characteristics do you most like about 
living in Britain compared with other European 
countries?
How typical of British people in general would 
you say you are?
Of all the nations in the world, Britain stands out
I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any 
other country in the world
To what extent would you say you feel proud of 
Britain in each of the following?
Its economic achievements
Response Categories
OPEN
OPEN
1= Not at all typically British 
2= Not very typically British 
3= Fairly typically British 
4= Very typically British 
1= Strongly disagree 
2= Slightly disagree 
3= Neither agree nor disagree 
4= Slightly agree 
5= Strongly agree 
1= Strongly disagree 
2= Slightly disagree 
3= Neither agree nor disagree 
4= Slightly agree 
5= Strongly agree 
1= Not proud at all 
2= Not very proud 
3= Somewhat proud 
4= Very proud
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5b manipu7 Its history 1= Not proud at all 
2= Not very proud 
3= Somewhat proud 
4= Very proud
Attitude
6 euroattl How positive or negative do you think your 
views about the European single currency, the 
‘euro’, are?
1= Very negative 
7= Very positive
7 euroatt2 Which of the following statements best 
describes your view of UK participation in the 
single currency, the ‘euro’?
1= Strongly support 
2= Generally in favour, but could be 
persuaded against if I thought it would 
be bad for the British economy 
3= Generally opposed, but could be 
persuaded in favour if I thought it 
would be good for the British economy 
4= Strongly oppose 
5= Don’t know
8 reason What is the main reason why you hold this view 
about the euro? Please type your answer in the 
box below.
OPEN
Involvement
9 polinter How interested would you say you are in 
politics generally?
1= Not at all interested 
7= Very interested
10 eurointe How interested would you say you are in the 
future of Britain’s relationship with the 
European Union?
1= Not at all interested 
7= Very interested
11 euknow How knowledgeable would you say you are 
about Britain’s relationship with the EU?
1= Not at all knowledgeable 
7= Very knowledgeable
12
13
euroinfo How well informed do you feel about the pros 
and cons of joining the single currency?
Here is a quick quiz about the European Union.
1= Not at all well informed 
7= Very well informed
366
Personal relevance
13a
13b
13c
13d
13e
14
quizl
quiz2
quiz3
quiz4
quiz5
holiday
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
For each of the following statements, please 
click on one of the circles to show whether you 
think it is true or false, or whether you are not 
sure. Don't worry if you don't know an answer - 
just click 'Not sure'.
Britain’s income tax rates are decided in 
Brussels (False)
Elections to the European Parliament are held 
every 5 years (true)
The European Parliament is located in 
Strasbourg (true)
Switzerland is to join the European Union 
(false)
The President of the European Commission is 
directly elected by citizens of the member states 
(false)
Have you visited any European countries since 
1st January 2002?
1= True 
2= False 
3= Not sure 
1= True 
2= False 
3= Not sure 
1= True 
2= False 
3= Not sure 
1= True 
2= False 
3= Not sure 
1= True 
2= False 
3= Not sure 
1= Yes 
0=No 
1= Yes 
0=No 
1= Yes 
0= No 
1= Yes 
0= No 
1= Yes 
0= No
367
National identification
France 1= Yes
0= No
Germany 1= Yes
0=No
Greece 1= Yes
0= No
Ireland 1= Yes
0= No
Italy 1= Yes
0= No
Luxembourg 1= Yes
0= No
Holland 1= Yes
0= No
Portugal 1= Yes
0= No
Spain 1= Yes
0=No
Sweden 1= Yes
0=No
Othhols 1= Yes
0= No
language Can you speak any European language(s) other 2= Yes, fluently
than English? 1= Yes, a little
0= No
pride To what extent would you say you feel proud to 1= Not at all proud to be British
be British? 7= Very proud to be British
identitl How much do you agree or disagree with the 1= Strongly disagree
following statements? 2= Slightly disagree
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Demographic
characteristics
It is important to me to be British
3= Neither agree nor disagree 
4= Slightly agree 
5= Strongly agree
17b identit2 I identify with British people 1= Strongly disagree 
2= Slightly disagree 
3= Neither agree nor disagree 
4= Slightly agree 
5= Strongly agree
18a arglike Considering the 3 arguments individually... 
.. .which one did you like the best?
1= Argument 1 
2= Argument 2 
3= Argument 3 
4= None of them 
5= Don’t know
18b arghate .. .which one did you disagree with the most? 1= Argument 1 
2= Argument 2 
3= Argument 3 
4 = None of them 
5= Don’t know
19a elabl Considering all 3 arguments together...
To what extent do you feel they made their point 
effectively?
1= Not at all effectively 
7= Very effectively
19b elab2 To what extent do you feel they were 
convincing?
1= Not at all convincing 
7= Very convincing
20 elab3 To what extent did you agree or disagree with 
the arguments?
1= Disagree completely 
7= Agree completely
21 effort To what extent were you trying hard to evaluate 
the arguments?
1= Not very hard 
7= Very hard
22 sex Are you...? 0= Female 
1= Male
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23 age What is your age? OPEN
24 educate What is your current and highest level of 
education?
1= Secondary 
2= Secondary -  A-level 
3= First degree 
4= Certificate/ Diploma 
5= Vocational qualification 
6= Masters/ Doctorate
25 job Which one of the following options best 
describes the sort of work you do? If you are 
not working now (e.g. you are retired, 
unemployed or on maternity leave), please tell 
us what you did you in your last job. Please 
select one option only from the list below.
1= Professional or higher technical 
work
2= Manager or senior administrator
3= Clerical
4= Sales or services
5= Foreman or Supervisor
6= Skilled manual work
7= Semi-skilled or unskilled manual
work
8= Full-time student 
9= Voluntary/ Unpaid work 
10= Other
11= Have never worked
othjob Other: OPEN
26 ethnic How would you describe your ethnic 
background?
1= Bangladeshi 
2= Black African 
3= Black Caribbean 
4= Black other 
5= Chinese 
6= Indian 
7= Irish 
8= Pakistani 
9= White
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10= Other
11= Decline to answer
27 nation Which of the following would you normally use 
to describe your nationality?
1= UK citizen 
2= British 
3= English 
4= Northern Irish 
5= Scottish 
6= Welsh 
7= Other
othnat Other: OPEN
28 region In which of the following regions is your 
permanent address?
1= The North West
2= The North East
3= Yorkshire and The Humber
4= The West Midlands
5= The East Midlands
6= London
7= Eastern
8= The South West
9= The South East
10= Northern Ireland
11= Scotland
12= Wales
13= Overseas
29 news Which one of the following daily newspapers do 1= The Express
Political orientation/ civic you most regularly read? 2= The Daily Mail
engagement 3= The Mirror 
4= The Daily Star 
5= The Sun
6= The Daily Telegraph 
7= The Financial Times
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30 party
othparty 
31 vote
Which political party are you most inclined to 
support?
Other:
If there were a referendum tomorrow on whether 
Britain should be part of a single European 
currency, how likely is it that you would get 
along to vote?___________________________
8= The Guardian 
9= The Independent 
10= The Times 
11= The Scotsman 
12= The Glasgow Herald 
13= The Western Mail 
14= Other local daily 
15= Other
16= None of these - 1 don’t read a 
daily paper 
1= Conservative 
2= Green 
3= Labour
4= Liberal Democrats
5= Plaid Cymru
6= Scottish National Party
7=UKIP
8= Other
OPEN
1= Definitely will not vote 
7= Definitely will vote
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11. How know ledgeab le  w ould you sa y  you a re  a b o u t Britain s rela tionsh ip  with the  E uropean Union?
N ot a t  all know le d g ea b le  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  V#fV know,#<,9 #ab l6
12. How well informed do  you feel a b o u t the  pros a n d  cons of joining the  single  currency?
N ot a l all w ell inform ed O  O  O  0  O  O  O  Very w ell inform ed
a
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17. Mow m uch do  you a g roo  or d isa g ree  with the following sta tem ents?  For e a c h  sta tem ent, p le a se  choose  < 
response  only from the  drop-dow n boxes on the  right.
It a important to m e to be  British 
I identity with British people
Please select one option only fa  
Please select one option only
Below a re  th ree  d ifferent a rgum en ts  in favour of the  UK joining the  eu ro . M ease re a d  through  the  a rgum en ts  a n d  
then  answ er the  questions th a t follow.
Some people argue that we shoufdnt /otn the euro 
because money has a powerful symbolic value. Yet the 
essence of being Bntah has nothing to do with the pound or 
the euro. Our national idenlity would b e  very #vn indeed if 
the best thing ab o u t our culture was the Queen's head on 
the con .
A single currency a. m principle, a  desirable thing foi Britain 
because of its effect on exchange rate nstabirfy, 
transaction costs, interest rates and because of its 
dadpinary effects on the public finances of other 
European nations.
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Bntxtn cannot afford to be left on its own while the rest of 
Europe goes ahead with a common currency. A 
modernised Brrtam needs to be part of Europe, not to stand 
apart from it.
Now you have re a d  th e  3 argum en ts, p le ase  tell us w hat you though t el them  by  answ ering  the  following questions:
18. Considering  th e  3 a rgum en ts  individually ... 
■  hich ene  d id  you like the best?
Please select one only fa
W hich ene  d id  you d isa g re e  with the  most?
Please select one only fa
I f .  Considering  a ll th ree  a rgum en ts  together...
To w hat extent do  you fee l they  m a d e  the ir po in t effectively?
Not a t all effectively o o o o o o o
To w hat extent do  you fee l they  w ere  convincing?
Not a t all convincing C O O O G O O Veiy convincing
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^ c.tf-ooan... ^ rjb t to o j. - | ^ V |l 0  ie.«jspQ *  - " .■ r . ^ Z y - r ■jMrCt 5 ^ , ! !  cr : i
376
i= 0 «O “
---------5
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21. To w hat extent were you trying h a rd  to  evalu a te  the  argum ents?
Not very hard ? ? ? « * ? ? ?  Very hard
Ffc ! 4  »«« Fovortes tods FMp
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20. To w hat extent d id  you a g re e  or d isa g ree  with the  argum ents?
Finally, p le ase  could  you answ er the  following questions a b o u t yourself...
22. Are you
O Male or O Female?
23. * h a t  is your a g e ?  (P lease type  in the  box below.)
]  yean
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Email invitation used in study D (pilot survey)
D ear......
I am writing to invite you to take part in a quick survey. It should take less than 
10 minutes of your time, and there is a £50 prize draw for all entries submitted 
before the end of Monday 24th February.
Unlike our usual commercial projects, this survey is on behalf of an academic 
researcher at LSE, it is about European issues. No level of knowledge or 
expertise is required or assumed, if you are over 18 and a British citizen you can 
participate (if you are not please feel free to forward to anyone who is, that way 
you will get entered in the draw!)
As ever we do not pass on ANY of your personal information to our client -  
they will collect some demographic data at the end but this is viewed in 
aggregate only, and cannot be linked to your personal details. You will need to 
enter your Saros ID number, which is
69926
At the start of the survey, this is the only information that will be returned to us, 
as it represents your entry to the draw.
To enter the survey, please click here:
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/robertsc/europesurvev home.htm
If you cannot click on the above link for any reason, please copy <ctrl+a> and 
paste <ctrl+c> the whole URL into your browser window. Thanks very much for 
reading, and hope you can spare a few moments to complete the survey,
Best wishes,
Maya and the Saros team
www.sarosresearch.com
**************************************************************** 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
You received this message as you are a registered member of the saros research
database, please mail/forward to unsubscribe@sarosresearch.com if you no
longer wish to receive research invitations from us 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
38 The same letter was used for the main survey, except the incentive offered was £100 in a prize draw.
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Report o f the pilot study
In order to pre-test the methodology of the persuasion survey, an extensive pilot study 
was carried out. The pilot provided an invaluable opportunity to verify the validity of 
the survey measures, and to ensure the experimental design was appropriate to testing 
the research hypotheses. The focus of this appendix is to describe the measures that 
were included in the pilot questionnaire and the initial analysis of these measures 
conducted to assess their validity. As with the main survey, the pilot survey was 
internet-based, and was designed for online completion. The survey can be viewed at 
the following URL: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/robertsc/europesurvev home.htm (last 
accessed April 2007). The experimental design of the main survey remained unchanged 
after piloting, and is, described in chapter 7.
Method
Participants
The link to the pilot survey was sent to 1500 people on the Saros database. People 
contacted were sent a personalised email from Saros, inviting them to participate in the 
research if they were over the age of 18, and citizens of the United Kingdom. The final 
response rate was 24.5%, a total number of 367 cases. Data from 358 cases are 
analysed here. It is the policy of Saros not to send out reminders about the survey, so 
the sample received one contact only, and was asked to complete the survey within a 
specified period of two weeks. A prize draw to win £50 was offered as an incentive to 
participate. Saros data protection policy also meant that it was not possible to seek 
information regarding non-respondents. However, the experimental design of the 
survey, using random allocation to one of eight conditions, meant that non-response was 
less problematic than in sample survey research, except in terms of achieving a 
sufficient quantity of participants in each condition, to maximise the power of the 
experiment.
The table below shows the number of participants participating in each of the 8 
conditions. Because of the nature of the random allocation procedure that was used, it 
was unlikely that equal numbers would be achieved in each of the conditions. Attempts 
were made to control for this during the fielding of survey, by adjusting the relative 
likelihood of respondents being allocated to particular conditions. However, the
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resultant discrepancy in the total number of cases in each cell led to the decision for the 
main survey to adopt an alternative procedure of randomising allocation to the different 
conditions.
Table 1 -  Achieved samples by experimental group
Pre-Message A ttitude Post-Message A ttitude
Strong Weak Strong Weak
High Low High Low High Low High Low
55 56 34 47 41 47 37 50
(n=367)
The sample characteristics (including demographic information, political affiliation and 
newspaper readership) are shown in table 2 below.
Table2 -  Socio-demographic makeup o f pilot sample
Variable Categories n
(Total
n=
358)
%
Sex of respondent Males 106 29.6
Females 252 70.4
Age of respondent Min: 18 
Max: 70 
Mean: 35
Level of education Secondary 68 19
Secondary -  A-level 73 20.4
First degree 93 26
Certificate/ Diploma 54 15.1
Vocational qualification 39 10.9
Masters/ Doctorate 31 8.7
Occupation Professional/ Higher technical 63 17.6
work 57 15.9
Manager/ Senior administrator 72 20.1
Clerical 28 7.8
Sales or services 5 1.4
Foreman or Supervisor 12 3.4
Skilled manual work 13 3.6
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual 36 10.1
* For the purposes of the pilot study, ‘other’ responses were not coded
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work 19 5.3
Full-time student 51 14.2
Voluntary/ Unpaid work 
Other*
Have never worked
2 0.6
Ethnicity Bangladeshi 1 .3
Black African 2 .6
Black Caribbean 2 .6
Black other 0 0
Chinese 0 0
Indian 6 1.7
Irish 4 1.1
Pakistani 1 .3
White 324 95
Other 15 4.2
Decline to answer 3 .8
National identity UK citizen 23 6.4
British 191 53.4
(How do you describe your English 105 29.3
nationality?) Northern Irish 2 .6
Scottish 19 5.3
Welsh 11 3.1
Other 7 2.0
Region The North West 39 10.9
The North East 15 4.2
Yorkshire and the Humber 32 8.9
The West Midlands 21 5.9
The East Midlands 31 8.7
London 60 16.8
Eastern 14 3.9
The South West 33 9.2
The South-East 88 24.6
Northern Ireland 0 0
Scotland 16 4.5
Wales 7 2
Overseas 2 .6
Newspaper readership The Express 11 3.1
The Daily Mail 51 14.2
The Mirror 23 6.4
The Daily Star 2 .6
The Sun 52 14.5
The Daily Telegraph 17 4.7
The Financial Times 10 2.8
The Guardian 23 6.4
The Independent 15 4.2
The Times 20 5.6
The Scotsman 2 .6
The Glasgow Herald 3 .8
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Political party affiliation
The Western Mail 1
Other local daily 15
Other 15
None of these - 1 don’t read a 98
daily paper 
Conservative 83
Green 17
Labour 111
Liberal Democrats 96
Plaid Cymru 1
Scottish National Party 5
UKIP 8
Other 37
23.2 
4.7 
31
26.8
.3
1.4
2.2
10.3
.3
4.2
4.2 
27.4
Procedure 
Cover story:
Respondents were directed to a home page for the survey that displayed the ‘cover 
story’ for the experiment. This was described as follows:
“This research is being carried out in the Department o f Social Psychology at the 
London School o f Economics. It is part o f an ongoing project evaluating the different 
arguments people use for and against joining the single currency, the 'euro'. This 
particular study looks at arguments in favour o f the UK joining the euro - arguments 
from newspapers, websites and euro campaign material. We are asking people to 
assist in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses o f different arguments in favour o f the 
introduction o f the euro in the UK. Because your personal views about Britain and 
Europe (for example, whether you think we should join the euro or not) might influence 
what you think o f the arguments, it is necessary to gather some additional information 
about you. For this reason, we have included lots o f different questions that ask your 
opinions about Britain creating stronger links with Europe, how interested you are in 
European politics and some questions about how you feel about living in Britain and 
being British.
The cover story was intended to prepare people for the fact that they would be presented 
with different arguments in favour of joining the euro. However, the real purpose of 
presenting the arguments was to examine the persuasive influence of information on 
attitude change. Thus, half the respondents were asked to read and evaluate the 
arguments at the start of the survey, and then to respond to the other measures, whilst
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the other half of the sample received the questions at the onset, followed by the 
arguments. Some additional procedural instructions were provided to participants on 
the home page. A button saying ‘Start the survey’ then directed participants at random 
to one of the eight versions of the questionnaire.
Message presentation:
A pre-test of an earlier version of the survey had presented respondents with a number 
of arguments in the form of a single message (as is the method adopted by authors of 
the ELM, and others working within the model). Respondents were asked to read 
through the message before evaluating it on a number of different scales. Comments 
from participants in this earlier pilot agreed that this task was off-putting and overly 
arduous (in the context of an online survey), and so it was decided that to facilitate the 
task, the paragraph would be broken down into the three separate (strong or weak) 
‘arguments’ of which it had been composed. These were the arguments that had been 
investigated in an earlier study designed to establish argument quality in order to 
develop strong and weak messages for the experiment. In order not to unnecessarily 
add to the time it would take participants to complete the survey, just three arguments 
were included. It is acknowledged that presenting the persuasive message in this way is 
likely to have had an impact on elaboration likelihood (by encouraging people to spend 
time reading the arguments more carefully). However, the advantages of this approach 
from the point of view of retaining participants were assumed to be greater than any loss 
of validity in the experiment resulting from not presenting an ‘ELM-style’ message. 
Using this format also supported the cover story, as the task would appear less like an 
attempt at persuasion, and more like a straightforward task to evaluate different 
arguments in favour of joining the euro.
The presentation of the arguments was balanced, so that in both the strong and weak 
conditions, respondents received, firstly, an argument with a national identity frame, 
secondly, an argument with an economic frame and, thirdly, an argument with a 
political frame. The three arguments receiving the highest ‘persuasiveness’ ratings and 
eliciting the greatest proportion of favourable thoughts in the argument quality 
questionnaire were chosen as the ‘strong’ arguments. By comparison, ‘weak’ 
arguments received amongst the lowest ratings in persuasiveness and were associated 
with a large proportion of counterarguments (see chapter 7). The arguments are shown 
in figure 1. After reading through the messages, respondents were asked to answer a
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number of questions relating to the arguments, intended to measure elaboration. These 
are described below.
Figure 1 Strong and weak messages
Strong Argument 1:
Some peop/e argue th a t we shouldn’t  join the euro 
because m oney has a  powerful symbolic value. Vef, ffie 
essence of being British has nothing to do with the  pound or 
ffie euro. Our national identity would b e  very ffiin indeed  if 
the best filing a b o u t our cuffure was ffie Q ueen’s h ea d  on 
the  coin.
Strong Argument 2:
A single currency is in principle, a  desirable thing for Britain 
because of its e f f ec t  on exchange rate instability, 
transaction costs, interest rates and  because of ifs 
disciplinary effecfs on ffie public finances of other 
European nations.
Strong Argument 3:
Britain canno t afford to b e  left on its own while the rest of 
Europe goes ahead  with a  common currency. A 
modernised Britain needs to be part of Europe, not to stand 
apart from if.
Identity salience manipulation:
Six items were included in the pilot survey, intended to prime self-categorisation as 
British, and thereby, positive ingroup evaluations by artificially raising the salience of 
British national identity. The procedure employed was broadly based on that used by 
Brown, Vivian and Hewstone (1999) and Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001). 
Because the focus of the study was on the impact of raising salience of national identity 
on elaboration, in the high salience conditions, respondents received the priming 
procedure immediately prior to being presented with the persuasive message. First of 
all, respondents were asked to make a positive evaluation of their nation (Great Britain) 
in comparison to other (unspecified) European countries (i.e. to engage in an intergroup 
comparison (Mummendey et al., 2001). In two open questions, respondents were asked, 
a) ‘What are the best things about living in Britain?’ and b) ‘What characteristics do you 
like most about British people?’ Following these two open questions, four closed 
questions, in the form of attitude statements with 5-point Likert scale response 
categories (ranging from ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’). These items were 
intended to reinforce respondents’ positive ingroup evaluations, by attempting to draw
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Weak Argument 1:
Some peop/e argue that we shou/dn 't join the euro because 
ffie pound is a  major national symbol for Britain. We are rightly 
proud of Britain and confident in our nationaf identity. But 
Britain would still b e  Britdn if we voted  to join fhe euro, and fhe 
Queen’s head would still b e on cur coins.
Weak Argument 2:
Joining fhe euro would b e  better for shoppers because prices 
would be  lower. Everybody knows that everyday consumer 
goods are much cheaper in fhe rest o f Europe fhan in Brifarn.
Weak Argument 3:
Even if Britain doesn’t  join the single currency now, it won't be  
able to avoid it. Sooner or later it wil invade Britain. It is 
inevitable
attention to intergroup differences and decreasing ingroup and outgroup heterogeneity. 
They are shown in table 3.
Table 3 Salience manipulation and manipulation check
Salience Manipulation:
1. O f all the nations in the world, Britain stands out
2. The world would be a better place i f  people from other countries were more like 
the British
3. Generally speaking Britain is a better country than most other countries
4. I  would rather be a citizen o f Britain than o f any other country in the world 
Manipulation Check:
5. It is important to  me to be British
6. I  identify with British people
7. To what extent would you say you feel proud to be British?
(Not at all proud to be British — Very proud to be British)
Three additional questions were included in all eight versions of the questionnaire, 
intended as a manipulation check. These included two measures of ingroup 
identification, and an additional measure of positive ingroup evaluation.
Survey measures
1) Attitudes towards the euro
The main dependent variable under investigation in the study was a self-rated attitudinal 
measure of how negative or positive respondents’ views of the European single 
currency. The item used a seven-point scale, ranging from ‘Very negative’ to ‘Very 
positive’ on which respondents were required to rate their views on the euro. The use of 
the ‘semantic differential’ style of measure was intended to be somewhat vague, in 
order to allow the detection of relatively small difference in means. In contrast to the 
relative ambiguity of this task, a second measure of attitude was included, developed by 
the Social Research Institute at MORI, was highly specific in differentiating those who 
were decided in their opinion on the euro (as either ‘strongly in favour’ or ‘strongly
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opposed’), and those who were undecided and open to persuasion (either in favour or 
against joining, if they thought it would be good or bad for the British economy). This 
item was included because identifies a group described as the ‘waverers’, who form the 
‘battleground’ (Mortimore and Atkinson, 2003) for campaigning for a euro referendum.
In addition to these measures, respondents to the pilot survey were given an open 
question asking the main reason why they held their view of UK participation in the 
euro (referring to the MORI item described above). The rationale for including this 
item was two-fold. Firstly, there is little existing data on the arguments people use to 
justify their position on the euro. Obviously, this holds considerable scope for 
qualitative research. The purposes of including the item in the pilot, however, was to 
develop a closed measure for use in the main survey, in order to identify the main 
‘arguments’ respondents use in favour or against joining the euro, providing an obvious 
point of comparison with media effects studies presented earlier in the thesis. The open 
responses from the pilot survey were coded, and a closed question was included in the 
main survey.
2) Issue involvement
In the ELM, involvement refers to the motivation and ability of the individual to 
elaborate on issue-relevant information. With respect to political issues, one of the key 
factors influencing motivation to engage with information is the level of interest a 
person has in the issue and the degree of personal relevance the issue holds for them 
(e.g. EMU may be of greater personal relevance to those who travel regularly to 
Euroland countries). In terms of ability -  whilst it is likely that a person’s level of 
education will be important in influencing elaboration -  in relation to the issue 
specifically, ability to elaborate on issue-relevant information will depend on people’s 
existing knowledge about and understanding of the issue. Thus, the survey used 
multiple indicators for issue involvement intended to tap into these two dimensions of 
elaboration likelihood. The items were developed from the measures employed in the 
secondary analysis of the deliberative poll data described in the previous chapter. They 
included four items asking respondents to use semantic differential-style 7-point scales 
(as before, with the attitude item) to rate a) how interested they are in politics generally 
as well as, specifically, in the future of Britain’s relationship with the European Union;
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and b) how knowledgeable they are about Britain’s relationship with the EU, and how 
well-informed they are about the pros and cons of joining the single currency.
In addition to these 4 rating scales which measured subjective evaluations of interest 
and knowledge, respondents were asked to answer a 5-item quiz on Europe developed 
from that used in the deliberative poll survey. The rationale behind measuring both 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ levels of knowledge was largely underpinned by previous 
research by Mueller-Peters et al. (1998a), which found that people were not always very 
successful in judging how knowledgeable or well-informed they were of the issues 
surrounding economic and monetary union. Additionally, however, given the 
difficulties associated with ‘objectively’ assessing knowledge in the context of a survey, 
it was essential that multiple indicators be used. The quiz was intended only as a crude 
measure of people’s awareness of factual information about European integration and 
the euro, and was not intended to undermine the significance of the representations that 
underlie the attitudes people express in opinion research of this kind.
In addition to the questions relating to levels of interest in and knowledge about the euro 
issue, a further component of involvement measured in the survey was that of personal 
relevance. There is a range of ways in which EMU can hold varying degrees of 
personal relevance for different people, for example, depending on whether they are 
homeowners; those running small businesses, etc. To examine all such variables is 
obviously beyond the scope of the present research. However, given the significance of 
recent European travel experience and the ability to speak European languages in 
predicting varying levels of involvement in the deliberative poll study, these two 
variables were included in the present survey. The former was addressed by asking 
respondents whether they had travelled to any European countries since the launch of 
the euro (and if so, which countries), and the latter was addressed by an item asking if 
the respondent could speak any European language(s) either fluently, a little or not at 
all.
All these items were used to calculate an overall score of ‘involvement’. This was 
calculated simply as the sum of scores on each of the items. Each correct response to 
the quiz was scored 1; respondents scored 1 if they had travelled to any Euroland 
country since the introduction of notes and coins in January 2002; respondents scored 2 
if they spoke another European language fluently and 1 if they spoke another European
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language a little. Issue involvement was, thus, scored out of a total of 32 points. Scores 
were scaled so that they ranged between 0  and 1 0 0 , and the sample was split into two 
equal groups, representing low and high involvement participants.
3. Argument Elaboration
To test the predictions of the ELM, a number of measures of argument elaboration were 
included. These were based on Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) account of the 
methodology, which describes how using manipulations of argument quality and 
measures of message elaboration (such as though-listing techniques or message recall 
tasks) enable the researcher to drawn conclusions about whether central or peripheral 
route processing has taken place, and, if central, whether this processing has been 
relatively objective or relatively biased. Once again, using the online survey method 
imposed a number of constraints as far as simply replicating Petty and Cacioppo’s 
method was concerned and it was necessary to adapt their techniques and operationalise 
their measures in such a way as would be suitable for an online self-completion 
questionnaire.
Five measures of argument elaboration were included. Firstly, respondents were asked 
to identify which of the three arguments they had liked the best. Response alternatives 
included the options ‘None of them’ and ‘Don’t know’, as well as a choice between 
arguments 1, 2 and 3. This item and the subsequent one, which asked respondents 
which of the arguments they had ‘disagreed with the most’, was intended as a means of 
capturing cognitive responses to the arguments. The former measured whether any of 
the arguments had elicited favourable thoughts amongst respondents, whilst the latter 
was intended to capture the experience of counter-argumentative thoughts elicited by 
the arguments.
Secondly, two items taken directly from Petty and Cacioppo (1986) asked a) which of 
the arguments respondents found most convincing and b) which respondents felt had 
made their point the most effectively. The rationale behind the inclusion of these two 
items was to obtain a measure of whether respondents had carefully considered the 
cogency of the message arguments by providing an overall evaluation of message 
quality (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; p.46-47). Instead of providing respondents with an
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ordinal sale, however, once again, a choice was offered between each of the three 
arguments, ‘None of them’, or ‘Don’t know’.
4. Demographic measures and political engagement
As is shown in table 2, a number of demographic items and measures of political 
engagement were included to allow analysis of the data across different groups. These 
items were also included to enable comparison of the achieved sample with those of 
random sample surveys carried out by opinion research organisations (e.g. MORI, and 
the EC’s Eurobarometer survey).
Results
A preliminary analysis of the (majority of) data from the pilot survey (n=358) was 
conducted in order to examine the appropriate of the measures and the effectiveness of 
the different manipulations. The analysis shall be presented in the following order: 1) 
main message effects; 2) argument quality effects; 3) involvement; 4) national identity 
manipulation; 5) message elaboration.
Main message effect:
One-way analysis of variance revealed a strong, significant difference between the pre- 
and post-message attitudes, indicating a clear persuasive effect of being exposed to 
arguments in favour of joining the euro. Mean scores on the attitude measure before 
message exposure were 3.44, whilst those after message exposure were 4.12 (F 1,356 = 
15.45, pO.OOl).
Argument quality effect:
The ELM predicts that strong arguments will be more persuasive than weak arguments. 
Firstly, the main argument quality effect was investigated. Strong arguments produced 
greater attitude change than weak arguments. The difference between pre- and post­
message attitudes in the weak message condition was 0.42, whereas that in the strong 
message condition was 0.91. The difference was not found to be significant (p=.161; 
observed power=0.288). Nevertheless, the ELM predicts that this effect will be 
moderated by individuals’ prior level of involvement in the issue, with greater
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differentiation between strong and weak arguments expected amongst high involvement 
participants. Using a crude summed score on the involvement measures (see below), 
the sample was divided into high and low involvement groups to explore this effect. 
Mean attitude change (calculated as the difference between pre- and post-message 
attitudes) for low and high involvement groups, in the strong and weak argument 
conditions are shown in table 4. However, the interaction effect of pre- and post­
message attitude*argument quality*involvement was not found to be significant using 
ANOVA (p=0.97; observed power = 0.05). Thus, it was concluded that whilst 
differences were observed, and in the anticipated direction, the observed power of the 
experiment was not sufficient to draw conclusions regarding the size of the effect and 
whether or not it was a result of sampling fluctuation, or real differences in the 
population. However, the differences observed were taken as evidence for an argument 
quality effect, and it was decided that the manipulation had been successful. The larger 
sample size in the main survey will provide a more powerful test of the effect.
Table 5 Mean attitude change by argument quality and involvement
Argument Quality 
Involvement Weak Strong
Low 0.41 0.77
High_____________________________ 048____________________ 087__________
Measuring involvement:
Interest and subjective knowledge:
As was detailed above, multiple indicators for issue involvement were used in the 
survey. Correlations between the first four items are shown below. Taken together as a 
scale, reliability analysis yielded an alpha of .85. Mean scores on the item are shown in 
table 5. -  unsurprisingly, respondents were generally quite interested in Britain’s 
relationship with the EU. Figure 2 shows the extent of the skew, but it is not severe. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of scores on the four items taken together, and shows a 
normal distribution.
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Figure 3 Interest in Europe
Interest in Europe
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Figure 4 Involvement score
M ean interest and know ledge score
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Combined interest and knowledge
Correlations
Interest in 
politics
Interest in 
Europe
Knowledge
about
Europe
Informed 
about euro
Interest in 
politics
Pearson Correlation 
N
Interest in 
Europe
Pearson Correlation 
N
.613**
357
Knowledge 
about Europe
Pearson Correlation 
N
.647**
357
.635**
358
Informed about 
euro
Pearson Correlation .496** .453** .631**
N 357 358 358
**• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5 Mean scores on involvement variables
Item
How interested would you say you are in politics generally?
Mean
score
(n=357)
3.99
Standard
Deviation
1.68
How interested would you say you are in the future o f 
Britain ’s relationship with the EU?
How knowledgeable would you say you are about Britain’s 
relationship with the EU?
How well informed do you feel about the pros and cons o f 
joining the single currency?
4.59
3.64
3.66
1.47
1.42
1.50
Objective levels o f knowledge:
Table 6 Distribution o f responses to knowledge quiz
Quiz item
1. Switzerland is to join the European Union 
(false)
Correct
42.2
Incorrect
15.4
Not
Sure
42.5
2. Elections to the European Parliament are 
held every 5 years (true) 53.9 9.8 36.3
3. Britain’s income tax rates are decided in 
Brussels (false) 77.7 4.7 17.6
4. One Euro is worth less than one Pound 
Sterling (true) 81.8 11.5 6.7
5. One o f the government’s economic tests 
states that we will not be able to join the 
euro unless it is good for British consumers 
(false)
28.2 34.9 36.9
Table 6 shows the results of the knowledge quiz. Recoding ‘don’t know’ responses as 
‘incorrect’ allowed analysis of the items together as a scale. Mean scores for the five 
items, and item-total statistics are shown in table 7. Reliability analysis of the five-item 
knowledge scale yielded a value for Cronbach’s alpha of just 0.47. Examining the item-
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total statistics provides some indication as to which items might be contributing to this 
poor scale performance. Both quiz items 4 and 5 have low corrected item-total 
correlations, indicating that they discriminate poorly between respondents on the scale 
as a whole. The value for alpha that could be achieved by removing the items is close 
to the achieved alpha, suggesting that neither item adds much to the reliability of the 
scale as a whole. Respondents found item 4 particularly easy, with 82% correctly 
answering the question. Item 5, by comparison, was particularly difficult for 
respondents. Just 28% correctly responded ‘false’, whilst 37% indicated they were not 
sure what the answer was.
Table 7 Item statistics for knowledge quiz
Quiz item Mean Corrected Alpha if
Item-total item 
correlation deleted
1. Switzerland is to join the European Union
(false) .423 .288 .390
2. Elections to the European Parliament are
held every 5 years (true) .539 .251 .419
3. Britain’s income tax rates are decided in
Brussels (false) .778 .350 .353
4. One Euro is worth less than one Pound
Sterling (true) .818 .191 .453
5. One o f the government’s economic tests
states that we will not be able to join the .282 .189 .459
euro unless it is good for British 
consumers (false)
Including at least one easy item can be beneficial for a knowledge scale of this kind -  
for example, by putting the item at the start of the scale, it could help to ‘relax’ 
respondents. If the item loads highly on the scale as a whole (as indicated by the item- 
total correlations), it means it has the power to discriminate well between respondents 
of varying levels of knowledge. Such, a rationale would justify the inclusion of item 3, 
for example. However, in the case of item 4, it seems that the question is of little
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value, either in its own right, or for the scale as a whole. Similarly, item 5 appears to be 
of little value to the scale, but this time because of the difficulty respondents 
experienced with it. Whilst this would be no justification for excluding the item per se, 
it does seem that the ambiguity of the item might be contributing to the large number of 
incorrect responses. The fact that a high proportion of respondents were not able to 
answer the question correctly is in-keeping with the findings of other research that has 
shown that the majority of British people are unable to name any of the government’s 
five economic tests. On the other hand, whilst the statement is false -  none of the tests 
directly concern the interest of British consumers -  it could also be argued that the 
economic tests have British consumers in their interests. Thus, it could be argued that 
there is no clear right or wrong answer to this question.
Whether or not this is indeed the case, it was decided that the two items (4 and 5) should 
be removed from the scale and replaced in the main survey by two other items. The two 
replacement items were taken from a scale developed and tested by Allum 
(unpublished), and were both found to be good discriminators on the scale in which they 
were included, as well as being neither especially difficult nor easy for his respondents.
Figure 5 shows the almost perfectly normal distribution of scores on the knowledge quiz 
scale as a whole, in spite of the problems associated with the reliability of the scale.
Figure 5 Distribution of responses to quiz items
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Personal relevance:
Fifty-seven per cent of the sample stated that they could speak at least one other 
European language a little, compared with 33.5% who could speak no other languages 
at all, and just 10% who could speak another European language fluently. Fifty-five per 
cent (n=197) of the sample had visited another European country since 1st January 2002 
(when euro notes and coins were introduced, and just one of these people had only been 
to Sweden, where the euro has not yet been adopted (others travelling to Denmark and 
Sweden had also visited other Euroland countries).
In order to calculate an overall score for involvement, it had been intended to create a 
scale from the subjective involvement measures, objective knowledge measure and the 
measures of personal relevance. However, examining the correlations between all sets 
of variables indicated that there was little justification for calculating involvement in the 
issue on the basis of personal experience of travelling in Euroland, or the ability to 
speak foreign languages (although both of these variables were positively and 
significantly correlated with knowledge and interest in the issue). Thus, it was decided 
to calculate an overall ‘involvement score’ on the basis of responses to the four 
subjective measures of interest and knowledge and the quiz score. All these scores were 
positively and highly correlated with each other. Principal component analysis of the 
five measures extracted a single component with an eigenvalue higher than 1, 
accounting for over 60% of the total variance. Figure 6 shows the distribution of scores 
on the subjective involvement measure and figure 7 shows that for the overall 
involvement measure (calculated as the sum of the subjective and objective measures).
Figure 6 Distribution o f scores on subjective involvement measures
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Figure 7  Distribution o f scores on overall involvement index
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From the involvement score (which can be viewed as a continuum from low to high 
involvement in the euro issue, as postulated in the ELM), it was possible to divide the 
sample into high and low involvement groups.
National Identity Manipulation:
To check whether the national identity salience manipulation had worked or not, 
responses to the three items included in all versions of the survey as manipulation 
checks were analysed. Table 8 contains means scores on the three items in the low and 
high salience conditions. Independent samples t-tests indicated that only the difference 
between groups on the first item was statistically significant (t=-2.06, d.f.= 356, 
p=0.005). Raising the salience of national identity appears to have had the effect of 
reducing levels of identification and positive ingroup evaluation. This finding runs 
counter to the expected effect of raising identity salience, which was that people would 
identify more strongly with their national ingroup, and consequently, rate that group 
more favourably. Why?
Table 8 Scores on salience manipulation check variables
Item Low High
Salience Salience
Condition Condition
It is important to me to be British (coded 1-5)
3.87 3.52
I  identify with British people (coded 1-5)
3.78 3.69
To what extent do you feel proud to be British? (coded
1-7) 4.93 4.68
397
One explanation for this somewhat counter-intuitive finding is that owing to external 
events, being British does not present ingroup members with the opportunities for 
positive self-esteem that it might have do at other points in time. The pilot survey was 
fielded at a time when public opposition to military action against Iraq was at its 
highest, and with it, very high levels of anti-British and anti-American sentiment in 
Europe. The first weekend when the survey was in the field saw the staging of the 
largest peace demonstration in this country ever (15th February 2003). In other words, 
people were filling out the survey at a time when the public were not feeling especially 
proud to be British. Completing the priming procedure in the survey, therefore, could 
have had the effect of making those in the high salience condition reflect on their 
national identity and to negatively evaluate in the context of the events current at that 
time. In this sense, the responses of those in the low salience condition can be seen to 
represent a baseline level of national identification. This explanation is supported by 
responses to the open questions in the salience manipulation, many of which contained 
negative comments about living in Britain today.
However, an alternative explanation exists, and that is that the incongruous findings are 
a possible artefact of the design of the survey. In the high salience conditions, national 
identification (the manipulation check) was measured immediately following the 
priming procedure, and immediately prior to the presentation of the arguments. In the 
low salience conditions, however, the national identification measures were included 
along with the demographic items at the end of the survey (i.e. after message 
presentation). The decision to do this was based on the concern that the three 
manipulation checks in themselves might have the effect of raising national identity. 
Because the control condition aimed to ensure that the category British was not 
artificially primed in any way prior to message evaluation, it seemed appropriate to 
include the measure later in the survey. By contrast, it seemed sensible to check the 
success of the manipulation immediately after priming. The outcome of this decision, 
however, is that it is not possible to compare the three items intended to check the 
success of the manipulation, as it is not possible to know the cause of any resultant 
difference between the high and low salience conditions. What we are essentially 
comparing is national identification before and after message exposure. In other words, 
the observed difference in national identification/ positive ingroup evaluation could be a 
function of exposure to the message arguments.
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If it is, indeed, the case that reading arguments about the euro has the effect of raising 
the salience of national identity, and priming positive ingroup evaluation (over and 
above any artificial method of achieving this), then one explanation might be that the 
way in which people think about the issue of the single currency is implicitly based on 
the ingroup/outgroup distinction of “Britain and Europe”. There are two possible ways 
of checking whether this is the case. The first involves checking for any differences in 
identification between the strong and weak message conditions. If the messages are 
influencing British identification, then we might expect some difference on the basis of 
argument quality. Analysing data only from those respondents in the low salience 
conditions, a t-test was conducted to compare means on the identification measures 
between strong and weak argument conditions. No difference between the two 
conditions was found. However, the strong and weak message conditions were 
balanced such that both started with an argument framed around national identity, so it 
is possible that both strong and weak messages had an equal influence on national 
identification. A second check for a message effect on identity salience involves 
looking for any differences between high and low involvement participants, who, 
according to the ELM, would be expected to respond differentially to persuasion 
attempts in terms of extent to which engage with the message arguments. Any 
differences in elaboration might manifest themselves as differences in ingroup 
identification (if the messages are indeed ‘persuading’ people to feel more British). A t- 
test comparing differences between high and low involvement participants in the low 
salience condition found that high involvement participants had higher scores on all 
three measures of identification, but none of the differences were statistically significant 
(unsurprising given the minimal power associated with a sample of this size). Such a 
finding might well be consistent with a message elaboration (or indeed, issue 
elaboration) effect on national identification. That is to say, thinking about the issue of 
the euro raises the salience of national identity.
In short, the design of the survey confounds national identification measures with 
message exposure, and it is not possible on the basis of the data gathered from the pilot 
survey to decide whether or not the manipulation was successful in raising the salience 
of national identity (there are no pre-message, pre-manipulation measures of national 
identification). It seems likely that both explanations are true. On the one hand, asking 
respondents to reflect on what it means to be British at a time when people are more 
accountable for that identity than ever before may well have had the effect of tempering
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people’s pride in being a member of that category. On the other hand, it seems that it is 
also likely that, as hypothesised, thinking about Europe in and of itself, has the effect of 
raising national identity salience, and with it, enhancing positive ingroup evaluations.
Given the problems associated with the priming procedure, it was not appropriate to 
conduct any extensive analyses explicitly exploring the effect of national identity 
salience on message elaboration and attitude change. Because of this, it was not 
possible to make a fully informed decision about whether or not it was it was 
appropriate to retain the identity manipulation in the design of the study. Therefore, the 
decision was made to retain the manipulation, but to modify it as much as possible so as 
to maximise the likelihood of respondents in the high salience condition making 
positive ingroup evaluations (regardless of external events!), and to rectify the problem 
of confounding the manipulation with message exposure by measuring ingroup 
identification at the same point in the survey (either both before or both after the 
presentation of the arguments). In the end, it was decided to locate the manipulation 
checks immediately before message exposure, so as to have a direct measure of the 
impact of the manipulation, unrelated to any possible message effect on identification. 
The salience manipulations employed in the main survey are described in chapter 8.
Argument Elaboration:
The final aspect of the survey design that was assessed through analysis of the data from 
the pilot study was the measures of argument elaboration that were specially developed 
for use in the context of the online survey method. All the measures of argument 
elaboration were intended to capture the extent to which respondents had engaged in 
thoughtful message processing, and the direction of this processing (i.e. whether it was 
relatively objective or relatively biased).
In order to test the ELM, it is important to assess how much message processing 
participants are engaged in. As we saw earlier, the present survey employed three 
different measures of elaboration.
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1) Self-reports o f effort
Self-reported elaboration effort was measured on a seven-point scale. As expected, the 
mean score for high involvement participants (5.10) was significantly higher than for 
low involvement participants (4.36) -  t =-4.35, d.f.=244; p<0.001. Low salience 
participants did not engage in significantly less effort than high salience participants, 
however, suggesting that raised identity salience did not measurably reduce to quantity 
of argument elaboration (independent of levels of involvement).
2) Measures o f favourable thoughts and counter-argumentation
The first two items focused on whether respondents had reacted positively or negatively 
towards the arguments -  in other words, on the cognitive responses elicited by the 
message amongst respondents. According to the ELM, ‘strong’ arguments will elicit 
more favourable cognitive responses than ‘weak’ messages, which will be more inclined 
to encourage counter-argumentation. Furthermore, this effect will be moderated by 
involvement, with low-involvement participants being less likely to differentiate strong 
and weak arguments. The second two items focused on the overall persuasiveness of 
the different arguments, and again, it was anticipated that high involvement participants 
would be better judges of the persuasiveness of the arguments than low involvement 
participants. In order to explore differences in the ratings of arguments by high 
involvement participants across the strong and weak argument quality conditions, 
frequencies of responses to the four main message elaboration measures were examined. 
As predicted, by comparison with low involvement participants, high involvement 
respondents were more likely to identify one of the three arguments as being either 
more likeable, counter-arguable, more convincing or more effective. Low involvement 
participants being more likely to select ‘none of them’ or ‘don’t know’ in response to 
the four items. However, no differences in response patterns amongst only high 
involvement participants were found between the strong and weak argument conditions.
It is likely that the finding that there was no difference between the strong and weak 
argument conditions is a result of poor design of these four measures. Being categorical 
variables, the items do not provide a useful means by which to compare messages on 
the basis of argument quality, although they do provide a (albeit somewhat crude)
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measure of the extent of elaboration. For this reason, it was decided that the measures 
of overall message cogency would be converted to ordinal scales, as prescribed by Petty 
and Cacioppo (1986), and the cognitive response measures would be excluded from the 
main survey altogether. Losing these two measures was not considered problematic, 
given that the design already includes the argument quality manipulation central to the 
procedure for assessing the extent of cognitive processing advocated by Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986; 44). In addition, a further measure was added which asked 
respondents to indicate the degree to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the 
message arguments (taken together). This measure was intended to provide a further 
means by which to explore the influence of the persuasion variable (identity salience) 
on message processing, in conjunction with the manipulation of argument quality.
Peripheral cues:
If raising the salience of national identity works as a peripheral cue in the persuasion 
context, then it ought to have the ability to affect attitudes in the absence of any 
arguments. One way to test this idea would be to look to see if there is a difference 
between attitudes in the high and low salience conditions, prior to message processing. 
Unfortunately, the present design does not allow such a test. Comparing attitudes in the 
high and low salience conditions after message processing gives some indication of the 
influence of salience on attitudes, but not independent of message presentation. Mean 
euro attitude in the high salience condition was 3.99, and 4.22 in the low salience 
condition (not significant) -  a difference in-keeping with the present theory that predicts 
that highly salient national identity will be associated with less positive attitudes 
towards the euro. The decision was taken to ensure that the design of the main survey 
would enable a comparison of pre-message attitudes across high and low salience 
conditions (i.e. to manipulate identity salience prior to the measurement of attitudes).
Summary of design decisions taken on the basis offindings from the pilot study:
To summarise, the piloting of the survey resulted in the modification of the design and 
measures of the study in the following way:
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Design:
The basic 2*2*2*2 experimental design of the study was retained for the main survey. 
The additional measures of involvement were seen to be a satisfactory means of 
providing an intrinsic blocking factor in the design, comparing low and high 
involvement participants. This design entailed the use of eight versions of the 
questionnaire, varying in terms of the ordering of questions and the presence or absence 
of the identity manipulation (6? additional items) in the high and low salience 
conditions.
Because of the problems experienced when checking the success of the identity salience 
manipulation using the design employed in the pilot study, it was necessary to change 
the time at which ingroup identification and positive ingroup evaluation were measured. 
It was decided that in order to be able to isolate the effect of the manipulation from any 
message influence of identification, it would be better to include the manipulation check 
before message presentation (in all conditions). Similarly, in order to provide a means 
of examining the potential influence of national identity on attitudes as a peripheral cue, 
high salience conditions would start with the priming procedure, immediately followed 
by attitude measurement in the pre-message conditions. Thus, question-ordering in the 
main survey was as shown in figure 8 (for both strong and weak message conditions).
Figure 8 Question ordering for the main experiment
Post-Message/ High Post-Message/ Low
Salience Conditions Salience Conditions
1. Salience 1. National
manipulation identification
2. National 2. Argument
identification elaboration
3. Argument 3. Attitudes
elaboration 4. Involvement
4. Attitudes 5. D em ographics
5. Involvement 6. Political en g ag em en t
6. D em ographics
7. Political en g ag em en t
Pre-Message/ Low
Salience Conditions
1. Attitudes
2. Involvement
3. National
identification
4. Argument
elaboration
5. D em ographics
6. Political en g ag em en t
Pre-Message/ High
Salience Conditions
1. Salience
m anipulation
2. Attitudes
3. Involvement
4. National
identification
5. A rgument
elaboration
6. Dem ographics
7. Political en g ag em en t
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Measures:
Attitudes: All attitude measures would remain unchanged with the exception of that
asking the reasons why respondents held their particular view on the euro. A closed 
question for this variable was developed for the main survey on the basis of responses to 
the open question in the pilot.
Arguments: Strong and weak argument conditions would remain unchanged.
Involvement: All measures would remain unchanged except for the replacement of 2 of 
the quiz items by two items pre-tested elsewhere by Allum (unpublished). The 
involvement continuum for the main survey would be calculated on the basis of 
responses to the subjective involvement rating and the quiz score. The ‘personal 
relevance’ measures would be included for the purposes of comparison with alternative 
data sources.
Salience manipulation: Owing to the possibility that the priming procedure employed 
in the pilot study had had the effect of reducing positive ingroup evaluations and the 
degree of ingroup identification, a number of modifications were made to the procedure 
which had the aim of maximising the likelihood of self-categorisation. Table 9 shows 
the new priming procedure, intended to raise the salience of British national identity by 
achieving the following:
1) Drawing attention to intergroup differences
2) Decreasing ingroup and outgroup heterogeneity
3) Increasing the typicality of outgroup exemplars
4) Specifically evoking category cues
5) Making the category British more accessible to respondents than other 
categories (e.g. through frequent references to the category)
6 ) Increasing the ‘fit’ between stimulus input and the respondents’ category 
specifications (Brown et al., 2000)
7) Increasing the accessibility of stereotypes
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In addition to the modifications to question wording, symbols intended to specifically 
evoke category cues were included on the home page of the survey and next to the 
priming procedure in the high salience conditions. These symbols included a Union 
Jack flag, a point coin and the Queen’s head (from a coin), repeated as a pattern forming 
a banner across the page.
Table 9 Modified priming procedure based on the results o f the pilot
1) What would you say are the best things about living in Britain 
compared with other European countries? e.g. You may think the best 
thing about living in Britain is the BBC, the countryside, or the 
weather! Please write your answer in the space provided below.
2) What characteristics do you most like about British people compared 
with other Europeans? e.g. Some say British people are very polite, or 
that the Brits have a good sense o f humour! Please write your answer 
in the space provided below.
3) Now, thinking about living in Britain and being British, how typical o f 
British people would you say you are? (Very typically British, Fairly 
typically British, Not very typically British, Not at all typically British)
4) Now think o f one other European country and name one stereotype that 
you associate with that country, e.g. French people are romantic
Dutch people are liberal
5) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
*O f all the nations in the world, Britain stands out ’
6) 7 would rather be a British citizen than a citizen o f any other European 
country ’
Manipulation check: The measures of national identification remained unchanged in 
the main survey, apart from the order in which they appeared in different versions of the 
survey.
Argument elaboration: The two ‘cognitive responses’ variables were not included
in the main survey. Overall message cogency measures were modified so that 
respondents would rate the strength of all three arguments taken together on two 7-point 
scales. An additional item asking how much respondents agreed or disagreed with the
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arguments was included to facilitate the analysis of the objectiveness of message 
processing. The self-rated elaboration effort measure was retained.
Demographics and political engagement: All measures in this section remained 
unchanged.
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